

MILITARY INTERVENTION, LOCAL WARS AND
SUPERPOWER POLICIES, 1950-83

Towards a Conceptual Framework

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DECLARATION

(Regulation 2.4.15)

I, Anestis T. Symeonides, hereby declare that this thesis has been researched and composed by myself.

Anestis T. Symeonides

Edinburgh, 10 February 1987

In Memory of
Theodore A. Symeonides
and
Mimi Tsiligiris

To
Mother Ourania
And To
Kate
with love

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A.T. Symeonides

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Anti-Aircraft
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
AVH	Hungarian Secret Police
C3	Command, Control, Communication
CBI	Caribbean Basin Initiative
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CPCS	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EEC	European Economic Communities
GVN	Government of Vietnam (South)
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
JEWEL	Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (Grenada)
KGB	Soviet Committee of State Security
KHAD	Afghan Security Police
KPA	Korean People's Army
LDCs	Less-Developed Countries
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MPS	Maritime Prepositioning Ship
MX	Missile Experimental
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NJM	New Jewel Movement
NNWS	Near Nuclear Weapons States
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
PD	Presidential Directive
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PM	Prime Minister
POW	Prisoner(s) of War
PRG	People's Revolutionary Government
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
RMC	Revolutionary Military Council
ROK	Republic of Korea
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SLBM	Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile
SVN	South Vietnam
UN	United Nations
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USSTRICOM	United States Strike Command

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ABSTRACT

There is wide recognition of the fact that superpower competition may be increasingly manifested in "second area" political and military actions to protect perceived "security interests" in contested areas of the world--provided of course that the central nuclear balance remains "stable". The invasions of Grenada and Afghanistan have fuelled the debate on whether the superpowers are increasingly inclined to use military force in challenging each other's influence and presence outside the European theater. The debate is more sharply focused when we take into account that, in recent years, and while United States policies continue to be influenced by the "Vietnam syndrome", the Soviet Union has established distant power projection capabilities and has steadily increased its involvement with Marxist movements and regimes in the Third World. Superpower military intervention in local conflicts could be therefore a critical, if not the decisive, element in the maintenance of world peace in the 1990s and beyond.

The central thesis of this work is that the "incremental" methods, employed widely in the study of the uses of military force as an instrument of policy by the superpowers, albeit useful in examining individual cases of military incursions, are of limited value in the construction of a generalized conceptual framework which, in turn, may lead to a diachronic model of superpower military intervention and involvement in local wars. This

study was conceived as a first contribution towards such a model. The research design was based on two principal methods: first, "soft" systems thinking and practice and, second, the comparison of case studies. Military intervention was conceived as a "human activity" system which, like all such systems, largely defies precise measurement or manipulation. Thus, the main purpose of this study derived from a desire to offer a conceptual, as well as, a methodological framework to facilitate further research.

PART I

INTRODUCTION

In the four decades since the end of the Second World War, the "general" peace achieved by the defeat of the Axis has been an almost exclusive privilege of the developed world. Most other areas of the globe continue to experience violent local conflicts which have already caused millions of casualties, pushed destitute people further into misery, and seriously undermined the long-term future of many smaller nations. From perennial guerrilla warfare in Africa and Latin America to major local wars like the interminable bloodletting between Iran and Iraq, these "smaller" conflicts are pregnant with escalation risks and, according to an increasing number of qualified observers of the international scene, should be treated as serious threats to international peace in the closing years of this century. It was the author's concern with such "small" wars, and their impact upon world order, which served as the initial motivation behind this study.

The Study of War

There is perhaps no other phenomenon in human history more avidly and continuously studied as that of war among nations. Wars have existed as long as man has. Ever since the first primitive hunter turned his crude weapons against his neighbours, wars have helped create, but also

totally obliterate, city-states, empires, nation-states and civilizations which, at the apogee of their power, seemed invincible to any plans conceived by man to¹ overthrow and destroy them.

Wars have always overwhelmed the human mind, but they have also caused it, in a rather ironic twist, to engage in impressive creative activity in every conceivable area of endeavour. That nations are prepared to drive themselves beyond the limits of physical, mental, moral, and material endurance in order to promote war efforts is, to say the least, baffling and sad; and upon reflection, it may appear as the ultimate proof of the pessimist philosopher's suspicion about mankind's essential irrationality. Nevertheless, war, as the ultimate test of individual as well as collective courage, dedication, and strength, continues capturing the best (and without doubt the worst) qualities in man. And if nations are not actually fighting, they neither fail to invest handsomely in preparing for combat nor lose their interest in studying the phenomenon of war.

Many thinkers throughout the ages have tried to bring war under "scientific" scrutiny in order to analyze its causes, capture its essence into "images" of international relations, comprehend its connection with human behaviour, and, last but not least, search for ways to reduce its occurrence and, even, abolish it altogether as an expression of human conflict. For all the dedicated labours of scholars, however, reaching a "general" theory

of war remains elusive. The analysis of the phenomenon itself is plagued by methodological and conceptual ambiguities which make the elaboration of theories an often hopeless task. To briefly illustrate, many prominent attempts have been waged in pursuit of a comprehensive list of the "causes" of war. Still though our understanding of the forces behind armed conflict is very much a product of intuition rather than the result of some universal set of attributes. Quincy Wright's observation, expressed over forty years ago, is quite relevant today:

To some a cause of war is an event, condition, act, or personality involved only in a particular war; to others it is a general proposition applicable to many wars. To some it is a class of human motives, ideals, and values; to others it is a class of impersonal forces, conditions, processes, patterns, and relations. To some it is the entrance or injection of a disturbing factor into a stable situation; to others it is the lack of essential conditions of stability in the situation itself or the human failure to realize potentialities. 2

Questions we ask about the constancy of war as an international phenomenon are equally perplexing. Is war inherent in human nature, an expression of primeval instincts inherited from some distant prehumanoids? Or is war the creation of homo sapiens, an "art" that he developed to make force a more effective instrument in winning power, wealth, and influence? If war is learned behaviour, could this mechanism of learning how to use one's best abilities for destruction rather than construction be reversed and, eventually, eliminated from human society? What is the relationship between a "bad

polity" and war? Do "bad" societies cultivate warlike men or do pugnacious men create aggressive societies? And does the evolution of nation-states as organized collectivities lead to more violence?

Given these complex questions, the study of war has taken many different directions. Scholars, depending on their academic training and their particular analytic preferences, have chosen approaches drawing upon a diverse body of disciplines in their efforts to explain the nature, causes, and future of war. These different approaches have been discussed in greater detail elsewhere³ and are presented in brief form below: (1) The biological approach recognizes war as a fight for survival of the fittest. It adopts a distinctly Darwinian line of argument and draws its empirical basis from the observation of animal behaviour, animals being "our closest evolutionary relatives".⁴

(2) The Psychological and socio-psychological approaches identify war with learned group behaviour, implying that man is not necessarily aggressive by nature but, rather, that he is born in a "grey area" of being neither pugnacious nor entirely peaceful. War is thus attributed to feelings of "mass hostility" stemming from the clash of "national psyches".⁵

(3) The anthropological approach has traditionally sought to explain war in terms of cultural experience and socialization. The main arguments here are similar to

those of the socio-psychological approach: increases in the sophistication of a given culture are linked to increases in the occurrence of warlike behaviour. Conversely, lack of sophistication is seen as a serious factor in less frequent uses of organized armed violence⁶ against "hostile" groups.

(4) The ecological and geopolitical approaches share as their main point of departure man's supposed desire to acquire new territory and expand into richer "living space". Theories of war based on the territorial imperative are among the oldest and most influential. Classical geopoliticians, like Admiral Mahan and Sir Halford Mackinder,⁷ placed secure geographical "positions", and policies to expand into "virgin" territories, at the foundation of a nation's power and long-term prosperity. Geopolitics have indeed survived the Second World War and entered the calculations of modern leaders: Western theories of "containment" and, more recently, the so-called Nixon, Brezhnev, and Carter doctrines reiterated the significance of "geostrategic" factors in the superpower competition.

(5) The legal approach to war is less concerned with the nature or the causes of war; it rather focuses on the ramifications of a state of hostilities, trying to relate armed conflict to a certain body of legal rules collectively known as the law of war. Thus war is "considered a legal condition which equally permits two or

more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force".⁸ Some of the most common areas where the law of war tries to establish universal criteria and restraining practices are definitions of "aggression", aiming at assigning responsibility for war initiation, the protection of territorial integrity of states and sovereign rights of governments, the treatment of prisoners of war and rules for their exchange or repatriation, and the processes of negotiation with the view of the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

(6) The moral approach to the study of war, being highly subjective and lacking any hard "operational" principles, remains the cause of bitter intellectual disputes. Most modern Christian theorists reject war as an immoral practice. Nuclear weapons and the visions of a nuclear holocaust have made ethical questions even more difficult to contemplate.⁹ Calls for the declaration of nuclear weapons as "immoral" (recently supported by the majority of Catholic bishops) are countered by "realists" stressing the dangers of unilateral disarmament--or, even, the risks in rejecting particular kinds of conventional weapons on solely moral grounds.

(7) Overlooking almost every consideration involved in all the previous approaches, the military-technical approach treats war as a separate phenomenon governed exclusively by the dynamics of battle and/or technical matters associated with the conduct of operations.

Because such analyses of war bypass the political dimension of conflicts, and devote little effort in examining the destructive consequences of armed violence, the military-technical approach is severely criticized by the liberal segments of the non-military community, and frequently rejected outright as the product of "militarism". The evils of the military-technical approach as an influence upon policy have received renewed publicity in recent decades. It is generally assumed, for instance, that the connection between "the military-industrial complex" and the unprecedented diffusion of weapons technologies is growing into a veritable threat to world peace. The nuclear arms race is only one aspect (but the most dangerous, it is asserted) of this wild proliferation of destructive weapons which has to be somehow curbed before the final catastrophe occurs.

Towards a New Method

While all the above approaches endure in the ongoing study of war, post-1945 analysis of international conflict has benefited significantly from the systems approach to international relations. Here the focus shifts towards an empirical "scientific" method of analysis which has two main aims: First, to devise meaningful models of the complex interactions among modern states (but also sub-national entities) on a global scale; and, second, to generate if not fully accurate at least rational assessments of the future. From the standpoint of international systems analysis, war is an extreme form of

conflict and is considered a byproduct of a combination of variables--in contrast to the "single-track" analysis adopted by the above approaches to its study. It is therefore appropriate at this point to look into systems and models in some greater detail.

The Need for Clarity

Social science is not a field where analysis benefits from the predominance of accuracy and order. Concepts and "patterns" of action rarely--if ever--present themselves in a neat and coherent fashion. To take the example of international relations, even a cursory look at the "international community" reveals a mass of nation-states (not to mention quasi-national entities and assorted other collectivities like 'national liberation' movements) engaged in a constant game of bargaining, coercion, and, more often than not, violence. This game, even in the eyes of the occasional undaunted optimist, seems to have few rules and fewer players whose actions are determined by a universal sense of fairness rather than an incessant pursuit of narrowly defined interests.

Yet the view of the world as a simple agglomeration of actors whose activities proceed in a disconnected and haphazard fashion has never appealed to scholars. Consequently, the search for universal principles which presumably lie beneath this apparent free-for-all in human relations has been at the center of scholarly efforts dating back to the days of Aristotle. In more recent

times, the study of the social sciences has grown into a highly elaborate form of enquiry which, aside from borrowing methodological tools from other disciplines, has evolved its own specialized methods and analytical devices.

The modern social science investigator strives to attain two parallel goals. First, to establish a theoretical framework founded on methods which offer high analytical precision and hence validity to his findings; and, second, to develop rigorous processes for the prediction of future events (an undertaking that has become central in the field of International Relations). Since the 1950s both these goals have occupied the foci of intensive "scientific" research giving rise to a substantial (and growing) body of literature and the creation of various sub-disciplines dealing with specialized areas of investigation (characteristically, forecasting and prediction have prompted a range of sub-disciplines variously referred to as 'futuristics', 'future research', 'global forecasting', 'future studies' and the like).

The Scientific Method

Although the connotation of the word "science" may be different in the minds of different people, there is invariably a certain sense of mystique associated with the term--which creates the impression that the "scientific" method is a highly formalized and abstract, if not incomprehensible, concept bordering, in certain

exaggerated cases, on the metaphysical.¹⁰

In practice, however, being "scientific" may be seen in far simpler terms. We can argue, for example, that the scientific method is a way of discovering and organizing knowledge into coherent bodies which, in turn, can be used in the testing, validation, modification, or rejection of whatever hypotheses we wish to investigate. In this context, the scientific method seems hardly the exclusive domain of the laboratory sciences. Thus, using the scientific method, and its verifiable and self-correcting processes, presumably minimizes the dependence on arbitrary approaches whose results may be satisfactory from our individual point of view but often in no position to claim universal acceptance (i.e. occupy the high ground of 'theory').

Devising the Scientific Method

Three of the most commonly quoted difficulties in attempting to devise a scientific method for the social sciences are those of ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity. Unlike physical phenomena whose causes and impact upon the environment may be examined and analyzed through controlled laboratory experiments, the phenomena which concern social science are abstractions immune to the traditional scientific methods of laboratory research. To take again the example of international relations, the phenomena that occur within the "community of states" originate in circumstances which more often than not are unclear and open only to educated speculation; cause

"event chains" which may or may not be immediately observable; and rarely, if ever, repeat themselves exactly although their outcome may be similar. As Professor Morgenthau lucidly put it:

The events he [the analyst] must try to understand are.... unique occurrences. They happened in this way only once and never before or since. On the other hand, they are similar, for they are manifestations of social forces. Social forces are the product of human nature in action. Therefore, under similar conditions, they will manifest themselves in a similar manner. But where is the line to be drawn between the similar and the unique? 11

The effects of ambiguity are compounded by those of uncertainty. While the laboratory scientist is able to measure and control events occurring in his laboratory with little dispute (based on his own senses and existing, tested, and recorded technical criteria), the observer of international politics enjoys little such luxury and frequently depends on his intuition alone for arriving at conclusions about specific occurrences on the international scene (for example, 'hostility' between states is said to occur when we observe steady 'deterioration' in mutual relations--although, in the capacity of outside observers, we have no way of measuring 'hostility' or controlling 'deterioration' and have no tested method of telling when these apparently existing conditions will degenerate further into overt armed violence).

Furthermore, "human nature in action" creates a bewildering array of variables which apparently co-exist and interact with each other to generate an infinite number of phenomena. Complexity makes cross-national

comparisons vague, and often meaningless, due to the vast amount of data one must shift through in order to form an empirical base for his conclusions. It imposes heavy research costs (although the advance in microprocessor technology in the last half decade is rapidly reducing the economic burden in this area); and it makes the process for establishing general criteria for the evaluation of the relationships that presumably exist among these many variables cumbersome and imprecise.

The Systems Approach

In the immediate post-war years, the search for an approach to the study of the social sciences which could minimize the effects of ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity--and, eventually, generate the social science scientific method--led to the rapid rise of the systems approach idea. According to Simon Ramo:

The systems approach is a technique for the application of a scientific approach to complex problems. It concentrates on the analysis and design of the whole, as distinct from the components or parts. It insists upon looking at a problem in its entirety, taking into account all the facts and all the variables, and relating the social to the technological aspects. 12

During the 1950s and 1960s terms like "systems analysis", "systems concepts", "systems thinking", "system science", "systems research", "systems methodology", and "systems education" became common in the social sciences literature, a fact which demonstrated the adoption of the systems approach, a method which derived its lineage from the "hard" science of engineering, by the so-called "soft"

sciences as well. Interdisciplinary research based on systems ideas was particularly stimulated and sustained by the rise of a generation of systems theorists who worked for the RAND Corporation and by the introduction of systems analysis as a separate division in the Pentagon¹³ during the tenure of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.

System Definition

A "systems" approach means little indeed without a working definition of the concept of system. The word has unfortunately many common usages and relates to a wide range of phenomena. We often speak, for example, of social, economic, cultural, defence, medical, or biological systems, to name just a few. This "lexical¹⁴ laxity" has not gone without criticism but still "system" has become a widely used term whose use subtly implies "scientific" orientation. As Professor Laszlo put it:

System is one of the most popular terms currently in the scientific vocabulary. It has penetrated the language of everyday life, and has created a vague assumption that if something is or acts like a system, it is efficient, up to date, and even good. ¹⁵

The variety of perceived systems however, leads inevitably to the problem of a definition generalized enough to grasp the richness of diversity but relatively free of prejudice upon its applicability. One useful beginning is the definition by Kast and Rosenzweig which identifies a system as "an organized complex whole: an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a¹⁶ complex or unitary whole". This statement, on the other

hand, does not mention the distinct relationships between system elements (or with other elements outside the system for that matter) and therefore needs further refinement. Morton Kaplan's own (but rather murky) definition tries to grasp this added dimension by stating that:

A system of action is a set of variables so related, in contradistinction to its environment, that describable behavioral regularities characterize the internal relationships of the variables to each other and the external relationships of the set of individual variables to combinations of external variables. 17

A translation of Kaplan's formulation into simpler terms leads to a system definition like the one offered by Brian Wilson:

---the system is first of all a set; i.e. it contains elements that have some reason for being taken together rather than some others. But it is more than just a set, it also includes the relationships that exist between the elements of that set. 18

Whatever definition we might choose, it is important to note, as Ackoff observes, that the systems we decide to study are indeed behavioural systems (i.e. their components display behaviour we wish to explore) by virtue of the way we conceptualize them--in other words, systems do not exist because some unwritten law of nature provides so, but rather because scholars have made choices in respect to the method they wish to employ in studying different phenomena. Ackoff's example is illustrative:

---we would not normally think of a man who starts a car as a system because we do not distinguish the parts of the man involved in the component acts. We may, however, consider man as a biological system when studying the metabolic process. A physical entity is considered a system if the outcome of its

behavior is conceptualized as the product of the interactions of its parts. Therefore many entities may be studied either as elements or as systems; it is a matter of the researcher's choice. 19

Applying the Systems Approach

The central attraction of the systems approach in examining social phenomena was its capability to bring precision into areas of traditional theoretical and methodological "fuzziness" and its relative ease in generating meaningful representations of abstract processes and relationships (i.e. models of which more below).

Moreover, the systems approach, by launching detailed analysis of "whole" instead of "partial" problems, and of their implications upon both theory building and practical decision-making, introduced a highly structured method to the tackling of previously unassailable "black boxes" apparently responsible for "some poorly understood
20 transfer function" converting inputs into outputs. Whereas the classical (Newtonian) scientific approach attempted "to derive various properties of the whole object directly from the properties of its parts without considering possible interactions between the parts at all", the systems approach assumed "that properties of the whole object depend not only on the properties of its parts but also on all possible interactions between
21 them". As Peter Checkland put it:

The system outlook, accepting the basic propositions of science... assumes that the world contains structured wholes (which include

soap bubbles, slow-worms and social systems) which can maintain their identity under a certain range of conditions and which exhibit certain general principles of "wholeness". Systems thinkers are interested in elucidating these principles, believing that this will contribute usefully to our knowledge of the world. 22

The systems approach encompasses a number of disciplines such as cybernetics, information and communication theory, artificial intelligence, operations research, systems analysis, and economic systems theory (all of which may be also viewed as components of a grand general systems theory).²³ Of particular interest to the social scientist are the methodologies of systems analysis and, to a lesser degree, its predecessor, operations research.

The Emergence of Modern Systems Analysis

Systems analysis grew directly out of operations research as it was practiced during the Second World War for solving problems related to war requirements. Given wartime constraints and pressures for speedy but effective solutions, operations research concentrated on producing "... 'cookbook' approaches to narrow and highly specific problems" of mainly techno-economic nature.²⁴ Systems analysis, on the other hand, pushed beyond these narrow limits to become "global" in its ways of looking at problems and attempting to associate technical elements with larger societal issues in a systematic, goal-oriented way. In its decision-making context, one of the early RAND systems analysts defined systems analysis as

---a systematic examination of a problem of choice in which each step of the analysis is made explicit wherever possible

and contrasted this method

with a manner of reaching decisions that is largely intuitive, perhaps unsystematic, and in which much of the implicit argument remains hidden in the mind of the decision-maker or his adviser. 25

Systems analysis, always operating from an interdisciplinary standpoint, employed diverse techniques to evolve into two main branches, the one quantitative-oriented making use of mathematics and sophisticated methods of statistical analysis to arrive at mathematically "elegant" solutions to "hard" problems associated with industrial production or similar areas, the other addressing "soft" problems which emerge from human social interaction and encompass non-quantifiable concepts. Thus, systems analysis entered the fields of sociology, political science, anthropology, geography, psychology, and economics, and became closely associated with management science concerned with the development and control of large organizations.

Although the idea of systems traces itself along historical lines extending as far back as the ancient Greek philosophers, the emergence of a modern general theory of systems is mainly credited to the writings and studies of a German biologist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy. It is Bertalanffy's central theme that classical physics and mathematics are inadequate means for the study of biological and social phenomena since both disciplines are

unable to offer perfect solutions to relevant problems. What is necessary instead is a novel form of abstraction based on a "unifying" science which could eventually lead to "exact" theories in regard to real-world phenomena. In Bertalanffy's own words:

- (1) There is a general tendency towards integration in the various sciences, natural and social.
- (2) Such integration seems to be centred in a general theory of systems.
- (3) Such theory may be an important means of aiming at exact theory in the nonphysical fields of science.
- (4) Developing unifying principles running 'vertically' through the universe of the individual sciences, this theory brings us nearer to the goal of the unity of science.
- (5) This can lead to a much needed integration in scientific education. 26

Bertalanffy's ideas, albeit not immediately popular, were eventually accepted as a much-needed response to the reductionist scientific approach with its "overcompartmentalized research and piecemeal analysis" that resulted "in particularized 'facts'" but failed "in²⁷ relevance to anything of human concern".

The Classification of Systems

Classifications may vary according to individual research preferences prompting many sub-groupings. One earlier and widely accepted hierarchical classification of²⁸ systems has been suggested by Kenneth Boulding. He sees nine system levels comprising the universe:

- (1) Static Structure or Framework (e.g. world

geography);

(2) Simple Dynamic or Clockwork (predetermined motions, e.g. a watch);

(3) Control Mechanism or Thermostat (self-regulating equilibrium, i.e. homeostasis; idea of cybernetics);

(4) Open system or Cell (self-maintaining structure; beginning of differentiation between living and non-living forms);

(5) Plant (absence of sensory reactions but division of labour among components);

(6) Animal (information receptors, various images based on information processing; any animal);

(7) Human (symbolic language, logic, self-consciousness; human beings);

(8) Social (complex organization, communication, historical record, human emotions, art symbolization; any 'social' system);

(9) Transcendental (unknowables).

More recently, Checkland has introduced the following
29
typology of systems as summarized by Wilson:

(a) Natural systems. Physical systems which make up the Universe in a hierarchy from subatomic systems through the systems of ecology to galactic systems.

(b) Designed systems. These can be both physical (tools, bridges, automated complexes) and abstract (mathematics, language, philosophy).

(c) Human activity systems. Generally described by human beings undertaking purposeful activity such as man-machine systems, industrial activity, political systems, etc.

- (d) Social and cultural systems. Most human activity will exist within a social system where the elements will be human beings and the relationships will be interpersonal. This is different in nature to the other three classes in that it spans the interface between natural and human activity systems. Examples of social systems would be the family, the community, and the boy-scout movement, as well as the set of systems formed by groups of human beings getting together to perform some other purposeful activity, such as an industrial concern, a choral society, or a conference.

System Boundary

Although, at first glance, system boundaries seem easy to define, in practice attempts to specify the frontiers of a given system may pose serious problems. These problems are especially pronounced in the case of human activity and social systems which lack the clear physical outlines of natural and designed physical systems. As the level of abstraction increases so does the inability of the researcher to elaborate the necessary conditions and/or properties which characterize system components/actors and thus create the dividing line between one particular "whole" and its fellows within the Universe. Boundary definition, therefore, depends to a great extent upon the researcher's own purposes. As Kramer and de Smit put it:

It thus seems that a boundary can only be defined as something imaginary or conceptual inasmuch as everything within it can be considered as part of the system, and everything outside it as part of the environment. This means that the boundary is determined by a number of criteria which entities have to fulfil to be considered part of the system". 30

Open vs Closed Systems and the Environment

What we may call the "permeability" of boundaries determines whether systems are open or closed in relation to their environment. As environment we may define the Universe (and the entities therein) which lie beyond the stated system boundaries (it follows that if we call the Universe a Super System then every system in it is in fact a sub-system of the Universe). Systems and their environment may be viewed as either in interaction or in total separation. In the former case, a system is termed open, in the latter as closed.

Closed systems exist mainly in the physical sciences and "are considered to be isolated from their environment".³¹ Closed system components are neither influenced from or influence themselves outside actors/systems. Closed-system thinking has been applied in examining the processes of internal management in large organizations--under the assumption that such organizations possess "sufficient independence" from outside interference.³² On the other hand, open systems approaches are mainly found in the social sciences where there is an assumption of "dynamic interaction" between system elements and elements of other systems. Open systems receive inputs, which effect and transform their internal structure, and produce outputs which are directed towards their environment.

One of the central difficulties in open-system thinking is boundary definition. Given the constant flows

of information, material, energy etc. from system to the environment there is usually little distinction between the two. If the level of system complexity is high then choosing a boundary, in Laszlo's words, "is a problematic and somewhat arbitrary procedure.... For example, the system may be said to extend only to the sets of relations on its particular level, and the sets of relations which constitute its components into systems on their own level may be excluded from the system and taken as its (internal) environment".³³ In fact, if we accept Hall and Fagen's definition of the environment as "the set of all objects a change in whose attributes affect the system and also those objects whose attributes are changed by the behavior of the system", then it is natural to ask "when an object belongs to a system and when it belongs to the environment". But,

The answer is by no means definite. In a sense, a system together with its environment makes up the universe of all things of interest in a given context. Subdivisions of the universe into two sets, system and environment, can be done in many ways which are in fact quite arbitrary. Ultimately it depends on the intentions of the one who is studying the particular universe as to which of the possible configurations of objects is to be taken as the system. 34

Reciprocal Dependence

The rules forming the bonds between the system components govern the action- reaction processes taking place within the system. An act of one system actor (or the common act of many actors) induces response(s) from other parts of the system. The outcome(s) of the action-

reaction process influences both the relationships between actors and the state of the system as a whole. The examination of these outcomes lies at the heart of the study of systems.

Dynamics

Systems are "live" collectivities which undergo changes over time. Systems may grow, contract, split into their components (which may 'connect' with others to form new systems) and, once their "life-cycle" has been completed, perish. The existence of dynamic processes within systems determines system behaviour and thus its impact upon its environment.

Models

Long narrative descriptions and analyses of complex systems may have thorough theoretical grounding, yet they seldom succeed in communicating clearly the logical interconnections which lead to them in the first instance. It thus became apparent that describing, studying, and improving large, complex systems can be much more effectively accomplished with the use of either symbolic representations of, or brief statements in logical order about, system structure and behavioural characteristics. These system "images", either symbolic or textual, are called models and the process of producing them modeling.

Given the level of complexity involved in all but the simplest physical systems, models are rarely exact replicas of the systems they represent. They nevertheless

should include enough information relevant to the system under study to allow the development of knowledge about it, the examination of its impact upon the environment, and the analysis of the logical relationships between components under investigation which cause particular system behaviours. Moreover, models do not pretend to be reality but rather to represent what an observer perceives as reality, i.e. as "good", "bad", "adequate", "feasible", "negative", "positive", "operative", "inoperative" etc. In Richard Dawson's words:

A model of something--a physical object, a living organism or a social system--is a physical or symbolic representation of that object, designed to incorporate or reproduce those features of that object that the researcher deems significant for his research problem. The term model, as used here, refers to a scientific tool. It does not connote that the representation is an ideal or a "good model" worthy of emulation. 37

The Classification of Models

In classifying models and modeling techniques, we may
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distinguish four different categories:

- Iconic: The model is a smaller-scale replica of the system and is expected to behave like the original (e.g. the model of a ship for testing in the shipbuilder's experimental tank).
- Analogic: The model's physical characteristics are different from the original but its use is expected to produce "representative behaviour" (e.g. flow of water through laboratory pipes to represent behaviour of molten metals inside large furnaces).

- Analytic: The model is expressed in mathematical equations and/or logical relationships with the belief that it indeed represents system behaviour (e.g. the mathematical expression of physical laws).
- Conceptual: While the preceding three categories cover models that can be either constructed physically or expressed in quantifiable terms, the conceptual category includes those models that deal with the qualitative aspects of a given phenomenon and may be expressed in schematic or textual forms containing statements about activities and their outcomes. Conceptual models are especially useful in the study of human activity systems.

Modeling "Soft" Problems

The development of social science system thinking in the last twenty years has directly led to the adoption of modeling as a separate, and continuously evolving, tool in studying "soft" ill-structured real-world phenomena--as opposed to the "hard" requirements of engineering/ industrial applications. A brief review of "soft" system environments reveals a host of variables responsible for our partial (or, more often, total) inability to "manage", in the strictest sense of the term, "soft" situations--variables such as conflicting information and objectives, differences in attitudes, desires, and goals, intelligence "blackouts", communication breakdowns, crises, competition, hostility and so on. Modeling "soft"

systems, and indeed human activity ones, although it does not entirely meet the ever increasing need for "solutions" to all sorts of perceived "problems", it does allow us to simulate reality more accurately and thus develop useful learning devices.

Modeling human activity systems is, in general, an attempt to build a conceptual model by gathering and structuring empirical data related to system components, their activities, and the relationships between them. While this may appear a straightforward job based on essentially hierarchical methodologies, one must not overlook at least two major areas which may pose difficulties during the actual construction of the model, viz. the resolution level and the expression of root definitions.

Resolution Level

Theoretically, there is no limit as to the number of activities/observations one may include in a conceptual model. On the other hand, it is practically impossible, but also unnecessary, to enlarge models indefinitely turning modeling into an end in itself without any real-world value. Therefore, a major prerequisite in effective conceptual modeling is a manageable level of detail which is usually achieved "by excluding marginally relevant variables and by translating empirical information about relationships into more simplified forms...";³⁹ "one must strive to simplify models either by ignoring details or by focusing on the relevant and important".⁴⁰

Furthermore, it should be remembered that, unlike physical and designed systems, human activity systems do not materially exist--"what do exist are perceptions of them in the heads of observers"⁴¹ influenced by the unquantifiable variety and richness of human endeavours. Hence, it is largely impossible to express general rules for deciding on the resolution level of a conceptual model without running the risk of being totally irrelevant. Determination therefore, of the level of detail rests with the researcher's purpose and is directed by the particular features of the phenomena under investigation.

Root Definition

Modelling systems requires the formulation of precise and laconic statements describing the essence of the system to be modelled, i.e. what we may call root definitions. Root definitions can be developed for each resolution level the observer chooses to work with and should indicate the set of activities "the system must do to be the system so defined"⁴². If we assume that human activity systems can be generally described as continuous processes of input-purposeful transformation-output (instead of being considered mere, and rather vague, agglomerations of component 'states'), then a root definition should be capable of communicating the nature of the transformation which creates whatever outputs we observe given a specific set of inputs.

Again, selecting the "right" root definition for a particular conceptual model we wish to develop is a

somewhat arbitrary process. Different observers have obviously varying perceptions of the real world and, therefore, decide differently on what is important and what is marginal. Since the content of the root definition depends on the observer's careful consideration of the relevant activities he wishes to incorporate in his model, there is no technique--i.e. a process which, whenever applied, produces almost invariably guaranteed results--that can generate "good" root definitions on demand. What the observer can do, however, is to formulate root definitions carefully according to a set of criteria that have been discovered to form the underpinnings of "successful" root definitions. Smyth and Checkland have⁴³ suggested such a list of elements as follows:

(1) OWNERSHIP: Sponsor or controller of the system. Party concerned about the system.

(2) ACTOR(S): Who carries out the transformation process? Who causes the transformation to be carried out? Agents.

(3) TRANSFORMATION: The transformation process carried out by the system. Core of the definition. Main activity(ies) of the system.

(4) CUSTOMER: Victim, beneficiary, or client of the activity(ies) of the system. Sub-system(s) affected by system. Indirect object of main activity(ies).

(5) ENVIRONMENT AND WIDER SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS: Environmental impositions. Interaction with super-systems of which system in (1) is a sub-system.

(6) UNQUESTIONED IMAGE: The Weltanschauung, the world model which makes this particular system and transformation process a meaningful one to consider. Seldom explicitly stated in the root definition but always relevant.

Systems and the Study of Conflict

One of the primary aims of international systems analysis is the study of international conflict. It focuses on three central considerations:

--The discovery of necessary conditions which allow a system to remain in equilibrium, i.e. to avoid significant interstate violence and achieve negotiated settlement of disputes.

--The discovery of conditions which contribute to disequilibrium and increase the likelihood of war.

--The examination of the linkages between war and system change.

The study of conflict is usually carried out at two different levels of analysis. At the international system level, actors are treated as "behaving units that possess some degree of autonomy in the sense that their external behaviour is not wholly controlled by some other actor(s)".⁴⁴ Forecasts of violent conflict among international actors are mainly based on their "behavioural" patterns, displayed during periods of tension or crisis, and the identification of "trends" related to these patterns. At the actor level, states are treated as mini-systems in their own right comprising

different subnational groups defined along ethnic, linguistic, economic, religious or other criteria. The analysis concentrates on conflict among these groups and tries to identify its ramifications upon the state's conduct on the international scene.

International System Models

In modern international relations studies, global stability-instability hypotheses have been usually advanced on the basis of two main international systems models. In the multipolar world model, actors enjoy roughly equivalent shares of power and no single state becomes dominant. System equilibrium is assured by the balance of power that continues to exist as long as actors⁴⁵ are willing to participate in multilateral bargaining. Local wars are by no means abolished, and indeed are seen necessary "safety valves" in local disputes not amenable to other forms of settlement; but large-scale war, involving all or the majority of system actors, signals⁴⁶ the demise of the entire system. In a bipolar world, on the other hand, actors cluster around two central powers forming two distinct "spheres of influence". Bipolarity's stability rests with the ability of the two dominant powers to arrive at a mutually acceptable notion of the world balance of their respective interests--and to ensure that secondary actors abide by the "rules of the game"⁴⁷ thus articulated.

The advantages and disadvantages of both models have been debated long and hard. Supporters of multipolarity

argue, for example, that equilibrium is inherent in a balance-of-power system: the existence of many actors causes attention division and prevents any one of them from exclusively concentrating on the acts of another--thus giving rise to "bogey" theories and inflated "threat" perceptions. Alliance politics, on the other hand, help create multiple "control" layers which absorb shocks from local crises and lead to their dissipation without serious consequences for the overall balance.

Critics of a multipolar world counter that, despite the complex diplomatic arrangements, multipolarity, as differences among its actors grow, cannot escape but gravitate towards two rival coalitions. The example of the pre-1914 European balance of power is often cited as an example because it was unable to avert the general conflagration when the ultimate crisis arrived in August 1914. On the contrary, bipolarity, at least as it existed during the first two decades after 1945, passed the acid test of major crises (communist victory in China, the Korean war, Cuba, Vietnam) without resulting in a third world war--albeit at the expense of grave ideological hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. Still other analysts look critically at both models,⁴⁸ arguing that a "mixed" system is perhaps a better answer or even that the level of polarity itself has no clear⁴⁹ connection with the incidence and intensity of wars.

The Superpowers and "Small" Wars

One of the major arguments in the analyses of

different world models is whether the involvement of the two superpowers in local conflicts raise the risk of "accidental" events which might, in turn, provoke a major international crisis with unforeseen consequences. Many specialists often express fears about a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union resulting from their military role in a "smaller" war taking place far away from their shores. Indeed, such a "worst case scenario" seemed to take concrete form during the 1973 Yom Kippur war when both superpowers made threatening moves of direct military intervention in the Middle East in support of their respective allies.

It is an undisputed fact that the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two major protagonists of the international system, are keenly interested in local armed confrontations and "hot-spot" crises. Although the complexity of the issues involved here make generalizations a precarious exercise indeed, it may be proposed that superpower interest in local conflicts stems, first, from the "global" nature of superpower security concerns and, second, from the perceived need of maintaining networks of "peripheral" friends and allies in order to protect, enhance, and secure "global security zones". This statement has several important corollaries:

--The superpowers, in the process of supporting friends and clients, often discover that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to totally insulate themselves from the wider implications of a

local conflict.

--"Peripheral" conflicts, with the exception perhaps of the Middle East chaos, have so far produced no clear threat to the stability of the central nuclear balance--and have thus sustained the impression that "low-level" military activities in "secondary" theaters may be pursued by the superpowers at an acceptable cost.

--Although economic assistance plays a major role in superpower global relations, military aid is increasingly taking over as the decisive factor in retaining allies, inducing others to become more "receptive" to specific superpower requests, and, last but not least, filling "vacuums" that were created either by a sudden shift of an actor to the other camp or by the radical re-structuring of regional power frameworks.

Against this backdrop, it would be premature, if not erroneous, to suggest that the superpowers contemplate seriously to curb their involvement in foreign crises for any number of real or imaginary reasons. A reasonable guess would be that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union are prepared, at least in the foreseeable future, to significantly reduce their commitment to the protection of established patterns of influence, or to the expansion of such influence as opportunity arises.

If this assumption is indeed correct--and historical experience so far offers little incentive to declare it

unfounded--then the crucial question regarding future superpower strategies becomes one of type of response rather than overall policy guidance. This study stems, therefore, from the desire to contribute specifically towards the systematic analysis of the military response to perceived "major threats" against the superpowers' "global" security interests. Presently, "military response" is defined as:

--military intervention in local wars in support of one of the combatants; or

--military intervention as a means of defeating "threats" which have caused sporadic armed action but have not yet reached the stage of full combat activity.

Thesis and Methodological Comment

The central thesis here is that the "incremental" methods, employed widely in the study of superpower use of military forces as instruments of policy, albeit useful in analyzing individual cases of such action at a given point in time, are of limited value in the construction of a conceptual framework which should lead to a diachronic model of superpower military intervention. This study was thus conceived as a first step towards such a model.

A preliminary review of the literature revealed two "grey areas" which complicate attempts to address coherently the issues of military intervention and local war. First, from a theoretical standpoint, there is a perceptible lack of agreement among scholars on the frontier that defines actions as military intervention--not to mention the general confusion on the concept of

intervention itself. There is also considerable fuzziness on the issue of "military intervention" versus "war": analysts often seem uncertain on whether to label a specific act involving military force as "war" or as a mere "interventionary" action. Here, as it should be expected, ideology and personal value judgements generated by political conviction play a decisive role.

Second, from the standpoint of operational "lessons", the absence of a military intervention model inevitably constrains "policy-relevant, cross-boundary" comparisons that can serve as a body of valid generalizations for future reference. The analyst is thus left to either theorize for the sake of abstract theorizing, or to focus on a particular section of the policy-making process and attempt to elaborate operational "rules of the game" as they apply to that section. In this context, it must be emphasized that purely "scientific" research into military intervention holds little appeal for the decision-maker who deals with real-life situations and, therefore, has fundamentally different needs from the scholar whose prime motivation is contribution to empirical theory. Elegant mathematical models, statistical distribution studies, and philosophical analyses of conflict seem to attract little attention from the policymaking community--a fact that creates a dilemma of sorts for the individual analyst who wishes to be "practical" as well as theoretically "rigorous".

These preliminary findings led to certain choices

concerning the method, content, and direction of this study. It is therefore necessary to underscore that this work attempts to cut a middle course between "pure" theory and the long-narrative account of historical exposition. The research methodology was based on "systems thinking" and simple modeling as discussed above. The case study technique, implemented in Part II, was chosen for the flexibility it offers the researcher. Comparing cases allows the construction of a coherent picture of policy processes during all phases--from conception at policy-making level to implementation by lower echelons. It also allows the examination of the undelying common dynamics, the discovery of otherwise hidden system "errors" which can be thus analyzed in greater detail, and the drawing of policy "lessons" to serve as future guidance in decisionmaking.

Organization

The study is separated into three main parts. The first part elaborates on the "global security system" within which superpower military intervention and local wars occur, proceeds to an overview of postwar superpower military intervention strategies and preferences, and arrives at a general discussion on the concept of intervention. The second part examines the historical record in an effort to demonstrate superpower strategies of military intervention "in action". The third contains the conclusions.

Six case studies were chosen. Three refer to the

United States (Korea, Vietnam, Grenada) and three to the USSR (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan). With the exception of Czechoslovakia, all interventions examined here resulted in armed resistance from local forces against the intervening superpower and, therefore, conform to the earlier definition of "military response". Although no fighting took place during the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the intervention in Afghanistan is still in progress, the importance of these cases in regard to Soviet interventionary policies could not be possibly overlooked and thus both were included here.

The increasing complexity of international politics, the delicate interplay between the superpowers, and the absence of an effective international regime for conflict resolution make further systematic research into military intervention an urgent necessity. The following chapters hopefully contribute towards a clearer picture of a phenomenon whose real dimensions and long-term impact upon world order remain still elusive.

CHAPTER I

THE GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT

It has now become a platitude to say that the global system has entered a period of declining security and increasing threats of violent conflict.¹ As one commentator put it: "In large parts of the world there is increasing evidence of growing incapacity to cope with emerging problems and crises, both domestically and internationally. The old confidence has given way to a mood of concern, perplexity, and confusion".² Specific exegeses regarding the deeper causes of such "instability" vary according to a wide range of factors--from revolutionary politics and the socioeconomic dislocations caused by modernization to the decline of the nation-state and the attendant corrosion of established norms and values.³ These complex theoretical questions aside, general agreement seems to exist on the fact that the present "insecure" state of flux arose due to a number of salient events which occurred in the late 1960s and the 1970s.

Prominent among them is the demise of the familiar US-Soviet bipolar world model which prevailed during the immediate post-1945 period. Bipolarity was succeeded by a loose multipolar system which sprung from the breakup of the colonial empires, the energy crises and the diffusion of economic power, the growing number of regional and

local conflicts, the retrenchment of the United States after Vietnam, and the enhanced role of such actors as the Western European states, China, and Japan. These developments reduced the cohesion of existing blocs and reinforced the determination of lesser actors to pursue policies not entirely "approved" by either the United States or the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, the emergence of the loose multipolar system, while it generated radical changes in the relationship of the two superpowers with the rest of the world, did not minimize the deciding influence of their confrontation upon international relations. The US-Soviet nuclear arms competition continues to pose the main threat to the longevity of the present global system not to mention the survival of human society. Having said this, the prominence of arms control issues, and the publicity they justifiably receive, do not necessarily mean that the superpower competition is by definition a military one. Superpower interaction is increasingly dominated by economic issues for example. Food exports, development of energy sources, trade in advanced electronics and other sensitive technologies are only some of the dominant economic themes which both sides consider vital for the future of world economic, and hence political, stability. In fact, the growing gap between "planned" and "capitalist" economies and the pace of economic modernization seem to concern the current Soviet leadership at least as much, and perhaps even more, than⁴ the nuclear arms race itself.

The Global Security System

Speaking of the "global security system" requires a certain degree of clarification. First, "global security" may be defined as the aggregation of relationships which govern the continuing survival or demise of individual national actors. These relationships derive from transnational activities (e.g. flows of foreign military aid, diplomatic pressures of one actor upon another, etc.) and determine the distribution of power within the system.⁵ No individual actor is capable of achieving total protection against outside interference, although the effort to protect one's interests as best as possible never ceases. Thus, national security strategies strive "...to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect the nation's institutions, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders".⁶

Second, there should be recognition of the centrality of the two superpowers, and their respective foreign policies and military strategies, in any such system. The two superpowers continue to command considerable influence upon individual actors within their loosely defined "spheres of influence" and, as a result, retain the potential to cause fundamental changes in the system itself. "Influence", however, does not automatically mean "control". As recent history demonstrates, neither superpower finds it easy to dictate policies to lesser states. As the politics of global economic interdependency

grow more complex, and the revolution in communications dilutes national frontiers, both Washington and Moscow find themselves in the rather awkward position of having to pursue intricate accommodation policies vis-a-vis many literally "fourth-rate" states. Furthermore, worldwide proliferation of relatively cheap, but sophisticated, conventional weapon systems have raised the price of military encounters to prohibitively high levels, even for powers which previously could prevail over lesser opponents with relative immunity.

Third, the presence and perpetuation of conflict is an inseparable, and perhaps the most important, property of the global security system. The root of conflict is change--or, as some would prefer it, "transformation".⁷ Change breeds conflict and vice versa. As de Reuck put it, conflict has

both destructive and constructive aspects. It can be both a warning and a promise: it heralds progress and growth as well as death and decay.

We are thus led to view conflict as a decision process which selects alternative futures. There can be no question, therefore, of the suppression of conflict--alternative futures are forever before us--but violence can often be replaced by other decision processes which are either less costly and more rational, or more persuasive and less power-laden.⁸

Finally, it should be underscored that the stability of, and conflict within, the global security system are as much dependent on power relationships between actors (i.e. on the content and evolution of international relations) as on the internal developments within each separate national system. This is a hypothesis which, albeit taken

for granted by many historians and political scientists, has evoked controversy when subjected to rigorous analysis.⁹ Whatever the theoretical arguments may be, it seems proper to realize that, given the "different forms of government and different policies and styles" which exist within the international system, political power elites are prepared "...to go to great lengths, even to war, in defending their systems and institutions against change, external influences, and the modifications that international transactions and exchange of knowledge can promote".¹⁰

The Global Security System Model

Building a model of the global security system requires a framework of component "blocks" that can be used to describe the real world. Since the purpose behind modeling is to simplify rather than attempt to grasp every nuance of reality, the following discussion focuses on a framework of eight main components as follows:

- The strategic relationship between the superpowers
- Opposing alliance systems (NATO/Warsaw Pact)
- Neutral and non-aligned states
- Emerging strategic zones and confrontation areas
- Nuclear proliferation
- Arms transfers to LDCs
- Resource competition, and
- Unconventional threats (terrorism)

Strategic Relationship

Historically, nuclear weapons competition has been

the most enduring aspect of the post-war relationship between the superpowers. The origins of the competition are not difficult to trace back to 1945-49 when American atomic monopoly spurred the Soviets into a concerted effort to develop their own nuclear capabilities. That Stalin was denied knowledge of the massive Anglo-American atomic research program, which culminated in the A-bomb attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was only one, albeit perhaps the most significant, indication of the distrust that separated the Second World War allies. The existence, let alone the awesome destructive power, of the atomic weapon must have come as an exceedingly painful surprise to the Soviet leadership--and must have convinced them that to possess nuclear weapons was the only way to counter the "capitalist-imperialist" atomic threat.¹¹

The early period of the US-Soviet strategic competition was dominated by the overwhelming superiority of the United States over the USSR in both quantities of deployed nuclear weapons and quality of weapons technology. When President Eisenhower entered the White House in 1953, the United States had successfully tested its first hydrogen bomb, was already designing, producing, and testing smaller-yield "tactical" nuclear weapons, and was rapidly expanding its strategic air force soon to be provided with its first long-range jet-propelled bomber, the B-52. In contrast, the Soviet Union, still suffering from the enormous losses of the war, was obliged to divert resources away from defence and into the civilian economy in an urgent effort to maintain a minimum standard of

living for the Soviet citizen and promote the re-buidling of its vital industries. Thus, the Khrushchev defence policy stressed reduced spending on "obsolete" components of the Soviet armed forces (like, for example, large surface ships) and concentration of resources in building up an ICBM force that could reach the US homeland. These early Soviet ICBMs were plagued by many technical problems, however, and thus they remained essentially "sledgehammer" weapons of revenge without any significant "first strike" capability against US targets.

This earlier phase was also a period of relative confusion as both American and Soviet leaders attempted to grapple with the wider political implications of the possession of nuclear weapons. This tentative search into the non-military ramifications of "going nuclear" was though hampered by the almost obsessive preoccupation with numerical superiority and "systems effectiveness". Consequently, military employment doctrine and weapons development came to monopolize the attention of both civilian and military leaders. The impressive intellectual work of the American civilian "think tank" strategists, carried out during the 1950s and early 1960s, for example, was overwhelmingly concerned with the quantitative aspects of the emerging nuclear theology trying to establish "cost effective" methods of integrating nuclear weapons into existing force structures, probing for "exchange ratios" during future nuclear conflicts, and refining the initial versions of "deterrence theory".¹² As a result, the salient features

of the superpower nuclear competition during that time were apocalyptic declarations on both sides, a practice that left little room for any serious attempt to lessen tensions and to conduct what was to become the "detente¹³ diplomacy" of the 1970s. Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, the US-Soviet strategic relationship entered a new "stability" phase due to three main events.

First, the Soviet Union became steadily more confident vis-a-vis its strategically stronger competitor thanks to the ICBM building program which slowly progressed through the mid-1950s and early 1960s. As ICBM designs improved, and readiness of the nuclear component rose, the Soviets also devoted an appreciable portion of their defence spending to "hardening" their existing strategic forces, the most significant development here being the construction of deep concrete missile silos designed to protect the USSR's growing inventory of ICBMs. This meant that Moscow could now bring into the strategic equation its own credible retaliatory forces to prevent a surprise nuclear attack launched by the "imperialist¹⁴ aggressors". Breaking the barrier of inferiority, which had already caused the Soviets major embarrassment during the Cuban missile crisis, opened the way for dealing with the United States from a position of strength and also increased the credibility of Soviet claims to superpower status.

Second, American policy, beginning with the Flexible Response strategy of the Kennedy-McNamara years, rejected the massive retaliation doctrine, which had prevailed as

the centerpiece of US defence policy during the Eisenhower Administrations, and took its first tentative steps towards increasing readiness for conventional war. The initial Kennedy-McNamara assumption, prompted by the "bomber gap" and "missile gap" scares of the 1950s, was that the Soviets had already attained superiority in nuclear armaments. However, when this impression was proven false by a thorough review of the strategic situation during the opening months of McNamara's tenure at the Pentagon, Kennedy resisted a return to "all-nuclear" doctrines and continued with the re-buidling of general purpose (conventional) forces. Pursuing the Flexible Response strategy was reinforced by Administration assessments which recognized insurgency wars as a more immediate threat to US global interests than a "central" war with the Soviet Union. Consequently, American officials began to re-discover nuclear arms control as a means of "managing" the US-Soviet strategic competition.

Third, by the end of the 1960s, the re-discovery of nuclear arms control by the Americans and a cautious but receptive attitude displayed by Moscow on the same issue, had moved the two superpowers much closer to an agreement than ever before. Thanks to a series of initiatives by the Johnson Administration and, later, by the Nixon-Kissinger regime, Washington and Moscow entered into formal negotiations on limiting nuclear arms which culminated in the signing of the SALT I treaty in Moscow on 26 May 1972. SALT I was preceded, however, by a

general augmentation of Soviet strategic systems with the exception of the long-range strategic bomber force; the ICBM force had numerically exceeded US deployed missiles in 1970; and the earlier SLBM-armed Hotel and Golf class submarines had been supplemented by at least fifteen vessels of the newer, more sophisticated Hotel class each carrying sixteen SLBMs. By the time the SALT I agreements were finally signed, the Soviet nuclear weapons building programs had succeeded in establishing relative numerical parity between the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

For all its real and purported shortcomings, SALT proved that the strategic competition between the superpowers could be "managed" however imperfectly. The lengthy negotiations offered the two sides the first real opportunity since the end of the Second World War to join one another around the conference table--which in itself was a major step towards reducing the mutual paranoia, and towards setting the stage for the adoption of serious "confidence-building" measures. In fact, in certain quarters of the academic/civilian strategic community, SALT was perceived as the culmination of "a process of convergence in the strategic philosophies and practices of the Soviet Union and the United States" which made the two superpowers to accept the notion of deterrence and strategic stability based on the concept of
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Mutual Assured Destruction.

However, those who believed in a stable US-Soviet strategic relationship stemming from similar views of deterrence theory--and hence similar practices in

producing and deploying nuclear weapon systems--were soon disappointed and, even, "shocked" by the realization that the Soviets had obviously not been "educated", as it was¹⁶ believed, in accepting American views on deterrence. Even worse for the "convergence" theorists, it was clear by the mid-1970s that the Soviets, taking advantage of the elasticity of the SALT agreements and the absence of an effective verification regime, had expanded their nuclear armory well beyond capabilities adequate for assured destruction (as defined in the Western lexicon) in what was perceived as a massive buildup to attain "superiority" vis-a-vis the United States. These developments aroused a great deal of alarm in the West, led to the demise of detente,¹⁷ and signalled the resurgence of the nuclear arms race. In any event, a closer analysis of the Soviet view of deterrence does reveal "convergence" theories to be a mix of largely wishful thinking and fallacies regarding Soviet concepts induced by consistent Western "mirror-imaging". According to Benjamin Lambeth:

The Soviet acceptance of SALT as an appropriate instrument for helping manage the superpower competition... in no way constituted either a testament to any broader change in fundamental Soviet security conceptions or evidence of Soviet convergence toward prevailing American notions about arms control. For Soviet planners, the very idea of "control" is anathema because of its implied relegation of Soviet security to imposed arrangements requiring conscious Soviet self-denial and reliance on the uncertain prospect of reciprocal enemy "good behavior".¹⁸

Thus, by the beginning of the 1980s, the superpower strategic relationship had returned to a state of strain and uncertainty. Attempts to reach a new consensus on

nuclear arms limitations through SALT II were unsuccessful. The SALT process had never won the confidence of a large segment of the US conservative wing, which continued to see it as a convenient vehicle of Soviet maneuvering rather than an honest negotiating mechanism; the undisputed Soviet weapons building programs of the 1970s did obviously little to dispel this view and, eventually, the invasion of Afghanistan confirmed the demise of detente and the "freezing" of SALT. The American response to the Soviet buildup was the introduction of new generation strategic systems in the US inventory, including such controversial ones as the cruise missile, the B-1 bomber, and the MX (now Peacekeeper) ICBM scheduled to replace the deployed systems of the Minuteman ICBM component, all of them specifically "designed to strengthen nuclear deterrence" according to¹⁹ ex-Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird.

American strategic modernization programs received a further massive boost with the election (and re-election) of President Reagan. The Reagan Administration has consistently stressed the "vulnerability" of the ICBM component of the US triad and has vowed to fully modernize US strategic forces in order to meet the requirements of²⁰ the so-called "countervailing" strategy. First articulated in the Carter Administration's Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59, 1980), the countervailing strategy was endorsed and reaffirmed by Reagan in National Security Decision Directive-13 (NSDD-13). PD 59/NSDD-13's main requirement is the development of capabilities to fight a

prolonged nuclear war, one which may last for days, weeks or even months. The countervailing strategy also emphasizes targeting of Soviet national leadership centers (like bunker-like facilities protecting key Soviet leaders), strategic targets (missile silos, C3 sites, strategic air and naval bases), and also assorted conventional military targets (like munition plants, communication hubs, concentrations of ground troops etc).²¹

At present, the superpower strategic relationship seems to be entering yet another cycle of attempts to renegotiate old arms control formulas and move towards new "confidence-building" measures and initiatives. The November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva summit, although it accomplished little regarding a concrete agenda for further action, nevertheless generated a tentative rapprochement which might lead to expanded, and hopefully substantive, dialogue between Washington and Moscow.

* * *

Ultimately, assessments of the superpower strategic relationship should not be approached as a purely quantitative exercise. Comparison of absolute numbers tells us little about the actual missions that each side considers essential to its military effectiveness, and ultimately, its survival. It is, therefore, essential to examine the differences between American and Soviet strategic thinking and doctrines. This is a crucial task. Much misunderstanding originates in looking at Soviet doctrine through Western eyes, therefore, ignoring "...the

possibility that two very different political systems²² could deal very differently with a common problem". It is thus useful to briefly reiterate here the chief differences between US and Soviet strategies "if deterrence fails".

First, Soviet military theory emphasizes surprise as²³ one of the most decisive factors in war. In a nuclear scenario, appropriately safeguarding the element of surprise and maximizing the effect of Soviet nuclear weapons are primary factors in subduing the "imperialist adversaries". In contrast to the confusion over "no first use" vs first strike that is frequently apparent in American strategic deliberations, Soviet strategic thinking appears quite clear on what must be accomplished during an initial phase of a nuclear conflict: disarming the enemy, and frustrating his attack plans before his nuclear weapons are launched, instead of sitting back and "absorbing" a first strike from the other side, seems the²⁴ preferable path for Soviet strategists. Or as Professor Vigor put it graphically:

[In case of war] the whole range and strength of the strategic nuclear arm must be directed to ensuring that the enemy's factories, his supply dumps, his transport, his harbours, his cities and all that makes possible a prolonged war shall be smitten into nuclear dust. 25

Having suffered immensely in the hands of "Western" invaders, the Russians do not seem inclined to either think "limited" for the benefit of their adversaries, or entertain thoughts of "absorbing" first strikes for the²⁶ benefit of world peace.



Second, US strategic plans typically speak of a "nuclear exchange", meaning nuclear war, which will presumably involve all of the nation's strategic forces. In this context, the "management" of a nuclear exchange is a separate exercise with general purpose forces remaining in reserve to be deployed as need arises. The scope of the conflict is rarely expanded beyond the geographical limits of the Soviet state, and nonmilitary factors (like ideology for instance) are never seriously addressed. The Soviet approach is entirely different. A "nuclear exchange" will automatically involve the total military structure of the USSR, both conventional and strategic, a fact which is clearly reflected in the Soviet combined arms approach to military operations.²⁷ The conflict, hardly remaining confined between the two superpowers, will almost immediately expand worldwide involving respective allies and friends--the struggle being "the final violent convulsion in the class conflict between capitalists and proletarians".²⁸

Third, the countervailing strategy's main aim is to provide the US President with a wide range of strike options and the ability to order selective "lesser" retaliatory attacks. This is the essence of "escalation control", one of current US strategy's most central elements. Escalation control, in turn, is expected to enhance the chances for "mutual restraint", a condition deemed desirable for a speedy end to hostilities. On the Soviet side, there is little evidence that "selective targeting" and "mutual restraint", or other such

incremental controlled escalation scenarios so prevalent in American literature, are concepts seriously contemplated. Once nuclear war is joined, the main Soviet aim would be the total defeat of the enemy with the least damage inflicted upon the USSR itself. Furthermore, while US strategy addresses poorly the immediate pre-war phase, the Soviets take a much longer view and apply considerable thought and planning to "special operations" designed to penetrate and undermine the enemy rear during a severe crisis and immediately before large-scale hostilities. These operations include "diversionary acts on enemy territory, the liquidation of political and military leaders, the destruction of lines of communication and supply and the carrying out of terrorist operations".²⁹

It is difficult to foresee with any certainty the future direction of the superpower strategic competition. The Reagan defence modernization programs, and his challenge of the accepted paradox of "mutual" deterrence through proposals like the Space Defence Initiative, have undoubtedly increased Soviet fears that the United States has opted for a war-winning counterforce capability. If this is indeed the Soviet view (and there is little convincing evidence to show this assumption false), then we must conclude that Moscow perceives "that deterrence at the strategic nuclear level has been rendered less credible and in subsequent years will become even less assured".³⁰

If Moscow's present "mind-set" is added to the long-held US conviction that Soviet offensive weapons have

grown in numbers and capabilities well beyond the acceptable margins of "parity", then the future seems less than promising. In the absence of significant new initiatives (like, for example, agreement on a verification regime or banning of anti-satellite space systems), the relative disarray that presently characterizes efforts to curb nuclear weapons will continue. The critical question is how the present (and future) "managers" of the strategic competition on both sides of the ideological divide respond to the obvious need for conceptual leaps -- with imagination and self-restraint or with the toughness of old cold warriors?

Alliance Systems

Any serious analysis of the global security system is incomplete, and indeed impossible, without a closer look at the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliance systems and their relationship to the central superpower balance. The creation of NATO in April 1949 preceded that of the Warsaw Pact by six years--a fact that has never gone unexploited by Soviet propaganda. Eastern Europe remained without a formal defence system until 1955 not so much because of Moscow's desire to hold the high moral ground above "aggressive military blocs"--a label the Soviets attached to NATO from its inception--but rather due to direct Soviet control of Eastern European armed forces, often exercised through the appointment of high-ranking Soviet officers to top command posts in the "host" country.

In the ensuing years, both alliance systems grew in

political, economic, and military complexity to a point where relations between the two dominant superpowers and their allies today depend increasingly on a finely-tuned exercise of "coalition politics". The motivating forces behind this exercise, and the forms and functions of the alliances thus maintained, vary according to certain key elements--such as the degree of control each superpower has over allied military forces in both war and peace. These key areas need to be comparatively examined if any meaningful observations can be made about the influence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact upon the global security system. Since it is impossible to offer a comprehensive exposition here, the following comments take a necessarily abridged form.

(a) The political dimension: Historically, alliances have often brought together partners with few common political characteristics--especially in times of war when the necessity to repel a common foe prevails over political differences. In this respect, neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact conform to any such historical precedent. They were formed by two groups of states sharing two different political and economic systems and sought to protect those systems through formal arrangements of common military defence. But neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact could be perceived, or indeed survive, in the long run without non-military cooperation. An early NATO report, for example, was quick to identify such cooperation as critical in the confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, and to call for "the transformation of the Atlantic Community into a vital and

vigorous political reality" since, and quite correctly many would argue, "there cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy".³²

Cohesion on political questions, or the absence of it, are major distinguishing features between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Moscow's grip on Eastern Europe, and the existence of one-party states there, remain the guarantees of "harmony" on matters of Warsaw Pact "fraternal" foreign policy. According to Soviet logic, the political objectives of all Warsaw Pact members are "identical" since all Eastern European states are "proletarian" and thus "linked by a single, unified 'class interest'".³³ The continuation of Eastern European subordination to Soviet definitions of security and interest, however, carries a large price in terms of strengthening popular resentment and embedded, anti-Russian sentiments among some of the ruling Communist elites (as in Bulgaria and Rumania).³⁴ As the recent events in Poland (and before that, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) demonstrated, suppressing this popular resentment may very well be impossible in the long run short of harsh domestic police measures or open Soviet armed intervention. The fact that Moscow has refused to recognize nationalism as a potent force of change--associating any nationalist expressions with 'counter-revolution'--further complicates the issue of Warsaw Pact political "harmony" and casts some doubt at least on its longevity.

On the NATO side, "harmony" is a word often lost in intense wrangling over alliance "common" military and

foreign policies. Despite organizations like the European Economic Community, Western Europe has failed to achieve any substantial degree of political integration. Western European nations remain individualistic entities jealously guarding their "sovereign" rights and pursuing policies defined by narrow national interests. This condition has not always helped in maintaining smooth relations between Washington and its NATO European partners. Furthermore, the narrowing gap between the American and European economies has increased Western Europe's confidence and its willingness to challenge American positions over a wide range of issues. The previous European assumption that the United States provided the alliance with solid leadership has thus been replaced by

---a conviction... that Washington has little idea where it is going vis-a-vis the alliance, and that its decision-making processes are so diffuse that it could not pursue a specific policy even if it is a misguided one. 35

Political disagreements between Washington and NATO's European members have been also deepened by changing perceptions among Western Europeans as to the nature of East-West relations and that of the Soviet "threat". During the 1970s, Western European governments, prompted by initiatives like West Germany's Ostpolitik and a desire to expand trade relations with Eastern Europe, became increasingly weary of what seemed to them as

---being pressed to accept poor American judgements which were based on over-confidence as to what military force could achieve and a misunderstanding of the intentions, capabilities and policies of the Soviet Union. 36

This gradual divergence of views was not an entirely one-

sided affair. It coincided with US attempts to pave the way towards meaningful nuclear weapons control, and an international diplomatic regime that would prevent the outbreak of another world war centered in Europe, via direct negotiations with Moscow which largely bypassed the NATO allies. These parallel trends led to a dual result: while Western Europe began to question accepted visions of the Soviet "threat", the United States, by entering the SALT cycle, also began to re-appraise its diplomatic approach to the alliance--which in effect meant downgrading "NATO as the primary means of organizing its relations with the Soviet Union".³⁷

The lack of political consensus on the nature of the Soviet "threat" is perceived by most observers as a fundamental NATO problem. In simple terms, and as Professor van der Beugel aptly put it during a recent address, "NATO is a defensive alliance and when there is no consensus about what it is defending against, we are in trouble".³⁸ One thing remains clear, however: The United States, for all its size and power, could never hope to obtain the powers of persuasion available to the Soviet Union in its role as the leader of the Warsaw Pact. And whereas Moscow's Eastern European "allies" have almost nonexistent capabilities to influence the political strategies of the Kremlin, especially on matters of "alliance" direction, America's European partners, thanks to the principle of unanimous vote that underlies alliance decisionmaking, are in the position to hamper, and even reverse, American policies pertaining to NATO strategy

with relative immunity.

(b) Common defence policy and military strategy: This is again an area where fundamental dichotomies exist between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Whereas the Western alliance has never been free from intense, and often acrimonious, debate on common defence, the Warsaw Pact has experienced only "tranquility" produced by the complete subordination of potential Eastern European national defence priorities to the "highest duty" of protecting the Soviet cradle of Socialism.

Deciding on common assessments of the military threat posed by the Warsaw Pact, and agreeing on the appropriate strategy to counter that threat, have never been easy for the NATO allies. Deliberations about military strategy have become even more complex since the erosion of American nuclear superiority (and hence of the certainty of a fail-safe American strategic deterrent against a Warsaw Pact onslaught on Western Europe) and Congressional rumblings concerning the size of US conventional forces assigned to NATO's Central Theater.³⁹

The root of these difficulties can be traced to the essentially antithetical approaches to East-West relations pursued on each side of the Atlantic. NATO's European members, ever since the great debates of the 1970s, seem much more pre-occupied with broad efforts to improve East-West relations and promote "peaceful co-existence" with the Soviet empire (with which they have to share the Continent) than with the steady upgrading of the NATO

military "deterrent"--an undertaking that appears incompatible with the ultimate goal of easing tensions with the East and avoiding another war on European soil. Western European responses to NATO are further conditioned by economic constraints, which put strict limits on the size of defence budgets, as well as the existence of domestic peace movements which, in recent years, have come to vociferously challenge NATO's nuclear strategy and the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe.

As a result, Western European governments have been traditionally reluctant to endorse American estimations of Warsaw Pact military power and intentions without tortuous consultations. With American administrations still influenced by the ideological conflict dialectic and suspicions of Soviet "grand schemes" for world domination, these European attitudes (frequently identified as 'foot dragging' if not outright appeasement by some American commentators) continue to cause rifts within the alliance. Bridging these gaps is not always easy or even feasible. The current controversy surrounding nuclear vs. conventional defence strategies is only one, albeit the most glaring, illustration of divergence between Western European and American views compounded by deep-seated intra-European differences on the same subject.

On the Warsaw Pact side, and in contrast to NATO, peace among the "fraternal" members is ensured by tight Soviet control exercised not so much with the aid of formal collective organs as through the permanent stationing of Soviet combat forces in Poland, East

Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (currently standing at an approximate total of ~~thirty~~¹ divisions), the pervasiveness of Soviet military doctrine and training, the loyalty of Soviet-educated national military elites, materiel dependence on the Soviet Union, and last but not least, the permanent "background" threat of Soviet military intervention in case of any "bourgeois counter-revolutionary conspiracies" materializing within pact member states (like, for instance, the Solidarity trade union movement in Poland). Total Soviet control is further reinforced by Soviet nuclear weapons monopoly which acts as an additional safeguard of pact "cohesion".

This enforced "tranquility" is not free of underlying problems, however. Causes of friction include the constant Soviet pressure "to 'integrate' Warsaw Pact forces into the whole framework of the Soviet military system",⁴⁰ the imposition of Soviet military doctrine as means to prevent Warsaw Pact members from developing "independent" military doctrines of territorial defence⁴¹ according to the Yugoslav and Rumanian models, and the various differences and traditional rivalries existing among non-Soviet members--"such as the Czechs poking fun at the Poles giving themselves military airs and⁴² graces".

In sum, the two opposing alliances, despite internal fissures and problem areas, remain primary vehicles in the superpower competition. Although a potential military confrontation between them remains the focus of attention, this should not prevent us from appreciating the

importance of two additional dimensions particularly in respect to the Warsaw Pact: economics and domestic evolution towards less rigid structures of political control. The lethality of these two factors for the stability of Eastern European satellites was amply demonstrated during the Polish crisis which, in the absence of any method of "managing" the unruly Poles other than military intervention, could only be controlled by "the semi-fiction of a semi-autonomous Polish military⁴³ coup".

Non-aligned and Neutral States

Whereas non-alignment, which evolved primarily among ex-colonies, can be defined as only a loose political doctrine referring to world peaceful change and rejection of politico-military blocs, neutrality has been an established legal status recognized by the international community and incorporated in international treaties. Furthermore, while non-alignment became identified with the developing and underdeveloped states of Asia, Africa, and South America, neutrality has been the domain of European affluent "stable, established states that had a clear sense of identity" and wished to practice a "passive, isolationist policy of non-involvement" in world⁴⁴ conflicts.

By virtue of the differences in socioeconomic indicators and political development, non-aligned and neutral states appear as two quite distinct groups indeed. For example, neutrals like Austria, Switzerland, Sweden,

and Finland, that enjoy high standards of living and free democratic institutions, cannot be compared with countries like Bangladesh, Tanzania, or Botswana in any meaningful fashion except in deliberate description of the glaring gaps separating their respective political, social, and economic systems. Despite these cleavages, the broad consensus on issues of world peace which non-aligned and neutral countries share, and the fact that all four aforementioned neutrals have been invited as observers to non-aligned movement meetings, may after all presage closer cooperation between the two groups especially in promoting⁴⁵ productive North-South dialogue.

In the years since 1945, non-aligned and neutral states have come to play an important role in the international system. In contrast to the neutral states' consistent policy of non-involvement, which tends to obscure their crucial contribution as diplomatic arbitrators and champions of peaceful resolution of conflicts, the non-aligned movement has become a vociferous, albeit not very effective, coalition of poorer countries currently demanding the radical restructuring of the international economic system--which they see as the essential pre-condition for the avoidance of future "global class war". In fact, the issues of international trade and foreign aid have come to dominate the non-aligned movement's agenda departing from the emphasis on⁴⁶ political questions of the 1950s and early 1960s. The Group of 77, as this coalition of southern states has become known, demands freer access to the markets of

richer countries, commodity agreements to control world prices and protect single-export economies from catastrophic fluctuations, changes in the international monetary system to break the total dependence of poorer states on the US dollar, and revision of the regime governing the flows of foreign development aid through multilateral international agencies like the World Bank.

Against the backdrop of the present North-South dialogue, and the anarchy in the world commodity markets, it seems unlikely that the industrialized countries will be willing to dilute the free-market system by moving towards a "new international economic order" of fixed price relationships or other similar centrally planned practices demanded by the southern states. Perennial dissension among the non-aligned themselves, and inability to agree on a universal agenda for negotiations with the North, will also sap the efforts of the Group of 77 to build Third World solidarity, and will allow the industrialized states to continue dealing bilaterally with LDCs on unequal terms.⁴⁷ On the other hand, there is also little doubt that any success of the non-aligned countries to promote lasting economic changes will have serious implications for the global political system as well. To grossly oversimplify, success of future Third World "centralists" will erode the economic domination of Western industrial states, and hence limit their capability to sustain "capitalist" systems of government in their present form.

This is undoubtedly a welcome prospect in Moscow's

view and hence Soviet policy towards the non-aligned states has been characterized by steady support of their anti-Western pronouncements. Although this tactic has not produced wholesale defections to the Eastern bloc, it has nevertheless helped to establish the Soviet Union as an important ideological contributor to the whole non-aligned movement. This fact was highlighted by the 1979 Havana summit conference, signalling the final acceptance of Cuba, a Soviet proxy par excellence, as a leading member of the non-aligned after years of reluctance.

Emerging Strategic Zones and Confrontation Areas

The past forty years have witnessed radical changes in the global strategic map. The most significant change was Europe's transformation from the central arena of global armed conflict into a peace zone, its stability maintained by the NATO-Warsaw Pact stand-off. Outside the "consolidated" areas of the Western industrialized world and those of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China, dramatic upheavals continue to feed conflict of all sorts. It is indeed fairly accurate to say that "peripheral" areas, i.e. those in the Third World, are undergoing processes of fundamental political, economic, and territorial restructuring.

From the point of view of the superpowers, these "second" and "third" regions constitute the most significant arenas for the present and future pursuit of their respective strategic interests. With the European balance firmly established, the "periphery" offers a

suitable ground for "shadow wars" with the aid of local surrogates and allies, a form of competition that minimizes the risk of direct armed confrontation and nuclear destruction while simultaneously promoting a world network of influence and friendly "cooperation". These superpower Third World activities, although they seem quite natural ingredients of the global power game from the vantage points of Moscow and Washington, evoke mixed feelings and reactions among lesser states whose own interests and national aspirations the superpowers manipulate and often totally ignore. In this context, the East-West competition in somebody else's "back yard" becomes extremely complex but also dangerously prone to escalation: the two-pronged US-Soviet interaction is transformed into a multifaceted conflict by the infusion of local elements of ethnicity, religious rivalry, economic differences, territorial claims, and political divisions.

Identifying these emerging strategic zones and confrontation areas is not difficult even after a cursory review of the historical record. Most major post-war crises have occurred in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in other words, the underdeveloped and developing South. The current map of the "periphery" includes two main confrontation zones, the Indian Ocean, and Latin America. The two aforementioned zones are not of course the exclusive arenas of US-Soviet competition. "Traditional" cockpits of crisis, like the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, receive their due amount of attention as do

"crisis enclaves" such as the Southern African arc, extending from Angola in the west through South Africa to Mozambique in the east, and the North-South Korean theater.

(a) The Indian Ocean: This is a vast geographical area whose landscape is dotted with some of the most intractable conflicts of the postwar period. Its approximately four dozen independent nations are separated by wide variations in every index of economic development and political stability. Two sub-theaters can be delimited here: an eastern sub-theater that stretches from South Africa and Mozambique to the approaches of the Persian Gulf; and a western that encompasses the Indian sub-continent and extends further to Southeast Asia and the Phillipines.

The convoluted nature of local conflicts and the mind-boggling variety of ethnic, religious, political, and economic backgrounds and rivalries found among Indian Ocean countries have so far limited superpower maneuvering in the area. However, the arrival in the late 1960s of Soviet warships in Indian Ocean waters traditionally dominated by Western sea powers signalled a new era of superpower competition. As early as 1966, both Washington and Moscow were concentrating their interest on the "vacuum" created by the British withdrawal from imperial positions, a fact that prompted the late Mrs. Gandhi of India to denounce the "vacuum" theory and emphasize her desire to see local powers occupy all ex-British

positions. Mrs. Gandhi's call for an Indian Ocean free of superpower competition was reaffirmed at the 1970 non-aligned nations' conference in Lusaka. In a final joint declaration, the participating Afro-Asian countries called upon both the United States and the Soviet Union to refrain from building up their naval presence in the region and to keep the ocean free of nuclear weapons.⁴⁹

The calls for neutrality have not been very successful, however. The United States has already a full-fledged naval base on Diego Garcia and the Soviet navy conducts regular patrols of Indian Ocean waters with surface combatants and submarines (the use of the Cam Ranh Bay naval facilities has significantly increased Soviet capabilities to maintain naval presence in the ocean). Also, the Soviet Union enjoys access to naval facilities at Aden, the Seychelles, and Ethiopia. The oil crisis, the perennial struggles in the Horn of Africa, the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, and the Soviet thrust into Afghanistan are only a few of the major events that have helped to shape the contours of the US-Soviet competition in the area. The current focus of international attention is on the crisis in South Africa where the imminent breakdown of exclusive white rule will diminish Western influence over a country of significant economic and strategic value.

(b) Latin America: From the American point of view, Latin America was until very recently a "secure" region which, after the departure of colonial Spain, suffered no

incursions by foreign powers. The Latin American post-war status quo, continuing traditions shaped during the 19th century, rested on a mixture of firmly anti-communist military governments, economic dependency on the United States, and rigid social structures, buttressed by the inequitable distribution of land and a conservative clergy. Political opposition was stifled and the privileged landowning and military classes, invariably pro-American, continued to rule undisturbed.

After 1960 this edifice began to crumble. Political agitation, and the birth of Marxist guerrilla movements inspired by the Cuban revolution, resulted in bloody confrontations with military dictatorships and aroused popular demands for real political change. The effects of these conflicts were further accentuated during the following decade when wild borrowing spawned a foreign debt burden in excess of \$300 billion. During this period, the stark impoverishment of the masses, receding US power after Vietnam, and resurgence of Marxist revolutionary movements (notably in Central America) combined to make Latin America much more vulnerable to outside, i.e. Soviet, "penetration". Although the Soviet Union has been particularly careful not to dispatch "advisors" beyond Cuba and Nicaragua (where their number remains small), American fears about the Cuban connection with leftist anti-US forces in the region, and hence about an "integrated" Soviet strategy to "destabilize" friendly Latin American regimes through Cuban-sponsored subversion, have grown exponentially since the "fall" of Nicaragua to

the Sandinistas and the eruption of guerrilla warfare in El Salvador.

Presently, the United States cannot afford the luxury of taking its southern neighbours for granted or lending only token attention to Latin America's many problems. Diminishing US political influence coupled with the general Latin American trend of seeking ways to expand economic relations with Western Europe and Japan have already eroded US "hegemony" over Latin America. The extent to which the Soviet Union (seconded by other 'socialist' countries) will be able to exploit the decrease in US preeminence remains to be seen. Soviet propaganda has naturally hastened to condemn "the usurious policy of the principal financial centers of capitalism (and above all the United States)" and express Moscow's solidarity to the Latin American debtors.⁵⁰ Although economic, political, and social turbulence offer fertile grounds for leftist insurgency, it should not be forgotten that Latin America is a total cultural, trade, and political stranger to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites.

Nuclear Proliferation

An important point, which should be made clear from the beginning of any discussion on nuclear proliferation, is that nuclear know-how (and corresponding technologies) carry an unmistakable military potential. It is, therefore, inaccurate but also misleading to speak of "good 'atoms for peace' and bad 'atoms for war'".⁵¹

That the current membership of the "nuclear weapons club" remains limited to the two superpowers plus the United Kingdom, France, and China is the result of practical constraints rather than the "peaceful" intentions of individual governments. To take the example of the "good atoms" only, "civilian" programs of nuclear power generation require a high level of technological sophistication, a large cadre of appropriately educated scientists and technicians, not to mention the financial resources to build and maintain the nuclear reactor facilities required. Even more significantly, fissionable material, the "raw" fuel for nuclear reactors, is not only scarce but also subject to strict international transfer safeguards which have so far precluded the operation of a free nuclear market. Provided, however, that a nation succeeds in developing an all-around "peaceful" nuclear capability, the jump to weapon-grade materials, and hence to "beginner" A-Bombs, is relatively short.⁵² Once enough such material has been accumulated, performing a prestige-boosting first nuclear explosion is within easy reach--if of course the scientific effort was directed from the outset towards "additional" uses.

The advanced technology required for a viable nuclear industry, the huge costs involved, the scientific personnel requirement, the scarcity and strictly controlled circulation of fissionable material, and last but not least, the political pressures in favour of nonproliferation do create a formidable array of obstacles that bars the nuclear path for most less developed

countries. Yet, optimism about the future of nonproliferation is guarded. Aside from those powers, like the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Japan, and Switzerland, which have chosen not to acquire nuclear weapons despite their advanced technological know-how, there is already another group of semi-developed and developed countries in the nuclear "twilight" zone. Often referred to as pariah or threshold states, countries such as India, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, and Pakistan are known to have nuclear capabilities at various stages of development.⁵³ At least one of the pariahs, South Africa, appears to have the capacity to assemble a nuclear weapon "on warning", and Israel is believed to possess a number of such weapons in operational status (kept in storage at the secret Dimona facility) which obviously give it the choice of an overt nuclear weapons posture.⁵⁴ Libya has clearly expressed its desire to build a nuclear capability and tries to effect progress on a "cash-and-carry" basis. Iraq, until its nuclear reactor was destroyed by an Israeli air raid in June 1981, was the most likely candidate for the production of the first Arab bomb. Iran, until the disaster of the Islamic revolution, was Southwest Asia's potential nuclear power. And, finally, India, with its "peaceful" nuclear explosion of May 1974, remains the only pariah to have carried out an actual nuclear test and is assumed to possess weapon components available for immediate assembly.

An almost universal assumption is that horizontal

nuclear proliferation, i.e. the expansion in the number of states with nuclear arsenals, is inherently destabilizing and should therefore be subject to international control measures. This hypothesis provides the backbone for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which came into effect in 1970. The result of a rare joint US-Soviet effort, the NPT was conceived as a means of effectively prohibiting the free transfer of weapons-related technologies, materials, or other devices and obliged its signatories to accept strict verification procedures in order to insure⁵⁵ observance of the treaty restrictions. The NPT gained little popularity among the so-called Near Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs) and was resented by many others, particularly in the Third World, as an attempt to further constrain the ambitions of the poorer South and as "a cover to promote superpower national security rather than⁵⁶ the security of other states".

What are the motives of a proliferant's drive to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities as guarantees for national security? Some of the hypotheses usually advanced in regard to this question are as follows:

(a) The most common incentive is perhaps the belief that a nuclear arsenal will enhance one's bargaining power and "increase" national security by "balancing out" the larger (conventional) military capabilities of a "threatening" neighbour. Kenneth Waltz has recently argued, for example, that "more nuclear weapons may be better"; this theory envisages nuclear weapons as generators of

deterrence relationships between smaller states and sees nuclear capabilities as mainly a bargaining chip rather than a contribution to "warfighting" potential.⁵⁷ This theory, however, may be criticized as too optimistic in regard to the stability of the deterrence relationships to emerge from horizontal proliferation. It ignores the asymmetries--political, economic, military, etc--that exist between potential nuclear actors and assumes that the "nuclearized" system of smaller states will evolve along the lines of the US-Soviet nuclear deterrence model. Whether the latter (which, in any case, remains purely hypothetical) will indeed work under the added strain of a multitude of participants is a matter of conjecture.

(b) A second incentive can be described as "battlefield use". Should deterrence fail, this argument goes, small-yield tactical nuclear weapons may be used to break an enemy's conventional attack launched with superior forces. This "last resort" scenario is especially plausible in a future conflict like another Middle East war between Israel and the massed Arab armies--provided that a significant erosion in the Israeli conventional capabilities has occurred coinciding with a proportional improvement in Arab combat performance. Another pariah, Taiwan, could also conceivably attack Chinese mainland ports with air-launched or rocketborne tactical nuclear weapons in case of a communist amphibious operation to⁵⁸ topple the nationalist regime.

(c) Another motive may be increased status and

independence of action within the international community. Nuclear weapons can be powerful "image boosters" for regimes in the Third World where "losing face" carries heavy political costs and is frequently feared more than, say, a foreign military threat. India's test explosion did not go unnoticed by other South Asian neighbours and especially Pakistan. Iraq's efforts to expand its "peaceful" nuclear program may be associated with Saddam Hussain's desire to elevate his country to a leadership role in the Arab world--after Egypt forfeited it through its bargaining with Israel.

(d) Finally, a strong incentive may be generated by domestic pressures for an independent nuclear force. It should be remembered, for example, that domestic political bargaining is often the determining factor in arriving at choices which seem quite irrational when subjected to independent scrutiny. It is therefore conceivable that acquiring nuclear weapons can be largely independent of purely military considerations -- but closely associated with the need to satisfy political parties, industrial lobbies, or an influential scientific community.

Arms Transfers to LDCs

During the last twenty years international arms sales, and transfers of military equipment, have accelerated enormously giving rise to a market unprecedented in history in terms of numbers of customers and diversity of merchandise. As Professor Pierre succinctly put it in his detailed study of the global arms

trade: "Arms sales have become, in recent years, a crucial dimension of international affairs. They are now major strands in the warp and woof of world politics. Arms sales are far more than an economic occurrence, a military relationship, or an arms control challenge--arms sales are
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foreign policy writ large".

While exports from industrialized countries to LDCs of assembled sophisticated weapon systems, like advanced fighter aircraft, is still the main dimension of the international arms traffic, there is also a growing parallel trend among weapon recipients to develop their indigenous industrial capabilities for arms production. These two dimensions are rapidly becoming intertwined, however, as importers and exporters conclude agreements on local assembly and co-production schemes, sharing of machining techniques, advanced training in maintenance skills, and co-operative research and development . Furthermore, the net result of joint ventures has been an increased number of developing countries becoming exporters themselves feeding the market with a variety of small arms, artillery pieces, military vehicles, and ammunition.

Developing countries find the trend towards indigenous arms production irresistible as it reduces dependence for defence procurement on outsiders and
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creates a high-profile prestige industry at home. Some developing countries, such as Israel, Brazil, South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, China, and India to name only a few, have already succeeded in reaching a level of

technological expertise that allows them to produce and market major weapon systems like supersonic jet fighters, main battle tanks, warships, submarines, and an array of missiles in addition to advanced military electronic systems and associated equipment.

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The proliferation of both arms producers and consumers, the speed at which arms transfers occur, and the amounts of sensitive military technologies available to parties willing and able to pay cash for their procurement have raised serious questions regarding the influence of the burgeoning arms trade upon the stability of the global security system. One obvious concern is the potential of regional arms races to dramatically disrupt regional military balances and lead to surprise outbursts of violence. There is also the widespread impression that unrestrained weapon transfers further promote the outbreak of violence by distorting the perceptions of one's real capabilities vis-a-vis potential adversaries; thus, it is asserted, the weapons trade reduces the willingness of opponents to negotiate non-violent solutions to existing differences, and hampers economic development by consuming scarce resources and diverting personnel to unproductive tasks.

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These views do not go uncontested of course. For example, the de facto correlation between the acquisition of weapons and the outbreak of violent conflict is frequently questioned. In the words of Michael Moodie:

It is difficult to accept the argument that arms are inherently destabilizing and cause conflict. If one argues that high levels of arms

inventories and/or more sophisticated arms increase the probability of conflict, then one must conclude that Europe is a more volatile region and more prone to conflict than Africa, the Middle East, or Southeast Asia. Yet, this has not proven to be the case in the post-World War II world, and there is little evidence to suggest that it will be the case in the future.⁶⁴

There are similar questions on the issues of defence expenditure as an obstacle to economic development and of Third World "militarization". Here, the negative correlations and attendant condemnation, emanating from the assorted Marxist theorists of underdevelopment, are countered by scepticism towards the methods used to analyze statistical data and long-term projections of Third World arms acquisition and production profiles. As Onkar Marwah suggests: "the literature and statistics devoted to an expose of military activities in the third world have tended to adopt a hortatory stance [and] to raise inferences from statistical data that are half⁶⁵ truths if not falsification of the real situation..." But even when trying to honestly avoid "falsification", results based on "aggregate cross-national studies" have been found to be unsatisfactory as they tend to "entail substantial⁶⁶ costs in empirical sensitivity and specificity".

Moreover, curbing military expenditure in no way guarantees that Third World rulers, most of whom run one-party, authoritarian governments, would rush to divert the funds thus saved to development programs: narrow political interests and prestige projects are equally threatening "big spenders" that can undermine development

budgets at least as much as defence spending, if not
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more.

Arms exports are crucial factors in the US-Soviet competition. Both countries operate complex programs of arms sales to dozens of friendly states. In addition, they also maintain large overseas contingents of military advisors and instructors to insure the effective "integration" of weapon systems into local military establishments. These programs are further supplemented with training of foreign military personnel in the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet "gun trade" pattern differs markedly from its Western counterpart. In contrast to Western suppliers, who invariably try to "package" arms sales along with wider trade and investment agreements, the Soviet Union favours "bulk" arms exports without any further coupling with economic assistance programs. This practice may be attributed to several factors, but most significantly, to the inherent inability of the Soviet economy to offer other high technology items in sufficient quantities for sustaining a multinational foreign aid program. On the other hand, arms sales are important hard currency earners for the Soviets and open up lucrative export markets which would
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have not otherwise existed. In 1978 alone, for instance, total earnings from Soviet weapon sales was \$3.8 billion which, along with sales of gold bullion, helped stabilize the Soviet current account and finance imports of Western
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technology.

Resource Competition

Resource competition came to the forefront of the public debate during the early 1970s following the jolt of the energy crisis. Up until October 1973, the fact that the industrialized Western countries absorbed the lion's share of nonrenewable resources and especially fossil fuels, like petroleum, was accepted without the fierce pen battles which were to erupt in the 1970s. The havoc which the Arab oil embargo caused throughout the world, however, had the major effect of sensitizing both governments and citizens in all parts of the world to the reality of diminishing resources and to the prospect of slower economic growth or, even worse, no growth at all. An equally significant corollary to the frantic search for ways to tackle the oil shortage was increased awareness of related issue areas concerning resource management and exploitation: the relationship between population growth and resource distribution, environmental pollution by industrial wastes, the question of nuclear power, conservation, food and clean water supplies, and strategic minerals accessibility.

As the term "resource competition" implies, the current emphasis is on the conflict-generating potential of resource scarcity and inaccessibility. Resource competition is better understood if we perceive the world in terms of a simplified three-level "resource distribution" model: First, the poor vs. rich countries level which addresses the problem of resource transfer from poor to rich at unfair prices--and which remains the

favourite among Marxist and Neo-Marxist thinkers. Second, the rich vs. rich nations level which represents competition between "have" states for larger slices of the existing resource pie--more popular among Western scholars in the Industrial Management and related fields. And, third, the poor vs. poor countries level which refers to bilateral arguments and/or violent clashes over disputed resource-rich territories--which is adopted in regional and comparative studies of Third World conflict.

One of the central components of the resource distribution model is that of "resource-energy wars", a concept which is now seriously discussed as one of the predominant forms of violent conflict during the next few decades.⁷⁰

The parameters of these wars remain open to speculation.⁷¹

One obvious question is whether the future "aggressors" will be able to achieve through military action what was denied to them through peaceful economic activities. As the early-70s oilfield seizure scenarios have demonstrated,⁷² securing normal access to sources of raw materials through "contingency" military strikes is hardly guaranteed: first, technical infrastructure, such as pumping systems, refineries, deep-shaft mines, and off-shore drilling rigs, can be easily sabotaged by the defenders even under conditions of total surprise causing chaos at the production base; and second, the risk of unexpected escalation with the involvement of third parties is often too high and negates expected strategic gains.

Another analytical difficulty in understanding the

dynamics of resource competition lies in the definition of "natural resources" which, in the Western lay vocabulary, have come to be almost solely identified with industrial minerals and fossil fuels. This restricted approach leaves important considerations outside the analytical framework and confuses issues of great significance to individual actors. As Dorner and El-Shafie observed, "Natural resources... may include anything in the material universe that someone considers useful or beneficial or potentially beneficial".⁷³ Failure to appreciate these definitional problems obscures keen concerns of disadvantaged Third World nations about such essentials as adequate food supplies, decent housing, and clean water--all assumed to be available for the taking in the Western industrialized countries--in addition to, say, energy at affordable prices. The amount of recoverable titanium or platinum is indeed of little relevance and/or consequence in an economy where the annual corn harvest determines the frontier between survival and famine. It is therefore instructive to contemplate that, in the long run, endemic food shortages, especially when projected against population growth, may be a central cause for conflict in addition to being future's "principal scarcity problem" on a global scale.⁷⁴

The implications of resource competition for the stability of the global security system have yet to be fully appreciated--although there seems to be increasing urgency in assessing the chances of resource-energy wars affecting the distribution patterns of critical materials.

It is also important to note that shooting wars are not the only risks inherent in colliding resource needs. What is potentially far more damaging is the insidious affect of perennial shortages on national well-being, political,⁷⁵ economic, and social.

Unconventional Threats (Terrorism)

During the past two decades "unconventional" threats have gained a high degree of prominence thanks mainly to the increased frequency of acts of international terrorism. According to US Government sources, for example, in the years since 1962 "700 identifiable guerrilla and terrorist groups have committed more than 8,000 major acts of political violence, a third of which resulted in death or injury. The number of incidents is growing every year, and terrorism is expanding into⁷⁶ previously unaffected countries".

Defining "unconventional" threats rather broadly requires examination of a spectrum of phenomena ranging from such familiar concepts as guerrilla war to more esoteric forms of "proxy" warfare and "destabilization" at the subnational level through clandestine operations and⁷⁷ "home-grown" subversive activities directed from abroad. Currently, referring to unconventional threats almost automatically focuses attention on terrorism; its potential to erode the control of states within; and its ability to undermine peaceful negotiation and conflict resolution at the international level.

Modern terrorism exhibits a number of salient

features which distinguish it from past similar activities.

-- First, modern terrorists, thanks to free travel and communication, display a vastly improved capability to coordinate their actions across national frontiers, to recruit multinational membership, and to conduct simultaneous campaigns of violence against targets separated by significant geographical distance.

-- Second, with the exception of the inevitable lunatic fringe elements, terrorists today tend to be much better organized. Their tactical efficiency and logistics often frustrate counter-terrorist measures and result in surprisingly durable underground groups. The revival of the Red Brigades in Italy, the continuing activities of the Irish Republican Army, and the Basque separatist campaign in Spain are only three examples of how effective modern terrorist organizations can really be.

-- Third, the terrorist's arsenal has steadily improved in both quality and quantity of munitions and equipment available at any given time resulting in proportional increases in the destructiveness of terrorist attacks.

-- Fourth, modern terrorists display an unusual tenacity in attacking both the organized state and society at large through calculated murder, hostage-taking, destruction of property, and extensive terror bombing of civilian targets.

-- Fifth, many modern terrorist movements, in their effort to elicit support from receptive audiences, choose to engage, in addition to their violent strategies, in

elaborate political propaganda campaigns using as platforms suitable "front" political parties as well as other sympathetic "public awareness" groups.

-- Sixth, international terrorists have come to benefit from the fact that "many states tend to tolerate, appease, and frequently, even support the use of terrorism as an acceptable legitimate tool in achieving certain desirable goals".⁷⁸ The sponsorship of terrorist groups by a number of regimes outside the developed world is a well-established fact that has led to the unique contemporary phenomenon of what is generally recognized as a "terrorist state".

-- Finally, international terrorism continues to show disproportional preference for attacks on Western industrialized democracies than against other countries.

Attempting to assess the impact of international terrorism upon national security and international stability is a difficult exercise given the paucity of reliable, public-domain information about worldwide terrorist links and patterns of operation, the limited amount of research into the ideological and strategic motivations of terrorist organizations, and the secrecy that shrouds anti-terrorist contingency planning at national government level. Nevertheless, a number of general observations, based on the existing record, can be offered as follows:

(a) Although terrorist groups have been so far unable to cause a major disruption in the international system (like, for example, a full-scale war between a Western

power and one of the terrorist states), it would be safe to assume that the cumulative effect of terrorist activities will sooner or later produce the conditions for just such an eventuality. For example, if the April 1986 American bombing raid against Libya is the precursor of things to come, military retaliation against perceived terrorist centers should be expected to increase in proportion to the number and severity of further terrorist attacks. Decisions to launch such strikes, on the other hand, will depend by necessity on secret intelligence unavailable for any form of public scrutiny, a fact that may cause serious international complications in addition to possible domestic constitutional crises.⁷⁹

(b) There are growing fears that the immediate future will witness a sharp escalation of the costs and casualties caused by terrorist attacks. Many experts agree that crossing the threshold from "broadly symbolic" attacks into a phase of mass destruction may be imminent. It is feared, for example, that the use of chemical and bacteriological agents might be the next weapons of choice for terrorist groups seeking to cause "governmental disruption of major proportions and widespread public panic."⁸⁰

The possibility of nuclear terrorism is not discounted either. Although nuclear devices of even the crudest form require significant technical expertise to manufacture and deploy effectively if there is a source of weapons-grade fissionable material, it is conceivable that

terrorist groups under state sponsorship may eventually gain access to all the elements required for building a "revolutionary" bomb.⁸¹ The intensification of conflicts fuelled by Islamic fundamentalism is yet another serious cause for concern. The Iranian revolution has already spawned a new breed of "martyr" terrorists desensitized to the certain prospect of violent death and ready to commit suicide missions against any and every perceived "infidel" adversary. Such availability of willing men and women has in turn produced new and highly destructive tactics like the truck bomb. Finally, the perennial problem of inadequate security of sensitive installations, like nuclear power stations and defence plants, invites terrorist attacks which can have incalculable⁸² consequences.

The problem of multinational terrorism has so far eluded attempts (most of them half-hearted to be frank) to eradicate it. In fact, with decolonization complete, traditional guerrilla activity, along the lines of such earlier preachers of people's war as Mao and Che, is slowly being displaced by terrorism in urban areas conducted by small cells of men and women who rely more on the psychological dislocation of the "enemy"--i.e. the organized state and its designated bodies--rather than on the physical confrontation with its military and law-enforcement agencies.⁸³ More importantly, modern terrorists have adopted, and continue to improve, methods of blackmailing governments in order to extract desired changes in policy or other tangible benefits like the

release of jailed comrades. In a long-term strategic sense, forcing individual governments to negotiate with shadowy groups is the most worrisome implication of multinational terrorism--one that might even influence the balance of power between Soviet-backed "revolutionary" dictatorships and "reactionary" liberal Western democracies.

THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT

Anticipating events that may lead to future "stability" or "instability" of the global security system is, at best, a notoriously constrained business conducted at the peril of one's credibility as an accomplished "futurist". Contrary to widespread belief, any "futures" analyst, claiming a fair degree of predictive capability, requires a much greater measure of common sense and intuition than ability to manipulate computerized statistical models. Numbers juggling without deeper understanding of the intricate interdependent relationships that exist today, let alone of human desires, urges, and perceptions, allows political leaders and military strategists only limited insights into the problems they face.

It is for this reason that "events analysis", basically an attempt to synthesize the rich intellectualism of traditional political thinkers with the rather more painstaking method of the modern strategic analyst, has recently gained momentum at the expense of esoteric mathematical modeling of international conflict.

In this light, and in an attempt to shape a picture of the future of international conflict, five areas of potentially destabilizing "Event Chains" have been⁸⁴ recently suggested as follows:

- (i) "A major change in the strategic relationship between key international players attendant upon a technological breakthrough".

The most obvious pair of such players of course comprises the United States and the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration's strategic modernization program, and particularly the Space Defense Initiative (SDI), have prompted unprecedented debate and thus demonstrated the precariousness, but also diversity, of the existing perceptions of nuclear "security" espoused by the Soviet Union and America's NATO allies. The furore over SDI vividly underscores the paradox of nuclear deterrence: in the nuclear age, it is "considered an advantageous military doctrine to make your own country deliberately vulnerable" since according to current orthodoxy "vulnerability [contributes] to peace and invulnerability⁸⁵ [contributes] to risks of war". That the mere declaration of intent to develop SDI would provoke such sharp reactions only goes to prove the crucial role of technology in the superpower strategic relationship.

What the future holds regarding further improvements in strategic as well as conventional weapon systems and associated technologies which can corrode established concepts of security, is only a matter of strong⁸⁶ imagination: increased accuracy guidance systems for

ballistic missiles; real-time computer command-and-control fully exploiting faster processors and compact megabyte memory modules supported by reduced-instruction operating systems; breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare making the sea-based nuclear deterrent truly vulnerable to hostile sea control operations; development of the ultimate unmanned airborne tank killer; resurgence of the chemical and biological warfare threat and so on.

(ii) "A major change in a regional power configuration by violent action".

The simmering Middle East crisis is an excellent illustration of how such changes can take place and what their long-term effects are. Israel's settlement of the West Bank and its de facto annexation of the Golan Heights have given the Arab world, and particularly Syria, a permanent cause for war. It is indeed difficult to exclude any Third World areas from the risk list or to underestimate the likely effects of violent internal changes in strategically important actors like the Arab oil producers (witness, for example, the tensions inside Saudi Arabia or the effects of Khomeinism in the Gulf area). But neither the superpowers nor Western Europe are immune from violent change in their own "back yards". For the United States, events in Central America are sources of great anxiety about domino effects that can eventually "destabilize" Mexico. Poland has caused worries in the Kremlin and undoubtedly prompted some unsettling thoughts about another Hungary or Czechoslovakia (but with the Poles putting up stiff resistance). And the perennial

disputes between Greece and Turkey promise continuing friction in NATO's southeast theater and even the unprecedented spectacle of two NATO "allies" at war over the Aegean.

(iii) "A major change in the international economic balance".

Although the industrialized countries weathered the successive oil crises, albeit at the expense of sometimes painful restructuring of their economies, there is little to raise the hopes of the Third World concerning the new international economic order. As many LDCs sink deeper into precarious borrowing, the Western democracies move into a new round of trade restrictions and mini-embargoes reminiscent of the catastrophic beggar-thy-neighbour policies of the 1930s. Rescheduling of debts carried by highly-borrowed Third World economies seem like a mere postponement of serious trouble; economic collapse of one (or all) of these states may have violent consequences--a glimpse of which the world received when Nigeria abruptly expelled over two million foreign workers from its soil in 1983 in the wake of a steep drop in national revenues due to falling oil prices. Further advances in alternative fuels technology and conservation measures may eventually rid the West from its dependency on Third World oil. This will lead to severe contraction of the oil producers' economic base with unforeseen results for the stability and longevity of these nations. A major economic crisis in the Western world itself is not inconceivable either. The giant US deficit is presently one of the most serious

possible causes for concern.

- (iv) "Major changes in the interests and objectives of key international players".

The current pattern of international relations is by no means guaranteed. Changes in foreign policy direction by key international actors have already created new alignments and reconfigured power relationships. President Nixon's China initiative is perhaps the best recent example of such sudden shifts away from established and apparently rigid positions. The Chinese-American rapprochement presented the Soviet Union with a rather unexpected twist in its confrontation of outside "threats". It can be argued that expanding cooperation between Washington and Peking, especially in the military sphere, coupled with a rearmed Japan in economic top form, will further strengthen Moscow's perception of isolation and indeed "encirclement" by less than friendly powers. One has also to contemplate the possibility of sudden changes in the orientation of key Third World states in relation to the superpowers. This is a prospect that seems particularly plausible in light of the fluid nature of politics within many a Third World state and the desire to obtain concrete support against local rivals.

- (v) "Major changes in the strategic outlook of key international actors".

The growth of the Soviet navy, and the worldwide presence mission undertaken by its surface fleets, are both indicative of Moscow's expanding perceptions of its strategic frontier and its determination to support this

expansion, dynamically if need be. China's attempt to launch its first sea-based ballistic missile in late 1982 (unsuccessfully) possibly heralded a new phase in Chinese strategic policy, one which may fuel the Sino-Soviet dispute and cause regional actors to modify their security arrangements. In the NATO area, a non-nuclear Labour defence posture under a Labour government would certainly trigger major reassessments of current NATO structure and strategy. A NATO "crisis of confidence" may thus ensue prompting increased Congressional pressure for the withdrawal of US land forces from the European theater and a complete "overhaul" of US-European relations.

CONCLUSION

If historical experience is to be taken as a yardstick, a no-war world model seems as elusive today as it seemed at the time the world plunged into the war "to end all wars" in 1914. The divisions and violence that beset contemporary international society can be seen as "the storm before tranquility" only with a high degree of optimism.

The distinct failure of international organizations to foster international order, the reluctance of the developed countries to sponsor major changes in the international economic system, the growing inability of many LDCs to escape the dual trap of blind nationalism and "revolutionary" ideologies, and the lacklustre performance of the superpowers in creating a meaningful "confidence-building" regime in their bilateral relations are only a

few of the disappointing--and foreboding--trends facing the world today.

On the other hand, it should be recognized that the existing "stability" model of superpower relations, based on the present strategic equation and the continuing rounds of US-Soviet dialogue, seems bound to last as long as no particularly catastrophic "event chain" affects the central balance. Thus, there is a growing tendency among international security analysts and political commentators to turn to "peripheral" crises and local wars in search of elements which can seriously disrupt the essential "normality" of superpower relations (if such a term can be used without a fair dose of poetic license). It is against this background that superpower reactions to these crises, and especially their willingness to use military force in order to contain perceived "threats" arising from them, become crucial to the continuing existence of the "stability" model. In the next chapter we will therefore examine superpower preferences and views on military intervention as an instrument of policy.

CHAPTER II

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE SUPERPOWERS

POSTWAR PREFERENCES AND VIEWS

Since the Second World War both the United States and the Soviet Union have maintained and deployed substantial conventional forces in addition to their nuclear arsenals. These forces, by virtue of their structure, weapons, equipment, and doctrine, remain essentially committed to meeting "major contingencies", the most prominent of which is a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

Ever since the destruction of the Axis powers, however, such a "major" contingency has not, fortunately, arisen mainly because neither superpower seems prepared to risk escalation of a conventional clash into a nuclear exchange--at least as long as they both perceive no direct and immediate threat against their "vital" interests which, in itself, would be sufficient cause for escalatory measures. Provided, therefore, that the existing central nuclear balance continues to generate the incentives for avoiding a direct US-Soviet confrontation, it seems only logical to focus on the "lesser" conventional contingencies and the changes in national strategy that should follow the expression of the "second area" action requirement.

* * *

Although both Washington and Moscow eschew pronouncing military interference in a foreign state's affairs as part of their official policy, the practice of worldwide military deployments and "muscle-flexing" have become permanent fixtures of superpower global strategy. This postwar development has not transpired without controversy, of course, particularly in respect to the moral question of the use of force in international relations. The practical or "policy-oriented" side has not escaped either, with opinions being divided on the issue of the real geostrategic payoffs of military power projection vs. a policy of noninterference in local conflicts. For instance, the majority of conservative Western observers would agree that countering the influence of a "militaristic" power like the Soviet Union requires some version of "extended deterrence": a combination of the persuasiveness of strategic assets with a capability to mobilize and deploy significant conventional forces in peripheral areas threatened by Soviet "penetration"¹ --a view hardly shared though by many "left-of-center" moderate thinkers not to mention the unilateralists.

Grenada and Afghanistan have prompted renewed debate on the willingness of the superpowers to use military force in protecting and advancing their interests. Many theories are hotly disputed in the literature revolving around two core questions: first, whether Grenada and Afghanistan signify the rise within the US and Soviet government elites of a "post-detente" group of

leaders who are less likely to be deterred by the escalation risks inherent in military intervention; and second, whether these two major displays of military might, in combination with events like the Cuban military presence in Africa and the undeclared war against Nicaragua, indicate the beginnings of a truly "militarized" phase in the conduct of superpower diplomacy.

The aim of the following paragraphs is not to resolve these major theoretical arguments but rather to contribute to the debate for the purposes of this study by, first, plotting the postwar US attitudes and changes of policy towards military intervention in "peripheral" Third World areas; and, second, by analyzing the Soviet approaches and strategy shifts towards the same subject.

It is also essential to note from the outset that Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe is not part of this exercise for two reasons. First, suppressing "counterrevolution" within the Soviet European security zone has generally been considered an "internal" affair between Moscow and its "fraternal" Warsaw Pact regimes which could attract little Western interference beyond verbal condemnation. Second, without the threat of direct Western counter-intervention to foil Soviet "police actions" against disgruntled fellow socialists, Eastern Europe remains an arena exclusively reserved (for the time being at least) for Soviet military activities and as such it cannot serve, in contrast to the Third World, as a comparative area for Soviet and US actions. However, two case studies drawn from Soviet interventionary activities

in Eastern Europe are included in this study in an attempt to gain better understanding of the overall Soviet "style" of military intervention as it has manifested itself until the Afghanistan invasion. Finally, the worldviews from Washington and Moscow are also briefly examined as a necessary framework of respective foreign policy perceptions.

The Worldview from Washington

Estimating the American leadership's perception of the global landscape suffers from the typical corollary of information overabundance: separating substance from chaff is often impossible due to the sheer volume of "raw" data. It is, therefore, imperative to reduce the US avalanche of both printed and spoken words into some logical matrix of attitudes and actions which reflect the US leadership elites' worldview. Given the openness of the American system of government, the nature of congressional politics, the size and influence of the mass media, and the US academic community's tendency to thrive on abstract "assessments" of current (and future) affairs this is hardly an easy task and it remains an obstacle to any analysis that strives to be objective.

* * *

The American leadership's worldview is shaped primarily by the lively public debate concerning the nation's approach to national security and, more specifically, to the means required to ensure that American global interests are adequately protected from

encroachment by rival powers. This debate is one of the most salient characteristics of the ongoing US domestic "self analysis", and, chronologically, a rather recent phenomenon. Until the First World War, the United States, insulated behind the great oceanic barriers, remained preoccupied with internal matters as it considered itself largely immune from foreign threats (the Neutrality Acts of the late 1930s were the isolationists' last serious attempts to curb America's involvement in international affairs). For pre-1941 Americans, "security was a given fact of nature and circumstance, an inheritance rather than a creation".²

Throughout the postwar years, the foundations of the national security debate have sprung from two prominent tenets: first, opposition to communism seen as an ideology totally alien, and in fact hostile, to the American democratic ideal and way of life; and second, opposition to the Soviet Union as the world's leading communist power and the sole state with the military capability to threaten the American homeland itself. That being said, the commitment to fight against world communism produced an equally significant determinant of postwar US policy. Seeking to subscribe other non-communist nations to the American ideal of a "Free World", the United States, departing from a practice that had been observed with almost religious devotion since its inception, rapidly expanded its bilateral and multilateral relationships to a point where, by the 1950s, it presided over a system of alliances spanning the globe, a phenomenon unprecedented

in the history of US foreign relations. As a keen observer of the American national security debate, the late Professor Brodie, put it, the United States

---moved from a nation of "no entangling alliances" to being the "leader of the free world," with a considerable packet of direct alliance commitments, and with various more generalized commitments sometimes attributed to the United Nations Charter but which seem also to exist independently of that document. 3

On the level of policy, grappling with the realities of the US-Soviet rivalry eventually produced three main schools of thought.⁴ The first, which took shape in the closing years of the Second World War, although it recognized the ideological incompatibility of the two systems, adopted a generally benign view of the Soviet Union and saw US-Soviet differences as amenable to "accommodation" by negotiation--without the need for spurring the "horizontal" struggle between the two countries and creating detrimental ripple effects in the form of localized "vertical conflicts".⁵ This concept of "termination by accommodation" was rejected by the second school which advocated "termination by victory" over the forces of communism. The basic assumptions here called for a broad-front assault on communism in general coupled with specific strategies aimed against the Soviet Union itself--including efforts "to transform the USSR from within" by stirring unrest among its people, economic warfare to damage the Soviet system, and development of "positions of strength" before any negotiations with the Kremlin on international issues could be joined.⁶ Finally, striking the middle ground between these two

approaches, the "management" advocates underlined the necessity to put US-Soviet relations in a proper perspective and reach a balanced view of the Soviet "threat". The "managers", who saw no immediate risk of a world war with the USSR, promoted the idea of "businesslike" relations with the Soviet leadership, and emphasized the difference between what communists wished to happen and what real Soviet capabilities made possible.⁷

The changing domestic mood and the various political currents helped channel anti-communism into a succession of intellectual "casts" by rotating supporters of each of the above schools into positions of power. But, despite changing administrations and revisions of strategic priorities, the essential themes remained constant: from Dulles' massive retaliation strategy to Nixon's detente and Carter's oscillating policies, the fundamental opposition to the USSR and its claims to superpower status, and the policy of "containing" Soviet influence outside the Eastern bloc, have shown remarkable historical endurance--only to be reaffirmed and strengthened by President Reagan as the cornerstones of his drive to restore American power.⁸

The centrality of the Soviet "threat" in shaping American perceptions of the international environment is thus pervasive--although one should remain perennially cognizant of the numerous gradations encountered within the liberal constituency, and among those moderate "revisionist" inheritors of the "accommodation" theories.

As a result, Washington's postwar perspective of the international landscape has gone through four more or less distinct phases dominated by the rivalry with the USSR:

--the Cold War, when the Soviet "grand conspiracy" theories predominated and American leaders perceived communist subversion as the main source of international instability;

--the early arms control phase, when "businesslike" relations with the Soviets were established and "linkage" theories became subjects of cautious revision despite conflicts like Vietnam;

--the short-lived period of detente, when "peaceful coexistence" with communism led to spectacular diplomatic moves, like the China initiative, and strategic nuclear parity signalled the "muting" of global nuclear confrontation and renewed interest in the strategies, implications, and long-term impact of local conventional conflicts;

--and, finally, the return to confrontation following the invasion of Afghanistan and President Reagan's election to power on a political platform emphasizing traditional American values and conservative approaches to international relations.

Irrespective of the twists and turns in foreign policy management, however, closer examination of these phases reveals one common feature of the American "mindset". Perceptions of the international arena, despite an outer layer of "flexibility", demonstrate a rather rigid understanding of international relations and deficient appreciation of what Ernst Haas sees as the crucial "advance-and-retreat" dynamics so prevalent in the Soviet analysis of the "world correlation of forces" (of which more below):

We [Americans]... are at a disadvantage because we tend to fall back on all-or-nothing categories: conflict or cooperation, peace or war, detente or confrontation. Our reliance on the concept of the "balance of power" is static as contrasted to the Soviets' "world correlation of forces". 9

Criticisms such as the above have, in turn, led to calls for a comprehensive national strategy with which to cope, rather than simply react, to the fast-changing global structures, the aspirations and anxieties of less fortunate nations, the expectations of allies and friends, and last but of course not least, the competition with the ¹⁰ USSR. During the Carter presidency the pressures for a broad-based and coherent national security strategy increased due to events like the Teheran hostage fiasco and the subsequent abortive rescue operation, but also because of the Administration's inability to promote intra-NATO consensus or strike meaningful arms control agreements with the Soviets. By 1980, the Carter interlude, to the obvious satisfaction of conservative hardliners, was generally assessed as a failed "neo-accommodationist" attempt to experiment with a worldview based exclusively on high moral principle (human rights) and the quest for reduced defence spending.

In fact, the conservatives' declared viewpoints about the true motives, plans, and aspirations of the USSR received an unexpected boost from the Carter Administration itself following the invasion of Afghanistan. It was President Carter himself who immediately expressed "shock" at the Soviet action and, shortly afterwards, promulgated the Carter Doctrine which, in essence, declared US determination to protect the Arabian oilfields against a Soviet thrust by military force (see next section also). Thus, the invasion did not only reinforce the conservative interpretation of Soviet

intentions, but also helped to erode the Administration's own belief, assiduously cultivated by Carter's liberal Democratic supporters, that Moscow could be indeed "trusted" to refrain from blatantly "aggressive" acts in the Third World.

It was against this background that the Reagan Administration embarked upon its own re-definition of US foreign policy as it is customary with incoming administrations. Reagan's worldview rejected his predecessor's "dispiriting" approach and adopted a hard-line position strongly reminiscent of that which prevailed in the earlier years of containment. The Reagan anti-communist stance re-emphasized (a) the ideological distrust of the Soviet Union as a partner in negotiations (b) the linkage between local conflicts and Soviet global strategy, and (c) the need to meet the Soviet challenge by "horizontal" rather than "vertical" escalation (i.e., by 'coupling' Soviet actions in one area with US responses¹¹ not necessarily confined to the same location). Early in the Administration's tenure, for example, the Soviet Union was again identified in clear-cut terms as the main threat to US interests and international stability. As Secretary of State Haig put it:

A major focus of American policy must be the Soviet Union, not because of ideological preoccupation but simply because Moscow is the greatest source of international insecurity today. Let us be plain about it: Soviet promotion of violence as an instrument of change constitutes the greatest danger to world peace.

In regions sensitive to Western interests, in the littorals of critical sea passages, in areas

that hardly affect Soviet security, you will find Moscow taking a keen interest in conflict. Thus, Western strategic interests as well as the hopes for a more just international order are at stake. 12

In the ensuing years, this view has been echoed by a variety of Administration spokesmen, although President Reagan's politically motivated willingness to engage in summitry with General Secretary Gorbachev has helped to minimize, and even quietly set aside, the tougher theories (such as 'linkage') propounded during the Administration's first term.

One final component of the American leadership's worldview deserves special attention, viz. the post-Vietnam reassessment of national security objectives. Until Vietnam, containment dictated blanket opposition to communist regimes and communist-led "revolutionary" movements irrespective of immediate American interests. This rigid approach began to change during the closing years of the conflict as domestic pressures against US military involvement in distant theaters grew. By the time of the Carter Administration, the "Vietnam syndrome" had visibly reduced the willingness of American political leaders to commit the country to a policy of "second area" military adventures without a clear and immediate threat to vital US interests or the life of US citizens.

The direct result of these developments was a shift in national security planning towards differentiation between primary and secondary issue areas. Implicit in this change was also the acceptance of the fact that not all Marxist revolutionaries were willing Moscow *allies*;

and that Marxist regimes around the world were equally exposed to the dynamics of cultural, economic, and social diversity as much as their non-communist counterparts within the international system. Preventing the spread of communism thus became a complex exercise of a mixture of approaches--political, military, and economic--which, on the one hand, appeared to reduce the possibility of military confrontation with the USSR, and on the other, attempted to restore US leadership among allies and friends and thus inject old anti-communist coalitions with new energy.

The Worldview from Moscow

Given the Soviet obsession with secrecy and the traditionally restricted flow of information within Soviet society, determining the Soviet leaders' perception of particular issues in international relations remains a difficult and complicated undertaking. The SALT dialogue in the late 1960s, and the corresponding growth of Western public interest in the Soviet "threat", caused a notable swelling in the until then sparsely populated ranks of "Sovietologists" and "Kremilinologists". This onslaught of "experts" did not necessarily or dramatically improve¹³ the quality of research conducted into Soviet affairs, but it did help to energize debate and to foster the case for more coherent analysis of an ambiguous and, from the point of view of an English-speaking world, linguistically hostile body of information.

* * *

Historically, Soviet perceptions of the international environment have been shaped by the Marxist-Leninist dialectic and the traditional Russian fears of foreign invasion. As early as 1918, Lenin emphasized that

International imperialism... could not under any circumstances, on any condition, live side by side with the Soviet Republic, both because of its objective position and because of the economic interests of the capitalist class which are embodied in it-- 14

Indeed, Lenin's prophesy of inevitable war with the "bourgeois states", striving to destroy the Bolshevik revolution, seemed to materialize first during the Russian Civil War, when "imperialist" troops came to the aid of the Tsarist remnants, and then during the titanic battle against Hitler's armies (although in the case of the Great Patriotic War allowances had to be made for the alliance with capitalist America and Britain). On the other hand, neither Marx nor Lenin provided a comprehensive theory of international relations in book-length form to serve as a guide for Soviet foreign relations. In the original Marxist "comprehensive intellectual structure", which simultaneously drew from every known "bourgeois discipline", international relations never figured prominently "as a general or universal category", and received attention only as an element in the historical
15

record. Thus, the Kremlin leaders were left with the task of formulating their own international relations doctrines based on the Marxist-Leninist exegesis--a rather disagreeable task given the heavy reliance of Soviet policies on the "irrefutable", but somewhat "prepackaged",

Leninist principles and maxims, and the risk of rendering "eternal truths" hollow in the process of practical application.
16

It is safe to argue that no interpretation of Soviet perceptions of the world are complete without first noting the importance which Soviet analysts attach to the concept of the "world correlation of forces". As one analysis explains:

The concept of the world correlation is based on the principal ideological assumptions, on the view of the general development of world events, and on an intuitive calculation of intangible values. It concerns generally-presented global potentialities of the opposing camps, and not the actual forces, which can be applied in particular conflicts. 17

This dynamic approach to international relations operates at several levels simultaneously assessing, for example, the impact of superpower differences upon regional conflicts and vice versa, the influence and prospects of communist parties at the national level, the relationship of the "world revolutionary process" with expanding Soviet influence in specific countries or regions, and so on. It also synthesizes, and attempts to literally "calculate" outcomes from, a wide variety of factors ranging from political stability to economic performance, and from social and scientific-technical advances to the size and weapons of military forces. Continuing reliance of the Soviet leadership upon this concept as a predictive tool reflects commitment to the "conflict view of world relations" since " 'correlation of forces'--sootnoshenie sil--is itself a denial of the notion of the 'balance of

power' in the traditional sense. If anything, it is the
18
opposite, namely, 'disbalancing' power balances".

Another, equally significant, factor in studying the Soviet worldview is the deep-seated hostility of Soviet ideology towards all enemies of the "proletariat"--i.e. any regime, group, or movement which is, or appears to be, opposed to Marxism-Leninism. Early Bolshevik doctrine went to particular pains to identify and name the enemies of the socialist revolution, presumably in order to make the results of combating them as effective and long-lasting as possible:

Bolsheviks must not yield to a sense of being surrounded by unknown enemies, or entertain fantastic conceptions about dangers; they must ascertain enemies precisely and in realistic fashion.....

According to Bolshevik doctrine, the enemy has one or a few "well-known" "centers." He is not "mysteriously" "diffused" in "all," but in ascertainable fashion is present in many places--though it often may be difficult to "expose" him. 19

This division of the world into "enemies" and "fraternal, peace-loving" nations leads to the rejection of any notions of "common purpose" permeating the international system (a common characteristic of Western theories of international relations), and creates the permanent rift between socialist and non-socialist states which can only be mended with the eventual triumph of Marxism-Leninism. As Noguee and Donaldson explain:

The idea of a common set of objectives or aspirations [between all nations] is substantially if not totally rejected in communist theory. The enemy is considered evil. The differences between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and the states that embody these

class identities are fundamental and irreconcilable. Furthermore, these differences have their roots not in the behavior of the parties involved--after all, behavior patterns can change--but in the essential character or makeup of the enemy. 20

Until Khrushchev advanced his "peaceful co-existence" doctrine in 1956, the Soviet worldview was dominated by the Stalinist doctrine of "capitalist encirclement", a vehement, and even paranoid, version of the Leninist bourgeois-enemy theory which unambiguously predicted war to the finish between the USSR and its capitalist opponents.²¹ Stalin's departure in 1953, however, paved the way for questioning the total belief in universal "basic laws and principles", a shift which unavoidably put rigid adherence to ideology "on the defensive".²² This development led to change of methods throughout the Soviet system and the area of foreign affairs did not remain unaffected. Khrushchev's repositioned emphasis, from the inevitability of a violent clash between the Soviet Republic and the "bourgeois states" to co-existence with the enemies of socialism, was prompted by "a political choice in favour of avoiding nuclear war"; at the same time, Russian commentators, in order to forestall criticism of Khrushchev going "soft" on capitalism, insisted that

---'peaceful co-existence' is not a means of easing the 'contradictions of capitalism', it is not a means of 'reconciling capitalism with socialism', nor is it opportunistic or of 'pacifist colouration'. 23

Thus, "peaceful co-existence" marked Moscow's graduation, so to speak, into a period of tentative

confidence vis-a-vis the Western world in general, and the United States in particular, and a departure from the Stalinist siege mentality syndrome. This emerging confidence was mainly due to the well-deserved pride emanating from the "crushing defeat" the USSR had inflicted upon the "shock forces of world imperialism--Nazi Germany and militarist Japan", and, more significantly, to the apparent, and perhaps inescapable, conclusion that Soviet military power, by destroying the Axis, had "led to fundamental changes in the international alignment of forces in favour of socialism".²⁴ The main lesson of the Second World War had been "the invincibility of socialism as a social system", but also "the complete hopelessness of anti-socialist 'crusades'".²⁵ In light of these assumptions, and with a fair amount of hindsight, the post-Stalin Kremlin collective, despite numerous Western assessments to the contrary, "seem to have assumed between 1953 and 1962 that, short of a catastrophic miscalculation or a cataclysmic accident, an American nuclear attack was out of the question"--something which, of course, never prevented them from exploiting US massive retaliation scenarios for propaganda purposes while, on the other hand, resting assured that a nuclear holocaust²⁶ was a rather remote possibility.

By the time of Brezhnev's rise to power, the conclusion that the "world system of socialism" had become the decisive factor in the international arena occupied the center of the Soviet worldview. As a result, the Soviet analysis of the global situation further concluded

that the "imperialists" had been effectively deprived of their previous freedom of action--and could not as easily intimidate "peace-loving" states--and that it was now up to the "fraternal" socialist nations to steer the rest of the oppressed masses towards "revolutionary change and development". For instance, as it was stated in 1969:

Imperialism can neither regain its lost historical initiative, nor reverse world development. The main direction of mankind's development is determined by the world socialist system, the international working class, all revolutionary forces. 27

These developments were seen as stemming directly from "the steady growth of the economic and defence capability of the USSR and other socialist countries" and could only result in "continuous change of the world balance of strength in favour of socialism over imperialism"--a fact which did not obviously escape the attention of "the ruling circles in Washington".²⁸

In the span between 1969 and 1975, the Soviet worldview was essentially conditioned by the drive to attain as much benefit as possible from the Nixon-Brezhnev-sponsored thaw in US-Soviet relations. This period appeared particularly opportune to the Soviets; it was estimated, for example, that the United States faced unprecedented domestic problems in allocating resources between a "bloated military budget and the most costly systems of armaments" and "internal social requirements",²⁹ the latter supported by "broad sociopolitical forces".

With the leading capitalist power divided from within, detente offered a dual opportunity to Moscow: first, the

possibility of improved overall relations with the West at a time when the Sino-Soviet dispute demanded increased Soviet vigilance and commitment of resources to meet the perceived Peking menace; and, second, an opportunity to cultivate better trade relations along most-favored-nation lines with the United States, and other Western countries, in order to improve the sluggish Soviet economy. However, as Vladimir Petrov³⁰ phrased it, "the state of euphoria began to evaporate by 1975, as alarming signs of opposition to detente appeared in the United States" and the opportunity for closer economic ties with the United States was lost; nevertheless,

There was enough momentum left in detente to enable the Soviets to expand dramatically economic relations with Western Europe and Japan and to carry out the long-cherished project of legitimizing the status quo in Europe, imbedded in the Helsinki accords signed in the summer of 1975.

During the 25th CPSU Congress, held in 1976, Brezhnev himself recognized that US-Soviet relations were being "complicated", albeit solely due to the activities of "influential forces" in the United States³¹ --by which, the General Secretary meant, if one hazards a guess, the "economic monopoly circles" and the ever-present military-industrial complex. Moreover, and on a more profound note, the return of the Western "ruling circles" to policies of confrontation did not only call for increased "vigilance" in the military sector, but also

---created the necessity... of an analysis and a critique of bourgeois-reformist conceptions of globalism, models of a "world system"... and the like, which are being produced so bountifully in the West today, and serve as pseudoproofs of

"the convergence" of capitalism and socialism, the purposes of "de-ideologisation", hegemonism, cosmopolitanism and attempts to "substantiate" what is alleged to be the "supra-class", "supra-social" and "supra-national" nature of global problems. 32

Despite the collapse of detente, Brezhnev's legacy of pursuing "reduction of tensions" with the United States survived the Andropov-Cherneko interlude and has become a centerpiece in the Gorbachev foreign policy. This could have not been achieved though without the consolidation of Soviet power during the Brezhnev years, and the firm belief, cultivated meticulously during the same period, that the "correlation of forces", guarded by Soviet military might, had irrevocably shifted in favour of the USSR and the rest of the "fraternal" socialist states.

The fact that US policy, early in this decade, turned again towards "the worn track of the cold war, posing a serious threat to peace and international security"³³ did not defeat the Soviet "philosophy of historical optimism" which continued to influence the Soviet worldview:

While being aware of the danger of the current international situation the Soviet Union is convinced... that a new world war is not inevitable and peace can be preserved and strengthened by uniting... the efforts of the millions of participants in the anti-war and anti-nuclear movement and those of the peaceful states. 34

As during the heyday of the Nixon-Brezhnev summitry, this brighter note of "historical optimism" co-exists with the polemics, and similarly receives the sanction of the top Soviet leadership. General Secretary Gorbachev, for instance, speaking shortly after the Geneva summit meeting with President Reagan, referred to a "certain change in

the political atmosphere [which] is already evident", and to "the possibility of returning to detente, terminating the insane arms race and developing normal peaceful international cooperation".³⁵

In sum, the Soviet worldview remains dominated by both a desire for "peaceful co-existence"--generated by realist considerations rather than moralist philosophies--and, at the same time, by the impelling force of Marxist-Leninist ideology and its conflict view of international relations. Fusing "peaceful co-existence" with the call for "world revolution" though obviously creates some serious problems of policy, and in the end it seems³⁶ unattainable "unless Bolsheviks cease to be Bolsheviks". Ultimately, it is the Soviet leadership's overriding concern to avoid charges of "reformism and revisionism, i.e. ideological heresy", or suggestions that it conceives US foreign policy as moving away from its "class³⁷ nature", which shapes the Soviet perception of the global environment and the USSR's position in it.

American Military Intervention

(1) The Decision to Intervene

The use of military force, either as a non-combat political instrument or as a means of "physically³⁸ imposing the U.S. will" through the initiation of combat action, "has never come easily for the United States,³⁹ either in conception or in practical application". This outward reluctance to resort to military force can be attributed to several factors. First, historical

uneasiness about large standing armies, bequeathed to young America by the British, combined with the revolutionary origins of the United States, have led to bouts of anti-military sentiments and an urgency to avoid declaratory policies that can be perceived as "militaristic". Second, in a country where the function and powers of a free judiciary are crucial components of the political system, matters of military intervention tend to be immersed in heated debates concerning international law and the need for the US government to show "due cause" for its interventionary actions. Third, a critical by-product of the US legal tradition is embodied in the constitutional limitations imposed on presidential powers restricting the executive's freedom to order, or prolong, foreign military deployments. Fourth, there is considerable pre-occupation with questions of morality and human rights which provide a powerful emotional base, strengthened by a liberal press and the religious influences of the Judeo-Christian tradition, against "violating" other people's "independence and freedom to choose". And finally, in an era of nuclear weapons and theories of nuclear deterrence, the concept of "detering" opponents, through warning or signalling, has steadily penetrated into every area where use of force may be contemplated to the point where, as one critic put it

---we [the US] have come more to deter ourselves in our response to transgressions than to inhibit transgressors. 40

These factors, however, have not prevented the use of US armed forces as a political instrument to increase

precipitously since 1945, one recent study recording 215
such occasions between 1946 and 1975.⁴¹ Pinpointing the
exact causes of this increase is difficult, if not
entirely impossible. While we are always free to
speculate about different scenarios of government
decisionmaking, and seek "patterns" that apparently
"explain" behaviour after the fact, the chances of
ascertaining the true motives of key players are extremely
limited as private "thought processes" never really reach
the public eye; indeed, "post-facto explanations by the
decisionmakers themselves (as in memoirs) do little to
ease such speculation; for there is then a question as to
the motives behind the explanation".⁴²

As a result, attempting to ascertain the reasons for
the post-1945 increase in US military intervention has
taken the form of numerous popular theories, but without
the benefit of any firm conclusions. As Herbert Tillema
observes these attempts "tend to assert necessary but not
sufficient conditions for military intervention" and,
therefore, are only capable of partial explanations as
follows:⁴³

--The "official" explanation of intervening to
protect threatened "American lives and property";

--Intervention "to help other countries resist
outside aggression, especially Communist aggression";

--Military intervention to "contain" communism.

--The "liberal" explanation of military intervention
as a tool to maintain the status quo since the United
States "has lost her revolutionary origins and now
acts as a conservative power";

--Military intervention to protect US economic
interests and investments overseas;

--Resort to military force in the absence of skillful diplomacy;

--The "dominant group" theory which sees military intervention as a result of the Pentagon's pervasive influence on US foreign policy.

These theoretical difficulties are further compounded by the postwar bureaucratic explosion which has transformed presidential decisionmaking. The relatively simple interaction of a handful of top administration officials with the president himself, which prevailed through the years of the Second World War, has grown into a highly complex "group" procedure involving the secretaries of various departments, scores of special White House advisors, and a far larger number of inputs from federal agencies, congressional committees, and ad hoc advisory boards.⁴⁴

(ii) The Lessons of the Past

The concept of "lesser contingency" did not enter the American strategic vocabulary in earnest until the Korean conflict. Intervention in Korea spurred the debate concerning limited conventional war and the requisite capabilities to meet this challenge successfully. Given the expanding global presence of the United States, and the de facto assumption that American military power was now the Free World's guarantee of peace and security, American strategists, grappling with the possibility of such hostile (i.e. communist) "peripheral" conventional probes in the future, faced a dual task: First, to elaborate a strategic concept which covered the whole spectrum of non-nuclear contingencies and provided for

responses to "hot spot" conflicts outside Europe; and, second, to review and modify the structure, deployment, and support systems of existing US general purpose forces in order to meet the requirements of the new strategy.

Both of these tasks received secondary attention during the 1950s, when the emphasis remained on the massive retaliation scenario, and it was not until the Kennedy Administration that a serious effort to address the lesser contingency issue through the elaboration of a theory and doctrine of "limited war" was launched. This development was prompted by President Kennedy's desire to pursue an ambitious foreign policy, and the realization that a strategic concept anchored rigidly on nuclear retaliation imposed "unacceptable limits" to any such endeavour.⁴⁵ In light of this fact, the Kennedy Administration embarked on a "Flexible Response" strategy which sought, on the one hand, to retain America's nuclear deterrent intact while, on the other, improve conventional military capabilities substantially in order to augment the range of military options available to the US commander-in-chief.

A further boost for the "limited" conventional war strategy came from the fact that Kennedy's "Flexible Response" ideas reflected themes already advanced by many influential civilian strategic thinkers, including William Kaufmann, Bernard Brodie, James King, Henry Kissinger, and Robert Osgood, who had similarly voiced scepticism about a defence policy which almost entirely depended on nuclear weapons.⁴⁶ In a passage typical of the "limited war"

thinking of the late 1950s, Osgood, writing in 1957, had expressed in clear terms "The Rationale for Limited War" which the Kennedy Administration came to share with the academic strategists:

---the principal justification of limited war lies in the fact that it maximizes the opportunities for the effective use of military force as a rational instrument of national policy. In accordance with this rationale, limited war would be equally desirable if nuclear weapons had never been invented. However, the existence of these and other weapons of mass destruction clearly adds great urgency to limitation... the stupendous destruction accompanying all-out nuclear war makes it hard to conceive of such a war serving any rationale purpose... Only by carefully limiting the dimensions of warfare can nations minimize the risk of war becoming an intolerable disaster. 47

The Administration's formulation of just how the United States could adapt to the requirements of Flexible Response was based on a two-pronged approach: A complete review of American worldwide treaty commitments to determine exactly who and what needed defending in a crisis; and the elaboration of priorities according to theater of operations and existing US capabilities to deploy rapid-response military contingents to that theater. The results of these investigations were hardly encouraging. It was revealed, for example, that the United States was expected to support, because of both "formal treaty commitments" and "informal but no less weighty obligations", at least fifty different allies half of whom "were on or near the borders of the Soviet Union and China"; and the conclusion was that, "even with significant contributions from these allies, the burden on

the United States looked as though it would be impossibly
large".⁴⁸ Despite these discouraging findings though,
planning for a "2-1/2-war" scenario--i.e. a conventional
war with the Warsaw Pact in Europe, a major conflict with
a communist power like China or North Korea, and a
'brushfire' guerrilla war in a remote Third World
country--went ahead and

---was directed toward meeting these
contingencies on a conventional level and based
on the assumption that no more than two major
and one minor contingencies would occur
simultaneously. 49

The "2-1/2-war" policy debate thus began to put flesh
on the bones of a worldwide rapid deployment strategy
built around long-range mobility forces. The use of the
intercontinental, wide-bodied, heavy-payload, jet, cargo
aircraft seemed to solve the problem of deploying troops
and heavy equipment in distant theaters on short notice.
The "limited contingency" strategy envisaged only a
"minimum of overseas deployments" since, in combination
with a program of pre-positioning equipment in selected
theaters, and of introducing fast deployment logistics
ships to "serve as floating depots" for materiel,

---a large fleet of cargo jets would ensure that
intercontinental mobility could substitute for
having forces frozen into all the theaters of
primary interest to the United States. 50

Beneath its neat logistics blueprint though--and aside
from failing "to disaggregate a range of lesser
contingencies according to levels of intensity or
adversary",⁵¹ a major operational flaw-- the "2-1/2" wars
concept also failed to recognize a number of crucial

limitations: the inability of the United States to provide adequate manpower to meet the proposed commitments without fully mobilizing its reserves; the long-term costs of procuring large fleets of transport aircraft and logistics ships; the bureaucratic inertia, reinforced by interservice rivalry, which precluded the rapid development of sea-land-air "combined operations" doctrine and tactics; and, last but not least, the need to "sell" the new ideas to America's allies, most of whom had grown accustomed to "total" nuclear defence and were reluctant to embrace conventional strategies as alternatives to "resolute" nuclear deterrence.

(iii) Towards a Revised Intervention Concept

By the early 1970s, the enormity of commitments inherent in the "2-1/2" wars strategy was beginning to dawn on American policymakers. The intensity of the Vietnam conflict, and the demands in materiel and manpower which the war against Hanoi imposed on the United States, made it plain that, if what started as a "half" war against a primitive adversary could come to cost so much in blood and treasure, then preparing to fight another two major simultaneous wars elsewhere was both excessive and unrealistic. Consequently, the interest in military intervention, and in the associated limited war theorizing, receded sharply as "the negative education of⁵² the American defense community by the Vietnam war" took firm hold, and the Nixon Administration moved to scale down the original "Flexible Response" to "1-1/2" wars. As

a result of this reassessment, the Nixon Doctrine was promulgated in November 1969 which

- reiterated that the United States was not about to abandon its treaty commitments, but

- announced that American manpower was to be kept out of small wars in remote parts of the world;

- and indicated that friendly regimes in the Third World would continue to receive US military and economic assistance, but emphasized that any embattled government would be also expected to do its own fighting.

It can be safely argued that the Nixon Doctrine represented the main vehicle of rationalizing the American military disengagement from Southeast Asia while, at the same time, attempting to (a) re-assure friendly Third World regimes of America's continuing support in case of a "massive" attack by communist forces; and (b) offer domestic opponents of military intervention--whose anti-Vietnam war campaign threatened the country's political stability--a major public statement marking America's return to a noninterventionist global policy.

Strong sentiment against military intervention continued to dominate the US defence policy debate throughout the 1970s. With the exception of the Mayaguez incident in May 1975, when a US Marine detachment was dispatched to rescue an American merchantman captured by the Cambodians, the United States displayed little desire to engage in overseas military action. Public pressure against military intervention also resulted in the passage of the War Powers Act which, in effect, quite specifically restricted the president's constitutional latitude in ordering US troops deployed overseas or extending their

involvement in foreign crises (or wars) beyond a period of sixty days without appropriate Congressional authorization. As one study, published in 1976, succinctly noted, following Vietnam, there was "a lower threshold of public tolerance for the direct exercise of U.S. military power overseas and thus a diminishing willingness to 'send in the Marines'".⁵³

It was not until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 that the need for military intervention capabilities was re-discovered, and serious efforts began "to forge a degree of national consensus on the need to make such provisions, especially for Southwest Asia".⁵⁴ The definitive testimony to changing American attitudes towards involvement in "lesser" contingencies was the Carter Doctrine, incorporated in the President's 1980 State of the Union message, which declared that the United States, in view of the events near the Middle East oil fields, was prepared to use military force to defend its "vital interests".⁵⁵ Carter's change of course focused on the threat of direct Soviet intervention in the Third World, and more particularly, on Soviet "penetration" of the oil-rich Persian Gulf region. The corollary to this central consideration, however, was also the revival of the "brushfire" wars idea of the 1960s--which in the revised US Army Field Manual 100-20 became 'low intensity conflict'--along with the prospect of direct US military involvement in a guerrilla war waged in any Third World country--a mission that was now generally identified as "foreign internal defense".⁵⁶ The new version of FM 100-20

includes, for example, detailed discussion of "insurgency" strategies and tactics, of operational guidelines for the deployment of large military units in "counterguerrilla" missions in "host" countries, and of missions to be undertaken by special forces such as "long-range reconnaissance" and population indoctrination.

In compliance to this shift in national defence guidance, plans for distant projection forces were re-introduced with the activation of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), whose purpose was broadly similar to that of previous joint forces commands that had existed since 1962 when Secretary McNamara first activated the US Strike Command (USSTRICOM).⁵⁷ In its earliest form, the RDF was perceived as an umbrella command organization designed to integrate forces, stationed in the continental United States and drawn from all services, for rapid deployment in "non-NATO crises" areas. This initial RDF concept centered on "two major airlift and sealift enhancement initiatives" involving maritime prepositioning of supplies and heavy equipment of three US Marine brigades, and a new program to build a fleet of intercontinental heavy cargo aircraft.⁵⁸

The rather hasty designation of the RDF as a force with a worldwide mission was largely a political by-product of the furore caused by the invasion of Afghanistan, and the alarming exchanges about the "geo-strategic crisis" facing the Western alliance that inevitably followed.⁵⁹ It is safe to assume, however, that informed Carter Administration officials, although not

prepared to admit so publicly, must have been dubious about existing US capabilities to back the Carter Doctrine with deeds. It should not be surprising therefore that, shortly after its establishment, the RDF's tasking underwent modification which dropped the worldwide mission in favour of concentration on Southwest Asia and the protection of Western oil supplies.⁶⁰ These political maneuvers notwithstanding, the designation of the RDF as a reaction force to specifically counter Soviet "adventurism" in Southwest Asia, and even more so, "the unilateral commitment of military force with no temporal limits" to an overt intervention role "with only passing reference to the role of regional actors",⁶¹ marked the first, serious US administration attempt to depart from the "Vietnam syndrome". Although it would still be quite premature to assert that the impact of Vietnam upon the American conscience has been significantly reduced, it should also be underscored that the RDF concept was the first, post-1975 crucial "move forward" in re-defining US military intervention strategies and providing for the requisite force structures.

The imperatives of the Carter Doctrine were readily endorsed by the Reagan Administration and the implementation of related programs was accelerated accordingly. In national guidance terms, dealing with "lesser" contingencies, until then a matter of supporting friendly regimes on an ad hoc basis, was explicitly tied with the defence of "US or allied vital interests" worldwide since, in the words of General Jones,

---it is no longer practical to design autonomous regional strategies, for a threat in one strategic zone will almost certainly have a serious impact on the security of the others. 62

In order to underscore the centrality of the RDF intervention mission in national defence planning, the Reagan Administration upgraded the RDF command organization to the status of unified regional command. Redesignated US Central Command (USCENTCOM), the RDF's express mission became "to deter Soviet aggression and to protect U.S. interests in SWA [Southwest Asia]" by being "prepared to fight, thereby raising the cost of Soviet aggression to an unacceptable level".⁶³

(iv) The Question of "Proper" Strategy

Criticism of the RDF's doctrinal foundations, and of the overall shift towards military intervention, was (and is) certainly not absent. Those complaining are hardly limited just in the ranks of the traditional opponents of foreign military adventures. Vagueness about the purpose and rationale of the RDF has not gone unnoticed among conservative civilian strategists or military men themselves, and it has generated ample commentaries in search of appropriate force structure and mission designation.⁶⁴

Being "prepared to fight", and thus to raise the costs of Soviet "aggression" to "unacceptable" levels, were obviously insufficient sources of accurate operational military doctrine--let alone top-down guidance on the size and composition of forces involved, weapons systems, support systems, and mobilization procedure.⁶⁵

Furthermore, the implicit characteristic of the RDF as a political instrument (in addition to its military role), created the need for elaborating a clear set of political "rules of involvement" to be used in determining the "rungs" of escalation in times of crisis and, consequently, to offer distinct "threshold" points for the deployment of military power in crisis areas. However, none of these requirements were sufficiently met during the initial planning and declaratory phase after the promulgation of the Carter Doctrine. As Professor Waltz noted, RDF-related statements by administration officials engaged in much haphazard theorizing, left a lot to be desired, and displayed only "hazy notions about what an RDF can and should do".⁶⁶

In the ensuing years, articulating the rationale and purpose of the RDF has not significantly improved. The two elements that are still prominently missing from the current debate about the RDF--and thus from the deliberations about a comprehensive US concept of military intervention--are, first, the aforementioned political rules of involvement, or what has been described as the "basic political parameters within which the United States will be compelled to act";⁶⁷ and, second, the main function of an intervention force once commitment of military assets has been decided, the more widely discussed options being :

--"Tripwire" role: Focus on deterring Soviet actions by interposing token light-infantry force in the path of Soviet advance and the threat of escalation, both conventional and nuclear, if Soviet actions lead to military engagement.

--"Police" or "firefighting" role: Focus on suppressing imminent internal threat to friendly government through quick, "clean" action (not a long-term counterinsurgency commitment).

--"Theater war" role: Focus on battling a localized Soviet thrust into the Persian Gulf region by deployment of heavy ground and air forces.

--"Local defence" role: Focus on contesting territory and vital installations against resistance from one or more Third World countries (counterinsurgency operations possible).

Despite the sense of urgency that the Reagan Administration's defence policy has presumably injected into the planning process, it is still difficult to discern whether these conceptual problems are being adequately addressed. For example, it is still unclear exactly how the RDF would be able to counter a massed Russian advance against Iran, especially if it continues as merely "a state of mind, backed by a reservoir of resources and a determination to act"⁶⁸ instead of moving towards a standing projection force with dedicated assets and immediately deployable "nonborrowed" elements. Public official statements of the Administration have failed so far to provide an adequate reply to these questions. In his recent annual reports to Congress, for instance, Secretary Weinberger has dealt fairly extensively with ongoing programs of rapid-deployment logistical systems procurement, but has examined the question of roles and functions of the RDF in only cursory fashion while making⁶⁹ no mention of the "standing force" idea.

(v) Which Policy?

It is difficult to say at this juncture whether the

present Administration (and its successors) would opt for a "standing" RDF, or whether it would gear existing capabilities towards a "heavy" combat role as opposed to a structure which is "relational, i.e. reconfigured ad hoc⁷⁰ for the theater, the enemy, and the situation".

Ultimately, choosing a concept of operations suitable for "lesser" contingencies, and developing appropriate military forces and doctrine, remain functions of the political policy adopted to counter Soviet activities outside the European arena. In this respect, a recent Congressional research study suggested "the range of plausible options" open to US policymakers which in effect provides a typology of possible future US policy⁷¹ responses:

- o A Confrontationist Policy

- USSR viewed as "an expansionist-opportunist power" against which all instruments, nonmilitary as well as military, would be used.

- Soviet influence would be confronted on a global scale and "desirable buildups of key allies" would be carried out to enhance the US position in "threatened" areas.

- o A Neocontainment Policy

- Focus on responding to threats "of Soviet military intervention, subversion or use of military surrogates in the Third World not with the full range of U.S. policy instruments, but rather only with military, intelligence, covert action, and security assistance programs".

--Soviet "leverage" on Third World governments would not automatically invite US reaction, although any attempt to inject military force into the equation would prompt US counter-intervention.

o A Flexible Response Policy

--The USSR is again an "opportunistic" power with ambitions in the entire Third World.

--Due to limited resources, however, US policy would be geared towards protecting US interests "in areas of vital concern--primarily the Arabian Sea, Central America, and the Caribbean" with a variety of policy instruments.

o An Economic Security Policy

--The goal here would be to "diversify" US economic relations and cushion the US economy against "short to medium term losses of particular Third World areas to Soviet influence".

--By restructuring the whole system of US international trade relations, foreign aid practices, and investment priorities, the United States would be able to challenge Soviet advances in the Third World by exploiting the inherent inability of the USSR to compete as vigorously in the economic sphere as it does in the military one.

Soviet Military Intervention

Between the early 1950s and the invasion of Afghanistan, commitment of Soviet combat troops to overt military intervention in the affairs of third states

remained confined to the East European sphere of Soviet influence. Combating "counterrevolution" in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia resulted in various degrees of armed violence against the population of those countries, and ultimately established the unassailability of the USSR's European security zone. At the same time, and beginning roughly in the mid-1950s, Moscow embarked on a strategy of expanding its influence overseas through a combination of extensive military assistance programs and politico-economic efforts to bolster indigenous "vanguard" parties. It was during this period that a permanent Soviet interest in Third World affairs was established. Soviet presence beyond the European landmass, and "fraternal" relations between the Kremlin and peoples striving to free themselves from the "colonialist yoke", were seen as promoting the realization of Lenin's call for breaking "the chain of imperialism... at its weakest link"--the "weakest link" being the host of underdeveloped countries where the "bourgeois state" was nonexistent and where socialism could take root with relative ease.⁷²

(1) The Third World in the Soviet Worldview

Until the promulgation of the peaceful co-existence doctrine, the underdeveloped world remained a distant element in the Soviet worldview. Stalinist dogmatism had prevented contact with non-communist anti-colonial movements on ideological grounds; and it had rejected the prospect of colonies gaining their independence without the prior overthrow of imperialism by means of the

proletariat revolution.⁷³ Under Khrushchev this rigid position was discarded in favour of an activist policy to befriend the newly independent states and attach them, at least in theory, to the socialist commonwealth. The emergence of leaders in the ex-colonies who openly rejected capitalism and proclaimed themselves as adherents of "socialist development", coupled with the residual anti-Western feelings colonialism had bred, seemed to offer fertile soil for the quick growth of ties between the USSR and the Third World with only a minimum investment of Soviet resources. In addition, and beginning in 1961, because of the gradual erosion of the USSR's undisputed position as the center of the world socialist movement generated by the Sino-Soviet dispute, Moscow initiated a number of ideological innovations with the aim to re-assert Soviet ideological prominence over the Chinese and once again rally communist parties and regimes under its banner⁷⁴. But

Although these enunciations were offered as guides to other states and parties, it was evident that each communist country and party would examine the new ideological wares and carefully select and reject in accordance with its own needs.⁷⁵

In light of these adjustments, and in an attempt to accelerate the entry of the Third World into the Soviet sphere, Moscow adopted ideological accommodations which

--accepted that national liberation could be achieved by peaceful means;

--recognized "national democracy" as an acceptable form of government on the way to socialism even

though "bourgeois elements" still played an important role in it;

--and accepted the "validity" of alternative roads to socialism and the right of individual countries to pursue them.

Khrushchev's open-arms policy towards the Third World, however, did not have any spectacular results. While leaders like Castro, Nasser, Ben Bella, and Nkrumah embraced Moscow as an urgent alternative to an indifferent and often openly hostile West, the bewildering diversity of Third World problems, and the individual political and economic policies of each of the ex-colonies, left little room for the immediate rise of a Soviet-controlled, uniform, tightly-organized "peace zone" across Africa and Asia. The Soviet task was further hampered by Moscow's thinly-veiled reluctance to commit itself to a substantial program of foreign aid (a problem which was only partially alleviated by the willingness to provide arms and military assistance), in addition to the often unclear and inconsistent statements as to the method(s) it proposed to use in supporting the "oppressed" and the newly independent. In the case of Arab nationalism, for example, one analysis noted that:

The Soviet Communists inflame the national and racial feelings of the Arabs against the Western "colonisers," but when these feelings lead the Arabs to stray from the Soviet pattern of "national transformation," the Soviet Communists accuse them of harboring "reactionary feelings," "radicalism," or "petty bourgeois nationalism." 76

Thus, by the end of Khrushchev's incumbency, only

three Third World countries, Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam, openly identified themselves as Marxist-Leninist states. The rest of the "nonaligned" practiced assorted "third way" versions of socialism, frequently suppressed indigenous communist parties with a vigour reminiscent of the colonial "oppressors", and shared little with Moscow beyond the ever-present "mutual friendship" agreements and a broad "anti-imperialist" vision.

This failure to obtain full-fledged "allies" among the developing countries caused much introspection within the CPSU and eventually changes in the Soviet attitude towards non-communist, one-party Third World regimes. In retrospect, the early inability to build up Soviet influence in non-European areas seems only inevitable in light of the fact that the Soviet leadership had only scant knowledge of Third World affairs, and depended for its decisions "on a minimum amount of factual information⁷⁷ and a large amount of Marxist theory".

Khrushchev's departure from the Kremlin in 1964 signalled the return of ideological as well as political caution in Soviet Third World thinking and policies. The reassessment of the Khrushchev period, and political developments within Third World countries such as the wave of "reactionary" military coups that swept Africa in the mid-1960s, demonstrated that the optimistic expectations of socialism sweeping spontaneously through the ex-colonies were ill-founded, and from the viewpoint of foreign policy management, even counter-productive. The Brezhnev collective must have noted, for example, that

the majority of Third World elites remained dominated by "nationalistic petty bourgeois" elements with little appetite for "scientific socialism"; that Western methods of conservative state organization prevailed making the transition to Soviet-style socialism an extremely difficult exercise; that communist revolutionary movements looked inevitable if such transition was to be expected; and that strictly economic assistance could not induce adequate desire for the Soviet model of socialist development and, therefore, building Soviet influence would have to follow alternative paths.⁷⁸

Consequently, the Brezhnev approach to the Third World became dominated, in noticeable contrast to the rather haphazard practices of the 1950s and early 1960s, by the deliberate study of "the ongoing development of the world revolutionary process and of the national liberation struggle"; this painstaking process was adopted as the only means of reaching "theoretical comprehension" of the problems "involved in the building of socialism and communism in the USSR and other fraternal countries...".⁷⁹ which, it would seem, was the key factor in correctly assessing Third World dynamics and prospects of promoting the development of socialist state systems.

Thus, the lessons of the Khrushchev era spawned a major re-evaluation of policies towards the developing countries characterized by

- a more pragmatic assessment of the future of individual "revolutionary" regimes,

- a greater emphasis on weighing the long-term implications, instead of short-lived propaganda

gains, of Soviet involvement with particular Third World clients, and

--additional investment of Soviet resources mainly in areas where the cumulative effect of Soviet presence was deemed strong enough to insure a dominant Soviet role in local affairs.

These tenets were strengthened, refined, and institutionalized during the Brezhnev years and continue to shape the essential Soviet Third World views and attitudes.

Perhaps the most crucial characteristic of this doctrinal shift, especially from the viewpoint of Western security considerations, was the rejection of the possibility of "peaceful transition" to socialism. It was now posited that the necessary condition for introducing socialism was a "revolutionary struggle" by domestic "progressive forces" led by a "revolutionary vanguard" and assisted in their fight by other members of "the socialist community of nations".⁸⁰ As in the past, the USSR was to assume the "vanguard" position in this "internationalist" struggle.

This point was explicitly driven home during the 24th CPSU Congress (1971), when Brezhnev reaffirmed Soviet determination to "give undeviating support to the peoples' struggle for democracy, national liberation, and socialism",⁸¹ and again during the 25th CPSU Congress (1976), when "Brezhnev himself described the national liberation struggle as part of the international class⁸² struggle of the oppressed against their oppressors". Furthermore, Soviet commentary saw support of nations struggling to win and protect their right to self-

determination as not only a Marxist-Leninist duty, but also a moral obligation stemming from "international documents" which fully justified "helping colonial and dependent peoples in their struggle for independence".⁸³

By the mid-1970s, "national liberation" victories in Mozambique and Angola, and the overthrow of the Ethiopian emperor by a Marxist coup, balanced the Third World "correlation of forces" against setbacks like the ejection of Russian advisers from Egypt in 1972 and Somalia in 1977. By this time, the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic relations with ninety Third World nations, relations which, at least in Soviet propaganda parlance, "were complemented with mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation".⁸⁴ Although these countries differed in their stage of economic development, their policies of achieving "socialist construction", and their internal balance between "progressive" and "reactionary" political forces, their general "anti-imperialist" orientation offered a firm foundation for collective resistance against imperialist-capitalist exploitation and aggression. The power of "collective measures" was not to be underestimated, especially since it could even prevent escalation to "an imperialist-inspired world war" as the experience in Indochina had demonstrated:

The victory of the Vietnamese people, supported by the USSR and other socialist countries and by the world communist movement, clearly showed that when communist parties act in the same direction and mobilise the people in a determined struggle, imperialist aggression inescapably fails.⁸⁵

In the late Brezhnev years, as detente with the West

slowly disintegrated and Western-Chinese "collusion" acquired a new momentum, the importance of "collective" action as the underpinning of global Soviet "peace policy" was further emphasized. It was suggested, for instance, that "neo-colonialism" engaged anew in "a vigorous ideological expansion in the developing countries" spearheaded by "the propaganda of deideologization (sic) and anti-communist concepts and ideas"⁸⁶ which obviously called for "resolute rebuffs" of imperialist encroachments upon these countries. Such defence against the capitalist threat could not be achieved without increasing stress on the model of socialist development as the guiding national philosophy, supplemented by the need to discard hybrid "national" socialist doctrines, and by exposing the US policies of economic aid exploitation as tools in⁸⁷ penetrating and destabilizing developing economies.

* * *

For all the calls for a return to "pure ideology" among "friends" and "allies" in the developing world, the present Soviet attitude towards them seems to be more dominated by pragmatism than a blind belief in the "natural" alliance between Moscow-sponsored Marxism-Leninism and Third World states. If nothing else, the Soviets must have realized that treaties of friendship and co-operation are hardly cast-iron guarantees of permanent influence, let alone changes in national policy made for the benefit of specific Soviet interests.

Moreover, it must also be clear to the Soviet leadership that reduction of Western influence upon a

particular client Third World state does not automatically generate opportunities for Soviet inroads. The foreign policies of developing countries, contrary to what can be described as the unitary orientation model, have become increasingly complex exercises in avoiding the often asphyxiating embrace of one, major, external benefactor. Only recently, for instance, the majority of African states endorsed the Soviet-Cuban assistance to the Angolan and Ethiopian Marxists, while the same group of states actively discouraged "Soviet interference in Western, and later British-led, initiatives to effect a peaceful transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe".⁸⁸ Echoing this sense of realpolitik--and perhaps in tacit recognition of the limitations of Moscow's ability to spur wholesale defection of Third World actors to the Soviet sphere--the current CPSU Programme proclaims that

Relations between the Soviet Union and newly free countries have demonstrated that there also exists a realistic basis for cooperation with those young states that are following the capitalist road to development. 89

On the other hand though, commitment to the "anti-imperialist struggles" of those who strive to join the road to socialism remains undiluted:

The CPSU supports the just struggle waged by the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against imperialism and the oppression of transnational monopolies... for a restructuring of international relations on an equal and democratic basis... 90

In conclusion, therefore, the present Soviet attitude towards the Third World may be summed up as follows:

--The "internationalist struggle" continues

throughout the global system and the developing countries are in need of both "proper" ideological guidance and material support on the road to socialism;

--"peaceful transition" from capitalism to socialism is extremely difficult, if at all possible, "and thus a Soviet-sponsored revolution from outside is seen as the most promising way of securing Moscow a lasting presence" in the affairs of individual developing states;⁹¹ and

--in the interim, the USSR must be prepared to pursue relations even with those Third World states firmly lodged in the capitalist orbit.

(ii) Military Intervention: The Soviet View

In contrast to the rapid expansion of American military presence and involvement overseas in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the Soviet Union remained disinterested in overseas presence or bases,

and indeed withdrew from Porkkala Udd in Finland and Port Arthur and Dairen in China in the interests of better relations with the countries concerned.⁹²

Lacking a system of extra-European alliances, historically oriented towards warding off Germanic invasions, constrained by the lack of long-range transport aviation and a large surface navy, and largely preoccupied with strengthening its strategic Eastern European buffer, Moscow reserved only minimal interest for distant conflicts and even less for "projecting" military

power beyond the Soviet rimland. 93

Khrushchev's Third World policies, although paying lip service to the cause of "national liberation", failed to commit Moscow to specific forms of assistance, and even more so, to any undertaking entailing the participation of Soviet military personnel in foreign conflicts. The reluctance to become entangled manifested itself in "another doctrinal novelty" introduced by Khrushchev which posited that "local wars" could easily escalate to a global superpower nuclear confrontation--a condition which implied that local clashes with the United States over "liberation movements" must be avoided. This "novelty", designed as it was to preclude direct US/Soviet confrontations in peripheral areas, conveniently placed constraints "upon support of revolutionary conflicts" and as such "was caustically noted by the Chinese Communists".⁹⁴

Thus, reluctant to become involved in national liberation wars, the Kremlin resorted to a campaign of criticizing American doctrines of limited war--a practice which combined the advantages of being virtually risk-free, as far as a direct US-Soviet clash was concerned, with those of a high-profile exercise in the propaganda war against "imperialist aggression". The main focus of Soviet propaganda was the flexible response doctrine and its "brushfire" wars concept. Soviet commentators suggested, for example, that flexible response was in effect a hoax designed to deceive Washington's NATO allies

into believing that "general war" in Europe was a remote possibility, while all along striving to push "the waging of war as far away from U.S. territory as possible" without truly diminishing the risk of a nuclear exchange.⁹⁵ Particular stress was also put on the ideological deficiency of the "flexible response doctrineers" who, by virtue of their inability to comprehend the driving forces behind guerrilla struggles for freedom, condemned "imperialist aggression" to ultimate failure:

One of the most serious mistakes... in the imperialist concept of anti-guerrilla warfare is failure to realise that in certain conditions it is utterly impossible to find the way to achieve victory over a popular movement which has taken the form of guerrilla warfare....

Guerrilla warfare... has its own specific and original features, which powerfully confirm the invincibility of the popular movement and the futility of imperialist attempts to suppress it no matter what methods are used. 96

With the advent of the Brezhnev collective, the Soviet approach to Third World conflicts entered a more orderly phase of re-thinking tactics and attempting to reconcile specific policy objectives with expanding military power. The Cuban missile crisis had already demonstrated that brinkmanship involving a distant Third World "ally" carried unacceptable risks, especially in light of the USSR's limited power projection capabilities and the mathematics of the nuclear balance. It was, however, obvious that, if Moscow desired to arrest the plans and influence of the Peking "opportunists" directed at the "nonaligned", and if it seriously contemplated to

seek access to diversified "strategic positions" around the globe, its assistance to the "oppressed" had to take more concrete form.

The Brezhnev Third World strategy thus assumed two parallel paths: first, arms transfers, kept to relatively low levels during the Khrushchev era, began rising and Soviet military advisers were dispatched to recipient countries to serve in combat support roles;⁹⁷ and, second, the "local war" edifice came under renewed scrutiny in an effort to construct the "proper" intellectual framework to serve both the requirements of Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet global policy.

Reassessing the nature of "local wars" seemed quite urgent indeed in view of emerging, and rather confusing "contradictions": Third World nations, ostensibly united in their opposition to "imperialism", were now clashing over territorial and ethnic disputes (as in the 1967 Middle East War and the 1965 Indo-Pakistani conflict), and calling for the first time for Soviet help in their individual feuds with their ex-colonial brethren.⁹⁸ Consequently, choosing sides in Third World conflicts became not only inevitable, but also the subject of delicate policy exercises with the aim of limiting the damage upon long-term Soviet interests, and ensuring a major Soviet role in every significant accommodation between non-Western regional powers.

The growing US military intervention in Vietnam during the late 1960s placed a special burden on the USSR in its role as the leading defender of "revolutionaries"

around the world. Although Soviet commentary reiterated Moscow's faith in the ultimate futility of the small-war "rainbow ideas" succeeding against the ideologically superior North Vietnamese communists,⁹⁹ it was also "apparent that the USSR was willing to do very little on behalf of the Vietnamese communists beyond the shipment of arms".¹⁰⁰

Whether this hands-off Soviet approach was due to the belief that the Americans could do little but simply postpone defeat in the face of Hanoi's "moral superiority", or due to a sober assessment of the consequences of direct Soviet military involvement in Indochina is a matter for debate. In any event, the Vietnam war rekindled the view that "dirty local wars", unleashed by the United States to further its "aggressive plans", could indeed escalate to world war under certain conditions (i.e. not inevitably), but it was also emphasized that this prospect could not and would not prevent the USSR from giving "thorough support to the national liberation movement".¹⁰¹ At the same time, the Khrushchevite link between local and nuclear world war was dropped and replaced with a crucial new theory: favourable world correlation of forces, and the expansion of Soviet nuclear capabilities, made possible to prevent "the development of local wars into an enormous clash on a world-wide scale".¹⁰² Now,

US imperialism must reckon with such cardinal factors as the military-economic and scientific-technical potential of the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp. These factors have made it possible to create... a mighty nuclear

missile armoury, which is the decisive element in the Soviet Union's strength, and which operates as a deterrent to aggressive aspirations of world reaction, headed by US imperialism. 103

This display of confidence in socialism's ability to command sufficient strength to challenge, without the fear of nuclear annihilation, "imperialist aggression" against "revolutionary movements" was crucial. As Katz put it:

The ability to prevent the outbreak of world war through the increased strength of socialism meant not only that the USSR could play a greater role in aiding progressive forces to counter a local war launched by the imperialists, but also that the Soviet Union could itself make foreign policy gains through local wars without fear of world war. Previously, local wars had been thought of as means through which only the imperialists could gain. Now it was recognised that the USSR could gain from local wars as well... 104

As a result, in the mid- and late-1970s "aiding progressive forces" in the Third World became much better planned, organized, and implemented. The most important development in the military sphere was the expansion of the Soviet Navy which, under the leadership of Admiral Gorshkov, was already embarked on an ambitious plan to establish permanent Soviet presence in distant oceans. Soviet naval patrols in "warm waters" not only underlined Moscow's claim to the status of a global power, but also reminded present and potential Soviet clients that the USSR was indeed building a power projection capability to support "anti-imperialist struggles" with both words and deeds. Overall, Soviet penetration of "target" countries became a careful interplay of three main elements: arms transfers, close ideological links with local Marxist groups, and generous use of foreign "advisory" missions

drawn from Moscow's Warsaw Pact satellites and countries like Cuba and North Korea.

These developments appeared to win some impressive gains for Moscow: Soviet and other Eastern bloc advisers, assigned a variety of military, technical, educational, and internal security tasks, became almost permanent fixtures in the domestic scene of many Third World nations. More significantly, Cuban troops arrived in Africa to offer combat support to, but also undertake independent combat missions for, Marxist regimes in Angola and Ethiopia under the umbrella of an unprecedented Soviet long-range logistical operation aimed at providing the requisite weapons and supplies to Moscow's friends. In both cases, the Soviet-Cuban presence was crucial in the "socialist victories" of those regimes, and signalled the beginning of what has been described as "the new Soviet proto-alliance system" in Africa.¹⁰⁵

During the same period relations with Iraq, Syria, and Libya were strengthened, and broadened Soviet presence in South Yemen turned "that strategically important country into what one Western diplomat called a 'military warehouse'"; however, these advances were partially counterbalanced by the "loss" of Somalia, the "gradual shift Westward" of Angola and Mozambique due to their disastrous economic condition, the transition of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe without Soviet participation in the Lancaster House agreements, the low Marxist fortunes in the Caribbean, and the diminishing Soviet role in the search for settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.¹⁰⁶

The magnitude of the support given to the African Marxists against "imperialist reaction", and especially the presence of "reliable" Cuban troops on the battlefield did, however, have another, less publicized, purpose: historical experience had already demonstrated that Moscow's fundamental security interests frequently diverged from those of indigenous Third World forces--a fact which increasingly called for a direct Soviet role in controlling events and boosting the "fraternal" fervour of Marxist-Leninist Third World regimes. 107

As the 1970s came to a close, the invasion of Afghanistan gave the signal that this direct role might after all take the form of overt military intervention to prevent the overthrow of "progressive" Third World governments struggling against the "agents of imperialism". This possible action though in no way diminished the consistent Soviet policy of peace because, as Marshal Grechko had written earlier, a war imposed upon the USSR "or other socialist states" by the imperialists was "unjust... and a continuation of their predatory politics"; furthermore,

This war would be just and progressive on the part of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. It will be a continuation of their revolutionary politics of defending the freedom and independence of their motherland and promoting the great cause of building socialism and communism. 108.

Lest the "imperialists" forget, peaceful coexistence with the "bourgeois states" did not "abrogate the laws of class struggle", nor did it eliminate the right of a nation to oppose "aggressive imperialist policy by all means

accessible to it, including the defense of its interests by beginning a national liberation war with guns in hand".¹⁰⁹ Shortly after the invasion, the "external" role, which the Soviet armed forces assumed in "protecting" Afghanistan, was reaffirmed by Colonel Vorob'yev as a primary mission aimed at "frustrating the aggressive plans of international imperialism", and as part "of the historical mission of socialist states to defend the peace of the whole world"; the "external function", Vorob'yev indicated, could be "implemented in various forms" according to prevailing conditions, one of which is "revolutionary wars in defense of the socialist Fatherland [and] of all world socialism".¹¹⁰

This brings us to a final observation: although Vorob'yev stopped short of clearly stating a concept of Third World military intervention, the implications of the "external function" appeared more or less obvious. However, it was also premature to forecast "massive" Soviet power projection in "unstable" areas with the active deployment of combat troops. Given the Soviet propensity to establish long-term strategies only after a critical test has been performed successfully, the outcome of the Afghanistan war will be crucial. If Soviet arms fail to subdue the Afghans (and so far there is little cause for Soviet optimism), then "it is doubtful that [the Soviets] would discuss direct Soviet military intervention in Third World conflicts as a policy to be undertaken elsewhere".¹¹¹

Conclusion

The following points have hopefully emerged from the preceding discussion:

- (A) In the years since the US departure from Vietnam, and while American perceptions on distant power projection came under the restrictive influence of the "Vietnam syndrome", Moscow moved beyond its own traditional reluctance to get involved in the Third World and embarked upon a policy of "fraternal" assistance to "progressive forces" in their fight against "capitalist neo-colonizers". Thus, for the first time in its history, the USSR is able to contemplate challenging US security interests, and US-backed regimes, through a variety of military-political actions in areas far away from its shores with the hope, however limited, of actually gaining an advantage.
- (B) It is also important to note the significance Moscow ascribes to the "political effect of the strategic balance" upon regional political developments, a relationship that "has been ignored or denied in orthodox U.S. strategic theory".¹¹² Soviet confidence, based on expanded strategic capabilities, is perhaps the key ingredient in current Soviet activities in the Third World.
- (C) Although the United States clearly retains a superior aggregate capability to project military power overseas, the shift in Soviet theory and practice regarding commitments in the "periphery", from an

essentially reactive posture to one of assertiveness and initiative, might in the long run be a crucial political factor in the battle for the "hearts and minds" of Third World governments.

- (D) Finally, a word of caution is due concerning the "risk" of "massive" Soviet intervention in Third World conflicts. Soviet theory and practice have stopped, so far, short of defining and implementing the "external function" of the Soviet armed forces broadly enough to sustain credible theories of a Soviet "onslaught" against peripheral strategic areas.

CHAPTER III

MILITARY INTERVENTION: TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Unlike the search for a theory on the causes of international conflict and war, military intervention as a theoretical concept has generated fragmented interest and resulted, so far, in sparse literature. One reason for this paucity may be the preference to look at military intervention as a component (sub-system) of the global system encompassing the entire spectrum of the uses of military force in international relations.¹ According to this view, the military intervention sub-system is normally activated on an ad hoc basis depending on objective conditions of power and the requirements of a particular conflict situation.

While historical experience may support this view in connection to earlier stages in the evolution of the international system (e.g. during the 19th century European 'balance of power' period) the ad hoc approach seems ill-suited for the study of military intervention within the post-1945 international security environment. In the present uncertain days a number of significant factors support a different approach to military intervention. First, the speed of change in the less developed areas of the world create unprecedented pressures and risks of armed conflict among regional actors; second, the diffusion of power and the

multipolarity it entails limit the effectiveness of "spheres of influence" and impose increasing restrictions upon the actions (but, also, reactions) of previously dominant actors, a situation which offers fertile ground for military responses even to minor "threats"; and, third, the perception that the world is entering a state of increased turmoil and instability--not necessarily associated with superpower rivalry--feeds the process towards ever more comprehensive "contingency planning" and "scenario building" which, more often than not, contain² substantial military components.

These factors create the need for viewing military intervention as an essential and permanent part of international security relations. This chapter will therefore (a) focus the discussion on the concept of intervention in general and attempt to describe it in general systems theory terms, and (b) further refine the discussion to consider the military intervention subsystem and its characteristics.

The Intervention System

"Interventionary" activities within the international system have traditionally triggered heated debates among scholars. Moral, legal, economic, and strategic concerns have all combined to form a rather tangled net of argument and counter-argument regarding the methods, rationale, and possible outcomes of interfering in the affairs of "victim" or "target" system actors.

The pervasiveness and historical durability of the

concept of intervention--or, at least, what different analysts choose to call 'intervention'--leads to a continuum of definitions which identify the concept with innumerable "shades" ranging from phenomena associated with the use or the threat of force to virtually every activity originating in one political system and having repercussions in another.³ As a result, intervention is variously associated with terms like "penetration", "coercion", "aggression", "subversion", and even "influence" be it political, economic, cultural, or any combination thereof. The propensity to use the above terms almost synonymously often leads to ambiguity and contradiction. The situation is further obscured by the erosion of the traditional doctrine of nonintervention in favor of "conditional intervention" due to changing perceptions on international law and methods of offering assistance to less developed nations. As Professor Scott observed:

The doctrine of nonintervention stands in serious need of modification. Powerful nations do not, and cannot, adhere to it. They cannot adhere to it and offer leadership because the exercise of international leadership often involves intervention. The United States, for example, cannot assist a poor nation along the path of development while observing the principle of nonintervention because a full-scale program of assistance revolves around various forms of intervention. One nation cannot help another nation modernize and, at the same time, cling to the time-honored principle of nonintervention.⁴

The contradiction of opinions on intervention becomes even more sharply focused when we note that strictly-defined nonintervention remains the aim for all less

powerful developing states. In this respect, the traditional view that intervention should be linked with only the threat of or the use of force has been challenged as "too restrictive" for modern times as it fails to take into account "other types" of intervention such as

- economic pressure;
- diplomatic proposals accompanied by political threats;
- subversive activities and incitement to rebellion;
- allowing traffic in weapons and military equipment in order to assist a rebel band in another state;
- supplying government-made or government-owned weapons for the same purpose; and
- allowing persons within the jurisdiction of the interfering state to take part in the preparation, organization, and execution of a military enterprise designed to initiate or promote rebellion or sedition within another state. 5

The historian's observations have produced, and continue to generate, great amounts of empirical information about interventionary activities. This reservoir of facts, contrary to what one might be tempted to believe, creates no firm grounds for the elaboration of a concept definition, let alone for constructing a general theory of intervention. Given the sheer complexity of interventionary activities, the analyst is confronted with the not unknown problem of trying to work his way through a lexical maze to a definitive typology of intervention--which, in all probability, will never be able to reach. As Stanley Hoffman says:

A general presentation on the subject of intervention is likely to contain little that is original, and to consist only of an endless series of classifications. The reason for this

is very simple. The subject is practically the same as that of international politics in general from the beginning of time to the present. 6

Richard Little, in his attempt to address the problem of theory formulation created by the myriad connotations of the word "intervention", observes that the analyst is indeed prisoner of the "paradox of conceptualization"--intervention is a widely used word but hardly a well-defined concept; forming a theory requires a concept although no concept can be formed without a theory. He concludes, therefore, that,

an examination of all forms of behaviour identified as intervention will not help elucidate a concept. Certain a priori assumptions have to be made and many connotations associated with the word must be eliminated if a clearly defined concept is to emerge. 7

Little's view testifies to the near frustration associated with the effort to force an abstract phenomenon into an intellectual "cast"--and the usual, if unavoidable, tendency to respond by relying on axioms and other "truths" drawn from "general observation". Professor Rosenau, in his well-known earlier study of intervention as a scientific concept, arrives at a similar conclusion although he rightly seems reluctant to assign scientific value to the gathering of ever-increasing amounts of data without the benefit of a set of unifying, explanatory (and hopefully tested) generalizations. In his words:

Data and insights in themselves... do not necessarily lead to an ever-accumulating body of reliable knowledge about the conditions under which intervention does and does not occur---

---The factors that foster, precipitate, sustain, channel, constrain, and/or curb intervention simply have not been scientifically explored, with the result that the literature is barren of any established generalizations. All that exists is an enormous amount of conventional and legal wisdom in which conclusions are asserted on the basis of a jumble of ringing affirmations, impressive insights, clearcut preferences, and supportive historical examples. 8

Against this background, and of course the never-ending controversy concerning concept formulation, the problem of definition seems to have no obvious solution. In the absence of a firm consensus on the nature and forms of intervention, reaching a working definition has to inevitably rest with previous attempts to do so.

The least ambiguous point about "intervention" is that it constitutes "interference" in the internal and external affairs of another state. According to Helen Stern, for example, "intervention implies an active, calculated step, a forcible interference in another nation's external and internal affairs, to maintain or alter a condition or situation, presuming, further, that this coercion will in some manner benefit or protect the initiator".⁹ The notion of "interference" is also present in at least two additional attempts to define intervention. Rosenau distinguishes the intruder's convention-breaking behaviour but also the authority-oriented nature of his actions.¹⁰ This view posits that intervention is a "sharp break with then-existing norms" and that "it is directed at changing or preserving the structure of political authority in the target society"--i.e. it is meant, primarily, to influence or alter

existing rules of power transfer and, presumably, create¹¹
future regimes "acceptable" to the intruder. In a
similar vein, and again focused on interference in
internal politics, Oran Young defines intervention as
"organized and systematic activities across recognized
boundaries aimed at affecting the political authority¹²
structures of the target". An important part of such
"systematic activities" is the overt or implied threat of
sanctions if the target fails to comply with the wishes of
the intervener. The threat of sanctions alone, however,
is usually insufficient to modify the target's behaviour
according to the intruder's wishes. As Tedeschi et. al.
observe:

the threat of sanction, though necessary, is not
a sufficient condition of power because the
availability of sanction endows the source
[intruder] with power over the target only when
certain conditions are met (1) the target must
be aware of what the source wants, presumably
through clear communication, (2) the threatened
punishment must be perceived as costly to the
target, (3) the cost of the target's
noncompliance to the source's requests should be
greater than the costs of compliance; and (4)
the target must believe that the threatener will
probably punish noncompliance. 13

Assuming that these preconditions exist, and for
intervention to take its generally accepted form
associated with interference, the intruder should carry on
with coercive measures to secure the target's compliance.

Therefore,

---the real criterion for determining whether
there was intervention in a particular case was
whether there was any open or disguised coercion
to make a state do something contrary to its
desires and interests or to prevent it from
doing something which it could legitimately do
otherwise. 14

On the basis of the above, and for the purposes of this study, a first-level root definition and a "textual-form" model can be expressed as follows:

--An intervention system is a system controlled by the intruder's national authorities and designed to undermine, support, overthrow, or modify the behaviour of the target's political authority structures assuming that such action will satisfy specific desires (policy requirements) of the intruder at an acceptable cost.

MODEL

Express desire or policy requirement

Determine specific goal in regard to target
Determine mode of intervention

Evaluate available capabilities

Assess military force structures
Assess non-military means

Maintain contact with target

Insure unbroken flow of intelligence

Evaluate possible environment constraints

Assess risk of counter-intervention

Plan action and assign tasks

Non-military planning
Military contingency planning

Implement intervention plans

* * *

At this point, and in order to explore intervention in systemic terms, it is proposed to adopt Robinson's
15 approach and discuss the concept of intervention in the
16 systems language with the aid of what Robin Williams

calls "firm simplicities" available through general¹⁷
historical observation. The studies of Oran Young¹⁸ and
Robbins and Oliva¹⁸ have suggested lists of general
systems theory terms several of which are utilized below.

SYSTEM: The intervention system may be considered an open
human activity system where the minimum, necessary number
of actors is two. For the purposes of this study, the
intervention system actors are nation-states which, in a
world-system perspective, are defined as political
organizations representing only their own citizens and¹⁹
"contending with others in a larger arena".

Actor numbers can, in theory, be infinite. However,
in real-world situations, and for the sake of clarity, the
initial formulation of intervention systems should include
only the minimum necessary number so that relationships
between the intruder and the target can be clearly
defined. One topic of particular interest--and one which
should be treated with care when modelling intervention
systems--is the delimitation of significant actor sub-
systems. Although the traditional statecentric view of
international relations treats nation-states as more or
less cohesive units with a single "personality", so to
speak, such notions seem to have limited relevance when we²⁰
view many modern independent states.

Many Third World countries, for example, suffer from
political, regional, cultural, and economic fragmentation.
Failing to recognize the significance of national sub-
systems at the intervention system level often leads to

faulty systemic logic and distortion of findings. It is, therefore, useful to look at system actors in terms of their building blocks, i.e. those purposeful sub-systems whose interaction determines overall actor (and system) behaviour.

If, for example, the intervention system consists of one intruder and a target which is "bifurcated"²¹ because of internal unrest and the rise of a potent anti-government movement, modelling this system should be based on a minimum of three elementary sub-models; first, one representing the relationship between the intruder and the target's central government; second, another representing the target's internal conflict situation; and, third, another depicting the action-reaction process between the intruder and the movement challenging the target's central government authority (assuming that the intruder is indeed supporting that government).²²

ENVIRONMENT: Although intervention systems are ultimately components of the international system's universal environment, it is often useful, if not necessary, to opt for a lower environment resolution. Intervention systems other than those containing the two superpowers as dominant actors are prime candidates for such treatment. An intervention like that of Tanzania to overthrow Uganda's Idi Amin, the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, and Libya's intrusion into Chad may be much more precisely analyzed if they are examined within the regional rather than the global environment. This approach allows the

building of "linkage" models, representing the relationships between the given intervention system (taken as a single component) and other environment components, with a much higher degree of confidence.²³

DYNAMICS: The emphasis here is placed upon system change and particularly on structure and power distribution. Addition or removal of actors to or from the intervention system result in different power balances and influence the final outcome of interventionary activities.²⁴ Israel's intervention strategy in Lebanon had to undergo changes in response to active Syrian involvement in that country. It can be convincingly argued, for example, that the Syrian presence and willingness to engage the Israeli Defence Forces, reduced Israel's desire to create a security zone by semi-annexing southern Lebanon in much the same fashion as in the case of the Golan Heights.

The speed of change is crucial to system maintenance. High speeds coupled with extreme power disparities usually result in catastrophe for the target actor and lead to the demise of that particular intervention system. The American invasion of Grenada is a case in point. The American massive military blow completed the uprooting of the radical Grenadian leftists and their Cuban supporters in a matter of days and led to an equally rapid withdrawal of the main intervention force. Slower speeds, on the other hand, may lead to long cycles of system operation and modification as in the case of American interventionary activities in Central America.

OVERLOAD: An intervention system is overloaded when it is incapable of responding to demands placed upon it. Overloading is undesirable as it may lead to system dysfunction and eventual complete breakdown. It is, however, difficult, if not impossible, to determine threshold points and take preemptive action. One way of guarding against overload is to avoid defining system goals in overambitious terms. Failing to do so may lead policymakers to attach "high confidence" to "expectations that are too specific" and in fact quite unrealistic.²⁵ Monitoring resources expended against results obtained (the typical 'cost-benefit' analysis approach) is another. Ultimately, however, overloading may be unavoidable if intervention becomes an end in itself and loses its clearly focused objective. The US-Vietnam intervention system became gradually overloaded between 1965 and 1968 mainly due to American strategic oscillation--only to deteriorate further into dysfunction and collapse in the period from 1969 to 1975. In contrast, South African interventionary activities against neighbouring black African states are calculated to fully exploit existing power disparities and to promote South African interests without causing system overload (which could occur if South Africa chose to engage in long-term anti-guerrilla campaigns deep inside neighbouring territories).

CONTROL: This is perhaps one of the most important concepts when dealing with intervention systems. Control by system actors establishes the pattern of activity

"flows" which occur within the system. Positive control, i.e. the ability to plan and implement various strategies towards attaining objectives, is juxtaposed to negative control, an essentially reactive process whereas threatened actors engage in evasive action, so to speak, in order to minimize or avoid exposure to damaging encounters.²⁶ During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union exercised positive control over its missile-basing activities until American intelligence revealed the existence of Soviet launchers on Cuban soil. Thereafter, Moscow was forced into negative control measures steering clear of a nuclear confrontation with the United States but seeking, at the same time, to withdraw its strategic weapons from Cuba without serious loss of face. Although the United States appeared as exercising positive control during its intervention in Vietnam (at least until 1968-69), it may be said that most American actions were influenced by negative control thinking caused by the desire to minimize the possibility of direct Soviet and Chinese counter-intervention on the side of the Hanoi regime.

FEEDBACK: Information about the results of interventionary activity, communicated from lower to top leadership levels, should contribute, at least in theory, to the improvement or change of methods, practices, tactics, and strategies adopted and implemented by system actors. The common expression "learning from experience" seems appropriate in this context. Feedback is hardly

automatic, however. Creating effective, operational feedback "loops" which can pass reliable information to central command authorities is usually one of the weakest links in the intervention system.²⁷

Feedback allows lessons to be "learned" and policy modified accordingly. Argentina's leadership did not ignore goal-changing feedback following the Falklands debacle; and as a result there is no reason to believe that it plans, at least in the immediate future and in view of the Fortress Falklands British policy, to repeat the military junta's blunder. Similarly, it may be argued that Britain has also benefited from goal-seeking feedback adjusting its policies to the idea of eventual negotiation on the future of the islands. Another example of goal-changing feedback would be America's "Vietnam syndrome" which has undoubtedly and permanently altered American perceptions concerning the desirability and usefulness of combat commitments abroad.

GOAL/STABILITY: The primary goals of an intervention system are essentially two: (a) to cause changes in the target's policy outputs which satisfy perceived interests of the intruder, and (b) to secure long-term compliance of the target with such changes, i.e. to insure future system stability. Intervention systems are "stable" in the long term if they can maintain effective operation of a set of rules which govern the interaction of its actors.²⁸ Theoretically, such rules are dictated by the more powerful intruder, although it is also conceivable for

the target to manipulate weaknesses of the intruder's policies in order to force him into a "process of²⁹ decommitment" and eventual withdrawal.

On the other hand, stability--at least as perceived by the intruder--as inherently contrary to the interests of the target. The exercise of continuous intruder authority and the tacit acceptance of the intervention status quo by third parties, may be impossible to break short of a major war or other catastrophic occurrence (e.g., collapse of the intruder because of domestic reasons). Israel's occupation of the West Bank and of the previously Arab-held section of Jerusalem has created conditions of stability which no Arab nation -- let alone the Palestinian 'liberation' movement -- could safely challenge without simultaneously causing Israel to rise for a "total" war of survival. In similar fashion, the Turkish occupation of the northern half of Cyprus has resulted in the destruction of the sovereign Republic of Cyprus and the permanent division of the island between two rival sectors without any realistic prospects for reunification.

DECAY: Decay is closely related to dynamics and it refers to the slow deterioration of the intervention system. Decay may affect the nation-states/components themselves, usually leading to the demise or serious damage of the target actor, or to reduced effectiveness of interventionary strategies. Decay implies processes evolving over rather extended periods of time and thus it

is inapplicable in the case of "short-burst" interventionary action with radical aims.

COMMUNICATION: Communication is a routine process of sending and receiving signals (information flows) which, in an interventionary situation, acquires a key role. It might be argued, for example, that lack of adequate communication between actors often fuels interventionary activities for a variety of reasons: suspicion bred by the absence of direct, regular contact; overdependence on secondary and possibly corrupted means of obtaining information about the other party; preemptive moves to counter misperceived "threats"; and inability to assess correctly evolving situations which come to be identified as "crises" calling for drastic "corrective" measures. As one analysis put it, many "urgent international problems.... require low-level bargaining and persuasive expertise within a multilateral framework" rather than refusal to communicate.³⁰ However, such bargaining processes "are typically mobilized only in later, more acute stages of conflict, where the range of possible actions has become gravely restricted".³¹

INFORMATION: Information could prove to be of fundamental importance to the maintenance or breakdown of an intervention system. An intruder capable of thoroughly assessing the target on the basis of reliable information has the opportunity for better strategic analysis and planning; conversely, sparse or poorly assessed information may lead to ineffective action and failure of

the intervention system. From the point of view of the target, timely information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of a potential intruder may spell the difference between subjugation to his will and an acceptable level of defense against his coercion.

Military Intervention

Military intervention occupies the extreme point of the intervention activities continuum under the label "use of force". In broad terms, the activation of a military intervention system presupposes the following minimum number of conditions:

- The intruder's decisionmakers have reached the conclusion that a crisis situation has deteriorated beyond the capacity of non-violent methods of crisis management;
- A military power projection capability exists in a state of readiness;
- The target's political authority structures are either unable or unwilling to exert control over the evolving "threat";
- The "threat" affects (or at least appears to affect) "interests" of the intruder (defined in whatever fashion the intruder's policymakers choose).

The main difficulty in drawing the boundary of the military intervention system is the "fuzziness" which seems to exist when one attempts to differentiate between military intervention and a "war" super-system--a problem compounded by the familiar levels-of-analysis arguments. It frequently seems plausible to argue that military intervention constitutes the first step in a "local" war which, in turn, might lead to further escalation of hostilities and the expansion of the geographical limits

of combat operations. In the cases of the American involvement in both Korea and Vietnam, for instance, such expansion, following the initial insertion of token "intruder" combat forces, was narrowly averted thanks to mainly political reasons. The potential of a "police action" leading to protracted hostilities is a major consideration for decisionmakers and perhaps the single most important deterrent to the use of force.

An immediate reaction to these definitional problems is to point out that military intervention is indeed war of some form or another since it involves the use of military force to subdue a resisting party. Definitions of war have been sufficiently broad to allow military intervention to be listed under them without too much hesitation. Consider, for example, the definition of war offered by Most and Starr:

A "war" is a particular type of outcome of the interaction of at least dyadic sets of specified varieties of actors in which at least one actor is willing and able to use some specified amount of military force for some specified period of time against some other, resisting actor and in which some specified minimal number of fatalities (greater than zero) occur. 32

At least one analysis has gone even further to perceive military intervention as a "concept broader than war" and as one that would include "formal war", i.e. declared interstate war which is in essence a "hostile intervention... a forceful across-border interference in the target state's internal and external affairs".³³

Such high level of generalization has not failed to enter everyday language. Indeed, evaluations of military

intervention situations, especially when made by parties friendly to the target (or others with a genuine dislike for the use of force in general) tend to underline the "aggressive" nature of the military action undertaken and to swiftly conclude that the target has fallen victim of undeclared "war".

This popular, if seldom non-polemical, view, ladden as it is with the moral rejection of violence as a means of conflict resolution, takes little notice of (admittedly ambiguous) categorizations like "limited hostile acts with minor costs" as opposed to "very hostile war actions" which cause "many deaths".³⁴ It does respond, however, to underlying human and legalistic emotions by automatically linking military intervention with illegitimacy; and in the process it leaves little analytical room for the elaboration of sub-categories which might help separate "limited military incursion" from acts of all-out war. As one might expect, this point causes deep and lasting disagreements whose resolution ultimately rests with the successful reconciliation of differing methodological, moral, philosophical, and ethical views concerning the approaches to the study of war.³⁵

Since this study is not primarily concerned with "total" formal war, it bypasses the above arguments and assumes that the main attribute of military intervention systems, established through common usage, is the "limited" nature of their goals and the military means employed to achieve them. The military intervention system, at least at the initial planning stage and despite

the unavoidable considerations of escalation risks, is conceived as a closely controlled exercise which aims to dislodge and neutralize particular adversary groups within the target rather than destroy the latter entirely (an aim which would be appropriate to a 'total' war effort).

Although target catastrophe may occur as a result of even "limited" military actions, due to relative power asymmetries and changing intentions of the intruder, the assumption that military intervention systems are positioned towards the "low-intensity" conflict end of the conventional conflict spectrum remains. In general, "low-intensity" or "limited" conflict has come to be juxtaposed to "high-intensity" or "high-technology" conflict, a categorization which may not be wholly accurate but which has won its place in a substantial part of the literature. As David Tarr observes:

This language is not very precise, of course. But it does suggest the difference between, say, an intense, large-scale battle in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces, employing every form of advanced weapons technology, and a civil war waged by a poorly equipped guerrilla force against the regular armed forces of the government in an underdeveloped country in the Third World. 36

While positioning military intervention at the "low-intensity" end of the conflict scale creates a useful demarcation line separating "limited" military operations from those of major conventional war and nuclear conflict, this assumption does not necessarily clear the question of whether a military intervention system should include only those activities which involve the intervening forces in combat roles. Areas on the grey margin of combat

missions, i.e. "threshold" activities such as training and advisory assistance usually preceding the commitment of the intruder's forces to combat, are often seen as part of the military intervention system itself. One might wish to argue this point further although, as Macfarlane points out,

---in common usage, [military] intervention usually carries the connotation of a more direct military involvement than these forms of assistance. Cases generally referred to as [military] intervention share one characteristic: the involvement in combat roles of either the regular forces of the external power or the irregulars acting in the interests and at the behest of the intervening power. 37

To recapitulate briefly at this point:

- Military intervention is the sub-system of the intervention system comprising activities at the extreme "use-of-force" area of the intervention activities continuum.
- The assumption is made that military intervention activities are "limited" both in scope and objectives and as a result, military intervention is not initially, at least, conceived as a major war "formalized" through declaration.
- It is also assumed that military intervention, as understood in the context of this study, entails combat roles for the intruder's military forces or for those (regular or irregular) of its allies, with activities such as military advisory and training assistance assigned to the broader intervention environment (even if a small number of advisors

'observe' combat missions taking place within the target).

Military Intervention: A Second-level Model

Having considered the intervention system as a first level model, and bearing the above assumptions in mind, we will presently attempt to design a second-level model incorporating the specific attributes of a military intervention situation. This attempt centers on two main questions: What is the basic purpose of the system? What can be used to construct the system?

1) What is the basic purpose of the system?

The statement of purpose for a military intervention system could be a modified root definition of intervention which takes into account the use of military force in attaining specified system goals as follows:

-- A military intervention system is a system controlled by the intruder's national authorities with the purpose of supporting, undermining, suppressing, or modifying the outputs of the target's political authority structures or other groups within the target through the application of limited military force assuming that such action will satisfy specific desires (policy requirements) of the intruder.

A modified intervention model can also serve as the "second-level" (or derivative) model of military intervention:

MODEL

Express desire or policy requirement

Determine specific goal in regard to target
Determine extent/nature of military intervention
Issue policy guidance for military planning staff

Evaluate available capabilities

Assess projection capabilities over time

Evaluate possible environment constraints

Assess military risks of counter-intervention

Assess target's ability to secure outside sources of material aid

Implement military intervention plans

2) What can be used to construct the system?

Building a military intervention capability depends on a host of "national power" factors although, ultimately, the decision to use military force rests with the resolve of governments and the popular support they can mobilize for such actions. From the purely military point of view, intervention requires the effective integration of a number of attributes to form the "reach" and "punch" which underlie the effective application of force. These attributes are:

Aggregate military power

The term "power" is a notoriously hazy one but nevertheless it is used widely to denote the ability of given actors to exercise influence upon others. As Knorr put it, "power can be used either to establish influence by means of coercion or, without coercive intent to defend³⁸ or change the status quo between actors." National power is often associated with the sum of the nation's human resources, economic strength, technological advancement, trade relations, and, last but not least, military³⁹ might. Although it is generally assumed that a truly "powerful" state requires a balanced mixture of these elements, if it expects to become anything

resembling a "great" power, military might alone is often sufficient to provide an effective "cutting edge" for otherwise less powerful actors.

Aggregate military power is not any easier to define than "power" itself, but it may be said that it consists of the sum of at least four sub-elements: (a) The total number of weapons available to a given government; (b) the quality of both armaments and the human resources available to the nation's military forces; (c) the employment doctrine directing the national leadership on the use of its military forces; and (d) the ability to mobilize and deploy trained reserves.⁴⁰

Aggregate military power forms a major component of "national power" and is closely interconnected with the nation's grand strategy--the particular "worldview" which animates the plans and policies of the national leadership. A robust military component of national power does not always guarantee effectiveness in interventionary situations and it can quite often "produce unintended effects".⁴¹ Both superpowers, for example, have already discovered from their experiences in Vietnam and Afghanistan that even the world's most superior military machines are unable to give quick and lasting military solutions to the problem of counterinsurgency. And although Israel continues to militarily dominate its Arab neighbours by any measure of battlefield performance comparison, it has also been forced to retreat from Lebanon in the face of relentless terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists.

Capability to encounter

Even the most powerful military establishment is rendered incapable of projecting its power over distance if it lacks the necessary lift for transporting men and weapons to given theaters of operation. Military intervention missions other than against targets contiguous to the intruder's territory depend entirely on the intruder's capability to encounter, in other words his ability to transport and deploy adequate numbers of properly armed and supported troops in the target environment on relatively short notice.

It is self-evident therefore that long-range military intervention depends on the availability and readiness of air and sea lift assets. Since the opening phases of an interventionary situation are usually characterized by the need for moving an initial contingent to the target scene at great speed, airlift would be normally expected to bear the full weight of such emergency deployments. In fact, "under certain sets of circumstances, air mobility may offer the only effective means of military intervention".⁴² Unless the target area is accessible by sea and within a reasonable distance from the intruder's shores or overseas naval bases (if available), airlift should be further expected to continue ferrying additional troops with their air-transportable weapons, general cargo, and other equipment until other viable lines of communication can be established.

Airlift, while it gives a substantial speed advantage to the intruder, it does so at a cost. It is a highly

sophisticated capability, requiring constant modernization outlays, and, to the extent of its dependence on en route refueling (either in-flight or at secure airfields), vulnerable form of power projection. These technical complications are further exacerbated by uncertainties on "en route landing and overflight rights", a point of major importance for powers with worldwide power projection capabilities.⁴³ A credible airlift capability requires the maintenance of large fleets of modern transport aircraft along with the necessary support facilities and personnel. Above all, however, airlift is a fuel-intensive operation which can be sustained for longer periods of time only by intruders with the healthy economic means to do so.⁴⁴

Capability to sustain

After the successful insertion of an intervention force in the "hostile" environment, the emphasis shifts from the capability to encounter the target opposition to the one of sustaining friendly forces not only during their initial deployment in the area of operations, but also for the duration of the intervention. Here, unless the target theater is entirely inaccessible by sea, sealift becomes the crucial element. Simply put, "sealift is the body of ships that not only moves military personnel and equipment, but sustains them at their destination as well".⁴⁵ Although sealift is unable to compete with its air counterpart in sheer transit speed, it has no rival in providing longer-term support to distant fighting forces in terms of bulk cargo, number of

reinforcement troops transported, and favourable ratios of fuel consumed per ton delivered.

Sealift is indeed irreplaceable when it comes to augmenting the firepower of rapid deployment forces with heavier armored fighting vehicles, such as tanks, self-propelled artillery or other weapons which due to their size and weight cannot be easily transported by air.⁴⁶ The special combat conditions which intervention forces have to face, and the distance separating them from home bases, often create unusual logistical problems. It should be thus expected that the battlefield resupply requirements of even a modestly sized force fighting in a distant theater may be disproportionally high, especially if resistance is stiffer than expected or intelligence has failed to identify critical environmental factors.⁴⁷

Another crucial aspect of sealift for military intervention missions is the prepositioning of men and supplies aboard specially earmarked naval vessels in the vicinity of potential theaters of operation. Although prepositioning cannot totally replace permanent bases, it does reduce dependence on politically unreliable host countries as well as transit time to target areas in times of crisis. The concept of the Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS), carrying equipment, ammunition, fuel, and spare parts for amphibious fighting units, is already being utilized by the US Navy for support of future rapid deployment missions.⁴⁸ MPS-centered rapid-response forces have the major advantage of arriving in the theater of operations complete with their organic weapons, reasonable

amounts of critical supplies, and the support of fully integrated logistics elements.

Tactical technology

Intervention missions are special operations requiring tactical technology which can adapt, quickly and effectively, to a variety of combat environments. This requirement is extremely important since one cannot predict with confidence the entire spectrum of possible intervention situations, of the adversaries to be encountered, of their weapons and training, and of particular environmental factors and constraints at the time of specific future operations. Thus, the careful "blending" of tactical technology assets may indeed spell the difference between success and failure of a rapid-deployment mission.

In planning future force structures for such missions special care should be exercised in designing weapon systems with the view of operating in widely different geographic and military environments. This requirement becomes even more acute when planners ponder the proliferation of sophisticated tactical technologies among "secondary" or "peripheral" international actors. By the end of the 1970s a considerable number of states outside the Western industrialized world and the Soviet Union had come to possess adequate amounts of weaponry "designed for
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a war in Europe" which they would not presumably hesitate to use against any external threat. The implications of this development for future military

intervention operations is obvious.

Under ideal conditions, design and production of military hardware follows the expression of military requirements based on the analysis and evaluation of projected conflict variables. In practice, however, the technological innovation outpaces the military's inclination or ability "to modify traditional principles of combat and to develop therefrom corresponding requirements for military equipment"; the result is "technological supply pressure" which may create rapid deployment forces "to fit the equipment", a highly undesirable development with many adverse doctrinal and tactical implications.⁵⁰

Given the unpredictability of conflict situations, and the inability of planners to provide a complete range of intervention scenarios, maintaining "tailor-made" weapon inventories can be both impractical and expensive. Therefore, design should be geared towards producing "core" systems which can exploit the advantages of modular enhancement and modification within a broad range of projected operational parameters. In recent years, for example, the US Army has been experimenting successfully with a number of combat multi-mission systems and has been integrating them into units preparing to fight in a wide variety of environments and against diverse opponents.⁵¹

Command, control, communication (C3)

Rapid progress during the last twenty years in the fields of data processing, electronic communications,

automation, and general control systems has revolutionized⁵²
the way modern warfare is conducted. Extensive research
and development efforts have produced a mind-boggling
array of field C3 systems which have brought together the
advantages of reduced weight and volume with those of
modularization, low failure probability, and high volume
of data processing and transmission. At the same time, the
introduction of fast computers and the resultant increase
of the capacity of vertical information flows by many
orders of magnitude, have caused significant changes in
the way military operations are conducted and command
decisions are reached.⁵³ The huge amounts of "raw"
information circulating in C3 networks at any given time
"pose massive problems of digestion" for both civilian
policymakers and subordinate military commanders and
create unique difficulties in analysis, interpretation,
and adversary recognition.⁵⁴ As one analysis observes,

the essentials of a good command and control
system are the abilities to process vast
quantities of varying types of information in a
format that is both accurate and easily
assimilated, and to ensure that the information
so presented is sufficient to enable the
commander to make the right decision at the
right time. 55

Military intervention situations involving the
elements of limited warning, rapid response, and long-
range power projection place particular strains on C3
capabilities. National authorities must not only receive
regular real-time information concerning the status and
activities of their intervention forces but, also, ensure
that such information is rapidly and efficiently analyzed

to provide background for both diplomatic and military decisions. Secure and reliable communication, however, is only one leg of the C3 effort. It is flexible and responsive command-and-control planning which translates timely information from the battlefield into the inspiration of correct decisions. Thus, in an interventionary situation, the command-and-control function should actually combine three main activities: (1) ensure that the application of force is carried out in proportion to the perceived threat in order to avoid overreaction (and perhaps uncontrolled escalation) or, conversely, underreaction; (2) minimize reliance on excessive central decisionmaking by delegating authority for independent tactical action to field commanders under the guidance of general strategic directives ; and (3) maximize the performance of communication systems by implementing data processing automation plans and tackling identified causes of technical and organizational delays in the handling of messages.

Conclusion

The models of intervention discussed above are first steps towards a potentially more systematic conceptual framework for the study of the use of force within the international system. From an operational viewpoint, these models can be of universal applicability since their resolution level is sufficiently low to allow "tailor-made" second-level models to be constructed according to the parameters of specific environments.

PART II

CHAPTER IV

KOREA

Historical Perspective

On 25 June 1950, in a surprise, massive thrust across the demarcation line of the 38th parallel, the army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) attacked the Republic of Korea (ROK) with the declared goal of destroying ROK's pro-Western regime and unifying the two Koreas under communist rule. Within days of the invasion ROK's army, badly equipped and trained, had all but collapsed, the capital city of Seoul was in communist hands, and a headlong retreat of what was left of the south's government and armed forces had reduced ROK to a besieged perimeter around Pusan in the southeast corner of the Korean peninsula.

Thus began the Korean war which, over the span of the following three years, was to involve the United States, along with a token United Nations contingent comprising troops from fifteen other countries,¹ in direct armed conflict with Communist China, and threaten a confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Korean "police action", to use President Truman's chosen expression, was in fact a full-scale shooting war which eventually caused² an estimated 155,000 United Nations casualties. Far from being a total victory for American (and UN) arms, the conflict resulted in stalemate and led to the perpetuation

of the Korean nation's division into two separate, and mutually hostile, states.

* * *

As it is usually the case with strategically located lands, Korea traditionally suffered from its position on the edge of expanding, rival spheres of influence. Much of the country's history has thus been dominated by the triangular contest of China, Japan, and imperial Russia to absorb the Korean peninsula and thus create a guard on their exposed "soft" flanks. It was not until 1894 that a Japanese invasion broke the Chinese claim of suzerainty, and replaced Chinese domination with Japanese colonialism. In 1910, and after Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 destroyed the Tzar's hopes for dominating the area south of Vladivostok, Korea was officially annexed into the Japanese empire and remained under Japanese rule until 1945.³

At the end of the war in the Pacific, and upon Japan's defeat, Korea, its future freedom having been promised by the Allies during the 1943 Cairo conference, found itself divided along the 38th parallel ostensibly out of military necessity. This rather arbitrary dividing line was the result of the desire to separate clearly on the map the operational theaters of Soviet and American armed forces in the Far East. After the end of hostilities, however, and the surrender of all Japanese forces in September 1945, this wartime separation produced two occupation zones, one Russian and the other American, and no central Korean government responsible for the newly

independent territory.

As East-West relations deteriorated quickly after the end of the war, the two temporary, occupation zones became two de facto separate administrative areas. In the north, occupied by the Soviet Army, a communist party, under the direction of a little-known but skillful agitator and organizer, Kim Il-sung, evolved rapidly into the dominant political force, and became a dedicated follower of Moscow's line. In the American-occupied southern part of the peninsula, Syngman Rhee, an octagenarian nationalist whose struggles for Korean independence dated back to the closing decade of the 19th century, formed a "free national" government with the blessing of the American occupation authorities. Given the diametrically opposed political views of Kim and Rhee, neither regime showed any desire to discuss unification with the other; soon hostility between north and south erupted into border clashes, virulent propaganda attacks, and communist⁵ attempts to stir guerrilla warfare within the south.

By 1948 both north and south had completed a period of political consolidation. Kim, after outmaneuvering and eliminating his rivals, proceeded with creating a Soviet-backed people's republic -- which had already received the⁶ stamp of public approval following "elections" in 1947. Rhee, on the other hand, sharing Kim's ruthless tactics, had also ensured that opposition to his nationalist Administration was suppressed, and that the "independent" south organized its own police and national defence forces, always with the approval of US occupation

authorities.⁷ Finally, on 15 August 1948, Rhee announced the creation of the ROK, and the transfer of sovereign power from the American theater commander to his nationalist government. Two weeks later Kim responded by announcing his elevation to the post of premier, the ratification of a new constitution, and the creation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

It was obvious from the outset that, in real political terms, the north was the strongest of the two hostile new states. Kim's iron hand, and ample Soviet help, resulted in an aggressive, confident, and determined communist regime which hesitated little in harassing and pressuring the ROK. The level of cross-border violence, and guerrilla incidents inside the south, steadily increased throughout the remainder of 1948. Kim's prestige was further boosted in December when Moscow announced the withdrawal of all Soviet military units from the north--a move which automatically made the United States the only outside power still keeping occupation troops in the peninsula, and gave Soviet propaganda added opportunities to condemn American "neo-colonial⁸ adventurism". An immediate American withdrawal was averted only upon Rhee's intense pleading, but by June 1949 the remaining American troops had been withdrawn leaving⁹ behind only a small military advisory group. The year between the American withdrawal and the communist invasion was consumed in unsuccessful UN attempts to work out a re-unification formula, attempts which failed in the face of consistent Soviet veto. A UN commission,

dispatched to monitor developments in Korea and report to the General Assembly, remained a powerless witness of escalating violence and the deepening rift between the two neighbours. In the meantime, the Korean People's Army (KPA) prepared, trained, and husbanded its resources for the drive to the south which materialized on 25 June 1950.

* * *

The communist attack came at a time when, for reasons that will be analyzed below, American presence in Asia was on general retreat. The American military advisory group, left behind in the ROK, was in no position to offer any credible help to the beleaguered South Koreans, let alone stem the communist onslaught by itself. Numbering only a few hundred men without armour, other heavy weapons, or air support, this token American force joined the general retreat into the Pusan perimeter. With the UN in emergency session to approve the dispatch of a multinational military contingent to the ROK, President Truman ordered the activation of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's Far East Headquarters, and the immediate mobilization of US Army units stationed in Japan to enter combat in Korea. On 2 July 1950, the American military intervention in the war between the two Koreas commenced with the landing of an advanced task force at Osan which immediately engaged the KPA in a series of localized
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delaying actions.

Between July and August, and with the bulk of the American expeditionary force still assembling in Japan and stateside locations, the KPA kept its pressure on the

Pusan perimeter which, as the only area under ROK control on the peninsula, had become the ground to be defended at all costs. MacArthur's immediate concern was thus to strengthen this defensive arc and buy the necessary time to complete his reinforcement plan. By early September arriving American units had secured the perimeter's defence but the communist forces were far from defeated, and still occupied the main part of ROK territory. A bold strategic initiative was the only solution to this precarious situation, and the American supreme commander¹¹ responded with the launching of Operation CHROMITE.

A daring amphibious landing, carried out by the US X Corps at Inchon on the western coast of the Korean peninsula on 15 September, CHROMITE was an immense¹² success. Within ten days of its execution the 1st Marine Division had reached Seoul, and after two days of bitter fighting, during which most of the city was devastated by American firepower, the KPA units holding the ROK capital were forced to abandon their positions and retreat hastily above the 38th parallel. Simultaneously, the US 8th Army, besieged within the Pusan perimeter, broke out and pushed the remaining communist forces north. Caught between X Corps and the advancing 8th Army, and with its supply lines at the mercy of its enemies, the KPA invasion force disintegrated.

Having accomplished his primary goal of defeating the invasion, MacArthur, acting on Truman's orders and with the concurrence of the UN, crossed the 38th parallel in pursuit of the retreating North Koreans. On 20 October,

the communist capital, Pyonyang, fell to a combined infantry and airborne assault, and the UN forces advanced on a broad front towards the Yalu river forming the natural boundary between North Korea and China. Meantime, intelligence reports had confirmed the presence of Chinese troops south of the Yalu, albeit with considerable¹³ confusion as to their actual numbers and disposition. MacArthur for his part, having been refused permission to carry out air reconnaissance over Manchuria, and interpreting his instructions "to destroy the North Korean armed forces" rather liberally, decided at this point to continue his "probing" towards the Yalu, although this move carried the risk of confronting Chinese forces as his troops approached the Korean-Chinese frontier.

On 25-26 November this possibility became painful reality when a massive Chinese counter-offensive, involving at least eighteen divisions which had silently infiltrated into North Korea from Manchuria, smashed onto MacArthur's advanced elements which had reached the river. The force of the Chinese blow was such that, within days, the UN forces fell back in disorderly retreat. Before the end of the year, the entire US X Corps, along with thousands of ROK troops and civilian refugees, had retreated back to South Korea in order to avoid capture or annihilation. In less than six months MacArthur had thus achieved the dubious distinction of having coupled a¹⁴ brilliant victory with a humiliating defeat.

The year 1951 opened with a renewed Chinese offensive. Seoul had to be evacuated again and it was not

until March that the UN forces reoccupied the capital. While Chinese and UN armies remained locked in inconclusive combat, a major crisis erupted in the Western camp. In April, MacArthur, who made no effort to conceal his disapproval of the "limited" war strategy which prevented him from attacking Chinese bases in Manchuria and, ultimately, forcing a showdown with China and the Soviet Union, if the latter came to the rescue of its satellite, was summarily relieved of his duties as supreme commander of the UN forces and US forces, Far East, and was replaced by the more level-headed Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. MacArthur's unceremonious ouster caused a storm of protest in the United States, especially from Truman's¹⁵ Republican Congressional opposition. Still, the President stood firm by his decision since he was convinced that MacArthur's independent action, and his undisguised desire to debate national policy with his civilian superiors, bordered on insubordination which could have only undermined the President's own position as¹⁶ the commander-in-chief.

With Ridgway in command the UN forces returned to the offensive. Fighting around the so-called "Iron Triangle" of Chorwan-Kumhwa-Pyongyang, the main staging area of the communist armies, resulted in stalemate and both sides reverted to building in-depth defences in anticipation of a prolonged war of attrition. By June, however, it became obvious that the Chinese were in need of a respite as the Soviet Union presented a formal proposal for a cease-fire¹⁷ to the UN. Kaesong, inside communist lines, became a

first negotiation site but fighting resumed shortly after it was clear that the communists looked for an opportunity to air their propaganda. In due course, and in order to avoid the damaging psychological influence of having to bargain with an enemy in his own territory, the negotiation site was moved to a new location, this time situated in the no-man's-land between the opponents,¹⁸ Panmunjon.

Much of the rest of the war remained a "slugging match" at the expense of considerable amounts of blood and materiel for both sides. Negotiations at Panmunjon dragged on with the prisoners-of-war issue becoming the focus of the bargaining. In October 1952, having accomplished nothing, the negotiations broke off. Gen. Mark Clark, who had replaced Ridgway as US/UN commander in May, prepared for more defensive action. As the American presidential election unfolded, and with the American public showing clear signs of fatigue over the perpetuation of the Korean "police action", there was hardly a question of attempting to resolve the situation militarily. Thus, the fighting became the backdrop to the test of political wills, and the search for a mutually¹⁹ acceptable agenda on which to re-initiate negotiations.

What force of arms was unable to accomplish, Stalin's death, in early 1953, brought about by default. In March, Kim suddenly announced his agreement to the exchange of sick and wounded POWs, and, in July, despite Rhee's vehement opposition to any settlement that left Korea divided, and renewed Chinese attacks on ROK troops,

negotiations at Panmunjon got off to a fresh start. On 27 July, and following UN assurances that the battle front as it stood at the time, and not the 38th parallel, was the de facto boundary between the two Koreas, an armistice was²⁰ finally signed bringing hostilities to an end.

The Anatomy of American Intervention

After the Second World War, the American strategic policy debate centered on two major points: (1) The strategy of containment of communist influence; and (2) the defence of Western Europe from a surprise Russian onslaught. Containment was inaugurated in May 1947 with the Truman Doctrine which offered US economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey in order to allow them to counter, in the case of the former, communist insurgency, and in the case of the latter, Soviet pressures for territorial accommodation in tune with Moscow's strategic interests.

Mainly promulgated through the writings of George F.²¹ Kennan, containment was based on a long-term assessment of Soviet intentions which assumed indefinite confrontation with the forces of "world Communism", and with the Soviet Union itself, the only country which by virtue of its size, military potential, ideological hostility, and historical antipathy towards the West was prepared to engage the United States in a global struggle for power. Containment quickly became the Truman Administration's adopted strategic theme although it was far from an "action plan" of specific responses to

individually defined adversary challenges. Thus, the new strategy, while it infused a strong element of ideological commitment into American policy, and drew up the Cold War lines which were to define US-Soviet confrontation for the next twenty five years, did not lead to any systematic analysis of Soviet intentions and capabilities -- leaving a rather vague communist conspiracy theory, without the benefit of more specific projections, as the sole guideline for American policy makers. 22

On a more realistic plane, however, containment did recognize limits to American commitments abroad, and to the projection of American military power overseas in order to meet, and defeat, communist attempts to control other countries either through subversion or even the ballot box. Thus, future American strategy was to be based on the recognition of the Atlantic, and Western Europe, as the two most vital areas for the defence of the United States in a future war with the Soviet Union. In April 1947 this view was elaborated in detail by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a top secret memorandum which identified the "Old World" as the key to the successful defence of the United States itself:

It is obvious... that in case of an ideological war we must have the support of some of the countries of the Old World unless our military strength is to be overshadowed by that of our enemies... Further, almost all potentially strong nations who can reasonably be expected to ally themselves with the United States in such a war are situated in Western Europe. 23

Sending American troops to combat communist insurgents, or communist parties gaining control through democratic

means, was not recommended because,

Direct military intervention to prevent communist takeovers would only propel the United States into a series of civil wars from which it would be difficult to extricate itself. 24

On balance, containment was perceived as essentially a strategy of psychological warfare between the forces of the "Free World" and those of Communism, the ultimate prize presumably being the defeat of Soviet aggressive tendencies, and the securing of most areas, outside the Soviet Union, against communist penetration.

It was perhaps unavoidable, if somewhat paradoxical, that containment, with its emphasis on Western Europe and its lack of a coherent analysis of future Soviet trends, would implicitly cultivate the view that the Soviets, save a surprise attack on the United States or Western Europe, were not prepared to stage "a less than total challenge" in some remote arena and, therefore, a Soviet "local"²⁵ adventure was an unlikely event. Indeed, the accepted view within the Truman Administration was "that the Politburo would not engage in overt forms of aggression which involved the risk of general war for the present and several years hence", and that, as far as peripheral countries like South Korea were concerned, no immediate²⁶ dangers of communist aggression really existed.

This reluctance to recognize a tangible Soviet threat outside Western Europe was further sustained by at least two other reasons. First, in the aftermath of a prolonged, costly world war, Truman, eager to "bring the boys home" and assure Americans of a rapid return to

normalcy, presided over an unprecedented military demobilization. Such was the scale and speed of this drive to achieve a peacetime national posture that, within two years of V-day in the Pacific, the huge American war machine had been effectively dismantled, and millions of war veterans returned to their homes. Consequently, a national defence strategy which stood for continuing commitments in distant areas, let alone the possibility of employing American armed forces in another war in Asia, could not be implemented without attracting public opposition, and stretching existing resources to a dangerous limit. Second, the crushing defeat of the Chinese Nationalists in their struggle against Mao's communist armies in 1949--which was not averted by generous American assistance--convinced most American policy makers that supporting Asian clients was wasteful and carried the distinct risk of drawing America into an "accidental", and thus quite unnecessary, local Asian war.

* * *

In conformity to this post-war emphasis on streamlining resources, and limiting overseas American military deployments, South Korea was assessed as an area of "secondary strategic significance". In September 1947, for example, a Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, produced on Truman's request, stated that South Korea, from the point of view of military security, was of "minor strategic value" to the United States, and suggested that US troops stationed there be immediately withdrawn before ROK's deteriorating domestic political situation caused

them to reach "an untenable position". MacArthur's own opinion, carrying the added weight of America's senior military commander in the Pacific, agreed with the Joint Chiefs and excluded South Korea from the perimeter of US security interests in the Pacific.²⁷

Feelings about South Korea within the civilian sector of the Administration were very much the same; "privately the Americans agreed that they would not allow themselves to be drawn into a war to save the South Koreans".²⁸ Assuming this vein the 1949 State Department White Paper on China noted that the communists, about to take over China, "seemed to be riding a relentless tide of victory and Korea, as in her long past, would be greatly influenced [i.e. would probably come under strong communist influence, if not outright rule] by the tremendous developments in the mainland".²⁹ These developments could not be reversed without the least desirable direct intervention of American military forces. The perception that America was reluctant about military intervention in Asia was further strengthened, this time in public, by Secretary Acheson who, in a speech at the National Press Club on 12 January 1950, drew up the American "defensive perimeter" in the Pacific following the great arc from the Philippines through the Ryukyu Archipelago, Japan and on to Alaska. The perimeter excluded both China and South Korea, and recognized Japan and the Philippines as the only "inescapable responsibilities" from the point of view of American military security considerations.³⁰ In order "to care for

interests outside of our own defence line"-- and therefore the interests of a country like South Korea--the Secretary underlined that America expected that the defense of other Pacific states under attack could not be guaranteed in any way and would primarily depend upon the will and resistance of the local people:

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack... Should such an attack occur... the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations, which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.³¹

In sum, American policy, on the eve of the North Korean invasion, was only marginally concerned about a local war in the Korean peninsula, and it approached that possibility with noted lack of urgency. A Central Intelligence Agency estimate, issued only days before the communist attack, described the situation between the two Koreas as unequal, especially from the military point of view, but foresaw no immediate risk of a full-scale North Korean military effort to control the south without substantial Soviet or Chinese support:

Despite the apparent military superiority of northern over southern Korea, it is not certain that the northern regime, lacking the active participation of Soviet and Chinese Communist military units, would be able to gain effective control over all of southern Korea. The key factors which would hinder Communist attempts to extend effective control under these circumstances are: (1) the anti-Communist attitude of the Southern Koreans; (2) a continuing will to resist on the part of southern troops; (3) the Communist regime's lack of popular support; and (4) the regime's lack of

trained administrators and technicians. 32

Having concentrated their attention on the overriding concern of total war with the Soviet Union, initiated by an attack on Western Europe, the President and his advisors saw the defence of Korea mainly through the lenses of such a global confrontation with the Soviets, and, given its geographical position on the fringe of the Soviet landmass and thousands of miles away from the United States, as more of a strategic liability rather than an asset.

Against this background the explanation for Truman's sudden about-face, once the ROK was invaded, seems more like a "spasm" reaction rather than the outcome of long-term policy decisions. Yet, even "spasms" have many explanations in politics and this particular case should not be classified as an exception.

It is quite clear that, once the North Koreans had invaded, arguments about Moscow's reluctance to engage in local conflicts, exchanged within the Administration, immediately dissipated. The President and his inner cabinet, influenced by the accepted Cold War wisdom, saw the Eastern bloc as a monolith directed by the Kremlin whose orders had obviously activated the hand of its North Korean satellite. Automatically, therefore, South Korea came to be regarded, despite its label of "strategic liability" in previous assessments, as the first line of defence against Moscow's aggressive plans of expansion. As Secretary Acheson put it later, its defence was not only essential for the protection of American-occupied

Japan, but also vital for the protection "of the power and
prestige of the United States".³³ The North Korean
aggression could only be seen as a first move on the part
of the Soviet Union towards global domination; on the
basis of this assumption, which remained central to
American thinking throughout the war, "if this aggression
went unchecked, it would be the first of a chain of
aggressions that would destroy the foundations of
international security and eventually cause a third world
war".³⁴

Defending democratic principle within South Korea,
and upholding the right of its people to remain
independent of communist rule, although prominently
mentioned in American pronouncements during the war,
obscured only thinly the fact that the United States had
decided to intervene as it was eager to ward off an attack
on broader American security interests. As in the case of
the Greek civil war, from which the American-backed side
had emerged victorious almost a year before the outbreak
of the Korean conflict, the imperatives of containment had
become the vehicles of pure US power politics directed at
preserving the status of the United States as a
superpower. The consequences of inaction seemed all too
clear to the American leaders. As a State Department
analysis observed, "the liquidation of the South Korean
government" fitted perfectly in the Soviet global plan to
destabilize American allies and bring about a number of
important changes in the US-Soviet balance of power:

-- In Asia generally, the destruction of the ROK would

severely weaken US prestige in the eyes of those countries with anti-communist policies, and create the impulse for wavering governments to "get on the bandwagon" of Soviet-sponsored regimes. Additionally, absorbing the entire Korean peninsula into the communist sphere of influence would destroy a US strategic position on the approaches to the USSR, and enhance Soviet confidence.

-- In the particular case of Communist China, lack of American resolve in Korea could be "expected to cause Chinese communist leaders to adopt more bold and militant tactics in their attempts to promote Communism in other parts of Asia". On the other hand, determined US reaction "would produce a marked psychological reaction" in the minds of both the Chinese leaders and public, ultimately producing weakening of Soviet-Chinese ties.

-- Finally, and perhaps most importantly, success of the "Soviet-sponsored" North Korean invasion could prompt serious questioning of American "might and will" in Western Europe, enhance pressures for neutralism, and promote "Communism and Sovietism as a wave of the future". 35

Aside from these considerations, the decision to intervene must have been further strengthened by another important fact: the outbreak of communist aggression in a peripheral area seemed to confirm the conclusions of the Administration's main, and at that time secret, strategic study of future global security trends, NSC 68, submitted

to the President in April 1950.

NSC 68, perhaps the most important American document in early Cold War history, was authorized by Truman in early 1950 in an attempt to create "a single, comprehensive statement of interests, threats, and feasible responses, capable of being communicated³⁶ throughout the bureaucracy". Drafted by a special group of experts under Paul Nitze, NSC 68 put forth a powerful argument for a policy of dynamic opposition to Soviet global strategy, and the use of all means, including force if necessary, to stop the expansion of communist influence. This was reconfirmation of the basic principles of containment but with one crucial difference: whereas George Kennan's original ideas stressed psychological warfare and defence of selected points around the globe, NSC 68 introduced the concept of "perimeter defence, with all points along the perimeter of equal importance"³⁷. Perimeter defence had two serious implications for American military strategy. First, it advocated that Soviet aggression, either direct or by proxy, had to be countered by force of arms with American forces fighting side by side with allies supplied and armed by the United States. And, second, it implicitly recognized that a future Soviet thrust would not necessarily be directed at Western Europe, but that localized testing "probes" could be launched to harass, or seize, peripheral pro-Western nations, beginning with those nearer the Soviet landmass.

Prior to 25 June 1950, NSC 68's course through the

Congressional deliberation process appeared quite turbulent, especially given its unambiguous and repeated calls for increased defence expenditure and expansion of American military capabilities. However, as the North Korean tanks rolled against Seoul, its assessment of Soviet intentions, and its estimate of Soviet actions, appeared remarkably accurate. All the elements of a surprise Soviet challenge away from Western Europe's central theater, as described or implied by NSC 68, were present: (1) a willing and able proxy (North Korea); (2) a pro-Western regime vulnerable to military coercion (ROK); (3) a marginal American commitment which must have encouraged the enemy; and (4) a theater of conflict geographically favouring the Soviet Union but imposing serious logistical problems on the United States.

In summary, Truman's decision to send American troops to South Korea came about because of the desire to protect American prestige, and of the belief that to shy away from the fight could be the start of a fatal road towards appeasing the Kremlin. As the President later put it:

In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggression to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores.³⁸

It was perhaps inevitable that the President would be eventually called upon "to practice what he was preaching"

in his strategy of containment--although this left the basic question of "for whom was the war fought?"³⁹ unanswered. In retrospect, the answer seems rather clear. The "South Korean experiment", as John Foster Dulles put it, had to be preserved for the sake of the larger geopolitical interests of the United States in general, and, in particular, of the defence and rehabilitation of Japan which the communists sought to make "a point of U.S. weakness rather than of strength in the Far East".⁴⁰

* * *

Once American troops had joined the fighting in Korea, the Truman Administration faced the difficult task of bringing its objectives into focus, and defining its overall strategy. The speed with which the crisis had developed, and the unpreparedness at policy level, left the Americans with precious little else but the high moral tone of Truman's declaration that South Korea would be defended and restored as an independent nation. From the outset, however, the Administration had two overriding concerns; first, to avoid at all costs escalation of hostilities to a point where a war with the Soviets was inevitable, and, second, to minimize as much as possible military operations which could invite Communist Chinese intervention on the side of the North Koreans. By definition, therefore, the American action in Korea was to be limited, both geographically and militarily. In the chaotic early days after the invasion, and with the South Korean armed forces all but extinct, there was indeed no

ground for optimism, and the objective of saving the ROK from complete collapse seemed the only logical focus of attention.

Accordingly, as the President underlined in his message to Congress three weeks after the attack, American military action in Korea "was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle," and its aim remained to come "to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force".⁴¹ Since the presence of all UN forces in Korea was based on the same principle, the immediate objective of UN military operations was "to bring about the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel."⁴² Crossing the 38th parallel and threatening to take over North Korea was explicitly rejected because, in the words of the official analyst,

There is ample evidence of the strategic importance to Russia of the Korean peninsula. It is extremely unlikely that the Kremlin would accept the establishment in North Korea of a regime which it could not dominate and control.

When it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression will be defeated, there might be some agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the North Korean regime which would mean in substance that U.N. military action north of the 38th parallel would result in conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China.⁴³

The decision to limit the war south of the 38th parallel was further supported by the fear that prolonged military operations, beyond ROK's frontiers, would absorb too many US resources, and in effect "render the United States incapable of meeting aggression in any of a half-dozen other potential trouble-spots" like Iran, Yugoslavia, or

Berlin. On the other hand, and if the war in Korea was indeed the prelude to a general Soviet assault on the West, as some Administration officials feared, then the consequences of US military overcommitment in a secondary distant theater entailed serious risks. This view was voiced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff almost immediately upon the onset of hostilities. America's top military leaders, pointing out that "political considerations" could lead to "excessive commitments of United States military forces and resources in those areas of operations which would not be decisive", concluded that:

Preliminary to, or in the initial stages of a global war, it would be militarily unsound for the United States to commit large forces against the USSR in an area of slight strategic importance, as well as one of Soviet choice. Therefore, if major USSR combat units should at any time during military operations in the Korea area of hostilities engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.S. and/or friendly forces the U.S. should prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea and prepare to execute war plans. These preparations should include initiation of full-scale mobilization. 45

By late August 1950, however, the military situation had been stabilized and, as confidence grew about the eventual "roll-back" of the North Koreans, so did support for the view that the 38th parallel was not an inviolable line, and that military operations should continue into North Korean soil in order to bring about the total defeat of the enemy. General MacArthur himself had made no secret of his own preference for a quick, determined campaign to destroy the North Korean armed forces before the Soviets or the Chinese had enough time to offer

Pyongyang substantial assistance--a task which could not be accomplished without attacking and defeating the opponent inside his own territory.⁴⁶ Deliberations within the State Department and the Pentagon soon produced recommendations for the President from civilian staffs which adopted the same line. Correspondingly, NSC 81/1, dated 9 September 1950, suggested that,

The U.N. forces are clearly committed by the Security Council resolutions to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel and there is a clear legal basis for taking such military actions north of the 38th parallel as are necessary in accomplishing this mission.⁴⁷

Given the "clear legal basis" for military action inside North Korean territory, MacArthur would be expected to receive authorization to undertake all operations deemed necessary "for the purpose of destroying the North Korean forces."⁴⁸ Necessary instructions to this effect were indeed issued and transmitted to the General later that month, but with the crucial proviso "that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter⁴⁹ our operations militarily in North Korea". In any case, the decision to move across the 38th was in itself a sharp turn of American strategy away from the mere objective of repelling the North Korean invasion, and towards a much more widely defined effort to "liberate" the entire peninsula, terminate Kim's communist regime, and establish a unified Korean nation in the spirit of the 1943 Cairo agreement. After the Inchon landing, and the subsequent

routing of the North Koreans, the prospect of success for such a campaign seemed within easy grasp.

The Chinese intervention in early November 1950 changed this picture radically, however. As MacArthur reported on 28 November,

All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to enemy forces composed of North Korean troops with alien token elements can now be completely abandoned... We face an entirely new war... The resulting situation presents an entire new picture which broadens the potentialities to world embracing considerations beyond the sphere of decision by the Theater Commander.⁵⁰

The primary among the "world embracing considerations" for the Administration was again to avoid a collision with the Soviet Union. The strength and determination of the Chinese counterattack--but, also, its effectiveness in stopping MacArthur's advance--were all-too-clear signals that Peking was quite unhappy with the presence of imperialist" troops near its frontier. Moreover, given the American conviction that Mao, too, received his orders from Moscow, the Chinese intervention was immediately perceived as a warning directly from the Kremlin -- an act of deterrence which Stalin staged in order to remind Washington that Soviet patience was diminishing rapidly.⁵¹

Accordingly, American objectives shifted back to a "limited" scope. On 1 May 1951, the Joint Chiefs instructed MacArthur's successor, General Ridgway, that his main objective was "to destroy the armed forces of North Korea and Communist China operating within the geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto", and that he was now authorized,

to conduct air and naval operations within geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto as deemed by you to be necessary or advantageous to successful attainment of your objective. 52

This was hardly an open-ended authorization, however. In order to safeguard against further "liberal" interpretations of American policy, the instructions from Washington gave Ridgway a clear outline of his mission:

This [authorization] specifically does not include authority to conduct air or naval action against Manchuria, against USSR territory, or against North Korean electrical power complex including the Yalu River power installation, and as a matter of policy no operations will be conducted within 15 miles of USSR territory.... Under no circumstances will your forces cross Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea.

In the conduct of naval operations care should be taken to keep well clear of the coastal waters of Manchuria and USSR.53

These instructions, by "capping" the American military effort and severely limiting the prospects for a decisive blow against the North Koreans and their Chinese allies, did indeed confirm the full turn of the Truman Administration back towards the gradualist approach of containment. As Secretary Acheson noted later, by June 1951, the Administration had accepted that the unification of Korea had to be left "to time and political measures", and that the mission of the American troops in Korea was to "dig in" and, holding "strongly fortified lines", drain enemy power by luring the communist into persistent attacks against these defensive positions. 54

Thus, after a brief interval of seeking to gain the military initiative and attain the "rehabilitation" of the entire Korean nation under a pro-American government,

American goals shrunk to less ambitious levels. When Gen. Mark Clark arrived in Korea, in May 1952, to replace General Ridgway (who was assuming command of NATO forces in Europe), he discovered a "frozen front [which] represented a true balance of power", and decided that,

Since it was not our Government's policy to seek a military decision, the next best thing was to make the stalemate more expensive for the Communists than for us, to hit them where it hurt, to worry them, to convince them by force that the price-tag on an armistice was going up, not down.⁵⁵

Clark's pleading with Washington for measures to make "the stalemate more expensive" finally bore fruit in late June 1952 when, in a rather surprising about-face, the Joint Chiefs allowed the bombing of power stations in North Korea, including the massive Suiho hydroelectric installation on the Yalu.⁵⁶ The destruction of almost the entire electricity generating capacity in the north, however, left the overall American plan for a defensive strategy unaffected. As 1952 expired, the United Nations forces were still locked in indecisive, and bloody, combat against "human wave" Chinese attacks.

The drive towards a negotiated settlement entered its final phase in 1953 with the inauguration of the Eisenhower Administration. Presidential elections, held in late 1952, broke twenty years of Democratic rule and returned the Republicans to power under President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Central to the new Administration's platform was conclusion of hostilities in Korea, a commitment which won widespread support for the Republican party given the increasing frustration of the American

public with the lack of military victory in the Far East. Although Eisenhower was concerned at least as much as his predecessor about escalation, he nevertheless opted for decisive measures--including bombing bases in China and Manchuria and, as a last resort, using the atomic weapon--⁵⁷ if the communists showed low interest for an armistice. The new President, being a firm supporter of fiscal conservatism and ex-military man himself, felt that an indefinite entanglement in Korea could only sap American strength through manpower drain, higher taxes to pay for the war, and irreparable damage to America's relations with Europe. The bombing of the North Korean power plants had already caused strong complaints from the Western Europeans--who feared expansion of the war in the Far East at the expense of American commitments to NATO.

Conclusion

When the armistice was finally signed in July 1953, it was indeed difficult to decide what had been actually "won" for the Western alliance. Both Koreas existed as before, their hatred for each other remaining undiminished, their ideological positions as unbending as ever. Although some Americans believed, like General Ridgway, that "we did deliver to international Communism⁵⁸ its first resounding defeat", there was also a significant portion of those who saw the Korean "police action" as an unnecessary waste of American resources for returns of dubious value. Even more significantly, the critics of the war pointed to a major strategic lesson of

Korea that was to resurface with a passion during the Vietnam policy debates. As Robert Osgood observed,

granting the contribution to containment of the decision to intervene in Korea, it certainly did not prove that the nation should try to resist aggression everywhere under any circumstance, as General MacArthur maintained and as the [Truman] administration's blanket endorsement of the ideal of collective security implied. 59

From a military policy perspective, the Korean war served as the precursor of the deep, and frequently vehement, disagreements over "limited war" strategies which were to plague, and in the end defeat, US intervention in Vietnam. Although MacArthur's rebellion against Washington's perceived "defeatist" attitudes, and his unceremonious dismissal, focused public attention on a single flamboyant military figure, the General's departure did not eliminate military opposition to Truman's limited "police" action strategy. The majority of high-ranking American officers, with the possible exception of the Joint Chiefs, continued to disapprove of the restrictions placed upon them and never really "felt that they might be of some value".⁶⁰ In the end, what the war thus certainly accomplished was to demonstrated the almost outright rejection by the military of the "limited" war concept since, "A limited conflict of the kind the civilians, in however fumbling a manner, were attempting to devise⁶¹ simply was not a part of the military lexicon".

In sum, the American intervention in Korea ended without either a military victory or any significant political profit. It did not trigger a "roll-back" of Communist influence in Asia and hardly deterred other

"national liberation" movements from sprouting, particularly in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the intervention tied American prestige to the survival of an anti-communist regime in Seoul which directly led to permanent US military presence along the 38th parallel, a web of US defence guarantees against any communist incursion, and the risk, however limited, of a future American entanglement in yet another Asian war.

CHAPTER V

VIETNAM

Historical Perspective

No conflict in the history of the United States has generated greater acrimony, national division, and lasting political and social traumas than the Vietnam war. Although, from an American perspective, the term "Vietnam war" is generally used to describe the period from 1964 to 1973, American involvement in Indochina can be traced back to 1954 and the closing days of the French colonial presence in Southeast Asia. Chronologically, therefore, the American commitment to a non-communist South Vietnam, and America's efforts to defeat the Viet Cong and their communist masters in Hanoi, may be separated into four, rather distinct periods beginning in the aftermath of the 1954 Geneva Conference on the future of ex-French Indochina.

During the first, so-called "advisory", decade of 1954-64, the United States committed only a small number of military advisors "in country", and refrained from any large-scale overt military action on the side of the Saigon government, known as the Government of Vietnam (GVN). American aid was thus limited to providing South Vietnam with the means to bolster the GVN internally and ensure that it did not collapse under the pressure of the communist insurgency.

During the second period of 1964-68, the United States quickly "Americanized" the war in the face of growing political instability in South Vietnam, infusions of regular North Vietnamese troops in the fighting, and the danger of seeing what had by then grown into a major political, diplomatic, and psychological US commitment collapse under attack by communist forces. Sometimes called "the President's war", the period 1964-68 was marked by unprecedented combat ferocity as the United States chose to "contain" the Viet Cong, and Hanoi, militarily, and thus give the GVN sufficient time to organize a viable, non-communist state in the South.

The period from mid-1968 to 1973 was a period of transition during which US military presence in the South peaked at more than half a million troops and, under President Richard Nixon, began to diminish as the program of "Vietnamization"--a thinly-veiled effort to cut American losses and withdraw from Vietnam with or without 'guarantees' as to Saigon's survival--was put into effect. The Paris "peace" accords of January 1973 brought the American military intervention in Indochina to its official end, and paved the way for the final communist victory in 1975.

Finally, the two years between February 1973 and April 1975 witnessed South Vietnam's abandonment by Washington in the face of mounting military pressure from the North, and an acrimonious political battle at home. The collapse of the Saigon regime was ultimately sealed by a conventional North Vietnamese invasion launched in March

1975--which culminated, on 30 April, in the evacuation of the last resident US personnel from the South Vietnamese capital along a massive exodus of South Vietnamese refugees fleeing in the path of their country's "liberators".

Given the prolonged and complicated nature of the American intervention in Indochina, which seldom makes systematic analysis of the war an easy task, it is often necessary to "compartmentalize" the conflict into increments which, in turn, can be subjected to focused analysis. Since "the President's War" period is considered, by most independent accounts, the turning point in the battle against Hanoi, this chapter concentrates on the years 1964 to 1968.

1964-68: The Policymaking Process

In late 1963, Vietnam was still a rather obscure issue in the United States. The assassination of President Kennedy in November had left little room in the headlines for the distant war in Indochina. But, high government circles had different priorities. One of the first acts of Kennedy's successor, President Lyndon Johnson, was to reaffirm the previous Administration's commitment to an "independent, sovereign, non-communist South Vietnam", and to issue detailed instructions as to future American policy in connection with that country. Four days after he assumed power, NSAM 273 outlined the political and military initiatives the new Administration proposed to take in Southeast Asia; its very first

paragraph placed top priority on the defence and survival of South Vietnam:

It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against an externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all U.S. decisions and actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose.¹

NSAM 273 came at a time of intense political turmoil in South Vietnam. Almost a month before Kennedy's assassination, the South Vietnamese President, Ngo Dinh Diem, an earlier American protege, had been himself murdered in the course of a military coup which overthrew his government.² With Diem's demise, South Vietnam's political fortunes were cast in the hands of corrupt, and prominently incapable, generals whose infighting in Saigon's Byzantine power struggles left precious little time for attending to the country's deteriorating economy and, of course, the raging guerrilla war. Such was in fact the anarchy caused by the rivalling military factions that, in December 1963, the State Department was expressing its undisguised concern to the American embassy in Saigon, citing communist activity of alarming proportions in the countryside, and emphasizing that the United States had little choice but to take immediate steps in order to stabilize the situation.³

Thus, shortly before Christmas, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara was dispatched to Saigon for an on-the-spot evaluation and for making the necessary recommendations for American action. McNamara's report,

rich in gloomy expressions, saw South Vietnam as about to be converted into "a Communist-controlled state". While Saigon's military juntas remained embroiled in their own infighting, Viet Cong cadres roamed the countryside unhindered, and infiltration from the North continued unabated through corridors in neighbouring Cambodia and Laos as well as points on the coast. The closing paragraphs of McNamara's report reflected clearly the Secretary's rather grave feelings about the future:

My appraisal may be overly pessimistic... [However] we should watch the situation very carefully, running scared, hoping for the best, but preparing for more forceful moves if the situation does not show early signs of improvement.⁴

By the summer of 1964 such signs of improvement, which McNamara thought necessary if action on "more forceful moves" was to be avoided, had failed to appear and, if anything, the overall political and military situation in South Vietnam continued to worsen. It was now slowly but inevitably becoming clear that if "trends" in the fight against the Viet Cong were to be "stabilized" (or, even, reversed), American activities in South Vietnam had to expand rapidly beyond mere economic and logistical assistance. In October, and after the Tonkin Gulf incident had led to a Congressional resolution giving the President wide-ranging powers, including the right to use armed force "if necessary", in order to counter the communist challenge,⁵ intelligence reports added to the sense of urgency by finding South Vietnam "almost leaderless... reaching the point of anarchy";

"passiveness", "apathy", "lack of leadership and direction", coupled with increasing guerrilla activity, left little doubt that South Vietnam's collapse was imminent, if the situation was allowed to run its course.⁶

In February/March 1965, after Viet Cong attacks on US installations had caused several casualties among American troops, President Johnson, responding to pressure from his military chiefs and the majority of his close White House advisers, took two decisive steps towards "Americanizing" the war: in mid-February he ordered the commencement of operation ROLLING THUNDER, the sustained aerial bombing of targets inside North Vietnam, and, in the first week of March, ordered the US Marines to land two battalions near Da Nang with the express purpose of providing better "perimeter security" to nearby US bases. The expansion of the air war, and the marine landings, were immediately followed by NSAM 328, a "pivotal" document issued on 6 April, which gave Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) the green light for deploying US ground forces in independent combat missions, and indicated that the United States was to seek "allied" support, in the form of additional troop deployments, from South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. The key points of NSAM 328 were as follows:

- (1) An additional 18-20,000 US troops were ordered to South Vietnam "to fill out existing units and supply needed logistical personnel". Also approved was the deployment of another two US Marine battalions and one US Marine Air Squadron.
- (2) US Marine forces already deployed were allowed "a change of mission" away from static defence

duties and towards "active use under conditions to be established by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State".

- (3) Finally, air operations in Laos, and particularly those aimed at blocking communist infiltration routes, were to be stepped up in order to reduce the flow of arms, supplies, and men from North Vietnam.⁷

In the following months, American military presence in South Vietnam increased rapidly reaching, by July 1965, 75,000 troops--and with Secretary McNamara recommending the immediate deployment of additional forces to bring the US troop level to 175,000 men.⁸ These injections of US military power did very little, however, to either stem communist activity or bolster the South Vietnamese government which, in June 1965, had landed in the hands of yet another military cabal under Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky. A pause in ROLLING THUNDER, ordered by Johnson in May with the apparent hope of opening up an avenue of negotiations with Hanoi, was met with total communist rejection, and a similar move in December had no better luck. The communist response to these American enticements was to denounce Washington's initiatives as "deceitful" and "hypocritical" and insist on the immediate withdrawal of all US troops from Vietnam. As President Johnson put it, "The choice was either peace on North Vietnam's terms or no peace at all".⁹

Such communist confidence, quite baffling for most American observers who thought that Hanoi was bending under US military pressure and the promise of yet more to come, was to be a familiar sign of Communist behaviour throughout the war. In fact, it is clear that Hanoi's

leadership never lost its conviction as to its "just" aims and its eventual victory in its struggle with the American "aggressor". In April 1966, for example, Gen. Nguyen Van Minh, chief of the North Vietnamese communist party's "reunification" department, delivered a speech which is indicative of the frame of mind that guided the North Vietnamese leaders. General Minh, seeking to spell out the conditions under which Hanoi would negotiate, underlined that when there is a war between a powerful nation and a weak one, still struggling to acquire more power, "a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously does not exist":

Fighting continues until the emergence of a situation where both sides are fighting indecisively. Then a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously may emerge. In fighting while negotiating, the side which fights more strongly will compel the adversary to accept its conditions. Considering the comparative balance of forces, the war proceeds through the following stages:

- the fighting stage
- the stage of fighting while negotiating¹⁰
- negotiations and signing of agreements.

It was therefore the communist party's intention "to continue fighting until a certain time when we can fight and negotiate at the same time"; meantime, the enemy was to be repulsed "step by step" until "decisive success" was achieved. If and when negotiations came, they were to be conducted "simultaneously with fighting" which was to remain vigorous until the conclusion of an agreement.¹¹ In retrospect, this was a remarkably accurate presentation of the future course of the war.

By mid-1967 it was clear that the fight to keep South Vietnam from succumbing to the communists would be neither short nor easy. While the North endured all the limited military blows directed at it, American casualties rose steadily, their average monthly numbers nearly doubling in comparison to 1966 levels. Rising casualties, and what seemed to be inability on the part of the US military to deliver concrete results, despite the huge resource commitments to the war, had a predictable impact on the US domestic scene. Anti-war protests intensified and, as a prominent American journalist observed, evidence was growing that the American people were not going to be "patient enough for a long struggle"--they were becoming increasingly convinced that no "permanent victory" could be achieved especially "given the political endurance of the Viet Cong and their ability to lie low and rise again...".¹² To make things even worse, increasing outside aid to North Vietnam made hopes for a speedy "choking" of the communist war effort a very deem prospect. In May 1967 the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that the Soviet Union was about to introduce new, sophisticated weapons into North Vietnam's arsenal, including surface-to-air missiles (which were soon to begin extracting a heavy toll from American aircraft), various types of artillery, and electronic defence systems. The military chiefs recommended immediate air raids against North Viet Vietnamese ports as well as naval interdiction missions to severe Hanoi's sea lines of communication.¹³ Their recommendation was rejected.

President Johnson's response to this rapidly deteriorating situation at home and in the overseas battlefield was at best confused. Firmly opposed to mobilizing the reserves, especially because of the political impact of such a move, the President temporized. With US manpower in South Vietnam standing near 500,000 men, MACV's requests for additional troops could not be met without calling in the reserves, and thus all additional manpower recommendations were set aside.¹⁴ Instead, the Administration, lacking any further coherent plans to combat the seemingly indestructible communists, pinned its hopes on a program of sweeping political reform which it was expected to begin after the South Vietnamese national elections scheduled for September 1968.¹⁵

At the end of 1967, however, Washington was dominated by a sense of gloom thinly disguised by the continuing optimistic public assessments of the war. The siege of the US Marine base at Khe Shan absorbed public as well as the President's own attention. At the same time, secret intelligence reports spoke of communist preparations in the South Vietnamese countryside indicating an imminent "unusual offensive". Shortly before Christmas, MACV's commander, Gen. William Westmorland, informed Washington that the North Vietnamese seemed preparing for "a major effort", and "perhaps a radical switch in strategy", to begin sometime around the Vietnamese New Year (Tet) on 30 January 1968. During a military briefing, held on 15 January, Westmorland repeated his warning, and put the chances of a major communist attack occurring before or

around Tet at sixty/forty per cent.

On 30-31 January MACV's fears materialized when a communist general offensive was launched simultaneously throughout South Vietnam. Viet Cong assault teams attacked pre-selected military, administrative, and communication targets, including American bases and other facilities. The US embassy in Saigon was a prime Viet Cong objective, too, but the attack failed to occupy the building. In all, the Viet Cong attacked thirty six out of South Vietnam's forty four provincial capitals, one third of all district capitals, and numerous other small towns and even hamlets.¹⁷ While the majority of the attackers were local Viet Cong, the holy city and imperial capital of Hue received the blow from a well-coordinated force of two North Vietnamese army regiments.

Although the Tet offensive did not achieve total surprise, and was effectively defeated within a week, it was nevertheless the turning point in the American involvement in Vietnam. American casualties rose to an estimated 3,895 killed-in-action.¹⁸ Although the communists had allegedly suffered fifteen times as many casualties, few Americans at home did indeed pay any attention to Viet Cong losses. The American mind was simply absorbed by the depiction of the savage fighting that was taking place, among others, in the US embassy's own yard. After so many public reassurances about "winning" a "brushfire" war, the scenes from the burning streets of Saigon shocked and demoralized a nation used to quick, "clean" victories.

From the purely military point of view, Tet was a resounding communist defeat. The South Vietnamese forces, despite their reputation for docility and low morale, did react with relative firmness, held their ground, and repulsed most Viet Cong attacks at heavy cost to the attackers. The people of South Vietnam, despite Hanoi's declared expectations for a "people's uprising", did not welcome the attackers, and did not revolt against their government. The Saigon government itself, often accused of complacency and corruption, also seemed to respond to the economic and social dislocation caused by the offensive with unexpected energy. Measures to deal with the thousands of refugees, and the devastation of the cities, were implemented "swiftly and fairly effectively" and relieved, at least in part, the suffering of the people.¹⁹

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Tet signalled the end of the once deadly Viet Cong urban infrastructure. Thousands of war-hardened and experienced guerrillas perished in the fighting, and as a result, South Vietnam's indigenous "liberation" fighters ceased being a credible party in the prosecution of the war after February 1968. From that point on the burden of fighting "the imperialists and their puppets" was transferred²⁰ largely to the shoulders of the North Vietnamese army. In the post-Tet years, Hanoi, abandoning much of its "people's war" strategy, would wage a conventional "big unit" campaign against South Vietnam until the very end.

Psychologically, however, Tet was a decisive

communist victory. After months of American confident statements, the massive scale of the assault and the chaos it caused literally demolished the Johnson Administration's credibility--despite a favourable tally "on the ground" in South Vietnam. Tet, while it proved that Hanoi could not force a military decision in the face of American presence in Southeast Asia, had also demonstrated that the United States could not achieve a "total" military victory either (at least under the restrictions imposed by Johnson's strategy of 'controlled escalation'). As a prominent North Vietnamese communist commented in later years:

The American command had always been under the illusion that victory was in the palm of their hands. Tet destroyed that illusion. As to the actual losses in human life on our part, I don't recall the exact number, but... that was the price that had to be paid to win this strategic victory.²¹

The impact Tet had on the American public, and on the President himself, was devastating. Universal bleak media reporting of the Tet events fanned the anti-war sentiment and prompted loud calls from political leaders, prominent academics, and media personalities for a thorough²² reappraisal of the US role in Vietnam. Shortly after Tet, Defense Secretary McNamara resigned, his position at the Defense Department hopelessly weakened by lack "of light at the end of the tunnel" and his own doubts about any further American military commitments. His successor at the Pentagon, Clark Clifford, was thus left with the unenviable task of forming a special study group to review the Vietnam situation and make recommendations to the

President.

After much deliberation--which again revealed the conflict between the 'hawks' and 'doves' within the Administration--the Clifford report presented little more than a compilation of doubts expressed by various officials. On the crucial issue of reserves mobilization, it simply compromised by neither approving nor rejecting²³ it. It was obvious, nevertheless, that the majority of Johnson's advisers had experienced a radical change in mood, leaning for the first time since 1965 towards de-escalation rather than further increases in the US presence in Indochina.

In the aftermath of Tet President Johnson was near political, emotional, and physical exhaustion. His prestige as the nation's leader had been eroded by the relentless public outcry against the war, and within the Democratic Party he was challenged by rivals largely on the grounds of his failure to bring an end to the conflict. With his frustration over the military quagmire mounting, and with his health failing, the President, on 31 March 1968, announced his withdrawal from politics²⁴ along yet another halt in the bombing of North Vietnam. To his surprise Hanoi responded favourably. Shortly after the bombing halt, a first round of negotiations opened in Paris only to witness endless North Vietnamese deliberation of insubstantial matters--in a carefully orchestrated effort to stall any real progress while the military situation grew more favourable for the communist side. Ultimately, North Vietnamese endurance paid off.

The "fighting while negotiating" phase was at hand, and a powerful opponent sat across the table--his morale sapped and his determination to continue fighting diminishing steadily. The countdown for the US presence in Indochina was under way.

The Bombing Campaign 1965-68

In the latter part of 1965, and as American troop levels in South Vietnam rose rapidly, US air operations expanded both in scope and intensity. In the ensuing years air power became one of the primary military tools employed against Hanoi. A great number of missions, varying from aerial transport and air mobility to tactical ground support and interdiction of communist lines of communication, were undertaken by the US Air Force and the²⁵ air arms of the US Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.

While each mission contributed in its own right to overall US combat operations--and therefore deserves separate analysis and evaluation--the air war in Indochina was dominated by the bombing campaigns against North Vietnam, and the communist supply routes that carried men and materiel into the South through neighbouring Laos and Cambodia (it was estimated, for example, that only 25 percent of all attack sorties flown during the entire war 'were closely linked to combat taking place on the ground²⁶ or to a freshly sighted target'). Consequently, one of the major foci of the post-Vietnam controversy has centered on the conduct of the American bombing campaign. Many critics have blamed "indiscriminate" bombing for

great human suffering and little strategic advantage, while others have chosen to attack the half-hearted way in which the Johnson Administration used US air power and, thus, concentrate on its failure to extract maximum strategic benefits from American air superiority.

The idea to expand the air war against the North, beyond the retaliatory strikes by the South Vietnamese air force, had circulated in the White House as early as the beginning of 1964. In January of that year, a Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum spoke of the need "to conduct aerial bombing of key North Vietnamese targets, using US resources under Vietnamese cover, and with the Vietnamese²⁷ openingly assuming responsibility for the actions". In March, assuming a similar line, Assistant Secretary of Defense William Bundy, in a detailed memorandum to the President, analyzed US options in South Vietnam and concluded that direct military action against North Vietnam was the most promising "track" to follow--with the specific purpose of showing "the US hand" and forcing Hanoi, if not to stop completely, at least reduce²⁸ considerably its role in the South. At about the same time, Secretary McNamara himself, speaking during a public engagement, reiterated, now openly, the threat of US military action against North Vietnam in defence of US²⁹ interests in Southeast Asia. The Secretary presented the same views in a secret report to the President referring to a program "of graduated overt military pressure" upon Hanoi, which would in due time include "air attacks against military and possibly industrial targets"

north of the Demilitarized Zone.

The Tonkin Gulf incident, and the subsequent Viet Cong attacks against US bases in South Vietnam, came to boost the case for an air campaign against the North. Initial plans centered around three different options. The first provided for sharp, punishing attacks only "in retaliation for specific operations in the South" on the basis of the "tit-for-tat" principle. The second, which was particularly popular among some air force generals, aimed at bombing North Vietnam "back into the 'Stone Age' and thereby end the war by destroying its cause at the source". The third option, which eventually came to be the principal method of applying American air power against the communists, saw "a gradual but intensifying campaign" designed to put the "squeeze" on Hanoi and force³¹ it to stop supporting the Viet Cong and negotiate.

Using the air force to combat communist aggression in South Vietnam carried considerable appeal. It promised to inflict a great deal of destruction on the enemy with a relatively small investment of resources, and, most importantly, it (theoretically) made large-scale commitment of American ground troops unnecessary. The US Air Force's confident predictions helped curb any doubts, and the poor state of North Vietnamese anti-aircraft defences added to this confidence. Indeed, the early ROLLING THUNDER raids seemed to bear this optimism out. During the first ROLLING THUNDER mission, carried out by 111 aircraft on 2 March 1965, only four were lost to ground fire.³² According to earlier intelligence reports,

the North Vietnamese air defence system was known to possess no surface-to-air missiles; it was estimated to deploy only about 700 anti-aircraft guns, and a mere twenty early warning radars with little tracking capability. The whole communist air defence system, far from being either dense or sophisticated, was thus restricted to engaging attacking air formations at altitudes below 20,000 feet, a ceiling which American planners felt was safe for sustained operations.³³

From the outset of ROLLING THUNDER in 1965, however, President Johnson, concerned about Soviet or Chinese reaction, insisted that the bombing remained under strict White House control, and brushed aside calls for a massive air offensive against the source of the communist insurgency in the South. Placing his political concerns above the requirements of his air strategists, the President approved personally target "packages", worked out by lower-echelon intelligence officials, deliberating the final target selection with his personal advisers and a select group of Congressional leaders.³⁴ Despite the difficulties that this laborious and cumbersome process created, ROLLING THUNDER was never allowed to "drift" into the hands of the military and continued as a tool of "ascending" political pressure, instead of as a weapon for subduing Hanoi, until its total halt on 31 October 1968.

The hesitant manner which characterized the employment of US air power over the North met the disapproval of not only the generals, but also that of a significant portion of the intelligence community.

Shortly after the first ROLLING THUNDER strikes, John McCone, CIA chief, expressed his doubts as to the effectiveness of such a piecemeal bombing campaign quite clearly. In a secret report to top Administration officials, the intelligence chief argued that air strikes not designed to "heavily" damage North Vietnam, and "hurt" Hanoi's military machine, were products of an ill-conceived strategy. The restraints placed upon ROLLING THUNDER could only interpreted by the communist leadership as the result of America's desire "to temporize". If the bombing was not carried out with sufficient vigor, McCone underlined, the United States ran into the risk of being "mired down" in a jungle war which it could not win, and from which it could have great difficulty extracting itself. Concluding that "we must hit them harder, more frequently, and inflict greater damage", the CIA director rounded up as follows:

A bridge here and there will not do the job. We must strike their airfields, their petroleum resources, power stations, and their military compounds. This, in my opinion, must be done promptly and with minimum restraint.³⁵

Another CIA analysis of the same period went even further by suggesting that the bombing could actually strengthen the North's determination, instead of sapping its war effort. In words that in retrospect sound prophetic indeed, the CIA analyst stressed the risk of causing Hanoi to intensify, instead of reducing, its support for the Viet Cong; a "militant majority" within the North Vietnamese communist party leadership, the document noted, could be expected to view the US bombing

campaign as an attempt of "a foe endeavoring to ward off defeat", a fact which called for endurance rather than surrender to the "imperialists":

They almost certainly believe that, while the US could destroy much of their country by air attacks, these alone would not cause their regime to collapse or prevent them from continuing to support the insurgency in the South. And they may believe that their international political position would improve if they became the object of sustained air attack from the US. Accordingly, they might decide to intensify the struggle, accepting the destructive consequences in the North in the expectation of early victory in the South.³⁶

These misgivings about both the incrementalist approach to the air war, and its long-term strategic advantages, did not prevent ROLLING THUNDER from gradually assuming massive proportions. Although the President consistently refused to give in to the military's demands for a "knock-out blow", bombing sorties against the North increased from 25,000 in 1965 to 108,000 in 1967, with the bomb tonnage climbing from 63,000 to 226,000.³⁷ At first target selection kept the bombs as close to the Demilitarized Zone as possible and allowed strikes on military targets only. These hesitant missions, aside from conveying a rather dubious "signal" to Hanoi, did not cause any significant damage to targets of strategic importance. No strikes were allowed north of twenty degrees latitude, a fact which rendered the Hanoi/Haiphong area, and its vital plants, immune to air attack.³⁸ Slowly, however, the bombing map extended northwards and US aircraft were allowed to strike at industrial and communications targets. The impact of the air campaign

upon the North Vietnamese economy grew proportionately. Whatever industrial output the North could manage was steadily reduced; traffic arteries were disrupted and agriculture came under strain; oil storage capacity fell dramatically; and food stocks came to dangerously low levels. The North Vietnamese population, already subsisting under Spartan conditions, was forced to live under even more severe deprivation--especially after food rationing was imposed, and black marketing pushed the price of all major commodities, including rice, to as much as ten times higher the officially controlled levels.³⁹

These quite palpable signs of suffering, however, were deceptive as to the real effects of the bombing. Despite an easing in the rules of engagement during 1967, which allowed attacks on industrial targets around Hanoi, and the spectacular raids on the Paul Doumer bridge (the main transportation link over the Red River near the communist capital), bombing of Hanoi itself, the port of Haiphong, and railheads on the Chinese border still remained on the exclusion list. These were crucial omissions. Declaring Hanoi a "protected" zone was, ironically, the most effective air defence the communists could hope for. Although plans to move key government agencies away from the city had been made shortly after the bombing began, the North Vietnamese were never forced to execute them--and thus continued "business as usual" in the midst of a "total" war. Similarly, avoiding Haiphong ensured that North Vietnam's main seaport remained undamaged, and continued to receive an uninterrupted flow

of cargo from the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries which included such vital items as sophisticated anti-aircraft defence systems, food, and medical supplies. These shipments, along with the ones arriving from China via rail from Nanning in the east and Kuming in the west, armed, fed, and bolstered North Vietnam until the end of the war. When ROLLING THUNDER was finally halted in late 1968, the United States had lost nearly one thousand⁴⁰ aircraft, at an estimated cost of six billion dollars, whereas the North Vietnamese, although bloodied, had suffered no appreciable dent in their morale and went on fighting as before.

* * *

Aside from the self-imposed protection zones, which was perhaps the single most crucial limiting factor in ROLLING THUNDER's conduct, the failure of the bombing program to force Hanoi into negotiations should also be sought in a number of other factors.

First, American strategists obviously overestimated the impact of bombing on an underdeveloped nation existing at near-poverty levels. In early 1968, a special study, undertaken jointly by the Joint Chiefs and the Office of International Security in order to assess the effects of the bombing, concluded that "after two years of the air war, North Vietnam could, within two months, recover almost completely from the damage done to its strategic lines of communication", and that it could move to achieve a favourable military balance in the South within half a⁴¹ year after the bombing halt. Given the constraints

imposed upon the air war, the communists, relying almost entirely on outside aid in order to carry on with the war, and with a pre-industrial agricultural economy had no real manufacturing base or other sophisticated assets which a strategic bombing campaign could disrupt or destroy. With foreign benefactors paying for most of the resources lost due to bombing, North Vietnam was at no time faced with a crippling "true logistics crisis".⁴²

Second, the initial "tit-for-tat" attacks, and Washington's reluctance to commit itself to an unrestricted air campaign, allowed Hanoi "to start work on a comprehensive and efficient air defence system that would eventually come to include Migs, SAMs and AA artillery, all linked into a centralized warning and control system".⁴³ Although North Vietnamese air defences (and particularly the fighter/interceptor force) never came to the position of imposing unacceptable casualties on the attackers, their often deadly fire forced "compromise" tactics during bombing runs and thus reduced accuracy and overall effectiveness.

Third, North Vietnam "demonstrated great ingenuity and dogged perseverance in coping with the bombing".⁴⁴ Popular mobilization reached total proportions. As one analyst reports, "no fewer than two million civilians formed 'shock brigades' traveling where needed to man the bridges or repair road and rail lines ensuring the flow and pocket-storage of food, fuel, and ammunition".⁴⁵ In addition to these repair gangs, 50,000 Chinese engineer troops were also "voluntarily" dispatched to help with the

functioning of the North's transportation system, and the
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repair of bombing damage. Extensive camouflage and
concealment of supply trails through South Vietnam and
Laos ensured relative immunity from air attack at least
until technological innovation allowed 24-hour attacks
beginning in 1968. When the bombing took its toll in
motor vehicles, human convoys, using carts and bicycles,
took upon them the task of transporting supplies and
ammunition. This massive effort kept fighting communist
troops adequately supported, and helped minimize the
impact of ROLLING THUNDER.

Last but not least, constant interference on the
operational level by the President and his civilian
advisers created insurmountable obstacles in executing
even this severely restricted air strategy. Each separate
mission was thus transformed into a bureaucratic nightmare
requiring prior specific approval from Washington. One
indication of the "strapping" imposed by the White House
was the refusal to allow pre-attack photo reconnaissance
and no follow-up secondary strikes against targets of
opportunity; unexpended ordnance had to be jettisoned
before return to base. And in case that specific strikes
had to be cancelled, due to weather or other conditions,
the approval procedure for that particular target had to
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be repeated from the beginning.

In summary, ROLLING THUNDER ended as a distinct
failure in the overall US effort to influence events in
Vietnam. Although the Nixon Administration was to return
to massive strategic bombing in its search for an

"honourable" extrication from Southeast Asia, the effectiveness of a modern air force used against a semi-primitive, but highly motivated, enemy had already been shown to be limited.

The War on the Ground, 1965-68

Prior to the US Marine landings at Da Nang in March 1965, American military presence in South Vietnam was limited to deployment of advisory personnel along with required logistical units. In 1961, for example, there were only 3,164 American troops "in-country" and, by 1964, this number had grown to 23,310, still a far cry from the⁴⁸ massive deployments which were to follow in later years.

Before 1965 American advisers remained attached to units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), and to the other services, with the express purpose of training junior South Vietnamese officers, and advising ARVN commanders on tactics. Contact with the enemy in combat was rare, and most of the American casualties until the "Americanization" of the war occurred as a result of⁴⁹ terrorist attacks by the Viet Cong. From 1961 to 1964, the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)--which, in early 1962, became MACV--placed strong emphasis on improved mobility for the GVN forces, and the introduction of close air support for ground operations. The United States provided helicopters and transport aircraft, and expedited training in air reconnaissance, air-ground support techniques, and the collection of special intelligence. Small craft for controlling coastal waters

against infiltrators were also provided, and the training of a national civil guard was accelerated in order to free regular troops from static defence duties and return them to offensive operations.

These measures, designed to reinvigorate the ARVN and give the South Vietnamese a fighting edge in the guerrilla war, had limited success. The size of the country, the poor political control exercised by Saigon over the provinces, and the low morale of the GVN forces combined to allow the Viet Cong to roam the countryside largely unmolested. By mid-1965 the military situation had deteriorated to such a point that General Westmorland warned CINCPAC, Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp (who exercised operational control over the Southeast Asia theater) that, unless additional US troops were not immediately dispatched to South Vietnam to cope with the increased communist activity, no guarantees could be made about a successful defence against the guerrillas and their Northern allies. As Westmorland put it:

In order to cope with the situation... I see no course of action open to us except to reinforce our efforts in SVN with additional US or third country forces as rapidly as is practical during the critical weeks ahead.⁵¹

The proposed strategy for the increased American forces was based on standard US practices encompassing the experience of previous wars. Westmorland's main purpose was to "bring the war to the enemy" by utilizing his superior firepower and mobility. As he explained in the same message to CINCPAC:

Ground forces deployed to selected areas along

the coast and inland will be used both offensively and defensively. US ground troops are gaining experience and thus far have performed well. Although they have not yet engaged the enemy in strength, I am convinced that US troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the VC. The basic purpose of the additional deployments... is to give us a substantial and hard hitting capability on the ground to convince the VC that they cannot win.⁵²

In another message to CINCPAC, on 14 June, Westmorland sought to further clarify his intentions and alleviate fears that heavy fighting would take place near or in⁵³ densely populated areas. The MACV commander described his strategy as one of "mobile warfare" which would allow his troops to carry out major operations in remote parts of the country. The principle behind these operations was to be "search and destroy" which, applied immediately, was expected to "attrite" Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main force units. As the general explained, his intention was to direct his troops "against the hardcore North Vietnam/Viet Gong forces in reaction and search and destroy operations and thus permit the concentration of Vietnamese troops in the heavily populated areas along the coast,⁵⁴ around Saigon and in the Delta".

Throughout the period from mid-1965 to the end of 1967, the search-and-destroy strategy brought about major engagements between US and communist forces. Relying heavily on air mobility, aerial bombardment, and artillery, operations like MASHER/WHITE WING, THAYER I/IRVING, FAIRFAX, CEDAR FALLS, and THAYER II, brought American attack forces sweeping over large areas of South Vietnam in search of enemy concentrations, supply depots,

staging locations, and command/control posts. These actions were essentially large-scale tactical offensives, carried out by regimental or divisional-sized units employing armour and air elements, and designed to find, fix, and defeat the enemy in "decisive" battles. Although American forces prevailed almost invariably during these engagements--and the communists paid a heavy toll, at least in "body count" terms--by late 1967 it was obvious that MACV's plan to "attrite" Hanoi into submission was not paying off. Communist resistance showed no signs of breaking under the American "big unit" pressure. The Tet Offensive came to prove the enemy's resilience, and marked⁵⁵ the beginning of a reduced ground role for US forces.

The failure of search-and-destroy to achieve a decisive US military victory in Vietnam has naturally become, like ROLLING THUNDER, the focus of heated debate. Overall, as critics have pointed out, the main flaw in Westmorland's strategy was that it tried to reconcile essentially contradictory politico-military requirements into the same military operational plan. Carrying the fight to the Viet Cong was indeed much easier said than done. Unlike previous wars the United States had fought, the Vietnamese conflict offered no organized "fronts" with predictable dimensions. This was an "unconventional" war where population security, and various police operations, were as crucial as finding and destroying Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army units.

Fighting away from populated areas was equally impossible. Westmorland's express desire to avoid

civilian casualties did not change the fact that the Viet Cong, seeking primarily to undermine Saigon's authority over its people, were not bound by "conventional" military necessities. As a result, it was not long before the American juggernaut, in pursuit of an enemy that sought protection in the midst of the civilian population, began ploughing through South Vietnamese towns and villages with disastrous outcome for the people themselves, the popularity of the GVN, and the future of American-South Vietnamese "friendship" and "cooperation".⁵⁶

Another serious criticism of the US ground war strategy has been based on the inaccurate, and often overoptimistic, assessments of what deployed American manpower could actually achieve. Given the unpopularity of the war, and the increasing public pressure on the White House, troop levels in South Vietnam came under restrictive "ceilings" which, when considering the enormous task of fighting a "big unit" war alongside a "pacification" population-security campaign, made MACV's mission simply impossible. General Westmorland's comment is indicative:

Because neither the Americans nor the South Vietnamese possessed overwhelming numbers, the cordons erected when the enemy was found were sieve-like, and many of the enemy escaped. Nor was it possible to occupy the sanctuaries and other pieces of terrain permanently, so that foray after foray had to be launched.⁵⁷

Expectations that US aggressive and munition-intensive operations would cause the communists to sustain "unacceptable" casualties were also way off the mark. In the long run, the enemy's capability to absorb losses

proved quite sufficient to balance out, and eventually defeat, the US attrition strategy. By skillfully manipulating the time and place of combat, and having secure sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos to retreat to, the communist leaders were able to control the expenditure of their human resources, choose the time and place of fighting, and to plan realistically for a protracted war. In the words of George Herring:

An estimated 200,000 North Vietnamese reached draft age each year, and Hanoi was able to replace its losses and match each American escalation with one of its own... The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong fought at times and places of their own choosing and on ground favorable to them. If losses reached unacceptable levels, they could simply melt away into the jungle or retreat into sanctuaries in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. 58

Tactics "on the ground" did not escape criticism either. One of the most common such complaints was the lack of tactical surprise which American commanders rarely failed to bring upon themselves. It was the movement of often multibattalion assault formations, "accompanied and supported by cumbersome and noisy mobile equipment", into relatively restricted combat areas which gave ample warning to the enemy; the routine practice of "prepping" helicopter landing zones with artillery, and the deafening noise of approaching helicopters invariably guaranteed putting enemy spotters on the alert and causing the quiet retreat of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces into the safety of adjacent sanctuaries. 59

The blanket use of firepower, aside from achieving very poor ratios of expended ammunition vs. confirmed

"kills", inflicted frightful destruction on the countryside, and forced millions of peasants into crowded refugee camps and the already cramped cities of South Vietnam. The designation of large areas of the country as "free fire" zones, where any movement was met with massive fire "response", only added to the misery of the civilian population--without disrupting enemy movements which were usually re-routed through safer areas of compensatory communication. And to round off the bill of suffering, operation RANCH HAND, in an aerial effort to deprive the enemy of natural cover and food supplies, sprayed millions of gallons of herbicide, including the notorious Agent Orange, over great expanses of jungle canopy and arable land causing, in most cases, long-lasting and even irreversible ecological damage.⁶⁰

Conclusion

The defeat the United States suffered in the hands of an ~~underdeveloped~~ Third World nation has prompted much painful introspection among American political leaders, military writers, and scholars. Although many "lessons" have been elaborated, it is still difficult to offer the definitive list of strategic mistakes, outright political blunders, and other miscalculations responsible for the ultimate failure of the American attempt to keep South Vietnam from falling to communist hands. While the Johnson period marked the highest intensity of US military operations in Southeast Asia, the trail of Vietnam-related decisions can be traced from the Eisenhower presidency

straight through the final dramatic moments of the Nixon White House and the tentative Ford Administration of the mid-1970s--a time span of almost twenty five years.

The mere length of the war therefore, makes the identification of specific intervention causes, and analysis of their origins and development into generators of policy and military strategy, a complex and not always successful quest. This difficulty is further accentuated by the broad dimensions of the war, the sheer volume of the bureaucratic process involved, the turnover of policymakers, and the tortuous policy debates, often deadlocked, which were all salient characteristic of the years after 1964 in particular.

But it is generally accepted that "the President's war" of 1964-68 was the period during which the United States, although winning quite a few battles, did surrender the strategic initiative to its communist adversaries. What then created the apparent inability of the Administration to pursue a "war-winning" strategy and protect South Vietnam from conquest?

Inevitably, a large--perhaps the largest--portion of the responsibility should be attributed to President Johnson himself. Although his was the reputation of a man who hated "losers" (and who had privately often expressed his determination 'not to lose this one'), Vietnam immediately assumed impossible dimensions because the President chose to approach it as a contingency which could be met without any serious dislocation of peacetime American society but, also, without unleashing "unlimited"

war against Hanoi. From the beginning,

Johnson's strategy rested on three interrelated principles: gradual escalation, a highly restrictive list of permissible operations... and a declaratory policy that made clear that America had no intention of threatening the existence of the North Vietnamese regime. 61

This strategy suffered from at least two fundamental flaws: first, it failed to identify Hanoi as the main adversary in the war; and second, it gave no impetus to creative diplomacy capable of curtailing fears of Soviet or Chinese counter-intervention.

Refusing to focus on Hanoi as the major opponent in the Indochinese conflict gave the Johnson White House the opportunity to "push under the carpet" the fact that the United States was at war in Southeast Asia. This reluctance may be explained persuasively in terms of domestic politics. Johnson's supreme effort to rectify the ills of American society, and notably the civil rights issue affecting America's black citizens, required maximum concentration on the domestic front, and indeed as little friction with Congress as possible. The President later referred proudly to "the season of accomplishments" which the nation experienced in 1965-66.⁶² It is safe to assume that neither he nor his close advisers wished to jolt Great Society's building with a declaration of war against North Vietnam. Being in Vietnam, in fact, was presented more as a matter of commitment to a rather vague policy of protecting American interests in Southeast Asia, inherited by the Johnson Administration, rather than an all-out effort to defeat communist aggression. As President

Johnson himself put it during a speech at Johns Hopkins University:

We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-Nam defend its independence.....

We are also there to strengthen world order. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence... in the value of America's word. 63

Similar rhetorical commitments "to stay the course" and "pay the price" were often made during the years 1965 to 1968. Both civilian and military leaders concentrated on the broadly stated objective "to keep South Vietnam free", and they all suffered in the process from the lack of direction on who was the real enemy and what to do next. Like his predecessors, Johnson saw the American mission in South Vietnam as denying to the communists the control of that country, but not destroying the source of the insurgency. The result was a multitude of rubrics-- "counter-insurgency", "population security", "attrition strategy", "search-and-destroy", "big-unit war" etc.--but no streamlined, effective strategy. Colonel Summers, commenting on this confusion within the American national security establishment, wrote:

Although in theory the best route to victory would have been a strategic offensive against North Vietnam, such action was not in line with U.S. strategic policy, which called for the containment rather than the destruction of Communist power... Instead of focusing on North Vietnam--the source of the war--we placed our attention on the symptom, the guerrilla war in the south. 64

Failing to see the "strategic offensive" against Hanoi as

the necessary condition for eventually suppressing the communist guerrillas in the South allowed the "people's war", fed by the North, to become the focus of operations, something which, in the long run,

- (a) forced the United States to expend its forces on a "secondary" objective, i.e. battling guerrillas in the South Vietnamese countryside, and
- (b) led to the wrong ARVN deployments and made their reaction to a conventional North Vietnamese invasion impossible. 65

As Professor Berman aptly put it, "Johnson would not lose Vietnam by running away" but rather lose it "slowly"; indeed, "...in retrospect it seems perfectly clear that the United States had little chance of achieving its limited goal against a country waging total war". 66

On the diplomatic front, the Johnson Administration seemed equally reluctant to wage an enlarged campaign exploiting Sino-Soviet differences which could insure against, or at least greatly minimize, the possibility of Russian or Chinese direct involvement in the war. By 1966 it was obvious that the rift between Moscow and Peking was widening, and that the Chinese would be receptive to some form of rapprochement with the United States in order to gain support in their "struggle for physical survival vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union". 67 The two communist giants, although forced to agree in principle that communist North Vietnam could not be abandoned in the hands of the "imperialists", had very different views on how to achieve
68 victory for Hanoi. While Moscow ultimately favoured a negotiated end to hostilities, Peking assumed a much harder line which, in the Chinese leadership's estimation,

not only exposed the gutless "revisionist clique" ruling in the Kremlin, but also reasserted China's exclusive⁶⁹ dominance over a region in its own "back yard".

Had Johnson been prepared, like his successor, President Nixon, to undertake bold initiatives in improving relations with both communist giants the course of the war might have been very different. Shortly after Johnson's withdrawal from politics, Nixon was able to re-escalate the war while, at the same time, opening the door to China and establishing detente with Moscow. Nixon's decisive diplomacy can only be contrasted unfavourably with the static posture which the Johnson Administration assumed.

Johnson's relative inactivity in searching for a diplomatic advantage in the Washington-Moscow-Peking triangle can be attributed to a number factors. In the mid-1960s it was still the inflexible attitude towards Peking, and Communism in general, generated by the "loss" of China to Mao in 1949, that still prevailed in Washington. Johnson, like Kennedy and Eisenhower before him, perceived the Vietnamese conflict as part and parcel of the American struggle against a monolithic communist block, and saw Hanoi as just another Chinese proxy. There is little evidence that he and his advisers took seriously into account Hanoi's nationalist aspirations, or the view that the clash between the two Vietnams was essentially a civil war with deep roots in the historical experience of Southeast Asia. One would assume that precisely because of this pre-occupation with the communist monolith, an

attempt would have been made to negotiate more extensively with the perceived center, i.e. Moscow, directing Hanoi's campaign against South Vietnam. This was not done, however. While Nixon would depend on detente for finding an acceptable method of extricating the United States from its Indochinese quagmire, Johnson chose instead a dubious "signalling" tactic, based on various levels of military activity, which promoted neither a rapid American disengagement nor the long-term bolstering of South Vietnam. In the final line, it was this inability to define the true dimensions of the war--with Hanoi not a mere proxy, but rather a prime actor in the conflict--that defeated Johnson's unimaginative diplomacy and led to the prolongation of the Vietnam tragedy.

CHAPTER VI

GRENADA

Historical Background

Grenada, a tiny island of the Lesser Antilles approximately one hundred nautical miles off the Venezuelan coast, became an independent nation on 7 February 1974 after three centuries of French, and later, British colonial rule. At the time of independence Grenada faced serious economic and social problems. The government of Sir Eric Gairy,¹ which came to power in 1967 following elections conducted by the British colonial Administration, was retained after independence but could offer no effective solutions to the new state's pressing problems. The island suffered from endemic corruption and mismanagement. The economy, entirely depended on agricultural exports (such as bananas and spices) and tourism, continued to deteriorate. Between 1974 and 1979 Grenadian "finances collapsed into chaos" as Gairy resorted to "indiscriminate government borrowing" to² resolve his government's short term cash flow problems. The net result of these reckless financial tactics was loss of foreign development aid, general deterioration of the Grenadians' already poor standard of living, and further rumblings of discontent among the island's working class masses.

With no hope of recovery in sight and with public

unrest growing, police brutality became the sole instrument of government control in an effort to ensure that no political opposition worthy of the name materialized. Repression, however, could not control mounting criticism of Gairy's Administration by a small, yet vocal, group of foreign-educated political activists. Prominent among them was Maurice Bishop, an articulate British-educated lawyer, who envisioned Grenada as a socialist state governed by a national coalition of intellectuals, labourers, and peasants. In 1973, Bishop and Kenrick Radix founded the Movement for Assemblies of the People as an anti-Gairy party and soon merged it with a similar movement, the Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (JEWEL), to form Grenada's main opposition party, the New Jewel Movement (NJM). The NJM gathered under its wings leftists of various persuasions including doctrinaire Marxists. Its declared purpose became the ousting of the Gairy regime and its replacement³ by a socialist reformist government. Bishop emerged as the dominant personality in the NJM early on, and although he made no secret of his socialist philosophy, he remained ambivalent vis-a-vis more radical NJM members and avoided describing the party's principles as "Marxist-Leninist". NJM activities were greeted with increased police terror and the personal persecution of Bishop and the rest of the party's leading members.

Against this background of economic malaise and violence, general elections in December 1976 showed that Gairy's grip on power was less firm than previously

thought. The ruling party narrowly escaped defeat at the polls and, for the first time since 1967, was forced to face a genuine opposition in parliament headed by Bishop-- who, despite intense police harassment, had been the propelling personality in the pre-election drive against the government. The unmistakable signs of diminishing popular support, however, did little to change Gairy's tactics. Finally, with the economy in shambles, Grenada's external credit all but exhausted, and no prospect of relief from police terror, Bishop and the NJM, bolstered by popular support, staged a bloodless coup on 13 March 1979 and seized control of the government.⁴

As soon as the initial euphoria subsided, it became clear that the NJM, for all its previous declarations about participatory "mass" democracy, was tightly centralized and controlled not by "people's assemblies" but by a 16-member central committee under Bishop -- who had been declared Prime Minister of the self-appointed People's Revolutionary Government (PRG). In true "revolutionary" fashion, the PRG banned all other political parties, suspended the constitution, promised (but never allowed) elections, and began arresting those who raised dissenting voices. These acts, although reminiscent of the Gairy regime, did not significantly affect the image of the revolution thanks mainly to Bishop's charismatic leadership and his personal popularity. On the other hand,

By the indefinite suspension of the constitution, the NJM made clear to the world that the events of 13 March 1979 were designed

to do much more than just replace a dictator in order to return to the forms of representative democracy drawn up for Grenada by Whitehall civil servants and lawyers. It was to be a continuing revolution, in thought as well as in deed. 5

From the outset, however, the NJM's "continuing revolution" was torn by ideological tension. Politburo hardliners, congregated around deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, pressed for a rapid transition to a fully-fledged Marxist-Leninist system that guaranteed the prominence of the "proletariat". These pressures were resisted by the moderates around Bishop who adhered to principles of democratic socialism and insisted on a more cautious path. This uneasy co-existence within the top of the NJM was destined to have catastrophic consequences.

Divisions over ideology were coupled with disagreements concerning the economy and the pace of Grenada's socialist transformation. The PRG was able to halt the disastrous economic trends inherited from the Gairy years and to stabilize the economy. Emphasis was placed on food production, efforts were made to encourage tourism from Western countries, and private enterprise was tolerated although private industry came under pressure⁶ "through seizures, taxation, and various laws". There were at least four major factors responsible for Grenada's economic difficulties. First, the world economic slump depressed the prices of Grenada's main exports, such as bananas, cocoa, and spices, and led to significant revenue contraction. Second, the generally adverse publicity which the Grenadian revolution received in the Western

press eroded the island's tourist trade and almost totally eliminated a crucial source of foreign exchange. Third, differences over agricultural policy between Bishop and his more ideologically eager comrades resulted in haphazard planning and inefficient utilization of the land available for cultivation. And fourth, the PRG, despite initial rejection of prestige projects, became deeply involved in the building of an international airport at Point Salines, with the declared purpose to promote tourism, which seriously depleted the island's meager foreign exchange reserves.

Despite these difficulties, and although achieving a lasting economic turn-around was to remain elusive, the average Grenadian experienced real improvements in his daily life, unemployment was reduced to tolerable levels, and the island's economic infrastructure became the focus of a conscious modernization effort. Grenada received "a glowing annual report" from the World Bank for 1981-82 but it was also warned that long-term growth could only be secured by better export performance and improvement in its terms of trade.⁷

By early 1983, and despite the PRG's confident predictions, it was obvious that the Grenadian revolution was in crisis. With no significant economic improvement in sight, with ideological differences within the PRG mounting, and with Bishop still refusing to budge to the Coard faction's pressures for faster transition to Leninism, the ruling group of the NJM became polarized to the point of open conflict. The presence of Eastern bloc

advisors did little to correct the revolutionary failures⁸ or to restore harmony in NJM ranks. Coard, who had organized his devotees into a semi-secret Marxist discussion group called the Organization for Educational Advancement and Research, was now vociferously demanding an immediate reassessment of party organization and tactics according to Leninist doctrine. And even more ominously for the Bishop moderates, Coard insisted on the creation of a collective leadership with himself elevated to the post of joint leader of the NJM next to the Prime Minister. Although Bishop initially refused to consider the joint leadership issue, it was not too long before he was forced to submit to Coard's demands in the hope of avoiding a potentially fatal rift within the NJM.

Since Bishop's "wavering" was considered dangerous "reaction" by the Coard group, the hardliners took further steps to "protect" the revolution. In September, and while the Prime Minister was on a trip to Eastern Europe, the Coard supporters won control of Grenada's tiny army and effectively pushed Bishop out of power. On 13 October, the founder of the NJM was stripped of his powers and⁹ placed under house arrest. But news of the prime minister's confinement aroused immediate public protest and spontaneous demonstrations challenged Coard's action. On 19 October, a crowd of Bishop supporters freed the ex-Prime Minister who still believed that a peaceful resolution of the situation was possible. Later that same day, however, soldiers confronted a pro-Bishop demonstration, fired into the crowd causing numerous

casualties, and re-arrested Bishop along with a number of his colleagues. Within minutes of their arrest, they were all executed by pro-Coard troops inside Fort Rupert overlooking the capital of St. George's.¹⁰ A 16-man Revolutionary Military Council (RMC), under Gen. Hudson Austin was pronounced and the PRG was dissolved. But the new junta's rule was short-lived. On 25 October, and following five days of uncertain military rule, US forces, supported by a token military and police force from neighbouring Caribbean states, invaded Grenada to ostensibly restore order and protect the lives of American citizens. The Grenadian revolution thus came to a rather unceremonious end.

Background to Invasion

Before Gairy's overthrow Grenada attracted little official American attention. It was the seizure of power by the NJM which prompted Washington's interest and, in conjunction to events in Nigaragua and El Salvador, caused the United States to "rediscover" Central America and the Caribbean after almost two decades of benign neglect.¹¹

Grenada's revolution coincided with a period of overall policy reassessment within the Carter Administration. During 1979-80, Carter's original policy towards Latin America, emphasizing human rights and peaceful resolution of internal conflicts, underwent major changes as the Administration became more sensitive to the global Soviet challenge and traditional American security

concerns. In the Caribbean, three events contributed to the shift of the American approach towards more conservative tactics. To begin with, the dispatch of Cuban troops to support African Marxist regimes destroyed hopes for an eventual rapprochement between Havana and Washington within Carter's liberal policy framework. Secondly, the collapse of the Somoza dictatorship in Nigaragua brought to power a Marxist junta which favored close links with Castro and was avowedly committed to a Nigaraguan "people's republic". And, thirdly, El Salvador's leftist insurgents intensified their attacks on the central government making that tormented country another potential security "risk" on the immediate American periphery.

In light of these developments, Washington received the news of the Grenadian revolution with reservation. Although Gairy's departure marked, theoretically, a victory for the forces of democracy and respect for human rights, the NJM's Marxist inclinations, the suppression of its political opponents, and the failure to hold free elections combined to strengthen American misgivings about the Bishop regime. Thus, the PRG's declared intentions of cultivating closer ties with Havana, if only to bolster Grenada's defences against the ever-present fear of "mercenary" invasion,¹² drew an unusually sharp warning from the American Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, Frank Ortiz, who visited Grenada shortly after the revolution:

Although my Government recognises your concerns over allegations of a possible counter-coup, it

also believes that it would not be in Grenada's best interest to seek assistance from a country such as Cuba to forestall such an attack. We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba. 13

Grenada, Cuba, and the Soviet Union

Such US warnings hardly minimized Grenadian determination to promote links with Cuba, the Soviet Union and other "fraternal" socialist states (and, if anything, they must have strengthened resentment of the 'American imperialists' and the desire to obtain Soviet help).

Cuba, both geographically closer and the undisputed motherland of Marxist revolution in the Western hemisphere, became the NJM's mentor from the very beginning. Within a month of Gairy's overthrow, Havana had dispatched Julian Torres Rizo, a former head of the Cuban mission to the United Nations and a senior intelligence officer, as its first charge d'affaires at St. George's--an appointment which demonstrated the significance Cuba assigned to offering Bishop the correct "guidance" in his quest for "socialist transformation". In November 1979, it was also announced that the two countries had also agreed on an aid package for the construction of the new international airport at Point Salines.¹⁴ The personal rapport between Fidel Castro and Maurice Bishop, and the fact that the PRG was the first truly "revolutionary" regime in the circum-Caribbean, helped these initial contacts to evolve rapidly into a complex relationship. Not before long the Cubans were offering assistance in "amounts which were incongruous to

the small size of the island, its limited resources, and doubtful strategic value".¹⁵ Cuban involvement in Grenada's domestic life extended well beyond the bounds of the airport construction site. By mid-1980, several Grenadian government delegations had visited Cuba to consult with Cuban counterparts on a variety of economic, political, educational, and technical issues. During that same period, Cuba maintained at least sixty civilian advisors, diplomats, and technicians in Grenada (forty of whom were directly involved in the Port Salines construction) and planned to increase this presence to 250 personnel as the airport project entered its advanced stages.¹⁶

Collaboration was not limited to civilian aid programs but was enlarged to include assistance in military matters as well. In a separate secret treaty, Havana agreed to grant scholarships to Grenadians enabling them to study in Cuban military schools, and to dispatch twenty seven "permanent military specialists" to Grenada in order to "strengthen" its People's Revolutionary Army and Militia and assist in the

---combative and campaign training of the troops and staffs in the preparation of cadres and minor specialists, and in the elaboration of the operative and mobilization plans for the defense of the country. 17

The links with Cuba, although by far the most extensive Grenada maintained with a "fraternal" socialist country, were augmented by ties with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries.¹⁸ Contacts with the Soviet Union were initiated as early as December 1979 when a team

of Soviet trade officials visited Grenada to investigate areas for possible assistance. In March 1980, the island received the visit of the Soviet Navy chief and Deputy Minister of Defence, Adm. Sergei Gorshkov. In May, deputy Prime Minister Coard, heading a three-man delegation, visited the Soviet Union, followed by East Germany and Bulgaria, to discuss foreign aid and to acquire instruction on "techniques of agro-industrial production".¹⁹

The Coard trip inaugurated a period of continuous Grenadian efforts to develop closer links between the PRG and the Kremlin. In contrast to Cuba, however, the Soviet Union seemed to choose a less enthusiastic approach to Grenada's "internationalist" regime. The exchange of official visits, and even Grenada's support of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, did not result in any immediate expansion of diplomatic relations per se; it was not until September 1982, and following an official visit to Moscow by Bishop, that the Soviet Union finally established a full diplomatic mission at St. George's and dispatched Gennadiy Sazhenev, a high-ranking official of the military intelligence directorate, as Ambassador to the island.

This Soviet reluctance to fully and unconditionally endorse the Grenadian revolution sprung from at least two main reasons. First, official NJM ideology, influenced by Bishop's own utopian populist ideas, lacked the underpinnings of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy necessary to win the NJM a place in the brotherhood of true

"communist" parties, at least in Soviet eyes. At the time of the revolution, as the Kremlin must have observed, the NJM did not even have "a coherent political platform or a realistic set of policies for dealing with the island's problems",²⁰ let alone the painstakingly detailed, and preferably five-year, program typical of "scientific" Marxist movements. In the aftermath of Gairy's overthrow the NJM's "socialist" vocabulary undoubtedly improved but gaps still remained. For example, Bishop, as late as 1982, saw the Grenadian revolution not in strictly Marxian terms but at a rather vague "national democratic stage"--although he clearly perceived the PRG as "an anti-imperialist government" leading Grenada through a "socialist orientated stage of development".²¹ Similarly, the Grenadian Prime Minister, in his capacity as chief NJM ideologue, did not promote the Movement as the "vanguard" revolutionary party preferring instead to philosophize on the merits of broad popular support; no conscious attempt was made to recognize "class conflict" as the cause of Grenadian social and economic ills or to elaborate the benefits of the "dictatorship of the proletariat"; the PRG placed emphasis on agriculture rather than manufacturing industry; and even "scientific" Leninist hardliners like Coard admitted that the Grenadian "national bourgeoisie", i.e., the private sector, had a role to play in the "revolutionary" economy.²²

Second, the Soviets, weary of previous "revolutionary" experiments in the Third World (and particularly in Latin America) and with little experience

in circum-Caribbean affairs, viewed the prospects of the Grenadian revolution with a healthy dose of scepticism. As one analysis put it, "Grenada was not high on the Soviet list of priorities because of its rather insignificant size, remote location, viability, and vulnerability to 'imperialism' (i.e., American power)" although its "potentially strategic location" made it a prime candidate²³ for Soviet aid. The Russian reservations were clearly detected by W. Richard Jacobs, the Grenadian Ambassador in Moscow, who, in one of his reports to his government, wrote:

---the Caribbean -- as they [the Russians] repeatedly state (though often in different contexts) is very distant from them. It is, quite frankly, not one of their priority areas, and this is reinforced by their interest in reducing the areas of conflict with the USA. Furthermore, the CPSU has historically been very cautious in developing relations with parties that are new to them. This is due to their bitter experiences in places like Egypt, Somalia and to a lesser degree Bangladesh and Chile. 24

The result of the Soviet uneasiness with dealing directly with Grenada led to a clear-cut "division of labour" among those members of the Soviet bloc prepared to assist the PRG in its "socialist path". While Moscow "provided overall guidance and direction", East Germany organized the Grenadian internal security apparat, Czechoslovakia supplied arms, and Cuba provided the technical expertise and trained personnel for building up Grenada's economic,²⁵ educational, and medical infrastructure.

Grenada and the Reagan Administration

Improving cooperation with "fraternal" countries,

however, meant steadily deteriorating relations with the United States. Bishop's own preoccupation with CIA "conspiracies" and "plots" against the PRG fed a steady stream of anti-American rhetoric--which only made matters worse by adding to the mistrust and ill feeling already separating the two countries. In the closing months of the Carter Administration, Grenadian-American relations were at an all-time low following the American refusal to accept Dessima Williams as Grenada's Ambassador in Washington and to offer assistance to the PRG after Hurricane Allen destroyed almost half of the island's banana crop.²⁶

This poor state of affairs deteriorated further with the election of President Reagan. The new Administration perceived the Caribbean basin in considerably darker colours than its predecessor. The Caribbean was labeled a "crisis" area where the "lack of order" created fertile grounds for the growth of a Soviet/Cuban "conspiracy" to undermine Western hemispheric security.²⁷ In accordance with this view, the Reagan Central American/Caribbean policy became permeated by an attitude of "toughness" vis-a-vis avowed as well as potential allies of the Soviet Union in the area. Diplomatic and economic measures aimed at isolating Cuba and Nicaragua were soon extended to include Grenada, the latter being specifically targeted for development funds denial.

During 1981, this policy led to major difficulties for the Grenadian economy. US pressures resulted in the cancellation of a \$19 million loan from the International

Monetary Fund triggering loud protests from the PRG.

Later in the year, similar American pressures for excluding Grenada from the list of aid recipients caused the Caribbean Development Bank to decline handling a \$4 million loan earmarked for distribution among Eastern

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Caribbean states. Another focus of American economic measures was the Point Salines construction project. When it became known that the PRG was seeking European financing for finishing the airport, the United States launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to ensure that the

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Grenadians received no such aid. This attempt failed, however, when the EEC countries agreed not only to assist Grenada in raising the requisite airport construction funds but, also, to increase overall economic aid to the PRG--a victory which Bishop predictably hailed as a
31
"humiliating defeat" of "imperialism and Reaganism".

US economic denial directed at Grenada came again to the forefront when President Reagan announced the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) in early 1982. The CBI, designed as a regional foreign aid package, based on a combination of free-trade and investment measures, was meant to counter Cuban and Soviet influence by improving the competitiveness of local economies and raising general living standards. Since the plan centered on ways and means to develop private-sector enterprises, both Nicaragua and Grenada, pursuing the "socialist transformation" of their economic systems, were pointedly excluded from receiving CBI aid. This exclusion prompted Bishop's angry reaction who described the CBI as "chicken

feed" and "an insult" to Caribbean states "only aimed at
32
achieving military interests".

While such "vulgar economic intimidation" remained one of the chief Grenadian concerns, the aspect of the Reagan Caribbean policy which alarmed the PRG even more profoundly was the intensification of American military exercises in the area. Increased military activity in the Caribbean was well under way at the time of President Reagan's election, his predecessor having already set up a Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida with the express purpose of coordinating and controlling expanded US air and naval deployments in this "critical" theater. In August 1981, for example, Ocean Venture '81, a major US exercise conducted in the waters around Puerto Rico, included "Operation Amber", a simulated invasion of the imaginary "unfriendly" Amber island nation to rescue US citizens, install a "free" government, and give the "Amberines" the opportunity to prepare for free elections. The PRG perceived this exercise not only as a provocation but also as a "full-scale dress rehearsal" of an imminent US invasion of Grenada and expressed its fears officially to
33
international organizations and foreign governments.

American military activities continued to worry the PRG throughout 1982-83, especially in light of US reconnaissance flights in the vicinity of Grenada and President Reagan's mounting charges that the Point Salines airport was primarily a Cuban military project. In March 1983, tensions increased further when President Reagan,

during a national TV address, displayed aerial photographs of Point Salines and described the airport's intended use as "military and unfriendly".³⁴ In related statements, senior Administration officials also pointed to planned upgrading of Grenadian port facilities, warehousing, and telecommunications as intended to enhance Cuba's capability to penetrate other regions and warned that Grenada was about to become "a clandestine off-shore base"³⁵ of such Cuban activities. This major publicity coincided with renewed military exercises which brought US warships in the immediate vicinity of Grenada and led Bishop to declare, for yet another time, that the "fascist clique in Washington" planned an imminent invasion of the island--which, as in previous similar occasions, was³⁶ again proved a false alarm.

The Invasion Decision

Although leftist commentators saw the Ocean Venture '81 exercises as a prova generale for the invasion of Grenada, there is little public evidence, aside from speculation, suggesting that the United States had specifically decided to invade the island prior to Bishop's execution on 19 October 1983. In fact, a visit by the Grenadian Prime Minister to Washington in June of that year seemed to indicate that Grenadian-American relations were on the road to relative normality with Grenada taking the initiative. During his visit, Bishop, although unable to secure a meeting with the President himself, met White House national security adviser William

Clark and, according to documents captured by US forces after the invasion, expressed his desire (but not necessarily that of his Marxist colleagues) for improved relations between the two countries.³⁷

Between the June meeting and Bishop's overthrow in October, however, no progress was made in normalizing US-Grenadian diplomatic relations, although the anti-American rhetoric emanating from St. George's was considerably reduced. The American Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean continued having no official contacts with the PRG; and Grenada's Ambassador in Washington remained accredited only to the Organization of American States. The net result of this diplomatic "blackout" was reduced ability on the part of American decision makers to correctly assess the significance of the intra-NJM power struggle but, also, Bishop's chances of surviving the concerted attack upon his personal leadership.³⁸

At the time of Bishop's overthrow and arrest on 13 October, the two main determinants of US policy in relation to Grenada were

- (a) approximately 1,000 US citizens residing in Grenada, 700 of whom were students enrolled at St. George's University Medical School, a potential group of hostages in the hands of the NJM extremist faction, and
- (b) the possibility of an open invitation to Cuba by the new Grenadian rulers for regular Cuban military units to reinforce Grenadian defences against both internal opposition and external intervention.

While the safe evacuation of all Americans took precedence over other considerations, a possible Cuban move to exploit the situation must have also been a prime subject

in the high-level deliberations triggered by the events in Grenada. Given the perennial concern about Cuban activities, it seems safe to argue that, between 13 and 19 October, American decision makers were already contemplating some form of direct intervention, beyond the noncombatant evacuation of US nationals, to "stabilize" the situation in Grenada and preclude a Cuban "solidarity" move in support of the Coard faction. It was reported, for example, that, by 15 October, the Reagan Administration had already approached Barbados at an unofficial level to discuss the prospect of a rescue operation to free Bishop and transport him to a neighbouring friendly Caribbean country thus giving Grenadian moderates a second chance to reassert their
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power.

It was not, however, until after 18 October, and the murder of the NJM founder and his supporters, that the crisis management mechanism at presidential level became operative. Immediate concern focused on the medical students, Washington being anxious to avoid another hostage fiasco ala Teheran. Planning for the evacuation of all US citizens commenced immediately upon the news of the executions and the declaration of a shoot-on-sight curfew throughout Grenada. As a result, a naval task force, formed around the carrier Independence, and carrying 1,900 marines, sailed from Virginia on 18 October ostensibly on its way to Lebanon to relieve US Marine units on duty with the multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut. Additional naval and air force units were also

mobilized and ordered to forward deployment positions on standby for "any eventuality".

On 20 October, President Reagan formally requested Vice President Bush to activate a special White House situation group in order to take charge of the Grenada crisis management in conjunction with the National Security Council. The group's first decision was to divert the Independence carrier task force towards Grenada in a move that was described as simply "prudent" and not intended to cause any alarm in Grenada.⁴⁰ The following day, the Administration's preparations were given a critical boost by the official declaration of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) calling for intervention in Grenada and the OECS members' unanimous vote to ask the United States, along with Barbados and Jamaica, for assistance. The OECS invitation served two significant purposes. First, it sharply focused public attention on the Grenada situation and the fact that US citizens might soon be in danger. And second, it offered a perfect political pretext for proceeding with a "multilateral" effort to restore "order and democracy" in the troubled island and thus minimize the effects of the political and diplomatic fallout which⁴¹ a military operation was bound to cause.

With President Reagan away from the capital on a two-day golfing trip to Georgia, the situation group, including Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Gen. John Vessey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, continued its deliberations under the direction of Vice

President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz. These discussions were hampered by the confusion as to what was exactly happening in Grenada, the lack of "friendly" observers on the island, and a complete breakdown in telephone communications (by the time of the invasion, contacting US citizens was almost entirely up to amateur radio operators). Up until the evening of 21 October, therefore, the paucity of information, and the need to know more about the situation on the island, imposed an emphasis "on the collection and assembly of information, not its analysis" and on efforts to clearly define the problem at hand before expressing specific alternatives
42
for action.

The uncertainty shrouding developments on the island did not prevent, however, instructions to Adm. Wesley McDonald, commander-in-chief, US forces, Atlantic, to
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begin planning for an invasion of Grenada immediately. Although the military commanders had no reservations about the feasibility of the operation at hand, they were nevertheless worried by the same shortage of "hard" intelligence as their civilian counterparts and the "telescoped time basis" available for planning. There was little reliable information, for example, about the composition, weapons, and training of the Grenadian forces, and conflicting reports concerning the size, equipment, and character of the Cuban contingent stationed
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at the Point Salines construction site. Furthermore, detailed maps of the island were lacking and the planners were eventually forced to rely on tourist ones which

failed to identify properly landmarks of non-tourist
45
interest.

By 22 October, and after further consultations with the President, who remained in Georgia in order to maintain the Administration's outer cover of normality, the special situation group had decided to respond favourably to the OECS request for assistance in doing "something" about Grenada. Accordingly, Ambassador McNeil and Major General Krist were dispatched to Bridgetown, Barbados to "explore carefully with the leaders of the OECS and Jamaica and Barbados their information, their
46
analysis and their intentions".

On 23 October, the Grenada crisis was momentarily overshadowed by the suicide bombing of the US Marine headquarters in Beirut which forced President Reagan to return to the White House. Beirut had an indirect, but crucial, influence on the Grenada decision. As the news about the numerous American casualties poured into Washington, and the impression that "America was being kicked around as it had been when Carter was in charge" mounted, the President came under pressure to demonstrate convincingly the nation's resolve to fight back against its unseen enemies; since the Beirut bombers could not be reached, it was decided that Grenada, closer to home and under the imminent threat of "Cubanization", was going to
47
be "rescued". Thus, and after final discussions with the military chiefs, the invasion date was set for Tuesday, 25 October and the appropriate order for Operation Urgent Fury, as the invasion was codenamed, was

signed by the President on Monday afternoon. Within twelve hours, US airborne and amphibious formations began landing in Grenada.

Conclusion

While the shooting in Grenada lasted for only a few days, the war of words persisted long after the last US combat troops had left the island. The American action was met with almost universal condemnation from the NATO allies, not to mention of course the vehement denunciations from the Warsaw Pact and most Third World countries.⁴⁹ Domestic criticism of the invasion was also strong, particularly from academic personalities and the media, but the President's initiative received strong grass-roots support, a key factor in the minimal⁵⁰ Congressional opposition to Urgent Fury.

The speed with which the invasion was planned and executed led to charges that the Administration had barely reviewed, if at all, peaceful alternatives to using military force. This contention seems quite plausible, especially given Grenada's deliberate diplomatic blacklisting by the United States, and the Reagan Administration's consistent branding of Grenada as a developing platform for the export of Cuban-inspired insurgency into neighbouring areas. Assuming that military force was indeed the favourite option during the White House deliberations prior to 25 October (the records of which are all classified), one important question arises: since military force is generally perceived as an

instrument of last resort, how did the Reagan Administration come to react as if the developments in Grenada prejudiced American interests to a degree requiring a military response?

At the outset, there should be a definition of American interests in relation to Grenada. From the economic point of view, American interests were almost non-existent--unless special weight was given to a small Coca Cola bottling factory and the minimal investment of a few American tourist operators.

Politically and strategically, however, Grenada, by virtue of its pro-Marxist regime, its proximity to the United States, and its Cuban sympathies, occupied centre stage for an American Administration which made no secret of its fears about the "worldwide Communist threat" and its determination to challenge communist efforts to "undermine" the "free world". These views fundamentally affected the Reagan foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean which were collectively seen as "dominoes" vulnerable to the Cuban/Soviet conspiracy. It appears, therefore, that Washington had come to the conclusion that a potential "second Cuba" in the eastern Caribbean--America's "soft underbelly"--was simply unacceptable long before Bishop's murder and the alleged threat of a Cuban takeover.

In this light, the violent end of the Bishop regime, although principally the outcome of intra-NJM quarrels, gave the Reagan Administration a signal that was interpreted not according to objective analysis but rather

according to a pre-conceived notion of "threat": since Bishop had resisted the total Leninisation of the Grenadian revolution, his overthrow was perceived as the result of covert Soviet action which had directed the hand of the Coard-Austin group as part of the wider scheme to
52
communize the Caribbean.

Thus, American decision makers, having by most indications accepted the hypothetical Soviet destabilization scenario as truth, became convinced that not only Grenada was about to be "lost" like Cuba twenty five years earlier, but also that US citizens on the island were facing the risk of being killed in the "random fighting" or taken hostage by the "leftist thugs" who had
53
exterminated Bishop. The threat to the US citizens' safety has been seriously questioned, however, and while it became a centerpiece in the Administration's justification of the invasion, it should be viewed with scepticism. Echoing the invasion critics' doubts about the safety risks which American citizens in Grenada presumably faced, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote:

Nearly every country in the world contains American citizens to be declared in potential danger. Nearly every country in the world can be defined as of strategic importance to American security -- if not directly in itself, then indirectly through the convenient doctrine of "credibility", by which every local conflict is invested with global significance and becomes a test of American will... When we cut ourselves adrift from neutral standards of international conduct and make military action the first rather than the last recourse of national policy, we sail in exceedingly dangerous areas.⁵⁴

One last point deserves attention. As it was already

mentioned, the invasion was proved to be quite popular within the United States, an indication of changing popular mood vis-a-vis military intervention, especially when such an operation produces results quickly and with a minimal cost in American lives.⁵⁵ In this respect, Urgent Fury's significance lies not so much in the perceived, short-term, regional benefits to the security of the United States as in the revived American willingness to commit US forces in attacking Soviet ~~allies~~ for the first time since Vietnam. The impact of this departure from "complacency", as particularly practiced during the Carter presidency, is difficult to assess at this early stage. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that potential Third World Soviet clients may already be taking notice and modifying their policies accordingly, at least for the remainder of the Reagan presidency.

CHAPTER VII

HUNGARY

Prelude to Revolution

The events which culminated in the abortive Hungarian revolt of October 1956 can be traced back to the closing days of the Second World War. Hungary, having fought on the side of Nazi Germany under the fascist regime of Admiral Horthy, capitulated to the Red Army in early 1945. The coming of the Soviet troops, and the collapse of the fascist government, paved the way for the Hungarian Workers' party to climb to power and ensure that Hungary was firmly lodged in the USSR's expanding East European¹ buffer zone. Led by Matias Rakosi, a devoted Stalinist, the communists proceeded with eliminating the opposition of other political parties, taking over trade unions, and securing the obedience of the police and what was left of the country's public administration.

Although national elections in late 1945 showed little popular support for the communists--the bulk of the vote going to the 'bourgeois' Smallholders party--Rakosi, facing no other source of forceful opposition, persisted with Hungary's Stalinization unmolested. By 1952, after eliminating most of his non-communist opponents and many of his own party's prominent leaders, Rakosi reigned supreme, a "mini Stalin" who held both the post of Prime Minister and the powerful position of the

communist party's Central Committee First Secretary.

Rakosi's regime was distinguished for its brutality and callousness. Secret police terror, directed by the feared state security agency, AVH, left every Hungarian citizen potentially exposed to arbitrary arrest, torture, and "termination."² Deviation from the party line brought comparable fate to party members as well, irrespective of one's past faithful "revolutionary" record. To make matters even worse, Rakosi's blind espousal of Soviet-dictated economic policies depressed further an already devastated economy, and led to a steep drop of the national standard of living (which, after 1945, steadily deteriorated in any case because of energetic Russian³ measures to punish one of Hitler's past allies.)

Stalin's death in March 1953 prompted important changes at the top of the Soviet pyramid, and East European satellites did feel the impact of these changes almost immediately. Stalin's successors, eager to preserve their own authority by neutralizing Stalinist supporters, both at home and abroad, wasted little time in seeking to replace Stalinists in East European communist parties with more "liberal" personalities. Thus, Rakosi's grim-faced regime became a target for prompt reform. In June 1953, the Hungarian dictator was summoned to Moscow where he met the new collective Soviet leadership of Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, and Khrushchev. It was during this visit that Rakosi was ordered to turn over the reins of power to one of his ministers, Imre Nagy, a reputed anti-Stalinist and moderate. Although deprived of his

previously absolute authority, Rakosi managed to retain the post of party First Secretary and continued commanding the crucial loyalty of the party apparatus mostly staffed by his own appointees.

Imre Nagy, whose later "trial" and execution by the Russians led to much Western praise of his brave "democratic" convictions, was in fact an orthodox communist of the old guard. Yet, his interpretation of Marxism-Leninism was conditioned by the desire to avoid excesses "on the road to socialism", restore constitutional processes (within the party, at least), and observe the "basic moral and social values of justice, fairness, decency and respect for all other men as equals..."⁴ As a result, Nagy's first move as soon as he assumed the premiership was a "New Course" speech to the Hungarian parliament, delivered on 3 July, denouncing police terror, criticizing Rakosi's economic policies, and promising religious toleration, freedom for peasants to choose between collectives and private ownership of land, and a higher standard of living for all Hungarians.

Nagy's speech, delivered upon a country still under the control of Stalinist diehards, excited the Hungarian people enormously. Overnight, Nagy became the focus of vast popularity. Such was the impression made by this proposed New Course that Nagy's words "... took on a significance which was almost symbolic in certain cases, and had little to do with the proposed measures and changes they were announcing."⁵ Whatever the case, the new PM's message marked a turning point on the road to the

1956 revolt. The exposure of the rift within the Communist party, and the attack on "previously unassailable idols", triggered the open clash between Stalinists and moderates which would eventually lead to⁶ armed rebellion in the streets.

The sheer speed with which Nagy proposed to "thaw" Hungary surprised everyone. Although Moscow had presumably agreed in principle with the need for reforms by sanctioning Nagy's elevation, the new Hungarian leader's sweeping proposals were well outside what the Soviet presidium was prepared to tolerate. Rakosi, encouraged by the obvious Soviet displeasure, went immediately to action mobilizing his supporters in critical sectors of the state administration to sabotage⁷ and undermine Nagy's efforts at reform. Through 1954, entrenched "Muskovites" frustrated most of the "Nagyist" attempts to change the direction of the economy or to proceed with the liberalization of party structures. In February 1955, with Moscow anxious to retain its control over developments in Hungary, Rakosi was able to stage a counterattack, have Nagy stripped of the premiership and expelled from the party's leadership, and instruct the Central Committee to publicly condemn the New Course as "rightist deviation." With Nagy out of office, Andras⁸ Hegedus, a trusted Rakosi stooge became Hungary's new PM.

Nagy's uncereemonious dismissal was followed by the reintroduction of "correct" policies--although Rakosi, aware of Nagy's great popularity, ordered no general purge, and allowed the ex-premier, along with other

prominent "revisionists", to remain free but under the AVH's watchful eye. Several victims of the Stalinist period were posthumously rehabilitated, and the release of political detainees continued in an attempt to boost Rakosi's public image.⁹ While these measures succeeded in temporarily averting widespread unrest, they also demonstrated the Stalinists' inability "to turn the clock back" and defeat the "deviationists" in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Hungarian people. With Moscow growing impatient with the mounting signs of unrest caused by the Hungarian experiment, and with the Hungarian people approaching quickly the point of open defiance of a discredited regime, the road to revolution had been irrevocably joined.

Revolution and Intervention

The first loud signals of public discontent began in mid-1956 with the activation of the Petofi circle, an independent body of intellectuals invariably critical of Rakosi and his policies. Neither secret police harassment nor threats of legal sanctions could silence Petofi; the tone of the Petofi meetings grew more polemical, and public gatherings in universities became equally defiant.¹⁰ A ban on the Petofi circle sparked public outcry and, by July, Rakosi could do little, short of an outright police crackdown, to silence his opponents. After yet another visit to Moscow, the old Stalinist was again dismissed (this time permanently) and was replaced by his closest associate and disciple, Erno Gero.

Gero's selection, an obvious Soviet attempt to keep in power a man who could control the party and, simultaneously, restore some internal order, infuriated most Hungarians, who correctly perceived Gero as Rakosi's alter ego. The country's worsening economic plight, and the clear reluctance of the party to do away with the remaining vestiges of the "personality cult", solidified public opposition to the ruling communists; in October, with Gero away to Belgrade, the floodgates finally broke open bringing three years of almost continuous agitation¹¹ to their dramatic conclusion.

On 22 October, a mass student meeting in Budapest demanded a program for a "new Hungary" free of the presence of Soviet troops, neutral like Austria, and in open communication with the West. The students called for immediate, multi-party elections under an Imre Nagy government, for freedom of the press, and for the¹² punishment of Rakosi's criminal followers. The following day a new student demonstration surged into the city's Parliament Square demanding Nagy's return to office. Gero, who had rushed back home from Yugoslavia, responded with an aggressive radio speech branding the students traitors and enemies of the people. When crowds tried to force their way into the radio station, AVH guards opened fire, and several demonstrators were either killed or wounded. Within hours of the radio station riot, masses of demonstrators were raiding arsenals and munitions factories for arms, and the first armed civilian bands¹³ appeared in the streets.

Between the 24th and the 28th the revolt spread out of control. Although Nagy reappeared at the head of a coalition government which included non-communists, and all political leaders along with the high Catholic clergy appealed for calmness, Budapest remained a city under siege. As attacks against AVH troops and Communist party offices continued unabated, Soviet armoured units, stationed in the vicinity of the city, entered the Hungarian capital and were immediately involved in skirmishes with armed citizens. Meantime, Gero was finally forced to resign, and Janos Kadar, himself a victim of Stalinist purges, was installed as First Secretary. Neither Nagy's government nor Kadar's appearance, however, could possibly stem the avalanche. Following the so-called Parliament Square Massacre, fighting between Hungarians and Soviet tanks was joined in earnest.¹⁴ Soon the revolt had spread in the provinces and, as the Soviet army outside Budapest stood largely inactive, revolutionary committees claimed control over most local areas before the end of October.

Late on 29 October Soviet units began withdrawing from Budapest, and by the 31st no Soviet troops could be sighted within the capital. At the same time, however, Soviet reinforcements were crossing the eastern Hungarian frontier en masse. Despite Nagy's announcement that the Soviet withdrawal had been jointly agreed upon with both representatives of the Soviet government and local military commanders, the Soviet military movements confirmed a rapidly developing plan to gain control of the

entire country. On 1 November, Nagy made the unprecedented declaration of Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and, in an open radio message, appealed to the United Nations to guarantee his country's neutrality.¹⁵ This was a last, and indeed desperate, call. In the early morning of the 4th, main rail links, airports, bridges, and other vital facilities having already been seized, the Soviet forces launched their final surprise attack. Within one week, and after much bitter fighting, Hungary had been "saved" from the "counter-revolutionary threat", and returned among Moscow's loyal satellites.

The Anatomy of Soviet Intervention

The image of Soviet armour mowing down Hungarian street fighters tends to obscure the fact that the Soviet involvement in defeating the "counter-revolution" passed through some quite agonizing moments. Although the secrecy shrouding the inner workings of the Kremlin will most likely never allow historians to establish a fully accurate sequence of events, it is beyond doubt that Nagy's surprise "thaw" jolted the Soviet leaders into a major foreign policy crisis whose handling was to tax their skills severely.

Much of the soul-searching that gripped both Russian and East European communists in the late 1950s has been blamed, and rightly so one might argue, on Khrushchev's now celebrated "secret" speech at the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956. Khrushchev's attack on the "cult of personality", and his denunciation of Stalinist methods,

was received with mixed emotions--among which stunned¹⁶
disbelief predominated.

To the Eastern Europeans the "secret" speech brought a sense of relief, renewed expectations for relaxation of Soviet control, and guarded optimism as to Khrushchev's "democratic" intentions vis-a-vis "fraternal" communist parties. Although Moscow's interference in the internal affairs of its satellites hardly ceased following the speech, its regularity was reduced causing the erosion of the "techniques of coercion", but also a widespread popular desire "for a change from the set pattern of¹⁷ controls" which had existed ever since the final communization of Eastern Europe.

In Hungary, where communism was imposed on a very reluctant population, the need for deep reforms had been apparent even during Stalin's final years. Rakosi's disastrous handling of the economy had already drawn¹⁸ Moscow's dissatisfied attention. The 1950-54 Five Year Plan, exclusively concerned with Hungary's forced industrialization, left little doubt that the Hungarian people were facing a prolonged period of great hardship--something which prompted Rakosi's party opponents to warn that "the impoverishment of the population... would¹⁹ eventually be harmful to Communism as such". Nagy and his followers, although principled communists themselves, could see no benefit in repeating the tragic mistakes of the Soviet leadership during the USSR's own industrialization with its millions of dead and its mass police terror. Against this backdrop, the voices against

mass industrialization drew further strength from the country's appalling agricultural state and its increasing²⁰ inability to feed its own people.

The existence of this rather vocal opposition within the Hungarian Communist party created the first serious difficulty for the post-Stalin Soviet leadership. While in the years of Stalinist tyranny such "deviation" would have been dealt with swiftly and effectively--by liquidating the unpleasant comrades involved--Stalin's successors, still struggling among themselves for power, and, following Khrushchev's speech, involved, willingly or not, to the Soviet Union's own pale "liberalization", had limited room for such drastic tactics.

Amidst the deteriorating economic situation and the first, positive signs that the Hungarian people stirred uncomfortably in this sorry predicament, Rakosi's dismissal in 1953, and Nagy's appointment to head the Hungarian government (an experiment in 'civilized' transfer of power and containment of popular unrest) backfired badly. Instead of consolidating communist predominance, and allaying Moscow's fears prompted by Rakosi's mounting troubles, Nagy, with his New Course speech, dispelled any residual hopes which might have existed in the Kremlin as to the possibility of reconciling Soviet control with the Hungarians' own nationalist aspirations, not to mention their expectations²¹ for improved standards of living.

A temporary return to the Stalinist model, with Rakosi's reappearance in 1955-56, did not contain the

"counter-revolutionary" drift, convinced most Hungarians that the Soviet Union, even under its new cloak, remained an oppressive, intrusive, imperial power, and left both sides inevitably closer to a violent confrontation. Khrushchev's rather exasperated remark to Marshal Tito that he, Khrushchev, had to retain Rakosi in Hungary because "the whole structure will collapse if he goes"²² clearly illustrated the impasse created by a Soviet-generated contradiction: "liberalizing" the Soviet system of party control while simultaneously attempting to stem similar changes within "fraternal" people's democracies was simply not possible (at least at the price of relinquishing, sooner or later, dominant influence over 'disciplined' satellites).

Rakosi's final departure in July 1956, and the elevation of Gero to fill the leadership vacuum, was Khrushchev's last-ditch attempt to restore a semblance of party unity among the Hungarian communists, and offset the expanding influence of Nagy's increasingly pronounced "bourgeois moralism". In retrospect, Gero's appointment seems to further strengthen the impression that the Soviet leaders were unwilling, and perhaps unable, to recognize the fundamental changes taking place in Hungary at the time. Gero, Rakosi's closest associate and industrialization boss, could have been no worse choice at a time of burgeoning popular restlessness.²³ The hurried organization of Kadar's "centrist" group next to an old Stalinist strongman did nothing to change the party's corroded image, or to pacify angry intellectuals and

students.

In the stormy months preceding October, Soviet responses to the Hungarian crisis also included efforts to "rehabilitate" Nagy, lest his complete disappearance²⁴ unnecessarily inflamed the situation. In fact, this Soviet design was facilitated by Nagy's own hesitant manner, and his inability to articulate a clear-cut reform philosophy--which, many Hungarians expected, would reject communism as the basis of the country's political, economic, and social system, and proclaim Hungary's return to a truly socialist democracy. But for all his New Course proclamations, Nagy remained torn between his orthodox Marxism-Leninism and the mounting opposition of his countrymen to the Hungarian Communist Party (and of course the Marxism-Leninism it espoused). As Lomax observes:

The central weakness of Nagy's position derived from the fact that, despite the radical divergence between his socialist ideals and the reality of the communist state, he believed that the errors and mistakes of the stalinist era were simply the result of the usurpation and misuse of power by a group of evil and unprincipled leaders. The disease had only affected the elite; it was not a structural defect in the system itself. It could be cured by a "changing of guard", enabling a return to the correct policies and the noble ideals of socialism. 25

On the same day Nagy was reinstated (24 October), Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, acting as Khrushchev's emissaries, arrived in Budapest to endorse Nagy, fire Gero, and appoint Kadar to the party's top post. The two old Bolsheviks, having completed their last-minute manipulations to prop up the sagging fortunes of their local comrades, flew back to Moscow thoroughly alarmed by

the deteriorating situation in the streets of the Hungarian capital, and by the stark realization "... that after eight years of uncontested control, in a matter of days the Hungarian Workers' party had completely lost its influence".²⁶

Such reporting, the first by two of the politburo's most experienced and trusted members, must have caused considerable alarm in the Kremlin. It seems plausible to assume, therefore, that the decision to send Soviet troops into Budapest for the first time began taking shape at the time of the Mikoyan-Suslov fact-finding mission. Although what exactly transpired during politburo meetings is a matter of conjecture, there is evidence that the outgoing Gero, along with Hegedus, sought Soviet military help to quell the riots--although they immediately conspired to shift the blame to Nagy whose credibility in the public eye suffered accordingly.²⁷

It is also evident that the intensity and size of the popular uprising caught the Russians by total surprise.²⁸ As Miklos Molnar shows, the initial Soviet reaction to Gero's desperate calls for troops was erratic and showed no immediate preference for a military "solution". As the news of Hungarian civilians acquiring weapons poured in, however, the Kremlin was spurred into action--albeit issuing orders only to units in the vicinity of the capital to enter the city under "the proviso that they be used with caution". The lack of adequate military preparation was further underlined by the "military blunder" of sending armour into narrow city streets

without supporting infantry. Thus, the Soviet troops

could take possession of vantage points but not penetrate all the blocks of flats and other hiding places of the snipers. They could only have won the battle by exterminating Budapest. But that was neither their instructions nor their desire. They were baffled and bewildered, restricted to defensive action while the Hungarian teenagers dictated events in the streets of Budapest. 29

Between 25 and 29 October, and while the fighting in Budapest continued unabated, Soviet attempts to reach a compromise with Nagy proceeded apace. Mikoyan and Suslov returned from Moscow for fresh talks. This apparent Soviet willingness to negotiate, even in the face of a clear challenge to their authority staged by the armed Hungarian civilians, kept alive Hungarian hopes of an eventual acceptance by Moscow of the extensive program of internal changes and, even, Hungary's neutrality on the Finnish or Austrian model. 30 As if to confirm Hungarian hopes, on 28 October, and after marathon meetings with the Soviet delegation, Nagy finally emerged to announce that a cease fire had been agreed upon with the Soviet military commanders, and that the withdrawal of the Soviet forces 31 from the capital was to commence immediately.

What prompted Moscow to conclude this first phase of its military intervention? Available evidence makes a strong case for the Soviets agreeing to a cease fire because of military considerations. The speed with which the Hungarian crisis evolved into street fighting left the Soviet commanders with almost no time for either the regularly observed thorough logistical preparation or for giving the troops, saddled as they were with a thankless

mission, the appropriate indoctrination boost. Political officers must have made an earnest effort to stir their soldiers against the "fascist counter-revolutionaries", yet many units carried on reluctantly, and some of them abstained completely from fighting since their ranks could not be brought to see the Hungarian workers and students as "fascists".³² It also became obvious from the outset that, in order to suppress the revolt, a substantially larger "police" force was required--at a time when Soviet commanders around Budapest had only limited manpower at their disposal. As Vali notes,

if they [the Russians] had continued to fight, they might have lost their remaining armor. It is thus not unfounded to maintain that the Soviet forces broke off the engagement because of inability to sustain pressure on the insurgents.³³

As the Soviet forces evacuated Budapest, Mikoyan and Suslov arrived again, this time on 30 October, to find the city in the grip of what they must have thought was total anarchy. Sporadic fighting continued, revolutionary committees or simply mobs dealt summary justice on AVH policemen, and Nagy, unable to control the violent outburst of his people, had taken the step of organizing a coalition cabinet, complete with non-communist members.

Whatever the personal feelings of Khrushchev's emissaries might have been, they did present the Hungarians with an unprecedented document--an official declaration by the Soviet government regarding relations between socialist states. In an unusually conciliatory tone, the declaration spoke of relations between the

Soviet Union and "other socialist countries on the strict³⁴ Leninist principle of equal rights for the peoples". It also specifically referred to the stationing of Soviet troops in Warsaw Pact countries, and recognized that such arrangements could only be made "with the consent of the state on the territory of which, and on the demand of which, these troops are to be stationed". Even more surprisingly for the Hungarians, the declaration, after what seemed a routine reference to the forces "of reaction and counterrevolution", laid the door open for the negotiated withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary before concluding with the usual ideological platitudes.

For all the Western tendency to view similar Soviet initiatives with strong suspicion, the October declaration should be considered a genuine attempt on Moscow's part to calm the Hungarians and create an atmosphere conducive to³⁵ a peaceful settlement. As one analyst observed, for all the "distorted descriptions", transmitted to Moscow by Ambassador Andropov, "the very fact that the Soviets were doing all the fighting in attempting to suppress the uprising was powerful evidence that this was a genuinely popular expression of will", an assessment that must have been duly supported by Mikoyan's own "hardnosed" impression of what was going on based on his first-hand³⁶ observation.

Whatever sincere intention for concessions the Soviets might have had at the end of October they quickly lost on the first day of November. On that day, Nagy, still struggling to catch up with the flood of popular

demands engulfing his government, announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and appealed to the United Nations for protection of his country's neutrality. This was the final straw for the Kremlin--and within three days, the second Soviet intervention had put an end to the Hungarian experiment.

The scope and severity of this second blow reinforces the view that military intervention had been seriously contemplated at least as early as the first disturbances in the streets of Budapest (a multi-divisional operation, like the one carried out by the Soviet army on 4 November, is extremely difficult, if at all possible, to organize and launch in a mere four days). In light of this assumption, the tactical mistakes of the earlier "police" action--for which the devastating massed attack of 4 November more than adequately compensated--should be attributed to poor timing in troop deployment rather than genuine desire to avoid the use of force.³⁷

The limited information that is available about the politburo deliberations gives us a measure of the feverish consultations that took place during the period immediately prior to the final blow. According to Khrushchev himself, the primary Soviet concern throughout the crisis was the possibility that the "counter-revolution" would gain the upper hand and allow NATO to take "root" in Hungary--with threatening consequences for neighbouring socialist countries "not to mention the Soviet Union itself".³⁸ After many shifts and turns in opinion, executed under the pressure of an unbroken stream

of gloomy reports from Budapest, it was agreed that it would be "inexcusable" for the USSR "to stay neutral" while Hungary's working class struggled against the forces of reaction. Upon this decision (reached probably around 25-26 October), Marshal Ivan Konev, commander of the Warsaw Pact forces, was ordered to stand by for military operations against the Hungarian "fascists".³⁹

Moscow's irresolution prior to the second invasion is further illuminated by Khrushchev's consultations with Marshal Tito, and a high-level Chinese delegation which arrived in Moscow during the crucial final days of the Hungarian revolt. The Yugoslav leader, himself only recently reconciled with the Kremlin after being branded a "deviationist criminal" by the Stalinist propaganda, was especially sympathetic towards Nagy's desire to promote Hungarian "national" Communism. Indeed, Tito, having led his own country to its unique "road to socialism", felt that Hungary was only too ripe for a change according to the Yugoslav model and away from Moscow's stifling influence. As a result Belgrade was able to keep excellent communications with Budapest throughout the revolt. It is therefore plausible to assume that Khrushchev, as his channels of communication with the Hungarian government became gradually blocked by the confusion in Budapest, sought to exploit the Yugoslav conduit in order to gain whatever leverage he could extract from Tito's amiable relations with Nagy. When, however, Soviet diplomacy failed, paving the way for the military invasion, the Yugoslavs--who, until the very

last minute, felt that a Yugoslav formula could be worked out without bloodshed--were appalled "by the ruthlessness of Soviet military actions" and "the flagrant disregard of points of agreement reached between Khrushchev and Tito in regard to the treatment of 'Socialist' countries".⁴⁰ Recalling his exchanges with Khrushchev, and the rest of the Soviet leadership, during September 1956, Marshal Tito later wrote:

We [Tito, Rankovic, and Pucar] realized that it would be rather difficult to do anything since the Soviet leaders had different viewpoints as to other countries; they looked on their relations with other countries, with Poland, Hungary and others, from a wrong and defective angle... they lack sufficient confidence in the internal revolutionary forces in these countries...

We declared that Rakosi's regime, and Rakosi himself, had no qualifications whatsoever to lead the Hungarian state and bring about national unity...

[But] the Soviet comrades stated that he was a clever man, that he would succeed, and that they did not know anyone else whom they could rely upon in that country. 41

Consultations with the Chinese, whose chief delegate, Liu Shao-chi, maintained constant telephone communication with chairman Mao, revolved, according to Khrushchev, around the question of military force. The Soviet leader's memoirs reveal the Chinese advising restraint and suggesting "to let the working class [in Hungary] build itself up and deal with the counterrevolution on its own".⁴² This view was initially accepted by the Soviets but changed soon after in favour of military intervention because, as Khrushchev related, it would have been "unforgivable, simply unforgivable, if we stood by and

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refused to assist our Hungarian comrades". Liu, when presented with the news as he boarded the plane for the trip back to Peking, expressed his concurrence and assured his Russian hosts that their decision would also certainly receive Mao's endorsement.

A few years later, however, the Chinese would claim that they had pressed the Soviets for immediate military action against Hungary's "counterrevolutionary government", and had thus effectively taken the decision⁴⁴ their "confused" comrades were unable to reach. In fact, according to one account, the Soviet-Chinese consultations prior to the invasion were far from amiable, and were capped by a letter from Mao to Khrushchev where the Chinese leader,

while acknowledging the necessity of military intervention, reproached Khrushchev for seeking China's advice too late -- the time for consultation was before Khrushchev decided to "becloud the name of the great leader of the international workers' movement, the true Marxist-Leninist, Comrade Stalin". In this letter, the Chinese were openly giving notice that Khrushchev could no longer be accepted as the leader of international communism; he had betrayed the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and become a revisionist, and the leading role in the world communist movement would now belong to the Chinese Communist party. 45

Conclusion

Viewed in retrospect, the Soviet intervention in Hungary accomplished both its short- and long-term objectives. The Soviet tanks, although unable to avert the brutalities against minor Communist party officials and secret policemen, preserved the one-party state, destroyed the Nagy "revisionist clique", and saved

Hungary's Communism from certain complete disintegration. Of equal significance was the fact that Hungary's "pacification" served a clear message to the rest of Eastern Europe. Moscow had just demonstrated, rather brutally, to say the least, the limits of its patience with liberal experiments.

Western inaction, despite the Hungarian premier's frantic pleas for help, reconfirmed the European status quo as it had been agreed at Yalta and Potsdam, and dashed hopes of a grand Western crusade to liberate East European peoples. Although it is doubtful that the United States, or any other Western power, would have extended any tangible help to the Hungarians against the almost certain prospect of a military clash with the Soviet Union, the Anglo-French attack on Suez, which materialized at the end of October, ensured that Western attention was diverted elsewhere. This must have come as a welcome relief in Moscow and given the opportunity to the Soviet leaders to wholly concentrate on the Hungarian problem.

There is indeed little point in speculating about what would have been the outcome of the Hungarian crisis if the Soviets had indeed blinked and allowed Budapest to follow a neutralist course. The ramifications for Moscow's Eastern European security buffer, but also for the Soviet empire as a whole, are more or less obvious. As one analysis aptly put it:

As it was, the doom of Prague in 1968 was sealed. The "Brezhnev Doctrine" was born on November 4, 1956, and Leonid Brezhnev had very little to do with it. When the USSR was able to crush the Hungarians with impunity, there was

little reason to procrastinate over how to deal
with Czechoslovakia. 46

CHAPTER VIII

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Historical Perspective

As in the case of Hungary, the events which led to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 developed around the conflict between progressive and conservative forces within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS). In this context, "progressive" referred to the party group which rejected Stalinism, condemned the purges of the 1950s, supported economic reform, and sought (like the pro-Nagy Hungarian communists) greater autonomy in Czechoslovakia's external policies and relaxation of police controls within the country. On the other hand, "conservative" CPCS members, although not necessarily staunch proponents of Stalinist methods, rejected the idea of party "liberalization", favoured a pro-Moscow line in foreign affairs, and remained firmly in support of a centrally planned economy.

In addition to this overall disagreement on matters of policy, the power conflict within the CPCS was also centred on a revival of old ethnic claims concerning greater autonomy and the question of a federal state. While the primary concern of Slovak conservatives was enhanced autonomy for Slovakia through the creation of a Czechoslovak federated socialist republic with Moscow's support, the majority of Czech progressives drew their

inspiration from the tradition of independent democratic¹ politics in Bohemia and Moravia.

In January 1968 the divisions within the CPCS came to the fore with the ouster of Antonin Novotny, the party's First Secretary who had held the post since 1953, and his replacement by Alexander Dubcek, a Slovak, who, until his elevation to the top CPCS post, was First Secretary of the² Slovak Communist Party. Novotny's fall was sealed when, in late January, Dubcek, in his new capacity as the CPCS First Secretary, visited Moscow for talks with the Soviet leadership--a fact which demonstrated Kremlin's approval of the new CPCS chief.

Although Dubcek's ethnic origins left many Czech party members rather suspicious, his initiative in challenging the Novotny apparatus and in exposing the incompetence, autocracy, and poor economic judgement of his predecessor, won him widespread popular approval. At the same time, the battlelines were being drawn between the "technocrats", supporting a transition to a "rational, scientific" bureaucracy, and those who still rejected the need for reforms, especially in the areas of "economic³ efficiency" and "scientific management". It is probably correct to say that Dubcek had limited ambitions as to the degree of change he wished to or would implement. But, like Imre Nagy twelve years before, Dubcek, who had played a major part in exposing earlier Stalinist scandals in Slovakia, supported a range of reforms whose very nature⁴ was an invitation to crisis: a less centralized party structure allowing the "democratization" of procedures

especially in relation to the appointment and promotion of officials, relaxation of police controls, greater freedom for intellectuals and the press, increased flexibility in the economic sector, and, last but not least, greater independence for Czechoslovakia's ruling communists to decide for themselves on matters of foreign policy and economic ties with the West.

Dubcek's apparent espousal of such principles, and his energetic efforts to neutralize the Novonty apparat made increased public debate of future policies inevitable. Furthermore, and although not a "progressive" himself in the strictest definition of the term, the new party leader, by virtue of his anti-Novotny stance, became identified with the emerging progressive coalition within the CPCS. By March, the progressives, whose work all around the country was gradually removing the controls on information imposed by the Novotny regime and helping to publicize the progressive aims, had succeeded in stirring up the debate about Czechoslovakia's present and future to an unprecedented level; in mid-month, annual party district conferences, held in almost half of Czechoslovakia's districts and following secret ballots held for the first time in the history of the socialist republic, expressed their demand for "the replacement of senior officials and guarantees that the new policies would be put into effect".⁵

Such pressure for prompt reforms had predictable victims. On 21 March, Novotny, who had retained the republic's presidency after his forced retirement from the

CPCS Central Committee, received a "recommendation" from the Czechoslovak National Assembly to resign immediately; the following day, his resignation -- submitted along with the customary self-defensive letter -- was followed by a wave of similar actions by many of his devotees throughout the party and public administration. As the old guard marched out, the CPCS Central Committee, seeking to preempt accusations of anti-Sovietism, released an official statement where it made clear that,

the party will unhesitatingly defend the line of socialist construction and friendship with the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union. 6

Efforts to allay Soviet fears concerning the country's democratization, shared by the rest of Czechoslovakia's Warsaw Pact allies (with the exception of Rumania), were led by Dubcek whose remarks warning that "the wave of free political discussion in Czechoslovakia could go too far"--and that the CPCS Central Committee must "carry out its work logically, step by step" -- were already a matter of record.⁷ Shortly after Novotny's resignation, Dubcek met with the Soviet leadership, and the leaders of Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria at Dresden to reassure Czechoslovakia's "friends" that the liberalization process was carried out under the close scrutiny of the CPCS. A few days later, and in an apparent tactical maneuver to dispel the impression that the pace of reforms could soon be out of control, the CPCS Central Committee named Gen. Ludvik Svoboda, a veteran soldier of conservative sympathies, to assume the

presidency -- a choice which angered many progressives who saw Svoboda's election as a symbolic concession to the Soviet Union.⁸ With the old Stalinists' grip over the state administration finally broken, Dubcek turned to the reorganization of the party Presidium while a new cabinet, under Premier Oldrich Cernik, another progressive, took over from the cabinet of Premier Jozef Lenart who had announced his resignation on 6 April.⁹

Dubcek's position was now openly on the side of the progressives. Speaking about the future course of Czechoslovakia during an interview in early April, the CPCS First Secretary described "the unprecedented political activities [taking place in Czechoslovakia]... as a spontaneous democratic movement from below" and he dismissed fears that the party could be pushed aside by developments; as a matter of fact, Dubcek underlined, the only way for the party to regain popular approval, and continue leading the way as the "only decisive, organized, progressive force" in Czechoslovakia, was to consolidate¹⁰ the new freedoms and protect them by law.

Towards that end, the Central Committee, after a short debate during the first week of April, made public its 24,000-word Action Program entitled "Czechoslovakia's Road to Socialism" with the declared aim to form the new political line and announce the measures designed to insure citizen rights and freedoms. Although the Action Program was "an eclectic document" which "left a great deal to be concretely determined in future laws and¹¹ measures", it nevertheless presented an unprecedented

array of reformist policies:

- It guaranteed the freedom of assembly, speech, and movement of all citizens (travel abroad was now a right and not a privilege);
- It promised the rehabilitation of all the victims of judicial injustice;
- It recognized the urgent need for economic reform in order to stimulate rapid growth;
- It announced measures to curb the powers of the secret police and to separate state from public security functions;
- It urged the recognition of legal rights to opposition parties;
- It reiterated Czechoslovakia's commitment to a strong friendship with the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist world but on the basis of sovereignty and equal rights;
- It recognized the need for peaceful coexistence with the advanced capitalist states;
- And it pledged to rid Czechoslovakia of the last vestiges of its Stalinist past. 12

While the publication of the Action Program came as the official recognition that Dubcek and his supporters were committed to irrevocable reform, the general nature of its announcements served a two-pronged purpose: To help ease the pressure for wider changes at an accelerated pace, and to reassure the conservative faction that no universal purge was under way. At the same time, however, it also demonstrated

the contradictory tendencies of the leadership --its desire to continue along the chosen path to reform as well as its reluctance to take decisive action to break the back of potential resistance within the party. 13

On 4 May, Dubcek, leading a Czechoslovak delegation that included President Svoboda, Prime Minister Cernik, and conservative presidium member Vasil Bilak, visited

Moscow "to explain matters further" and to listen to the expression of Soviet fears about the "'anti-socialist' 14 excesses" apparently occurring in his country. During the talks, Dubcek finally bowed to Soviet pressure and agreed to allow Warsaw Pact "Staff maneuvers" to take place in Czechoslovakia in June -- something which he had steadfastly refused to do earlier because he felt that such military exercises did not coincide with his view of "noninterference" in Czechoslovakia's affairs. That the CPCS leader agreed on this occasion must have been prompted by his increasing concern about Soviet intentions (and diminishing patience) and by the ongoing political 15 debate within the CPCS itself.

Against this background, the CPCS Central Committee met on 1 June in order to chart the least hazardous path for the reform movement and ensure that Moscow received adequate assurances as to Czechoslovakia's continuing road to socialism. Thus, the five-point resolution adopted at the plenary session was an attempt to tone down the proclamations of the Action Program and project an image of unity and friendship with the Soviet Union. The resolution stated

that the leading role of the Party should be ensured; that the development of socialism should be safeguarded, with the freedom of workers and all working people; that the new political system should be consistent with the development of socialism; that all attempts at violating the legal order and disrupting the state apparatus should be opposed; and that the relations of Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and the world communist movement should be further developed, based on the principles of internationalism. 16

Simultaneously with this resolution, the Central Committee announced a party extraordinary congress for 9 September to review the new policies, including a new constitution, and the program for economic development. These announcements coincided with the first ominous signal of how the Warsaw Pact "allies" planned to insure Czechoslovakia's adherence to the socialist path: on 1 June it was also announced that a Warsaw Pact "Command staff", headed by Russian General Kazakov, had arrived in Prague to prepare the June maneuvers agreed upon by Dubcek¹⁷ during his Moscow visit.

By July, it was obvious that neither Dubcek's reassurances nor the caution expressed by the CPCS Central Committee could satisfy Moscow and the rest of the Warsaw Pact. What must have particularly alarmed the Kremlin and the Warsaw Pact leaders was the final abolition of censorship which the Czechoslovak government enacted into law during the last week in June. According to the new law, "any intervention against the freedom of word and image and their dissemination by means of newspaper,¹⁸ television, and radio" was forbidden --which in effect meant that state censors had lost all their pre- as well as post-publication powers.

Immediately upon the abolition of censorship, and while Warsaw Pact forces maneuvered inside Czechoslovakia pursuing their "routine" military exercises, a statement entitled "2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, Artists, and Everyone", composed by progressive writer Ludvik Vaculik and carrying the signatures of numerous

intellectuals and workers, appeared in a number of
newspapers on 27 June.¹⁹ Charging that "this moment of
hope... is still threatened" and that "fears have been
recently expressed that the process of democratization has
stopped", the statement emphasized that the pace of reform
from above was slow, that more action on the part of the
people themselves was needed to complete the "retirement"
of those party functionaries who still espoused pre-
January ideals, and that there was a "possibility that
foreign forces may interfere with our internal
development".

The response to this manifesto, if not entirely
unpredictable, was an unpleasant jolt for all less patient
reformists. The "2,000 Words", although "moderate and
practical both in tone and content, demanding nothing more
(and even less) than that which had already been demanded
on many public platforms"²⁰ aroused strong condemnation
from various CPCS and government leaders and was even
branded "an open appeal for counterrevolution".²¹ Its
signatories came under attack and threats of legal
sanctions were leveled against them. Although such an
outburst did appear to be the outcome of genuine
counterreformist tendencies within the CPCS Central
Committee, it would be fairer to say that, with Soviet
troops delaying their departure after the end of the
Warsaw Pact exercises on 2 July, Dubcek and his supporters
had little choice but to try to placate Moscow by
disassociating themselves, at least verbally, from the
producers of such "inflammatory" literature.²²

The final phase before the Soviet invasion on 21 August was marked by increasing friction between the CPCS and the rest of the Warsaw Pact as Czechoslovakia's "allies" became visibly restless over democratization. On 10 July it was announced that the government of Czechoslovakia had formally rejected Soviet demands for guarantees that the democratization "will not go too far". According to the CPCS Central Committee, the decision to reject the Soviet note was based on the simple fact that "nothing" had happened to justify Moscow's and the rest of the Warsaw Pact's anxiety and, therefore, there was²³ nothing which required an explanation.

With his latest attempt to bring the CPCS leaders to a conference involving all "concerned allies", Secretary Brezhnev responded with a Warsaw Pact meeting held in Warsaw on 14-16 July which took place without any Czechoslovak representatives. At its conclusion, the participants, having agreed that the reform movement in Czechoslovakia was a menace to the unity and security of the socialist world, dispatched an open letter of warning -- which was immediately dubbed the 'Warsaw Letter'-- to the CPCS leadership. Noting that "the developments in your country have aroused profound anxiety among us", the five Warsaw conferees continued:

---the reactionaries' offensive... threatens to push your country off the path of socialism and, consequently, imperils the interests of the entire socialist system...

---we cannot assent to hostile forces pushing your country off the path of socialism... This is no longer your affair alone. It is the common affair of all communists... united by

alliance, cooperation, and friendship. It is the common affair of our countries which have united in the Warsaw Pact...

Each of our parties bears a responsibility... to the international working class and the world communist movement...

This is why we believe that it is not only your task but ours to deal a resolute rebuff to the anticommunist forces and to wage a resolute struggle for the preservation of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia. 24

The "Warsaw Letter" was the most explicit statement that Moscow's tolerance of its wayward Prague "comrades" was running thin. Instead, however, of eliciting a signal of compliance from the CPCS Central Committee, the Warsaw ultimatum triggered another respectful but firm reply from Prague--a clear indication that the "Dubcekites" still refused to be intimidated. The CPCS response rejected the accusation that it was losing control of the internal situation and expressed surprise at the anxiety of the other socialist countries. It painstakingly listed all the measures taken to strengthen Czechoslovakia's socialist system, it reiterated the CPCS's desire to continue friendly relations with all "fraternal" communist parties, and concluded in a conciliatory note:

We do not want our relationships to continue worsening and we are willing on our side to contribute to the calming of the situation... We expect, however, that the other parties will aid these efforts of ours and will express understanding for our situation. 25

From the Soviet standpoint, this was clearly an unsatisfactory turn of events and hence the Czechoslovak leaders came under renewed pressure to meet with their "allies" for further talks. Dubcek, having successfully

evaded being pinned down for a multilateral Warsaw Pact conference until then, was again able to avoid a congress of all Warsaw Pact members--at least briefly. This time, however, he was forced to agree to a bilateral meeting with the Soviet leadership which was held on 2 August at the East Slovak village of Cierna-nad-Tisou just across the border from the Soviet Union.²⁶ During the brief encounter that took place in the village railway station building, it became clear that the Soviets had indeed accepted the bilateral talks in order to browbeat the Czechoslovak delegation into a broader conference. Having been outflanked by this Soviet move, Dubcek could only agree to meet with the rest of his "partners" but under the condition that the conference, to convene at the city of Bratislava on 3 August, was not going to discuss the Czechoslovak internal situation.²⁷ The joint communique that followed Bratislava made indeed no direct reference to the "anti-socialist" forces operating inside Czechoslovakia, although there was little departure from the standard phraseology dictated by Moscow.²⁸

In the two weeks between Cierna/Bratislava and the invasion, both Marshal Tito and President Ceausescu of Rumania visited Prague to demonstrate their solidarity to Dubcek's independent stance. Their visits were coupled with a brief visit by East Germany's Walter Ulbricht whose reception, unlike the receptions for the Yugoslav and Rumanian representatives, unfolded in a frosty atmosphere. After a brief conference, the East German party leader stated that the purpose of his visit was to discuss

"economic matters" with his hosts--although issues pertaining to "bourgeois ideology" and the Czechoslovak "experiment" had also received some attention.

Meantime, the Soviet press, after a brief lull in late July-early August, resumed its polemics against liberalization. On 18 August, two days before the invasion, Pravda carried yet another attack against the "antisocialist forces" trying to destroy the "foundations of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia" and warned that "the enemies' schemes are doomed to failure".²⁹ Within forty eight hours troops drawn from the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria began the massive invasion which brought the brief but bright "Prague Spring" to an abrupt and permanent conclusion.

The Anatomy of the Intervention Decision

Unlike Hungary where the political situation reached an explosive point in the span of only three weeks, political developments in Czechoslovakia followed a notably slower pace. Until 1967-68, Czechoslovakia gave no indication of becoming a major threat to the stability of the communist bloc and thus caught little Soviet attention. Enjoying a measure of prosperity, thanks to its industrial base, and with a solidly Stalinist regime, Czechoslovakia, even after Khrushchev's "Secret Speech", remained calm and seemingly apathetic to the wind of de-Stalinization sweeping Eastern Europe. Such was the entrenched power of the Novotny apparat that Prague refrained from any changes in its internal policies

despite Moscow's willingness to see the Stalinist past quietly buried. This picture of undisputed control, which Novotny was able to project thanks to his oppressive rule, masked the intra-party activities of the progressive group and left the impression that no effective opposition to the Novotny-dominated presidium could indeed take shape or cause any discomfort to the ruling faction.

Against this background, it can be reasonably assumed that Moscow was not alerted to the full scale of the anti-Stalinist feeling in Czechoslovakia until Novotny's position became untenable in December 1967. At that time, Brezhnev's visit to Prague must have convinced the Russians that, given Novotny's weakened position within the CPCS and the widespread popular dissatisfaction with the incumbent autocrat, it was only sensible to allow his political demise. Moscow's apparent abandonment of such a devoted comrade raised few eyebrows. The need for domestic reform was obvious if only to revive the sluggish economy and boost faith in the CPCS as the "vanguard of the working class". Novotny's obstinate presence had to be removed--if Czechoslovakia was to avoid popular unrest similar to that which had almost toppled communist rule in Hungary and had threatened it in Poland. Dubcek, on the other hand, satisfied the Soviet leaders as both a popular party figure, with an impeccable reputation for hard work, and a good Marxist with a thorough Soviet education. To underline its approval, Moscow greeted his January election to the post of First Secretary with an unusually warm congratulatory telegram from Brezhnev.

Yet Dubcek's appointment carried implications which the Soviet politburo had failed to appreciate fully. A young man, in comparison to the leaders of most "fraternal" parties, the new CPCS leader brought with him a distinct style of leadership which stressed cooperation rather than coercion as the foundation of political life. In public, Dubcek was "a simple but effective speaker, who projected warmth and friendliness", ³¹ qualities which immediately earned him the confidence and approval of not only party workers but citizens at large as well. It also brought into sharp relief the difference between him and his rigid predecessors, not to mention the grey clusters running Czechoslovakia's neighbouring "allies". Because of the genuine popularity he enjoyed, Dubcek became the key figure in Czechoslovakia almost overnight. Although his effort to unite the CPCS Central Committee behind his reformist propositions during the following months was going to be unsuccessful, in early 1968 the wave of change he had initiated seemed irreversible.

During January-February, the Kremlin leaders must have realized that Dubcek's views on internal reform and foreign policy, given his personal appeal and the apparent disarray of the anti-reformist opposition, were to be the moving forces behind Czechoslovakia's future course. During this early period, the new Czechoslovak leader was presumably given the benefit of the doubt even by those Soviet politburo members who may have seen his moderation as a possible sign of sympathy vis-a-vis the "anti-party clique". Hence, it was a rather uncomfortable Brezhnev

who, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the 1948 Czechoslovak communist coup, shared the platform with Dubcek only to listen to the CPCS First Secretary call for the rethinking of the party's role in light of "the new conditions created by the reform" in order to find solutions to Czechoslovakia's "burning problems".³² This must have been an unwelcome message in Soviet ears coming from Novotny's "safe" successor. Official admission that the party line was in need of "rethinking" could only further encourage the kind of public debate on ideological and political issues the Soviets had never tolerated--either inside the Soviet Union or within their Eastern European sphere.

Indeed, there were already strong signs that Dubcek's brief tenure promoted the freedom to criticize state policies, the party itself, and the country's relations with the socialist world. Although official statements remained scrupulously moderate, the relaxation of censorship was an "unprecedented experiment of granting the population far-reaching freedom";³³ and it resulted in an avalanche of candid press reporting on both domestic and international issues. Turmoil among the lower ranks of the CPCS increased and debates on past excesses revealed a desire for genuine change which focused, naturally, on those pro-Soviet elements that had thrived during Novotny's totalitarian rule. Above all, however, the resurgence of dissident intellectual opinion, with its vocal criticism of party corruption and nepotism, signified the most alarming break with the country's

orthodox communist past.

Thus, by early spring, Moscow's willingness to refrain from interference in Czechoslovakia's peaceful experiment must have been wearing thin. Several factors, similar in many ways to those that had nagged the Kremlin during the Hungarian crisis, must have contributed to the decision to see the Czechoslovak "revisionists" defeated in their effort to drag their country to "counter-revolution":

- Genuine democratization in Czechoslovakia could only lead to erosion of single-party rule and the emergence of "reactionary" political formations prepared to oppose Czechoslovakia's continuing participation in the Warsaw Pact and "fraternal" relations with the Soviet Union.
- Loss of control over the Prague regime could seriously undermine Moscow's leading position within the socialist camp and jeopardize Russian efforts to prevail over Peking's ideological challenge.
- A neutralist Czechoslovak government could cause penetration of the East European Soviet security zone by the West German "revanchists" and their American allies, and advance NATO plans to eventually undermine the post-war European status quo. This Soviet assessment obtained particularly sharp relief because of "an almost irrational fear of increasing West German economic and political influence" in Eastern Europe and the belief that this was only a preliminary move in the "revanchist" conspiracy.

- Success of the Dubcek "clique" could trigger a chain reaction in other Eastern European countries with unforeseen consequences for Soviet control over its satellites.
- Last but not least, the emergence of a pluralistic political structure within a fellow socialist state could further encourage "bourgeois" tendencies among dissident Soviet intellectuals and create an undesirable debate about increased freedom within the Soviet Union itself.

At Dresden, in late March, Soviet anxiety over Dubcek's policies was translated for the first time into open disapproval of the reform movement. Seconded by an uneasy East German delegation, the Soviet leaders apparently communicated to their Czechoslovak counterparts that the Soviet Union (and the rest of the Warsaw Pact) "worried" about the developments in Czechoslovakia. To underline Soviet concern, Brezhnev made an explicit offer of sending Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia in order to assist the CPCS in retaining control over the situation. 35

As it turned out, the meeting failed to produce any spectacular change of mind in Prague. But Dresden established the Moscow tactic of collective pressure upon Dubcek which was to continue until days before the invasion.

During the period from April to June, Soviet apprehension increased proportionally to the proposed reform measures debated in Czechoslovakia. The April Action Program, although it reaffirmed with no apparent

hesitation the socialist principles guiding the CPCS, was, in Soviet eyes, a particularly disturbing document (the proposition to give support to 'the realistic forces in the German Federal Republic', for example, must have struck a raw Soviet nerve).³⁶ If nothing else, the Action Program confirmed that the anti-reformists were losing the debate battle inside the CPCS and could hardly block Dubcek's way towards further democratization, let alone impose their Soviet-dictated views on their party comrades and the Czechoslovak people. In simple power terms, the rapidly declining political fortunes of the pro-Moscow elements reduced Soviet leverage inside Czechoslovakia to dangerous levels and increased the pressure on the Soviet leadership to take action against the "Dubcekites".

Coming only weeks after the Action Program's publication, Dubcek's visit to Moscow in early May, when he grudgingly agreed to Warsaw Pact maneuvers inside his country, was far from successful in convincing the Russians about Czechoslovakia's stability. The Moscow talks, and separate meetings that followed between Dubcek and the leaders of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, neither allayed Soviet fears nor satisfied the rest of the Warsaw Pact allies. This fact was clearly demonstrated by "strong and active polemics against the Czechoslovak reform movement" which appeared in the Soviet and East European media immediately after Dubcek's visit to the Kremlin and which attacked a variety of Czechoslovak targets from individual intellectuals to the student movement.³⁷

While the May developments brought military intervention closer, there was still the question of devising suitable "threats" to justify a military move against the "counterrevolutionaries". The continuation of spontaneous public activity in Czechoslovakia added to the Soviet fears of an impending uncontrollable crisis but, in contrast to what the Soviets expected (or perhaps wished for), failed to produce violence or other incidents which could double as excuses for suppressing the Czechoslovak reformers. In fact, the unfolding of events in Czechoslovakia had followed a consistent path which served Soviet purposes poorly.

First, despite continuing political turmoil, there was no armed revolt against the country's communist rulers or any indication that one was imminent. Although, from the Kremlin's point of view, the Dubcek reforms created a clearly unacceptable political debate within Czechoslovakia, it was also undeniable that the confrontation between the progressive and conservative groups was confined to crossing pens rather than swords in the arena of public media. Moreover, the reformist measures did not include liquidation of prominent Novotny supporters and Dubcek, eager to promote his policy of consensus over confrontation, neither supported nor encouraged violent reprisals against lower-level functionaries associated with the previous regime.

Second, this rather benign atmosphere coupled with Dubcek's own deliberate and patient approach to the program for democratization (in addition to his

painstaking efforts to reassure his "allies" about developments in Czechoslovakia) deprived Soviet propaganda of villains. Throughout the crisis Moscow could exploit neither of the focal points which had played such a crucial role during the Hungarian crisis: The existence of a violent opposition to communist rule, ultimately manifested in popular armed rebellion, and the presence of a prominent figure like Imre Nagy who, although opposed as much as Dubcek to a revolution, found himself, by commission or omission, in the forefront of the "thugs and bandits" seeking "return to capitalism".

Third, the reformist movement was far from anti-communist and indeed went into pains to proclaim its socialist foundations (unlike the Hungarian freedom fighters whose aims were, at best, unclear). While Dubcek went ahead with his declared overhauling of the CPCS and of unpopular domestic policies, there was still no decisive sign that he was indeed about to scrap the existing system and replace it with a truly pluralistic framework.

Under such conditions--among which the Russians could hardly find the "threat" allowing them to create the excuse for a military move against the "counter-revolutionaries"--the invasion option carried a risky and even damaging potential. This fact was especially recognized by the "noninterventionist coalition" within the Soviet leadership which included such sceptics as Kosygin, Suslov, Ponomarev, and the latter's deputy, V. Zagladin.³⁸ Their reluctance to sanction sending the

tanks against the Dubcek government was based on several
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considerations. According to Professor Lowenthal:

- Many communist parties could reject Moscow's guidance and refuse to accept the use of force against another socialist country;
- rejection could be particularly strong among Western European communists whose commitment to "peaceful change" through the ballot box left little hope for blanket approval of an invasion;
- Russian troops marching into "the heart of Europe" could strengthen NATO and jeopardize any dialogue with the United States; and,
- the Czechoslovaks could resist triggering reactions in Hungary, Poland, and even East Germany, with incalculable risks for the health of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet position in Eastern Europe.

The sceptics might have retained their misgivings had the publication of the "2,000 words" manifesto not given support to the case of those in favour of drastic measures against Prague. This document which, according to one Soviet source, sought "to nullify all socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people [and] to subvert the friendship between the Czechoslovak people and the peoples of the
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fraternal socialist states" left little room for debate. Its tone and content were proof-- or, at least, they were interpreted as such--that the "Dubcekites" had sufficiently "subverted" the socialist system in Czechoslovakia and now threatened to turn the country into a breakaway. By the end of June, therefore, the Soviet

leaders must have found themselves in relative harmony⁴¹
over the question of military intervention.

The arrival of internal consensus on the ultimate sanctions against Czechoslovakia did not prevent Moscow from increasing, once again, its psychological pressure on the Dubcek regime. This was most likely a last-ditch effort to prod the Czechoslovak leaders back to their senses by confronting them with the full might of the Soviet propaganda machine. Throughout July, this campaign to sap the morale of the Czechoslovak leaders took a dual form: almost daily virulent Soviet press attacks against the reform movement; and political maneuvers to convince Prague that its experiments had become an unacceptable liability soon to cause "corrective" action by its "allies". Moscow's menacing posture was underlined by the delay in the withdrawal of Warsaw Pact troops which, on 20 July, had apparently completed their exercises inside Czechoslovakia. It was only after strong representations by the Czechoslovak government to General Yakubovskii, Soviet commander of the Warsaw Pact, that the troops began to withdraw without, however, dispelling the impression⁴² that a "mini-invasion" had already occurred.

The last confrontation, before the invasion, between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders took place during the Cierna/Bratislava meetings. For Czechoslovakia, these talks were a "stay of execution" rather than an added opportunity to attempt dissuading its "allies" from invading its territory. Soviet troop movements along the Czechoslovak-Soviet frontier and reports of Soviet units

stationed in East Germany moving towards Czechoslovakia formed the backdrop to this final act.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the invasion, the Kremlin continued to justify the "temporary" measures against Czechoslovakia on the grounds of "collective defence" of socialism against internal "bourgeois threats". This line of reasoning eventually crystallized into the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, first expounded by S. Kovalev in Pravda⁴³ approximately one month after the invasion.

The Brezhnev Doctrine reinforced the conclusion that the Soviet leadership had again drawn the line on liberal experiments within the "socialist commonwealth" as it had already done some twelve years before in Hungary. The invasion was also evidence that Khrushchev's successors were settling into a tougher, conservative, anti-reformist policy which reasserted Marxist rigidity over whatever limited freedoms had been allowed since the death of Stalin both abroad and at home. As one analyst poignantly put it: "The threat which the Kremlin was afraid of was not the growing influence of imperialism in Czechoslovakia, but the growing influence of Czechoslovakia in the U.S.S.R. and neighbouring countries".⁴⁴

In terms of intervention decisionmaking, the Soviets, as during the Hungarian crisis, seemed to defer decisions about a military move, and to take considerable time in searching for diplomatic alternatives and/or methods to

coerce Dubcek into changing his policies. It has thus been suggested that the firm consensus on military measures did not form until the Cierna/Bratislava conferences--which in effect meant that

---it took the Politburo almost seven months to understand the implications of Dubcek's ascendancy for Czechoslovak policy and Warsaw Pact solidarity, to agree on a firm line of policy vis-a-vis the new Prague regime, and to decide upon a concrete course of action. 45

In broad terms, the invasion helped achieve the primary Soviet aims: to neutralize the Dubcek progressive group and to secure Czechoslovakia's continuing obedience within the Eastern European Soviet buffer zone. But, in contrast to Budapest in 1956, where an armed revolt, threatening the Hungarian Communist Party with complete collapse, gave Moscow at least a pale measure of justification for sending in its tanks, the Prague Spring presented the Brezhnev collective with a far more complicated political situation. In the aftermath of the invasion, for example, such was the Czechoslovak resentment that Moscow was not even able to master an adequate number of collaborators into a Kadar-style government. Dubcek had to be embarrassingly retained well after the invasion. It took a second, direct act of coercive diplomacy in 1969 to displace him and finally install a "safe" regime under the "dependable" Gustav Husak.

CHAPTER IX

AFGHANISTAN

In the late evening hours of 24 December 1979, and in the face of an increasingly chaotic situation inside Afghanistan caused by universal armed resistance against the country's Marxist rulers, a Soviet air armada "involving at least 280 transports" began landing airborne troops at Kabul international airport.¹ This was the spearhead of an invasion which rapidly unfolded during the next few days. By 27 December, Soviet troops in the Afghan capital numbered approximately 8,000 men in addition to 4,000 military advisers already "in-country".² As this force proceeded to seize control of the government by deposing and executing Prime Minister Amin, four Soviet divisions, massed along the Soviet-Afghan border, descended into the country and quickly advanced towards Kabul and the border with Pakistan. On 28 December, having secured Kabul and established control over the Afghan army, the Soviets installed their favoured man, a long-time pro-Moscow communist, Babrak Karmal, as Afghanistan's new Prime Minister. In the ensuing six years of a guerrilla struggle between the Mujahidin--the Moslem freedom fighters--and Soviet forces "assisting" a decrepit Marxist regime, the initial Soviet invasion has been transformed into a bitter, inconclusive campaign of attrition.

Historical Perspective

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came as a jolt to Western powers and Third World states alike. On the surface, the Soviet action directed against a poor, semi-feudal country, divided by perennial struggles between its dozens of tribal and linguistic groups, made little sense. On the other hand, one had to take note of the fact that Soviet interest in this rugged mountainous country, far from being a novelty, derived directly from Tsarist policies which forced upon Afghanistan the role of a "buffer" state during imperial Russia's attempts to block³ the expansion of British influence on its rimland.

Yet, and although Moscow had continued to meddle in Afghanistan throughout the postwar years, Kabul did not become a recognized member of the "socialist community" until mid-1978 following a Marxist coup. Until that time, and since Afghanistan was not an established "fraternal" socialist state, the Soviets had permitted a semi-neutralist government, albeit reluctantly, to steer the country towards modest relations with the United States and other Western powers. However, the invasion itself, and the subsequent investment of Soviet military resources in the continuing war against the Mujahidin, revealed a much higher level of Soviet interest in that rugged part of Southwest Asia than previously thought.

The beginnings of the historical process that eventually led to the 1979 invasion can be traced back to the July 1973 coup which dethroned King Mohammed Zahir Shah and dissolved the Afghan parliamentary monarchy.

King Zahir was thus replaced by Mohammed Daoud who proclaimed the Republic of Afghanistan and sought to institute political and economic reforms. Daoud--and indeed the coup that brought him to power--received the support of one of the country's two main communist factions, the Parcham (flag, banner), led by Babrak Karmal. As a reward for their support, a number of prominent Parchamists received portfolios in the new government; however, Daoud, who was known for his political caution, denied most emphatically suggestions that Moscow had anything to do with the overthrow of the monarchy.⁴ Within a year though, Parcham was slowly eased out of power as Daoud moved to counter claims that his regime had leftist leanings and to underscore his government's neutrality vis-a-vis "any ideological faction".⁵ In 1977, Parcham, now deprived of its government participation, and the orthodox Marxist Khalq (people's) group, led by Noor Mohammed Taraki, agreed to reunite and recreate the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), after a long period of bitter rivalry and out of fear of "remaining indefinitely in the political wilderness".⁶

Daoud's rule, which after an initial period of attempted reforms came to depend heavily on political patronage and police methods to insure popular compliance, became entangled in severe economic and political problems. Unfulfilled promises led to growing popular opposition which was further aggravated by Daoud's antagonism with Moslem fundamentalists and disgruntled

army officers. On 27 April 1978, spurred into action by the surprise arrest of its leaders, the PDPA, whose organizers/agitators had campaigned aggressively to increase membership and penetrate the armed forces, staged a coup with the help of pro-communist military officers which overthrew and executed Daoud and established the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Power landed in the hands of a shadowy Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, under the leadership of a certain Colonel Qadir, although a few days later the PDPA leadership formed its own Revolutionary Council which incorporated the military officers.⁷ Taraki was made Prime Minister and President of the Revolutionary Council, Karmal was named Deputy Prime Minister, and Hafizullah Amin, an energetic Khalq organizer who had played a crucial role in winning the support of army and air force officers, as second Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.⁸

There is speculation as to the exact role Moscow played in the overthrow of the Daoud regime, although Daoud's reported leanings towards "true nonalignment", and a rather unpleasant visit to Moscow in April 1977 which revealed the Afghan leader's resentment of Soviet⁹ domination, must have won him few friends in the Kremlin. It should also be noted that Soviet military advisers were reported joining Afghan troops in coup activities. Given the Soviet practice of strict political control exercised in similar situations, it is inconceivable that these Soviet officers would have acted "without prior high-level

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authorization". It is also plausible that Moscow's prodding was responsible for the 1977 reconciliation between Parcham and Khalq which united the Afghan Marxist movement, strengthened its opposition to Daoud, and gave a future coup increased chances of success.¹¹

That being said, the PDPA was far from a potent communist organization under tight Soviet control. Numbering only a few thousand, mainly urban, members in a country with an overwhelmingly Moslem, rural population of almost sixteen million, the PDPA had to tread carefully and in fact stage a veritable game of political deception which deliberately avoided identifying the party with the USSR--or with Marxist ideology for that matter: even after the coup had succeeded in toppling Daoud the PDPA leadership firmly denied any Soviet connection, let alone Soviet backing of the anti-Daoud plot:

Taraki emphasized to Western correspondents that there was no party called "Communist" in Afghanistan, and he branded all reports that the PDPA was under Soviet influence or control as "seditious fabrications." He called the neighboring Islamic states of Pakistan and Iran "brothers," acknowledging no such fraternal bonds with the USSR. 12

These pretensions did not last for long, however. Soviet presence in Afghanistan rose steeply after the coup, with Soviet military and "diplomatic" personnel arriving in droves to "assist" the Taraki regime in public administration and internal security. Moscow's diplomatic recognition of the new Kabul government was immediate; it was followed by the arrival of diplomatic envoys from the Warsaw Pact members and, for the first

time in Afghanistan's history of foreign relations, of an ambassador from Cuba.

More significantly, in December 1978, Moscow and Kabul concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness, and Cooperation. The contracting parties declared "respect for national sovereignty, territorial¹³ integrity and noninterference in each other's affairs"; and in Article 4, Kabul and Moscow agreed, in an ominously prophetic manner, that "in consultation" with each other they would also "take appropriate measures with the view of ensuring the security, independence and territorial¹⁴ integrity of the two countries". Thus, "the friendship treaty signified that the radical transformation of Afghanistan would be underwritten and guaranteed by Soviet¹⁵ power".

Behind these diplomatic exchanges though, Moscow faced serious problems with the process of "socialist development" in Afghanistan. The country was not only pathetically primitive with no "proletariat" class worthy of the name according to the Marxist lexicon, but it was also in the hands of a divided "vanguard" party with only embryonic understanding of the finer points of "scientific socialism". Overall, the Khalqis, aside from their "revolutionary" fervour derived from the reading of a few basic Marxist texts, displayed little intellectual vigour necessary for a serious analysis of the Afghan condition. Taraki and Amin, while well versed in the conspiratorial tactics which led to the PDPA's rise to power, demonstrated no visible talents for either public

administration or economics; and being absorbed in their own infighting with the Parchamis further reduced their effectiveness as government leaders. Moreover, the party remained permeated by an "elitist" outlook which tended to equate the "revolution" with its own tiny membership base and ignored the necessity to mobilize the "working class" and the rural masses in support of the new socialist state.¹⁶

Another Soviet worry stemmed from the different relationships which Moscow had developed over the years with the two PDPA factions. Khalq, dedicated to clandestine tactics and fiercely opposed to both the royal family and the Daoud regime, had followed a secretive path before the April coup and maintained relatively few "advisory" links with the Soviets. In contrast, the Parchamists, headed by Karmal who thrived as a public speaker and kept in close contact with the Soviet embassy in Kabul, had chosen to pursue a policy of participation in Afghanistan's political life, involved themselves in the Daoud government and became acquainted with individual Soviet leaders, and leaned towards an open style of agitation which seemed to offer better chances of building popular support for the communist cause.¹⁷

Soon after the coup, the semblance of unity among the ruling Marxists, established by the 1977 reluctant alliance between Parcham and Khalq, fell victim to fierce intra-PDPA power struggles. In the course of summer 1978, the Khalq, through a series of purges in the armed forces and the state administration, succeeded in ejecting

Parcham from the ruling coalition and in driving Karmal to¹⁸ thinly-veiled exile as ambassador to Prague. The purge was completed in September when Kabul dismissed the Parcham leaders from their ambassadorships as well and declared them traitors (Karmal failed to return to Afghanistan and settled in Eastern Europe).

Parcham's removal from the government did not, however, alleviate the legitimacy problems which beset the communists from the outset, nor did it ease rivalries within Khalq itself. By late 1978, it was obvious that the Marxist reform programs, which the Taraki-Amin regime attempted to force upon the Afghans with a sense of urgency exaggerated even by the standards of most neophyte Third World "revolutionaries", collided disastrously with conservative tribal customs not to mention the values and teachings of fundamentalist Islam. To make matters worse, the imposition of the reforms was carried out with considerable haste and harshness which resulted, among other things, in thousands of indiscriminate arrests, executions, and torture cases. Consequently, within months of the coup, and aroused by communist brutalities and the grave attacks on their Islamic way of life, various tribal groups, beginning with those inhabiting the provinces of Kunar and Paktia, began to rise spontaneously¹⁹ in armed resistance against the Kabul government.

Against this background, the post-coup purge of the Parchamists presented Moscow with a difficult choice: while it was clear that Khalq's ruthlessness and superior organization were winning the PDPA internal power

struggle, it was equally obvious that working with the sullen Khalq stalwarts--whose willingness to fully heed Soviet 'advice' was still questionable-- could turn out to be a serious obstacle for Moscow's interests. On the other hand, and despite Parcham's amicable links with the Kremlin, support for the Khalq, which by the autumn 1978 had emerged as the sole government in Afghanistan, could not be diminished for fear of "imperialist" penetration or the resurgence of neutralist tendencies in Kabul.

Faced with the dilemma of supporting the powerful Khalq while foregoing Karmal's personal loyalty and Parcham's long-standing dedication to the "Soviet model", the Soviets chose a middle course which seemed to resolve the problem--at least in the short run--and at the same time to preserve Moscow's image of "noninterference" in Afghan internal affairs. Relations with the Taraki-Amin regime continued without any visible signs of strain, but, in a subtle though crucial "background" move, those Parchamists exiled in Eastern Europe as "traitors" were immediately gathered into a "shadow cabinet" and kept under "Soviet patronage" in the wings for any
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eventuality.

Meanwhile, Khalq's own divisions were approaching a critical stage. By early 1979, Taraki's power had been effectively curbed by Amin who had emerged as the strongman behind the coup and the radical Marxist theoretician of the Khalq. Taraki, while retaining his post as President, was reduced to the role of a figurehead. On 27 March, five days after insurgent bands

had attacked and briefly held the city of Herat in what it turned out to be a massacre of PDPA officials and Soviet advisers, Amin assumed the post of Prime Minister which allowed him almost unlimited freedom of action in manipulating the state apparatus.²¹ Amin's elevation led to the concentration of power in the hands of a cabal of trusted cronies and in further erosion of Taraki's position. Amin followers were placed in sensitive posts within the military, the police, and the intelligence service giving the Prime Minister close control of these instruments of power and ensuring that Taraki-sponsored counter-plots were swiftly suppressed. Moscow did not welcome these developments. Amin was not trusted mainly because of his "questionable" educational background in the United States, but also because, after the April coup, he had "prevented the KGB's attempt to gain control of the security services and insisted on maintaining his party's independent control of the army and the secret police."²²

Finally, the Taraki-Amin rivalry came to a head in the autumn when the Afghan President, following a visit to Cuba and a stopover in Moscow for "consultations" with the Soviet leaders, returned to Kabul with apparent plans to reassert his authority and liquidate the Prime Minister. The plan did not work as expected, however, and indeed backfired when, on 14 September, Amin, warned by one of his military insiders, escaped unscathed from a shoot-out in the presidential palace and responded by arresting Taraki whose death due to "a long illness" was announced a few weeks later.²³

Taraki's elimination had little influence upon the domestic situation which continued to deteriorate despite efforts by Amin to win popular support by dressing the "revolution" in Moslem attire. Armed revolt affected all twenty eight Afghan provinces at various levels of intensity. Insurgent bands harassed army garrisons, attacked isolated outposts, and ambushed government convoys travelling between cities. The Afghan army, its senior officer ranks decimated by successive purges, could neither take control of the military situation nor discipline its own demoralized recruits whose performance against the hardened mountain tribesmen, never of high calibre to begin with, deteriorated steadily by the day.

It was thus evident that the Amin regime was rapidly losing the fight on both the political and military fronts. On the eve of the Soviet invasion, the prospects of the "Great Saur [April] Revolution" seemed even deemer in the face of Amin's stubborn refusal to seek reconciliation with Parcham and the Taraki group whose followers he continued to persecute with vigour.

The Decision to Intervene

Examined from a historical perspective, the 1979 invasion was far from an isolated phenomenon and should be perceived as yet another phase in the protracted imperial Russian/Soviet involvement in Afghan affairs. The historical element becomes especially important when one notes that the Soviet Union had already established a precedent by staging three small-scale military

incursions into Afghan territory in 1925, 1929, and
24
1930. What differentiated the 1979 intervention from
these previous Soviet forays was the assault upon and
liquidation of the country's incumbent leader, the size of
the intervening force, the immediate deployment of Soviet
troops in combat around the country, and last but not
least, the apparent Soviet determination to continue the
military effort until the "reaction" was either defeated
or forced by exhaustion to the negotiations table.

There can be little doubt that the April 1978 coup
served Soviet purposes perfectly. For the first time in
Afghan-Soviet relations, Afghanistan was under the
authority of a Marxist regime which was expected to
"accommodate" the Soviets in the same fashion as the Warsaw
Pact "allies" and to raise a barrier across the path of
Western influence in Southwest Asia. Moreover, a
"fraternal" Afghanistan would offer ample strategic space
for maneuvering Soviet military power in the proximity of
the Arabian oilfields and the shores of the Indian Ocean.
It was therefore imperative that the Afghan communists
consolidated their control within reasonable time in order
to secure Kabul in the Soviet orbit.

Soon after the "Great Saur Revolution", however,
Soviet hopes for a safe, secure, socialist Afghanistan
began to fade. In an ironic twist of events, the Taraki-
Amin regime, by virtue of its callousness, its inability
to grasp the long-term implications of haphazard radical
measures, and its myopic insistence on ramming social
structures which had existed undisturbed for hundreds of

years, had been transformed into its own worst enemy--and that of Soviet interests. It is safe to assume, judging from the history of the initial phases in "building socialism" in satellite countries, that Moscow did not give its blessing to Khalq's general assault on Afghanistan's traditional Islamic customs and tribal practices. Indeed, the Soviet leaders, not the least because of Moscow's own experiences with Islamic populations of the Central Asian Soviet republics, must have been keenly aware of the disastrous effects inherent in such antagonistic policies--policies which ignored the need to expand the popular base of the "vanguard" party and to unite the Afghan "progressive forces" under the banner of the PDPA.

In Moscow's eyes, Khalq's wave of repression at the first indication of unrest was as discouraging as the obviously miniscule following the Marxists could command among their own people. An equally discouraging development was the gradual erosion of Taraki's authority which shifted power into the hands of Amin and the dogmatic Khalq wing. Thus, the Soviets found themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to try and reconcile two essentially contradictory tasks: first, it was imperative to safeguard the Afghan "revolution"--which meant support for the PDPA regime under any circumstances; and, second, it was also imperative to promote moderation among the Kabul Marxists--which meant conflict with Amin, the Khalq's most powerful figure and the man who controlled the PDPA apparatus with an iron hand. Agreement

on the first objective must have been unanimous, but Soviet patience with the second was running thin. By mid-1979, and after Herat provided a vivid picture of the fate expecting both Afghan communists and their Soviet advisers if the Mujahidin were allowed to gain the upper hand, Amin, as far as the Soviets were concerned, had failed and his removal from office was imperative:

So long as he remained in charge in Kabul there was no hope of consolidating the grip that Communism had gained in Afghanistan with the April 1978 coup. There was, instead, the danger of losing it, of having the country fall into a chaotic anti-Communist condition. 25

Therefore, it seems that the Politburo, anticipating further undesirable convolutions and wishing to maintain control over events in Afghanistan, initiated plans for military action to "save" the Afghan "revolution" sometime²⁶ in late March or early April 1979. Between April and October the Soviet leaders watched apprehensively as the Taraki-Amin duo sunk deeper into crisis. In early April, the Moslem guerrilla activity had increased to such a point, that the Soviet leaders felt necessary to dispatch General A.A. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army, for an "on-the-spot" inspection in Afghanistan. The Yepishev visit, carried out over a period of two weeks, confirmed the widespread deterioration of Khalqi rule and the threatened, complete²⁷ disintegration of the Afghan military. Soon after the Yepishev mission was completed, Vassily Safronchuck, a veteran Soviet diplomat, was also assigned to the Kabul embassy with express orders to reconcile Khalq with

Parcham and to devise a political strategy for combatting the spreading Islamic resistance--objectives which he was²⁸ though unable to accomplish.

The first tangible indication of the invasion option taking shape in the Kremlin deliberations was the movement, in mid-summer, of elements of one Soviet rifle²⁹ division to positions inside Afghanistan. At the same time, an airborne battalion arrived at the Bagram air base³⁰ near Kabul "to provide airfield security" i.e. to establish Soviet control on the base that was to serve as a strategic "bridgehead" during the invasion. The summer deployments were followed by a three-week long "reconnaissance in force" in October by General I.G. Pavlovskii, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, "accompanied by a substantial group of Soviet³¹ officers". The reports which the two generals presumably made to the Politburo must have contained powerful arguments in favour of a military move--especially if one takes into account Yepishev's similar tour of Czechoslovakia before the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of that country and the fact that the general "had been one of the most outspoken advocates of the³² military intervention".

It is doubtful, however, that the Soviet leadership reached a definite consensus on exercising the military option until only a few weeks before 24-25 December. Although there is little conclusive evidence to support this theory, post-invasion Soviet statements about "the central committee and the Soviet government" acting (but

not deciding) together on the Afghan situation probably indicated

that there was considerable debate within the politburo, a division among key people about what to do despite later claims of leadership unanimity. 33

What were the central elements of this purported debate?

Here we can only speculate as follows:

- (a) Despite the unquestionable, from the Soviet perspective, place of Afghanistan within the de facto "security perimeter" of the Soviet Union, there must have been deliberation about Western reactions to a large-scale military invasion of an ostensibly independent Third World nation in close proximity to the Arabian oilfields. Special attention must have been paid to possible American reactions and, to a lesser degree, to those of China.
- (b) The Islamic revolution in Iran was an additional source of Soviet anxiety over developments in Afghanistan and must have been one of the central themes in the Kremlin pre-invasion deliberations. Khomeini's not-too-happy coexistence with the Iranian communist party (and indeed, with all non-Islamic political forces), the ayatollahs' proclaimed intention to "expand" the Islamic revolution, and the fearsome fervour of the Iranian "soldiers of Allah", raised the spectre of some future alliance between Iranian fundamentalists and Afghan "counter-revolutionaries" which could cause immense grief to the Kabul Marxists. Even worse, the Iranian

revolution must have prompted visions of a similar fundamentalist government emerging in Afghanistan, if the PDPA regime was allowed to collapse, a development totally incompatible with Soviet interests. Although no serious challenge to a Soviet military move could be expected from Iran, the potential of a protracted jihad, a holy war, against Soviet forces was not unlikely and it must have attracted attention during the final assessment of the invasion option.

(c) The seizure of the US embassy in Teheran must have figured as a particularly adverse development since it raised the possibility of a US military attack on Iran and of "imperialist" troops arriving dangerously close to the Afghan "reactionary bandits". In the end, however, the American factor must have been downgraded in the face of President Carter's distinct reluctance to engage in energetic measures against the Iranian mullahs, although the likelihood of future American military activity in the region must have not been discounted entirely.³⁴

(d) The invasion option might have created anxiety among those in the Soviet leadership who were more mindful of the consequences of Soviet action upon detente and nuclear arms negotiations. They might have pressed for alternative tactics such as a total cut-off of assistance to Amin and support of a Parchamist coup to oust him without the presence of Soviet troops.³⁵

(e) Finally, another serious "cost" factor from a "globalist" perspective must have been the reaction of the nonaligned nations whose cooperation and goodwill the Soviet Union continued to cultivate. A heavy-handed Soviet reaction in Afghanistan carried the potential of alienating many of them or even driving others to the "imperialist camp".

* * *

The invasion came to confirm that the Soviet leadership had at the end of the day agreed that Afghanistan had become an essentially military problem which, if left without the proper response, would have eventually forced the Soviet Union to guard "2,500 extra³⁶ kilometers of frontier".

Official justifications of the invasion pointed to "security for socialism in Afghanistan, security for its socialist revolution, and ultimately security for the Soviet Union itself" as the primary motivation of the Soviet actions.³⁷ Shortly after the occupation of Kabul, Pravda accused the "imperialist circles" with a broad range of subversive activities against the Marxist regime and declared that the USSR would never allow Afghanistan to become a "bridgehead" of "imperialist aggression³⁸ against the Soviet Union". Amin was a CIA agent who had "entered into collusion with the counterrevolutionary³⁹ rabble... entrenched... in Pakistan". His "treachery created the threat of a counterrevolutionary takeover. Furthermore, there was a threat to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic

Republic of Afghanistan, for imperialist powers were⁴⁰
drawing up plans to invade and dismember Afghanistan".
Brezhnev's own remarks reiterated the security theme and
underlined that inactivity of the part of the USSR "would
have meant passively watching the creation on our southern
border of a source of serious danger to the security of
the Soviet state".⁴¹ As Bradsher put it:

It is doubtful that pulling out was ever more of
a real option than it was for the United States
in Vietnam around 1964 or 1965.... The whole
activist history of Soviet involvements abroad
argued against quitting, against letting a
Communist position once seized be relinquished,
letting the wheel of history turn back. 42

The Lengthening War

In the early stages of the war, the main objective of
the Soviet command was to secure major cities and
provincial capitals and to control the paved roads
connecting them. The Soviets divided the country into
seven regional commands under the direct orders of Soviet
generals but avoid attempting "to cover the country with
a large expeditionary force--a move which would have been⁴³
costly and probably ineffective". Particularly intensive
operations were waged in the areas adjoining the Soviet
border due to fear that the unrest might spread among
Tazhiks and Uzbeks inhabiting the neighbouring Soviet⁴⁴
Central Asian republics.

In a country where the average altitude is 2,000
meters, preparations for mountain warfare are critical,
but the early performance of the Soviet troops indicated
poor training and tactics--shortcomings which were soon

alleviated by changes in the Soviet exercise patterns and the introduction of the rocket-firing helicopter in the dual role of weapons platform and troop carrier.⁴⁵ Also, by the end of 1980, the great bulk of poorly conditioned Central Asian conscripts, who had been sent to Afghanistan in the hope of eliciting friendlier responses from their co-ethnic Afghan population, had been pulled out and replaced with divisions composed of tougher Russian troops.⁴⁶

In the ensuing years, Soviet military efforts to defeat the Mujahidin have evolved into a sophisticated antiguerrilla campaign which, despite localized successes, has been unable to eliminate the Afghan resistance. Although the Soviet forces enjoy the enormous advantage of home staging and re-supply bases across the common frontier of the USSR with Afghanistan, operations inside the latter are severely restricted by the inhospitable terrain and the primitive road system. Harsh winters further restrict Soviet movements and produce the inevitable high-low activity cycles which allow the resistance to regroup and prepare for the next round of fighting. It is important to note, however, that the term "Afghan resistance" hardly implies a united movement against the Soviet occupation. The Mujahidin, apart from being poorly armed and trained, remain historically divided by century-old tribal feuds, the cause against the Soviets and their Kabul puppets apparently an inadequate⁴⁷ incentive to unite in the face of the common enemy.

To date, Soviet commanders "have pursued a strategy

of consolidating their control of the urban areas and the major transportation and logistics networks of the country, while denying any significant or lasting gains to the mujahidin".⁴⁸ Ambushing Mujahidin supply columns and staging camps has become a common tactic; heliborne assaults have also increased in an effort to gain tactical surprise and avoid movement through treacherous mountain passes.⁴⁹ Although the number of combat engagements where Soviet troops take the initiative has risen since 1980, the Soviets have consistently sought to minimize their casualties. They avoid exposure outside fortified positions, delegate much of the fighting to the Afghan army, and increasingly rely on air power, and especially the Mi 24 helicopter gunship, to attack guerrilla bands⁵⁰ and to disrupt their supply network. The Mujahidin have been unable to obtain a steady supply of modern antiaircraft weapons, such as shoulder-launched surface-to-air heat-seeking missiles, and "as a result, the Soviets are able to operate with virtual impunity in the⁵¹ air, precluding any lasting mujahidin gains".

Mastery of the air, however, has not entirely solved Soviet problems in battling the hardened Afghan tribesmen whose advantages mainly lie with intimate knowledge of the terrain and a natural inclination towards mountain guerrilla warfare. Moving through valleys without first "sweeping" the ridges overlooking them can still be a dangerous exercise even for heavily armoured Soviet columns, as the bitter fighting in the Panjshir valley has demonstrated. The Mujahidin regularly mine roads and

bridges, a tactic to which the Soviets, in the absence of a more effective response, have reacted by indiscriminately bombing villages and even towns near roads.⁵²

In the long term, unless they decide to multiply their troop strength substantially and commit themselves to multibattalion thrusts similar to the American "search-and-destroy" operations in Vietnam, the Soviets may face a deadlock akin to that confronted by the British army in its efforts to pacify the Afghan tribes during the better part of the 19th century. Until now, the prospect of climbing casualties seems to have acted as a deterrent to such escalatory measures, with Soviet troop strength increasing only moderately since the opening months of the war to 110,000-115,000.⁵³ Although accurate statistics are unavailable, reliance on air power and other modern weaponry, as opposed to troop-intensive tactics, appears to have succeeded in keeping Soviet casualties at relatively low levels while inflicting ten times as many casualties upon the Mujahidin.⁵⁴

Prospects for the Future

A complete withdrawal of the Soviet "limited military contingent" from Afghanistan is not likely in the near future unless drastic diplomatic decisions, involving neighbouring Pakistan, the United States, the Afghan resistance, and the Kabul regime, can be reached. Moscow's predicament is complicated by the total failure of the Kabul government to gain support in the

countryside--'which prompted one observer to quip that Afghanistan is now a good example of socialism in one town'⁵⁵ --the tenacity of the Mujahidin, and its own apparent unwillingness for a full-scale military commitment which results in the prolongation of the military deadlock. Karmal's dismissal from the post of General Secretary of the PDPA in May 1986, and his subsequent resignation from the largely symbolic⁵⁶ presidency for "health reasons", proved that, even in the world of the hopelessly fragmented Afghan politics, the persistent "image of being a Russian puppet" can potentially defeat any Soviet effort to create an⁵⁷ acceptable "fraternal" government in Kabul.

Karmal's replacement, Dr. Mohammed Najibullah, chief of the KHAD secret police, has a reputation for ruthlessness as well as for "getting the job done". Immediately upon his appointment, Najibullah criticized the PDPA's "lack of energetic action" which resulted in the Afghan Marxists becoming "poor practitioners" of "revolutionary" ideology and failing to establish "ideological influence on certain strata of the⁵⁸ population". His elevation, therefore, may indicate a toughening of the Soviet attitude which, when combined with persistent signs of the Soviet troops literally "digging in" (as, for example, the building of permanent bases, storage facilities, a new bridge across the Oxus river on the Afghan-Soviet border, and paving of strategic roads) argue against any negotiated settlement until, if ever, Moscow deems the "reaction" as defeated.

Moscow's position on troop withdrawal has hardly changed since 1980 and remains hinged on the dogged assertion that "the forces of the past would hardly be able to hinder the onward march of the new had it not been for the direct interference in Afghanistan's affairs by imperialist circles headed by the United States".⁵⁹ The continuing presence of the Soviet "limited military contingent" is in fact blamed directly on Washington. As Likutov wrote:

---by continuing to give material and moral backing to the Afghan counterrevolution Washington seeks to make sure that the external threat to Afghanistan remains and that as a result the Soviet military contingent whose task is to repel this threat stays on in Afghanistan.⁶⁰

On the other hand, the Soviets have avoided rejecting outright the negotiation process if only to serve their own long-term interests and accomplish the "sovietization" of Afghanistan with a minimum of international friction.⁶¹ It seems therefore that Moscow's insistence that troop withdrawal is a strictly "bilateral issue to be discussed only with its Afghan client", and that "the Kabul regime is not subject to international discussion",⁶² is a device designed to delay, or even frustrate, efforts at a meaningful accord. The prospect of such an agreement appears even deemer when juxtaposed to the fiercely anti-Soviet Afghan resistance and the necessity to destroy it before Soviet security interests can be satisfied.

Against this background, the "proximity" talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan, sponsored by the United Nations and held on and off in Geneva since 1982, comprise

the only platform utilized by the Soviets for cautious diplomatic maneuvering. The talks have often ~~been delayed~~ because Moscow has repeatedly charged "that the undeclared war that imperialism has unleashed against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is being waged primarily from Pakistani territory", ⁶³ and Pakistan has countered by insisting on Soviet troop withdrawal as a pre-condition for negotiations.

Any significant move towards peace will depend, therefore, on the emergence of a formula which will allow Soviet "good will" moves coupled with Pakistani pressures on the resistance to accept some form of cease-fire agreement until an all-party conference (including the Kabul government) can be arranged. Statements made during Secretary Gorbachev's visit to India at the end of 1986 might indeed be signs of Soviet willingness to negotiate, for the first time, future "principles" of a troop ⁶⁴ withdrawal under the aegis of the United Nations.

PART III

CONCLUSIONS

The global security system has been seriously affected by changes which mainly occurred during the last two decades. While these changes have effectively eroded the strict bipolar world model, the two superpowers continue to play the central role in the ultimate survival of the international system. The complexity of the superpower competition is such, and the number of variables which enter the "global" assessment so extensive, that the "broad picture" of the present "balance" is, at best, the result of educated guessing, and at worst, the outcome of propaganda exercises waged for political purposes. Thus, this study chose to focus on only a small segment of the superpower competition spectrum, that of military intervention.

General Conclusions from the Cases

The six case studies we examined here reveal the diversity of superpower military intervention policies. They also demonstrate the inherent difficulties the analyst faces when confronted with the question of "why", and because of "which" specific stimuli, the choice of force was made.

(A) US Intervention

1. Korea is an example of a "limited" war which

nobody in Washington really wanted, or thought it would indeed occur in the first place. Discomfort about the idea of another Asian war, so soon after the end of the war in the Pacific, confused US political and military goals in Korea and generated poor statements of overall policy guidance. In addition, prevailing perceptions about the communist monolith precluded the full appreciation of nationalist motivations behind the North Korean invasion. This in turn led to overestimations of Soviet intentions and worries, perhaps quite undue, about an imminent Soviet counter-action either in Asia or Europe. Thus, the Chinese intervention in support of North Korea was perceived as a precursor of a Soviet "plan" that never materialized--with all the resultant strategic and operational implications.

2. The desire to terminate the Korean "police" action did not prevent oscillation between a "total" victory concept, calling for the reunification of the two Koreas under a non-communist government, and a "limited options" strategic plan which eventually reduced the American military effort to a defensive posture. As an example of how "limited" war strategies can defy and even defeat timetables for war termination--assuming that the original

intention of policymakers in keeping a conflict "limited" is to allow rapid conclusion of hostilities--the American intervention in Korea could only be compared with the tortuous way, three decades later, towards "Vietnamization" of the war in Indochina.

3. The Vietnam intervention resembles Korea in at least two important aspects: first, despite the willingness of successive US administrations to increase support for the Saigon regime, US military presence in South Vietnam was never clearly rationalized in terms of a wider, coherent strategic concept; and, second, excessive pre-occupation with Soviet and Chinese intentions especially during the crucial period 1965-68, which was not always entirely justified, frustrated military planning to the point where Hanoi was offered the unexpected bonus of a reluctant and self-limiting adversary. As in Korea, the US desire to "limit" the war did not moderate the level of violence, or convince the communist side as to the essentially "benign" US intentions provided Hanoi would cease its "aggression" against the South.
4. The intervention in Grenada is quite dissimilar from the preceding two cases both in scope and length. It nevertheless demonstrates that the

traditional imperatives of containment, which played a significant role in decisionmaking during both Korea and Vietnam, are still very much a part of the American perception of the "Threat". Creating a "firebreak" against the proliferation of Marxist movements in Latin America was one of the American justifications for the invasion--and, without perhaps any question, the most important one.

5. It is doubtful that the United States would have resorted to force if Prime Minister Bishop had succeeded in curbing his party's internal disputes and carried on with the "revolutionary transformation" of the island. Bishop's murder though, and the disputed threat against the American students in Grenada, created the excuse for a "law-and-order" mission which was a thinly-veiled intervention to neutralize a potential communist regime uncomfortably close to the American mainland. Thus, the sequence of warning and decision that preceded the invasion has triggered charges of American "opportunism" which, in strict legal terms, resulted in the violation of Grenadian sovereignty at a time when that island state could not have been held responsible for any hostile act against either its Caribbean neighbours or the United States itself.

6. In Korea and Vietnam, US intervention was not averted by the fear of Soviet counter-measures, but, once American troops joined the battle, self-regulatory tactics were imposed in order to minimize the risk of reaction from Moscow. In Grenada, such risk simply did not exist.

(B) Soviet Intervention

1. The Hungarian intervention was far from a smoothly-executed operation. In contrast to the popular view of the Soviet leadership being able to implement interventionary policies swiftly and effectively, thanks to the absence of the complex decisionmaking processes present in a parliamentary democracy, Hungary proved that centralized control does not eliminate either indecision or the need for consensus building before drastic steps are taken. The Soviet withdrawal after the first intervention demonstrated that the Soviet leaders were unhappy with the thought of prolonged operations in an environment where Soviet military power could not seize the initiative; and that at least some of them, even at that final hour, were willing to promote a diplomatic settlement over military measures.
2. If Hungary thrust upon Moscow an armed challenge to communist authority, Czechoslovakia twelve years later presented the Soviets with an

intellectual insurrection which, potentially, appeared to carry an even graver threat against the "socialist commonwealth" than the Hungarian freedom fighters. Ironically, Dubcek's refusal to provoke the Soviets by striking a "national defence" posture, and by imposing upon Moscow the prospect of fighting to subdue an "ally", seemed to complicate rather than simplify the job of the Soviet leaders. Again, military intervention was decided upon after prolonged deliberations and only when it was fairly clear that Prague was not responding to "fraternal" warnings.

3. Afghanistan resembles the two previous cases in that it posed, at least in Moscow's view, an open threat to the integrity of the Soviet Union's defence perimeter. In addition, Afghanistan's location in the middle of a perennially turbulent region, and the Islamic fervour of Kabul's opponents, gave emphasis to the danger of a crisis which, if allowed to get out of control, might become extremely difficult to contain.
4. It is important to note that in all three cases the Soviet Union intervened at a time when there was minimum or clearly nonexistent risk of Western counter-intervention. The events in Hungary, for example, were overshadowed by the

Suez crisis and Czechoslovakia occurred at a time when the first, tentative steps of detente, in combination with US involvement in Vietnam, ensured Western noninterference. Similarly, at the time of the invasion of Afghanistan, Washington's attention was focused on the American hostages in Teheran and, in any case, American willingness to undertake military power projection after Vietnam was seriously questioned by friends and foes alike.

Towards a Conceptual Framework

The study of complex human activity systems, irrespective of their level of methodological sophistication and their success in analyzing relevant historical material, often suffer from one, perhaps unavoidable, shortcoming: they are unable to penetrate the decisionmaking "black box" sufficiently to establish definite links between given inputs (or policy directions) with desired outcomes (or policy results).

Rational analysis of "situational" variables alone, while it produces a coherent picture of policymaking, is insufficient as a conclusive method of establishing cause-and-effect relationships, let alone the true motives of policymakers. Accounts of significant events, produced at a later stage and away from the stress of "crisis management", are rarely capable of capturing the intensity and sense of uncertainty which more often than not plague decisionmakers.

This is particularly true in attempting to determine, not to say measure, the effectiveness of specific interventionary strategies. For instance, to establish with certitude that the use of military force resulted in achieving system goals and long-term system stability is usually no more than an exercise in informed speculation. It is very difficult, if not entirely impossible, to discuss with real authority the "success" of the interventionary activity in question and its true, as opposed to the perceived, impact upon the actions of the target's policymakers.

The familiar assertion that "history repeats itself" is a reminder of how mechanically we often view "similar" events, and how close we frequently are to drawing "lessons" which we then assume to be of universal applicability. A word of caution is, therefore, due against sweeping "predictive" statements or elevating "futurology" to the level of engineering science.

* * *

As it was stated in the Introduction, the central thesis of this study "is that the 'incremental' methods, employed widely in the study of superpower use of military forces as instruments of policy... are of limited value in the construction of a conceptual framework which should lead to a diachronic model of superpower military intervention" (pp. 34-5). This conceptual framework, in the first instance at least, should be based on a number of generalizations which emerge from the discussion in

Chapters I and II and the conclusions drawn from the case studies:

- (1) There is no "cast iron" way of depicting future conflict or describing superpower reactions to unexpected crises, especially if these events are to disturb the stability of the "central" system anchored in the strategic relationship between the superpowers and the opposing NATO/Warsaw Pact alliance systems.
- (2) Given the presence of nuclear weapons, "formal" or "total" war between advanced industrialized states, which carries the potential of nuclear escalation, has become a highly undesirable, and as some would argue, totally unacceptable method of continuing politics by other means.
- (3) By contrast, the "periphery" of underdeveloped and developing countries will continue to experience violence both within and between states. These upheavals can be termed "post-colonial wars of redistribution" and, as the Gulf War demonstrates, may be lengthy festering affairs not amenable to any of international diplomacy's traditional methods of conflict resolution.
- (4) Defining specific military responses by the superpowers in "lesser" contingency environments, and developing relevant operational doctrine, will remain a highly ambiguous exercise because of the unpredictability of local conflicts, the inevitable

lapses in both strategic and tactical intelligence, and the proliferation of sophisticated conventional military technology.

Having made these assumptions, we might then advance to the stage of attempting to relate the second-level model of military intervention, discussed in Chapter III, with projected theaters of superpower military intervention. Since this exercise is essentially experimental, "projected theaters" may be easily identified from a broad review of the literature (obviously, if this exercise is carried out at government policymaking level, national policy guidance and national security planning define such 'projected theaters' in much greater detail). A simple matrix showing the military intervention model attributes in relationship to the chosen theaters can then be drawn up (Fig. 1). Certain observations should be made in connection with this matrix:

- (1) The terms "effective" and "non-effective" are inserted to establish the relevance of military intervention as a response to a particular crisis in the indicated theater. For example, the pair "Aggregate Military Power--Non-effective" corresponds to the likely conclusion that a military "solution" to a specific event may be unavailable for a number of reasons (one such reason, which can be drawn from the matrix itself, may be that there is no capability to encounter the adversary, i.e. that a negative

Theater A		Theater B	
Effective		Non-effective	Effective Non-effective
Aggregate Military Power			
Capability to encounter			
Capability to sustain			
Command-Control-Communication (C3)			
Tactical technology			

Fig. 1--An Experimental Matrix of Military Intervention

relationship exists in the pair "Capability To Encounter--Non-effective).

- (2) The matrix is intended as an iconic aid in deliberating the feasibility of a military intervention operation and constructing specialized structures of specific rules of engagement.
- (3) The statement in (2) means in effect that this exercise is not "complete" in the sense of addressing all conceivable variables in an interventionary situation--a fundamental shortcoming which no amount of additional inputs can totally eliminate. As a result, this matrix is limited to showing whether existing capabilities can be applied in given theaters and makes no assumptions as to the intensity of operations or the escalation risks involved.

This modeling effort can be further focused by considering a list of additional key variables which can influence the relationships of the matrix pairs (Fig. 2). This list can be drawn by analyzing the superpowers' declared policies in respect to specific regions, their military strategy and tactics applicable in "lesser" contingencies, the composition, structure, weapons, and logistics of their general purpose forces (and/or forces specifically 'earmarked' for distant power projection), and, last but not least, their past behaviour in interventionary situations, preferably through the "focused" comparison of case studies.

It should be underscored that developing, magnifying

- Size and military capabilities of the target
 - Availability of overseas bases and willingness of host nations to allow use of these facilities for interventionary activities
 - Projected size of interventionary force
 - Projected composition of interventionary force (e.g. primarily 'special' forces as opposed to regular general purpose forces)
 - Long-range projection capabilities "in being" (naval, air)
 - The nature of the target's physical environment
 - The nature of the cause of intervention (e.g. support of local government against insurgents, rescue operation)
 - Projected costs of the operation
 - Projected duration of the operation
 - The organization of military command authority
 - Political and combat intelligence
 - Manpower constraints
-

Fig. 2--A List of Key Variables To Be Used in Conjunction With the Military Intervention Matrix (*)

(*) Not necessarily in order of importance.

and manipulating the matrix can be best achieved with the use of computers utilizing, if possible, custom-designed expert-system software. However, if the "in-house" software development capability is limited, and the research is being carried out by largely nonprofessional computer users, "off the shelf" software is obviously the alternative solution. If such is the case, currently available relational databases, with report-generating functions, and professional graphics and design programs offer reasonably structured environments for carrying out this project.

Model Applicability

The matrix thus developed can be applied in the analysis of specific interventionary actions, as well as in examining the long-term possibility of superpower military incursion into "regional" theaters (e.g. the Persian Gulf). It can also be modified, as in Fig. 3, to serve as a comparative tool in examining action-reaction scenarios in cases where there is possibility of involvement of both superpowers.

Theater A				Theater B			
Effective				Non-effective			
US		USSR		US		USSR	
Aggregate Military Power							
Capability to encounter							
Capability to sustain							
Command-Control-Communication (C3)							
Tactical technology							

Fig. 3--A Modified Matrix of Military Intervention

EPILOGUE

Historically, preventing the "spread of communism" has been the bedrock of postwar American foreign policy. From President Truman to President Reagan, battling Marxist-inspired "revolutionary" movements, and real or imaginary Moscow *allies*, have been the propelling forces behind America's global security policies. The main aim of this contest with the "forces of totalitarianism" has been, first, to restrict Moscow's freedom of maneuver in areas outside the "stable" European theater as much as possible, and, second, to ensure that regimes friendly to the West are not threatened by communist "penetration".

During the 1970s, however, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global power with nuclear assets at least equal to those of the United States, and increasingly credible distant projection capabilities, allowed Moscow to assume a more assertive international posture. Breaching the US-imposed containment barrier, which had begun in the 1960s, was completed thanks to a combination of factors: forward naval deployments, introduction of Soviet proxy forces, like the Cubans, into unstable local theaters to bolster Marxist regimes with extensive Soviet logistical support against internal armed opposition, and a greater emphasis on consistent aid--military, economic, and in maintaining domestic security--to Third World clients who otherwise might have fallen

prey to the "imperialists" or their "puppets".

The new Soviet assertiveness has thus triggered a debate in the United States, and elsewhere in the West, on whether Moscow is now implementing a "grand strategy" scheme to dislocate Western interests in the Third World, or whether Soviet "expansionism" is an opportunistic, largely tactical, exercise that can be checkmated by ad hoc Western actions. Both scenarios have come to include a strong military element. For example, there is a tendency among many conservative Western observers to insist on a prompt reaction--one that must convey the 'message' to Moscow in an unmistakable, preferably military, fashion--to every Soviet initiative in contested areas irrespective of scope or apparent goal. This view conveniently blurs the fact that American power in the aftermath of Vietnam is subject to often severe limitations; and fails to recognize that Soviet initiatives and instruments of leverage can also be buffeted by the unpredictability and instability of Third World politics.

Such attitudes, particularly at policymaking level, can be sources of ill-conceived "contingency" planning and serious, but unnecessary, political and military risks. No doubt, the thinly-veiled paranoia that often underlies Western assessments of the Soviet "threat" is undoubtedly shared by many Soviet leaders versed as they are in a xenophobic political tradition loaded with "threats" descending upon the Russian motherland "from all

azimuths". This brings us back to a point which is recognized as the main undoing of East-West relations: the absence of trust--not a whole lot of it, but rather just enough to allow for meaningful negotiations and agreements concerning exactly these "peripheral" problems which are lately blamed for much of East-West friction.

Indiscriminate military incursions by the superpowers in the Third World or in their own "back yards" will scarcely promote bilateral trust. Although military muscleflexing is an unavoidable expression of national power, and as such it should not be realistically expected to vanish in the name of peaceful coexistence, its frequency and scope can be certainly controlled. The linkage between local conflicts and the worldwide military balance is still poorly understood and, to many analysts, it will remain the "great unknown" that can cause dangerous, and perhaps ultimately fatal, confrontations between the superpowers.

NOTES

An Explanatory Note

Given the length of Notes, a full first citation of individual sources has been included in each separate section of chapter notes irrespective of whether the same source has appeared, and been cited in full, previously. For example, if Adam Ulam's Expansion and Coexistence was first cited in Chapter I and is cited again in Chapter III, its first citation in Chapter III appears again in full form and not as "Ulam, op. cit." as it is routinely done. It has been found that this method saves frequent referrals to the Bibliography in search of the complete details of a given source.

INTRODUCTION

1. It has been estimated, for example, that between 3600 BC and 1979, there were approximately 13,600 wars with battle deaths reaching the one thousand million mark; see R.J. Rummel, Understanding Conflict and War, Study on War, Power, Peace, vol. 4 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), p. 15.
2. Quincy Wright, A Study of War, vol. II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 728.
3. See, for example, Julian Lider, On the Nature of War (Farnborough, Hants.: Saxon House, 1979), pp. 5-47.
4. Peter Driver, "Toward an Ethology of Human Conflict: A Review", Journal of Conflict Resolution 11(September 1967): 366. The best-known ethologist is Konrad Lorenz; see Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (London: Methuen, 1966); see also Robert Adrey, African Genesis: A Personal Investigation Into the Animal Origins of Man (New York: Atheneum, 1961); and Clair and W.M.S. Russel, Human Behavior: A New Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961).
5. Two cogent analyses of international relations from the psychological perspective can be found in Otto Klineberg, The Human Dimension in International Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965); and Ross Stagner, Psychological Aspects of International Relations (Belmont, CA: Brooks Cole, 1967).
6. The purported linkage between increased sophistication of states and the outbreak of wars has not gone unchallenged; see, for example, Francis T. Underhill, Jr., "Modernized Societies and the Uses of War" in US, Department of Defense, National Defense University, The Future of Conflict, edited by John J. McIntyre (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press), pp. 1-22.
7. See A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History (New York: Hill & Wang, 1958) and Harold F. Mackinder, "The Round World and the Winning of Peace", Foreign Affairs 21(July 1943): 595-605.
8. Wright, op. cit., vol. I, p. 8 and also pp. 329-56.
9. For example, see a view on military service, nuclear war, and the Catholic conscience in John N. Petrie, "Exodus or Entrenchment: The Catholic Dilemma of Duty", Naval War College Review XXXV(July-August 1982): 69-76.
10. The evolution and revolution in the use of the

scientific method towards scientific discovery has been discussed in the now classic Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

11. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 18.
12. See Simon Ramo, "The Systems Approach" in Ralph F. Miles, Jr., ed., Systems Concepts (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 15.
13. On the history of the RAND Corporation see Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966). On the introduction of systems analysis in the Pentagon and its evolution through the tenure of Secretary Laird see Ralph Sanders, The Politics of Defense Analysis (New York: Dunellen, 1973).
14. See I. R. Hoos, "Systems Approach in Theoretical Perspective" in John Beishon and Geoff Peters, eds., Systems Behaviour, 2nd ed. (London: Harper & Row, 1976), pp. 163-4.
15. Ervin Laszlo, System Science and World Order: Selected Studies (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983), p. 3.
16. See F. E. Kast and J. E. Rosenzweig, "The Modern View: A Systems Approach" in Beishon and Peters, eds., op. cit., p. 15.
17. Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in the International System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), p. 4.
18. Brian Wilson, Systems: Concepts, Methodologies, and Applications (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), p. 20.
19. See R. L. Ackoff, "Systems, Organizations, and Interdisciplinary Research" in Donald P. Eckman, ed., Systems: Research and Design (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1961), p. 28.
20. See Kenyon B. De Greene, "Systems and Psychology" in Beishon and Peters, eds., op. cit., p. 115.
21. See George J. Klir, "General Systems Research" in Michael Ross, ed., Operational Research '72 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1973), p. 191.
22. Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1981), p. 6.

23. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "General Systems Theory--A Critical Review" in Walter Buckley, ed., Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968), p. 13.
24. Robert Lilienfeld, The Rise of Systems Theory: An Ideological Approach (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), p. 103.
25. See Malcom W. Hoag, "An Introduction to Systems Analysis" in Stanford L. Optner, ed., Systems Analysis (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 37.
26. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications (London: Alan Lane The Penguin Press, 1971), p. 37. In other words, "general systems theory is concerned with developing a systematic, theoretical framework for describing general relationships of the empirical world"; ultimately, the goal of general systems theory "...will be a framework [or system of systems] which could tie all disciplines together in a meaningful relationship"; see Richard A. Johnson, Fremont E. Kast, and James E. Rozenzweig, "Systems Theory and Management" in Management Science 10(January 1964): 369.
27. See Ervin Laszlo, Introduction to System Philosophy (London: Gordon and Breach, 1972), p. 6.
28. Kenneth E. Boulding, "General Systems Theory--The Skeleton of Science" in Management Science 2(April 1956): 197-208.
29. Wilson, op. cit., p. 22.
30. Nic J. T. A. Kramer and Jacob de Smit, Systems Thinking: Concepts and Notions (Leiden, Holland: Martinus Nijhoff Social Science Division, 1977), p. 31.
31. See Bertalanffy, General System Theory, op. cit., p. 38.
32. See Kast and Rosenzweig in Beishon and Peters, eds., op. cit., p. 19.
33. Laszlo, Introduction to System Philosophy, op. cit., p. 112.
34. See A. D. Hall and R. E. Fagen, "Definition of System" in Buckley, ed., op. cit., p. 83.
35. Robert M. Krone, Systems Analysis and Policy Science (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1980), p. 14.
36. Ibid.

37. Richard E. Dawson, "Simulation in the Social Science" in Harold Guetzkow, ed., Simulation in the Social Science: Readings (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 3.
38. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
39. See Joseph E. McGrath, Peter G. Nordlie, and W. S. Vaughan, Jr., "A Descriptive Framework for Comparison of System Research Methods" in Optner, ed., op. cit., p. 80.
40. V. Vemuri, Modeling of Complex Systems: An Introduction (New York: Academic Press, 1978), p. 77.
41. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 27-8.
42. See ibid., p. 31 and Checkland, op. cit., p. 169.
43. See D. S. Smyth and P. B. Checkland, "Using a Systems Approach: The Structure of Root Definitions" in Journal of Applied Systems Engineering 5(1) 1976: 78.
44. Oran R. Young, "Anarchy and Social Choice: Reflections on the International Polity", World Politics 30(January 1978): 243 241-63
45. For a now classic analysis of the multipolar model see Karl W. Deutsch and David J. Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", World Politics 16(April 1964): 881-909; and also, Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), pp. 128-36.
46. In fact, a multipolar world has been found to contain "the highest rates of war" and "incidence of war casualties"; see Michael Haas, "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity", American Political Science Review 64(March 1970): 121.
47. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World", Daedalus 93(Summer 1964): 881-909; and Aron, op. cit., pp. 136-46.
48. Such as "bi-multipolarity"; see Richard Rosencrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future", Journal of Conflict Resolution X(September 1966): 341-27.
49. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Measuring Systemic Polarity", ibid., 19(June 1975): 187-216.

CHAPTER I

1. The terms "global" and "international" are used

synonymously to indicate the system which includes all existing state actors plus sub-national entities, such as "liberation" movements, and international organizations such as the United Nations.

2. Rajni Kothari, "Survival in an Age of Transformation" in Burns H. Weston, ed., Toward Nuclear Disarmament and Global Security: A Search for Alternatives (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 638.
3. See for example, the detailed discussion in Stanley Hoffmann, "A World of Complexity" in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 25-43.
4. See, for example, Mikhail Gorbachev's remarks on economic guidelines for the future, delivered on 25 February 1986, in Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress (Moscow: Novosti, 1986), pp. 32-55; and Guidelines for the Economic Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the Period Ending in 2000, Report by Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to the 27th Congress of the CPSU (Moscow: Novosti, 1986). Poor domestic economic performance and shortage of hard currencies have forced the Soviet leaders to think seriously about joining the "capitalist" international monetary order -- the only sure way of expanding trade with the advanced industrial powers of the West; see The Sunday Times, 7 September 1986.
5. "Relationship" in the present context means exchange of something between actors although a number of other meanings have been elaborated in the literature; see the discussion of the term and its classifications in C.R. Mitchell, "World Society as Cobweb: States, Actors and Systemic Processes" in Michael Banks, ed., Conflict in World Society (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1984), pp. 64-72.
6. According to Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 4.
7. See, for example, the discussion in Dina A. Zinnes, "Prerequisites for the Study of System Transformation" in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 3-21.
8. See Anthony de Reuck, "The Logic of Conflict: Its Origin, Development and Resolution" in Michael Banks, ed., op. cit., p. 99. It is interesting to note in

this context that the "logic of conflict", as articulated in democratic systems, has been long associated with various theories of "just war"; for some of the issues involved in this debate see the incisive analysis in John Langan, S.J., "Just War Theory and Decisionmaking in a Democracy", Naval War College Review XXXVIII(July-August 1985): 67-79.

9. See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), pp. 303-12.
10. See John W. Burton, Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1984), p. 6. As far as "change" is concerned, it might be argued that this statement has much greater gravity in the case of authoritarian and totalitarian systems than in the case of democratic ones.
11. The game of secrecy and deception that was waged by the United States during the early atomic years is examined in detail in Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980).
12. The birth of US strategic theory was a phenomenon almost exclusively controlled by civilian experts. As Professor Pipes observed, "Current U.S. strategic theory was... born of a marriage between the scientist and the accountant. The professional soldier was jilted"; see Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War" in Murray and Viotti, eds., op. cit., p. 136.
13. The American strategy of containment, which survived into the 1960s, is a prime example of the confusion nuclear weapons introduced into considerations of national strategy. With the executive branch and Congress unable to define "overall objectives" or to elaborate plans relating nuclear weapons systems with contingencies, the task of shaping America's nuclear policies fell almost exclusively upon the defence agencies. This was the beginning of heavy reliance on nuclear weapons and a defence policy whose cornerstone was "the deterrent effect of a nuclear air strike mounted against the Soviet Union"; see J. W. Moore, "Deterrence, Credibility and American Foreign Policy" in Barrie Newman and Malcolm Dando, eds., Nuclear Deterrence: Implications and Policy Options for the 1980s (Tunbridge Wells, Kent: Castle House Publications Ltd, 1982), p. 54.
14. The Russians did experiment with creating a strategic bomber force similar to that the United States already possessed but, in the end, geography and the lack of a long-range bomber tradition led them to the

- ICBM alternative; see Norman Polmar, Strategic Weapons: An Introduction (New York: Crane Russak, 1982), p. 30.
15. See Thomas W. Wolfe, The Global Strategic Perspective from Moscow, P-4978 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1973), p. 9.
 16. Donald M. Snow, "Strategic Uncertainty and Nuclear Deterrence", Naval War College Review XXXIV(November-December 1981): 28.
 17. Yet, "detente, with all its emotive connotations known to us, does not exist in Soviet usage (or even in Russian)"; see John Erickson, "Detente: Soviet Policy and Purpose", Strategic Review IV(Spring 1976): 40. It would be more accurate to speak of "peaceful coexistence" which again cannot be implemented in conditions of "immobility and stability" for the socialist and capitalist systems "but is accompanied by their continuous competition"; see Evgeny Zhukov, "Soviet Foreign Policy as a Factor of Peace", Social Science (Moscow) IX (1) 1978: 11.
 18. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Arms Control and Defense Planning in Soviet Strategic Policy" in Richard Burt, ed., Arms Control and Defense Postures in the 1980s (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), p. 63. The Soviet view of deterrence is examined in detail in John Erickson, "The Soviet View of Deterrence: A General Survey", photocopy, Defence Studies, University of Edinburgh, n.d.
 19. Melvin R. Laird, "A Strong Start in a Difficult Decade", International Security 10(Fall 1985): 13.
 20. Supporters of the "window of vulnerability" theory stress Soviet advances in guidance systems and warhead payload, and, hence, the Soviet capability to deliver pinpoint blows and destroy insufficiently hardened US silos. The theory's opponents, on the other hand, point out the great technical complexity of the matter -- which presumably makes the supporters' facts and figures rather difficult to check accurately -- and, also, the uncertainty surrounding the performance of Soviet offensive systems (there is a strong possibility that the Soviets will be unable to achieve even a 'near perfect' launch with weapons, and C3 systems, which have never been tested in war). For example, see a discussion of the technical problems surrounding reentry vehicles in Matthew Bunn, "Technology of Ballistic Missile Reentry Vehicles" in Kosta Tsipis and Penny Janeway, eds., Review of U.S. Military Research and Development, 1984 (New York & London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), pp. 67-116.

21. See Jeffrey Richelson, "PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modernization Program", The Journal of Strategic Studies 6(June 1983): 142. The countervailing strategy contains of course many elements from previous strategic programs; its novelty lies in the "codification" of these elements into a formal body of doctrine. For a comparison of the Reagan and Carter strategic policies see Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "A Question of Priorities: A Comparison of the Carter and Reagan Defense Programs", Orbis 27(Fall 1983): 641-66. For a highly critical view of the countervailing strategy see Louis Rene Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: America's Countervailing Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983).
22. See Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought" in Derek Leebaert, ed., Soviet Military Thinking (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p.52.
23. For an excellent study of the Soviet views on surprise in conventional war see P.H. Vigor, Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory (London: Macmillan, 1983).
24. As one analysis observed: "In launching an attack, the Soviets explain, it is important to catch the enemy by surprise so that the attack succeeds in destroying the enemy missiles before they can be launched back in an organized response"; see Joseph D. Douglas, Jr., "What Happens If Deterrence Fails?", Air University Review XXXIV(November-December 1982): 4.
25. See P. H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War Peace and Neutrality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 137. For a Soviet view on the employment of nuclear weapons in the battlefield see US, United States Air Force, The Offensive by A.A. Sidorenko, Moscow, 1970, Translated and Published Under the Auspices of the United States Air Force (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 109-37.
26. See Erickson, op. cit., p. 6.
27. "Soviet military doctrine considers that victory in a modern war can be achieved only by the combined efforts of the armed forces. Despite the decisive role in war of strategic rocket troops, they are not able to assume all the numerous and varied tasks arising during the course of armed combat. From this there arises an objective necessity for the combined application in war of all branches of the armed forces"; see M. Skovorodkin, "Some Questions on Coordination of Branches of Armed Forces in Major Operations", Voyennaya mysl', February 1967 in US, United States Air Force, Selected Readings From

Military Thought, Selected and Compiled by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Vol. 5, Part I (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 141.

28. Stephen M. Millet, "Soviet Perceptions of Nuclear Strategy and Implications for U.S. Deterrence", Air University Review XXXIII(March-April 1982): 54; also Douglas, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
29. Victor Suvorov, Soviet Military Intelligence (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984), p. 140.
30. See D. S. Papp, "Soviet Views of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence in the 1980s" in Newman and Dando, eds., op. cit., p. 77.
31. Such as Marshal Rokossovski in Poland and General Panchevski in Bulgaria; see Malcolm Mackintosh, "Military Considerations in Soviet-East European Relations" in Karen Dawisha and Philip Hanson, eds., Soviet-East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition, and Consent (London: Heinemann, 1981), p. 138.
32. Quoted in Fredo Dannenbring, "East-West Relations: Are There Common NATO Positions?", NATO Review 32(October 1984): 1-2.
33. See Vigor, The Soviet View..., op. cit., p. 46.
34. George Schopflin, "The Political Structure of Eastern Europe as a Factor in Intra-bloc Relations" in Dawisha and Hanson, eds., op. cit., p. 76.
35. Derek Leebaert, "On Reaching Thirty" in Derek Leebaert, ed., European Security: Prospects for the 1980s (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1979), p. 5. However, those who prefer not to overemphasize current antagonisms between Europe and America as threatening NATO's existence (a group I usually call the Survivalists) stress the fact that an alliance of independent nations is never free of controversy concerning essential questions of policy and strategy. Although they acknowledge the intensity of feeling on both sides, the Survivalists emphasize that the intra-NATO disputes revolve around questions of means rather than principles--in other words, that both America and its European allies, although they frequently disagree on ways to accomplish specific tasks, are ultimately committed to the same political ends: defence of the Western democratic system, opposition to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, support of those outside the Western industrialized world equally committed to democratic ideals, and promotion of the free-enterprise economic model of development.

36. Trevor Taylor, European Defence Cooperation, Chatam House Papers 24 (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1984), pp. 4-5.
37. Stephen J. Barrett, "Retreat from a Shared Vision" in Leebaert, ed., op. cit., p. 29.
38. Ernst van der Beugel, "The Atlantic Family -- Managing Its Problems", NATO Review 34(February 1986): 13 (13-18)
39. The current US European troop strength ceiling imposed by Congress is 326,400. This limitation has been criticized by SACEUR General Rogers as the major better-performance constraint hampering US conventional forces in Europe; see United States Information Service, "Rogers Urges End to U.S. Troop Limit in Europe", Official Text of Rogers Senate Testimony, US Embassy, London, 5 March 1985, pp. 9-10.
40. John Erickson, Soviet Military Power (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1971), p. 102.
41. Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influences in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 153.
42. See Erickson, "The Warsaw Pact..." in Hanson, ed., op. cit., p. 151.
43. Pierre Hassner, "American Policy Towards the Soviet Union in the 1980s: Objectives and Uncertainties" in "America's Security in the 1980s", Part II, Adelphi Papers No. 174 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 48.
44. See Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance (London: Frances Pinter, 1978), p. 20.
45. See, for example, Daniel Frei, "Neutrality and Non-Alignment: Convergences and Contrasts", Korea and World Affairs 3(Fall 1979): 275-86; also in the same vein, Hanspeter Neuhold, "Permanent Neutrality and Non-Alignment: Similarities and Differences", India Quarterly 35(July-September 1979): 285-308.
46. The transition of the non-aligned movement from "impartiality" to "advocacy" of a new economic order and its implications are discussed in Timothy M. Shaw, "Political Economy of Non-Alignment: From Dependence to Self-reliance", International Studies 19(July-September 1980): 475-502.
47. See John A. Graham, "The Non-Aligned Movement After the Havana Summit", Journal of International Affairs

34(Spring-Summer 1980): 153-60.

48. Rajenda K. Singh, Politics of the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1974), p. 183.
49. K. P. Misra, "International Politics in the Indian Ocean", Orbis 18(Winter 1975): 1901.
50. See The Bondage of Debt (Moscow: Novosti, 1986), p. 33 and throughout.
51. William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1982), p. 5. Once a country decides to embark on a nuclear research and development program, it chooses to develop a technical and scientific infrastructure which, with necessary modifications, can produce nuclear weapons, albeit at great cost and scientific/technological inputs that might not be available without external assistance.
52. For a concise discussion of the technology and economics of nuclear power see Potter, op. cit., pp. 59-130.
53. The state of being a "pariah" is discussed in detail in Robert E. Harkavy, "The Pariah State Syndrome", Orbis 21(Fall 1977): 623-50.
54. Indeed, if the reporting by the Insight Team of The Sunday Times is to be believed, Israel has been a full-fledged nuclear power with weapons assembled and ready for delivery for at least a decade; see The Sunday Times, 5 October 1986.
55. For an analysis of the NPT see for example, Jozef Goldblat, "Discussion and Recommendations" in Jozef Goldblat, ed., Non-proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), pp. 3-38.
56. See Ashok Kapur, International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and Regional Aspects (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 42.
57. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better", Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981) particularly pp.21-3.
58. Taiwan may also choose to pursue a nuclear weapons program as a method of restoring its international status which has suffered severely after its expulsion from the United Nations and the Sino-American rapprochement. But there are also strong disincentives for such a program; see the discussion in George H. Quester, "Taiwan" in Goldblat, ed., op. cit., pp. 227-234.

59. Despite the veritable deluge of facts and figures, however, truly accurate data about arms transfers is difficult to obtain; see Michael Brzoska, "Arms Transfers Data Sources", Journal of Conflict Resolution 26(March 1982): 77-108.
60. Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 3. Emphasis in the original; also, Andrew J. Pierre, "Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy", Foreign Affairs 60(Winter 1981-82): 266-86; and Signe Candgren-Backstrom, "Global Arms Trade: Scope, Impact, Restraining Action", Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13(3) 1982: 201-10.
61. Smaller producers are as eager to export as larger ones. Development of the industrial capacity to produce arms requires significant capital investment which could be impossible without export revenue. Given the capital-intensive nature of the arms production cycle, local defence production could eventually create more serious financial problems than those it purports to alleviate; see Thomas Ohlson, "Third World Arms Exporters-A New Facet of the Global Arms Race", *ibid.*, pp. 211-20.
62. See James Everett Katz, "Understanding Arms Production in Developing Countries" in James Everett Katz, ed., Arms Production in Developing Countries (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 3-4.
63. See, for example, Raimo Vayrynen, "Economic and Political Consequences of Arms Transfers to the Third World", Alternatives 6(March 1980): 131-55; and Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf, "The Economic Consequences of the Transfer of Military-oriented Technology" in Mary Kaldor and Asbjorn Eide, eds., The World Military Order (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 210-31.
64. Michael Moodie, "Arms Transfers and Future Conflict" in William J. Taylor, Jr. and Steven A. Maaranen, eds., The Future of Conflict in the 1980s (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982), p. 66; and William P. Avery and Louis A. Picard, "Pull Factors in the Transfer of Conventional Armaments to Africa", Journal of Political and Military Sociology 8(Spring 1980): 55-70.
65. See Onkar Marwah, "Arms for the Poor: A Critique of Approaches to the Study of Third World Militarization", paper prepared for the 25th Anniversary Pagwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Warsaw, Poland, 26-31 August 1982, p. 1. For a critique of macrostatistical methods based on relating percentages of Gross National Product spending on defence with socioeconomic development see for example, Stephanie Neuman, "Security,

Military Expenditures, and Socioeconomic Development: Reflections on Iran", Orbis 22(Fall 1978): 569-94.

66. Steve Chan, "The Impact of Defense Spending on Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and Problems", Orbis 29(Summer 1985): 433.
67. See Pierre, op. cit., p. 37. In fact, the outright theft of foreign development aid, widely practiced by Third World dictators and government elites, is a far greater threat to the economic stability and viability of many LDCs; see the relevant analysis in The Observer, 28 September 1986.
68. Anthony H. Cordesman, "US and Soviet Competition in Arms Exports and Military Assistance", Armed Forces Journal International, 118(August 1981): 65.
69. Pierre, op. cit. p. 79. Between 1973 and 1980, the Soviet Union led all major suppliers in quantities delivered to the Third World in almost every category of major weapon systems; see US, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy: Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 25 September 1981, Table 3, p. 16.
70. See, for example, Richard J. Kessler, "Energy-Resource Competition as a Source of Conflict" in Taylor and Maaranen, eds., op. cit., pp. 29-41.
71. See Werner Kaltefleiter, "The Resource War: The Need for Western Strategy", Comparative Strategy 4(1) 1983: 31-49; and Albert Wohlstetter, "Meeting the Threat in the Persian Gulf", Survey 25(Spring 1980):128-88.
72. See Alvin J. Cottrell, "The Political-Military Balance in the Persian Gulf Region" in Joseph S. Szyliowicz and Bard E. O'Neill, eds., The Energy Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 135-6.
73. Peter Dorner and Mahmoud A. El-Shafie, "Natural Resource Issues in Economic Development: The International Setting" in Peter Dorner and Mahmoud A. El-Shafie, eds., Resources and Development (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 25.
74. See Edward S. Mason, "Resources in the Past and for the Future" in Charles J. Hitch, ed., Resources for an Uncertain Future (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 13.

75. "The Global Possible: Resources, Development, and the New Century" in Robert Repetto, ed., The Global Possible (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 493.
76. Los Angeles Times, 28 October 1983.
77. See, for example, Christopher Lamb, "The Nature of Proxy Warfare" in Taylor and Maaranen, eds., op. cit., pp. 169-94.
78. See Yonah Alexander, "Introduction" in Yonah Alexander, ed., International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. xvii.
79. As Senator Durenberger, Chairman of the US Senate Intelligence Committee, observed shortly after the Libyan raid, the "irrefutable evidence" about Libya's culpability was derived from intelligence reports distributed to only a small number of top policy makers with the public and the press having "no independent means of confirming the accuracy of those reports or whether they were subject to other interpretations"; this fact, according to the Senator, constituted "a historic change in the circumstances under which the United States commits its armed forces to combat" and "a considerable political risk" for the President who was unable to fully explain the reasons behind his "dramatic policy initiative" to the American people; see Los Angeles Times, 18 April 1986.
80. Not to mention of course deaths on a grand scale; see Yonah Alexander, "Technological and Strategic Aspects of Terrorism" in Taylor and Maaranen, eds., op. cit. p. 137.
81. See Brian M. Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear", Orbis, 29(Fall 1985): 510
82. It was recently reported, for example, that several US facilities that produce parts for nuclear weapons were found to be vulnerable to "theft or sabotage by a small group of armed terrorists who, by using a small truck, could drive through chain-link fences and bypass sentries"; see The Wall Street Journal, 31 October 1983. In this context of terrorist attacks against sensitive facilities, see also Christopher C. Joyner, "Offshore Maritime Terrorism: International Implications and the Legal Response", Naval War College Review XXXVI(July-August 1983): 16-31 but especially pp. 17-9.
83. Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), pp. 217-8.

84. See John J. McIntyre, "The Prospects for Conflict [1980-2000]" in US, Department of Defense, National Defense University, The Future of Conflict, edited by John J. McIntyre (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1979), pp. 41-6.
85. See Henry A. Kissinger, "The Future of NATO" in Murray and Viotti, eds., op. cit., p. 122.
86. See, for example, Barry J. Smernoff, "The New Faces of Conflict: Some Implications of the Military Innovation Process for 1980-2000" in McIntyre, ed., op. cit., pp. 89-116.

CHAPTER II

1. See Richard Smoke, "Extended Deterrence: Some Observations", Naval War College Review XXXVI(September-October 1983): 37-48.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 3.
3. Bernard Brodie, Strategy and National Interest: Reflections for the Future (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1971), p. 5.
4. See John Van Oudenaren, U.S. Leadership Perceptions of the Soviet Problem Since 1945, R-2843-NA (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1982).
5. Ibid., p. 10. Those who today advocate "de-coupling" of regional conflicts from the US-Soviet competition would certainly recognize many familiar arguments in this area of "termination by accommodation".
6. Ibid., pp. 27-8.
7. Ibid., pp. 43-4.
8. For an incisive analysis of how these intellectual "casts" were actually shaped during the four decades since the end of the Second World War see Allan C. Carlson, "Foreign Policy, 'The American Way,' and the Passing of the Post-War Consensus", This World, no. 5 (Spring-Summer 1983): 18-54.
9. Ernst B. Haas, "On Hedging Our Bets: Selective Engagement with the Soviet Union" in Aaron Wildavsky, ed., Beyond Containment (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1983), p. 105.
10. See James N. Rosenau, "Fragmentative Challenges to National Security" in US, Department of Defense, National Defense University, Understanding U.S.

- Strategy: A Reader, edited by Terry L. Heyns (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1983), p. 66.
11. Donald E. Nuechterlein, "National Interests and National Strategy: The Need for Priority" in *ibid.*, p. 36.
 12. See US, International Communication Agency, "An Address by U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig to the American Society of Newspaper Editors", Official Text, US Embassy, London, 27 April 1981, p. 3.
 13. Which, in fact, became flooded with "dilettantism and superficiality as more and more experts manques weighed in with barely disguised opinion pieces advocating one or another interpretation of the evolving Soviet 'threat'; see, Benjamin S. Lambeth, The State of Western Research on Soviet Military Strategy and Policy, N-2230-AF (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1984), p. 11.
 14. V.I. Lenin, "Report on War and Peace" in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Lenin Anthology (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), p. 542.
 15. See V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank, Marxism and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 7-8; the introduction to this work (pp. 1-24) provides an excellent overview of the topic which is followed by a comprehensive and incisive analysis.
 16. The "prepackaged" idea is of course rejected by Soviet theoreticians. Although, it is admitted, Marxism-Leninism is not an "'open sesame' for the solution of all problems", it nevertheless remains "the firmest and most extensive scientific foundation for the use of the most up-to-date devices of qualitative and quantitative analysis of [international] relations in historical and forecasting researches"; see Alexei Narochitsky, "Lenin and International Relations", Social Sciences (Moscow) VIII(1) 1977: 32.
 17. David B. Rivkin, "Moscow's View of the 'New US Threat'", Military Review LXIII(February 1983): 46.
 18. John Erickson, "The Shaping of Soviet Global Strategy", photocopy, University of Edinburgh, Defence Studies, n.d., p. 5.
 19. See Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1953), p. 399.
 20. See Joseph L. Noguee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 34.

21. Stalin's formula, however, called for a delaying policy to avoid war for as long as possible and until the USSR had built a strong industrial and military base; see Thomas W. Wolfe, Communist Outlook on War, P-3640 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1967), p.15.
22. Helmut Dahm, "The Function and Efficacy of Ideology", Studies in Soviet Thought 21(1980): 111; see also the discussion of ideology as a major determinant of Soviet perceptions of international politics in Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Challenge of Soviet Foreign Policy: Revolution or Expansion" in Vernon V. Aspaturian, ed., Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 194-202.
23. Erickson, op. cit., p. 3; see also the discussion of the concept in John Erickson, "Soviet Ideology: Concepts, Commitments and Preferences", photocopy, University of Edinburgh, Defence Studies, n.d.
24. F. Petrenko and V. Popov, Soviet Foreign Policy: Objectives and Principles (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), p. 149-50.
25. Pavel Zhilin and Pavel Sevostyanov, eds., Recalling the Past for the Sake of the Future: The Causes, Results and Lessons of World War Two (Moscow: Novosti, 1985), p. 120.
26. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 610.
27. Declaration of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969 quoted in Petrenko and Popov, op. cit., p. 152.
28. A.A. Gromyko and B.N. Ponomarev, eds., Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1945, vol. II (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), p. 413.
29. See Anat. Gromyko and A. Kokoshin, "US Foreign Policy Strategy for the 1970s", International Affairs (Moscow) Part 10 (October 1973): 72.
30. Vladimir Petrov, "New Dimensions of Soviet Foreign Policy" in US, Department of Defense, National Defense University, Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for US Policymakers, edited by Franklin D. Margiotta (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1980), p. 18.
31. See "Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in the Field of Home and Foreign Policy, Delivered at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Excerpt)" in

- Leonid I. Brezhnev, Peace, Detente, Cooperation (New York: Consultants Bureau, 1981), p. 12.
32. See Vadim Zagladin and Ivan Frolov, "The Global Problems of Our Times", Social Sciences (Moscow), VIII(4) 1977: 68.
 33. Georgi Arbatov, "US Foreign Policy at the Onset of the 1980s" in N.N. Inozemtsev, ed., Peace and Disarmament (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), p. 65.
 34. Konstantin Likutov, Soviet Foreign Policy: Questions and Answers (Moscow: Novosti, 1985), p. 11.
 35. "Mikhail Gorbachev's Answers to Questions Put by l'Humanite" (Moscow: Novosti, 1986), pp. 21-2.
 36. Erickson, "The Shaping of Soviet Global Strategy", op. cit., p. 5.
 37. Morton Schwartz, Soviet Perceptions of the United States (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), p. 150.
 38. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 11.
 39. Gregory D. Foster, "On Selective Intervention", Strategic Review, XI(Fall 1983): 49.
 40. Ibid., p. 50.
 41. Blechman and Kaplan, op. cit., Appendix A, pp. 547-53.
 42. Ibid., p. 64.
 43. Herbert K. Tillema, Appeal to Force (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1973), pp. 16-20.
 44. Ibid., p. 14.
 45. Robert P. Haffa, Jr., The Half War: Planning U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960-1983 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 26-7.
 46. The specific charges against massive retaliation which these scholars advanced in various publications are lucidly reviewed in Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1982), pp. 50-6.
 47. Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 26.

48. William W. Kaufmann, Planning Conventional Forces, 1950-80 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 4-5.
49. Haffa, op. cit., p. 33.
50. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 8.
51. Haffa, op. cit., p. 33.
52. Gray, op. cit., p. 135.
53. Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 36.
54. Kevin N. Lewis, Reorganizing U.S. Defense Planning To Deal With New Contingencies, P-6799 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1982), p. 10.
55. New York Times, 24 January 1980.
56. See US, Department of the Army, Headquarters, Field Manual (FM) No. 100-20: Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 14.
57. James A. Bowden, "The RDJTF and Doctrine", Military Review, 11(November 1982): 52.
58. US, International Communication Agency, "Establishing America's New Rapid Deployment Force: Opening Remarks by US Defense Secretary Harold Brown at a Press Conference at McDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida", Official Text, US Embassy, London, 28 December 1979. Early RDF plans called for the acquisition of 20 ships at a reported cost of almost \$2 billion and the "initiation of a \$7 billion to \$12 billion program to develop and deploy a fleet of cargo aircraft with an outsize load-carrying capability..."; see US, Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The Marine Corps in the 1980's: Prestocking Proposals, the Rapid Deployment Force, and Other Issues, Budget Issue Paper for Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 41.
59. See, for example, Jeffrey Record, "The Western Alliance, Japan, and International Security Threats" in US, Department of Defense, National Defense University, Rethinking US Security Policy For the 1980s (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1980), pp. 67-85 and particularly pp. 68-74.;
60. However, even concentration on a single theater did not quell sceptical remarks from the US military concerned with the lack of adequate long-range mobility assets; see, for example, the statement by

Vice Adm. Kent J. Carroll, Director of Logistics, Joint Staff in US, Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 2970 before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Department of Defense, Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, 97th Congress, 1st session, 1981, pp. 248-51.

61. See Maxwell Orme Johnson, The Military as An Instrument of US Policy in Southwest Asia: The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1979-1982 (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1983), p. 112.
62. See US, Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1982, An Overview by General David C. Jones (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 6. The vital zones, as defined by General Jones, are the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, Northeast Asia, and Southwest Asia.
63. US, Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 194.
64. See, for example, Thomas A. Fabyanic, "Conceptual Planning and the Rapid Deployment Task Force", Armed Forces and Society, 7(Spring 1981): 343-65; Geoffrey Kemp, "Contingency Planning and Persian Gulf Options", in US, Department of Defense, National Defense University, Continuity and Change in the Eighties and Beyond (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1979), pp. 61-76; and Jeffrey Record, The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1983).
65. The mobilization issue has received scant attention in recent years and it thus forms one of the weakest links in the conceptual, as well as operational, preparation for rapid deployment and "small wars" on the periphery; for an analysis of the problems and requirements of mobilization for low intensity conflict see Gregory D. Foster and Karen A. McPherson, "Mobilization for Low Intensity Conflict", Naval War College Review, XXXVII(May-June 1985): 49-64.
66. Kenneth N. Waltz, "A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force", International Security, 5(Spring 1981): 57-9.
67. See William O. Stauenmaier and Alan N. Sabrosky, "A Strategy of Counterrevolutionary War", Military Review, LXV(February 1985): 11.
68. Victor H. Krulak, "The Rapid Deployment Force:

- Criteria and Imperatives", Strategic Review, VIII(Spring 1980): 40. For a detailed discussion of the Iran scenario see Joshua M. Epstein, "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent", International Security, 6(Fall 1981): 126-80.
69. See, for example, US, Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1985 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 173-84; and, US, Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1986 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 193-204.
 70. Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare", Parameters, XIII(December 1983): 13 11-8.
 71. US, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Soviet Policy and United States Response in the Third World, Report Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 14-9.
 72. Uri Ra'anan, "The USSR and the Third World: Conceptual Overview, Strategy, and Tactics" in Uri Ra'anan, Francis Fukuyama, Mark Falcoff, Sam C. Sarkesian, and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes: Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and U.S. Policy, Special Report by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), p. 3.
 73. See the quotation by Professor Potekhin, "leading Soviet Africanist", in Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, "The Soviet Union and Africa" in Roger E. Kanet, ed., The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 53.
 74. For a study of this early Sino-Soviet rivalry in the underdeveloped world see Donald S. Zagoria, "Sino-Soviet Friction in Underdeveloped Areas", Problems of Communism X(March-April 1961): 1-13.
 75. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Soviet Union and International Communism" in Aspaturian, ed., op. cit., p. 727.
 76. Y. Marin, "Soviet Policy in Africa", Bulletin Institute for the Study of the USSR, XI(June 1964): 20.
 77. Roger E. Kanet, "Soviet Attitudes Since Stalin" in Kanet, ed., op. cit., p. 32. The early Soviet experiences in Africa were indicative of the lack of research into the history and politics of the "natives"; see, for example, Lazar Pistrak, "Soviet

78. Alexiev, op. cit., p. 11.
79. Petrenko and Popov, op. cit., p. 151.
80. Although most developing countries still retained capitalist systems, a ripe but untapped revolutionary potential existed in the suppression of the "disorganised" masses by the ruling minority classes who imposed their preference for the "capitalist perspective"; see Rachik Avakov, Kiva Maidanik, and Tatyana Pokatayeva, "Possibilities and Limits of Capitalism in the Third World", Social Sciences (Moscow), 6(4) 1975: 163. Also, for a discussion of the concept of the "socialist community" see M. Senin, "The Socialist Community of Nations: A New-Type International Alliance", International Affairs (Moscow), Part 11 (1978): 10-18.
81. "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Excerpt)" in Brezhnev, op. cit., p. 7.
82. Otto Pick, "Introduction: Political and Ideological Aspects" in E.J. Feuchtwanger and Peter Nailor, eds., The Soviet Union and the Third World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 5.
83. The "milestone" documents being "the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the first article in the 1966 International Covenants on Human Rights, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law, and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of August 1, 1975"; see G. Tunkin, "Constitutional Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy", International Affairs (Moscow), Part 4 (1978): 9.
84. Gromyko and Ponomarev, eds., op. cit., p. 491.
85. Petrenko and Popov, op. cit., p. 160.
86. G. Kim, "Neo-colonialism's Ideological Expansion", International Affairs (Moscow), Part 11 (1978): 77.
87. Andrei Gromyko, Capital Promotes Imperialist Expansion (Moscow: Novosti, 1984), pp. 180-91. "Aid" money, flowing into the coffers of corrupt "reactionary" elites, aggravates the "demonstration effect" which plagues most poorer societies--i.e. the expenditure of scarce capital in acquiring luxury nonessentials. This practice "diverts the already meagre resources... from productive utilization or reduces consumption of necessities, which find

- expression first and foremost in a poorer food ration"; see Anatoly Elyanov, "The Scientific and Technological Revolution and Socio-Economic Problems of the Developing Countries", Social Sciences (Moscow), 4(2) 1973: 138.
88. John J. Stremlau, "The Foreign Policies of Developing Countries in the 1980s" in John J. Stremlau, ed., The Foreign Policy Priorities of Third World States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1982), p. 14. In a related context see the detailed study by Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy, Security Policies of Developing Countries (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982).
 89. The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A New Edition, Approved by the 27th Congress of the CPSU on March 1, 1986 (Moscow: Novosti, 1986), p. 70.
 90. Ibid., p. 71.
 91. Alexiev, op. cit., p. 16.
 92. Francis Fukuyama, The Military Dimension of Soviet Policy in the Third World (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1984), p. 3.
 93. "Rimland" is of course a relative term. "Rimlands" contract or expand according to the strategic outlook and security "threats" perceived at a given time. In the case of the USSR, the immediate post-1945 critical rimland included Eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent, the Middle East-Southwest Asia crescent.
 94. Wolfe, op. cit., p. 23.
 95. V. Larionov, "The Doctrine of 'Flexible' Aggression", International Affairs (Moscow), Part 7(July 1963): 47. The conclusion was that, "Politically, this doctrine is not a new military policy of imperialism... but only a 'change of battle order' which no longer corresponds to the new relation of forces between the capitalist and the Socialist world" (p. 51).
 96. V. Pechorkin, "The Theory and Practice of Counter-Guerrilla Warfare", ibid., Part 10(October 1963): 29.
 97. Chronologically, the major shift towards dispatch of both substantial amounts of weapons and numbers of military advisers in Third World countries occurred in 1969-70, during the War of Attrition in the Middle East; see Bruce D. Porter, "The USSR in Third World Conflicts" in US, United States Air Force, The Soviet

- Union: What Lies Ahead?, Studies in Communist Affairs, vol. 6, edited by Kenneth M. Currie and Gregory Varhall (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 225.
98. Mark N. Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 37.
 99. See Y. Oleshchuk, "'Small Wars' and the Aggression in Viet-Nam", International Affairs (Moscow), Part 5(May 1966): 36.
 100. Katz, op. cit., p. 39.
 101. V. Zemskov, "Wars of the Modern Era", Voyennaya mysl', no. 5 (May 1969) in US, United States Air Force, Selected Readings from Military Thought 1963-1973, selected and compiled by Joseph D. Douglas, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber, vol. 5, Part II (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 37.
 102. G. Malinovsky, "Local Wars in the Zone of a National Liberation Movement", Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (May 1974) in Joint Publications Research Service, no. 62522, p. 73 (henceforth referred to as JPRS).
 103. B. Teplinsky, "Some Aspects of US Global Strategy", International Affairs (Moscow), Part 5(May 1970): 75 70-75; in a related context see also, M.V. Vetrov, "Problems of War and Peace and the World Revolutionary Process", Voyennaya mysl', No. 8 (August 1971) in Selected Readings..., op. cit., pp. 109-20.
 104. Katz, op. cit., p. 69 (emphasis added).
 105. W. Scott Thompson, The Projection of Soviet Power, P-5988 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1977), p. 17.
 106. Soviet Policy and United States Response..., op. cit., pp. 65-7.
 107. Katz, op. cit., p. 115. The role of Cuba as a Soviet surrogate is further examined by the same author in Mark N. Katz, "The Soviet-Cuban Connection", International Security 8(Summer 1983): 88-112.
 108. A.A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State: A Soviet View, Moscow, 1975, trans. by the United States Air Force (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, n.d.), p. 278.
 109. Ye. Dolgoplov, "Exposing Bourgeois and Maoist Falsifiers of the History of Local Wars", Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 6 (June 1980) in JPRS No. 76504, p. 80. For a useful "checklist" and discussion of the national liberation movements

currently recognized by the USSR see Wallace Spaulding, "Checklist of the 'National Liberation Movement'", Problems of Communism XXXI(March-April 1982): 77-82.

110. Konstantin A. Vorob'yev, "Development of the External Function of the Army of the Soviet State of the Entire People at the Present Stage" in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, eds., The Soviet Art of War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 255-6 (emphasis in the original). The reasons for "defending" worldwide appeared all the more compelling since Washington was determined to spread "NATO influence far beyond the framework which was officially designed", and "to include virtually the entire non-colonialist world in NATO's zone of influence"; see A. Migolat'yev, "The Aggressive Essence of Imperialist Bloc Policy", Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 8 (April 1980) in JPRS No. 76226, p. 23.
111. Katz, op. cit., pp. 152-3.
112. Keith Payne, "Are They Interested in Stability? The Soviet View of Intervention", Comparative Strategy 3(1) 1981: 20.

CHAPTER III

1. In fact, the finer theoretical delimitations between "military intervention" and all-out "war" remain relatively murky, especially when one examines the vehement arguments, offered by smaller states, against great power military coercion tactics. Considering the uses of military force in war as opposed to those in peacetime may form a useful departure point for a more orderly discussion of these theoretical differences; see, for example, Julian Lider, Military Theory: Concept, Structure, Problems (Aldershot, Hants: Gower, 1983), pp. 41-57.
2. It can be argued that competition in "marginal areas" of the world will be further intensified by the progressive "negation of the political-military utility of strategic and theater nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union" paving the way for conventional lower-level conflicts; see William J. Taylor, Jr. and Steven A. Maaranen, "Introduction" in William J. Taylor, Jr and Steven A. Maaranen, eds., The Future of Conflict in the 1980s (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982), p. 3.
3. The complexity of the issues involved in the study of "interventionary" activities can be easily demonstrated. Consider, for example, the involvement

of external actors in situations of civil strife. As Mitchell has shown, a "single conflict situation" can be in fact a multi-level phenomenon where internal and external parties interact in "a complex of overlapping conflicts and divisions of interest"; see C. R. Mitchell, "Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties" in International Studies Quarterly 14(June 1970): 167. Here, the question of "linkages" occupies the center of the analysis producing various, but rather cyclical, classifications and models; see *ibid.*, pp. 184-90. See also G.L. Van Tassell, "Intervention in International Politics: A Conceptual Model", Georgia Political Science Association Journal 2(Spring 1974): 51-71.

4. See Andrew M. Scott, "Nonintervention and Conditional Intervention", Journal of International Affairs 22(2, 1968): 209. Nonintervention is also frequently challenged when the protection of human rights is at stake (witness the pressures for 'sanctions' against South Africa). For a relevant discussion see Coronwy J. Jones, "The Principles of Non-intervention in the Internal Affairs of States, With Special Reference to the Implementation of Human Rights", International Relations (London) 5(November 1977): 154-161; and also, Gerard Elfstrom, "On Dilemmas of Intervention", Ethics 93(July 1983): 709-725.
5. See statement by Jose Maria Ruda, representative for Argentina, in "Status of the Implementation of the Declaration of Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty", International Organization XXI(Spring 1967): 368; see also opinion by Roger Seydoux of France in *ibid.*, p. 370.
6. See Stanley Hoffmann, "The Problem of Intervention" in Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 7.
7. See Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975), p. 2.
8. See James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept", Journal of Conflict Resolution 13(March 1969): 150.
9. However, this is a statement broad enough to include actions from guerrilla war to the use of the H-bomb; see Ellen P. Stern, "Prologue" in Ellen P. Stern, ed., The Limits of Military Intervention (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 9.
10. Rosenau, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

11. Ibid., p. 167.
12. See Oran R. Young, "Intervention and International Systems", Journal of International Affairs 22(2, 1968): 178.
13. See James T. Tedeschi, Thomas V. Brown, and Robert Brown, "A Paradigm for the Study of Coercive Power", Journal of Conflict Resolution XV(2, 1971): 198.
14. Ruda in "Status of the Implementation of the Declaration....", op. cit., p. 368.
15. See Thomas W. Robinson, Systems Theory and the Communist Orbit, P-3812 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1968). Robinson's main aim was to determine the "usefulness of systems theory as a tool" in the study of the communist system of states. In order to achieve this, he describes the characteristics of the "communist camp" in terms borrowed from systems theory.
16. These "firm simplicities" form a necessary introduction to a complicated topic about which little concrete theory exists; see Robin Williams, "Resolving and Restricting International Conflict", Armed Forces and Society 7(Spring 1981): 370.
17. See Oran Young, "A Survey of General Systems Theory", General Systems, 9 (1964), pp. 61-80.
18. Stephanie S. Robbins and Terence A. Oliva, "The Empirical Identification of Fiftyone Core General Systems Theory Vocabulary Components", *ibid.*, XXVIII(1983-84): 67-76.
19. See Christopher Chase-Dunn, "The Kernel of the Capitalist World Economy: Three Approaches" in William R. Thompson, ed., Contending Approaches to World System Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983), p. 71.
20. The "split personality" of many states has decisive influence upon their perceptions of national security in general and of outside intervention in particular. The problems associated with "national security and the nature of the state" are thoroughly examined in Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), pp. 36-72.
21. This distinction belongs to Little, op. cit., p. 6. A "bifurcated" target can also be subject to intervention by "allied" intruders rallying to support the same party in the internal conflict; see,

- for example, Bertil Duner, "The Intervener: Lone Wolf or...? Co-operation Between Interveners in Civil Wars", Co-operation and Conflict 18(3)1983:197-213.
22. Examples of intervention systems can be the Vietnam-United States system ('bifurcated' target and intruder), the Syria-Lebanon system (intruder and 'fragmented' target), the Soviet Union-Afghanistan system (intruder and again 'bifurcated' target) and so on.
 23. A useful beginning for constructing intervention system environments might be Robert Jervis' "four-world" model. Jervis describes each "world" in terms of perceptions which individual actors have regarding the amounts of "security" available to them. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma". World Politics 30(January 1978): 167-214, especially pp. 211-14.
 24. Intervention opportunities increase relative to the disparities in power distribution and the structure of the international system (polarity); see Young, op. cit., pp. 180-81; see also Jeffrey A. Hart, "Power and Polarity in the International System" in Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed., Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 25-40.
 25. In turn, unrealistic expectations can easily create the conditions for unnecessary escalation decisions; see Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 271.
 26. Avoiding negative control is a paramount concern for policymakers. Ideally, intervention is prompted by the desire to preempt a situation which policymakers believe will force them to react to an adversary's initiative. In this light, controlling the environment as a whole to one's favour is seen as preferable to being forced into a particular defensive position. As one recent analysis put it: "...the primary problem confronting statesmen is no longer so much that of defending their nations' particular, objective interests as it is the challenge of preserving and enhancing those interests by shaping the international environment itself--both the physical environment and the politico-moral environment"; see Alan K. Henrikson, "The Emanation of Power", International Security 6(Summer 1981): 154.
 27. In an escalation model, for example, a feedback loop "allows reexamination of earlier decisions about strategy, objectives, and escalation guidance" in order to give policymakers the opportunity to revise

- their plans; but it is also recognized that "treatment of feedback is complex in rule-based systems, especially when one attempts to send information back"; see Paul K. Davis and Peter J.E. Stan, Concepts and Models of Escalation, R-3235 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1984), pp.41-2.
28. Complications arise, however, because of the tendency of policymakers to take interventionary steps, and define goals, according to perceived "national interests" and largely ignore the strategic analysis of a given situation--an approach which guarantees neither sound goal definition nor long-term stability of the system; see Rosenau, op. cit., pp. 156-59.
 29. Such efforts by the target are often boosted by the intruder's omission to word his commitments "ambiguously" and thus avoid foreclosing "future options when it may be desired to... contract a commitment"; see Little, op. cit., p. 156.
 30. See Klaus Knorr, "Is International Coercion Waning or Rising?", International Security 1(Spring 1977): 99.
 31. See Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leis, Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970s (London: Allan Lane the Penguin Press, 1970), p. 282.
 32. Therefore, "to the extent that all involved parties are nation-states, wars are resultants of attempts by one to use particular means for influencing another, resisting nation" (emphasis in the original); see Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, "Conceptualizing War: Consequences for Theory and Research", Journal of Conflict Resolution 27(March 1983): 140-41.
 33. See Frederic S. Pearson, "Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention", Journal of Conflict Resolution 18(September 1974): 435
 34. See Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most, "Patterns of Conflict: Quantitative Analysis and the Comparative Lessons of Third World Wars", note 6 in Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, eds., The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Volume I (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), p. 51.
 35. For a concise discussion of the approaches to the study of war see Julian Lider, On the Nature of War (Farnborough, Hants.: Saxon House, 1979), pp. 5-47; see also the now classic Kenneth N. Waltz, The Man, State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); and Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (London: MacMillan, 1973).
 36. See David W. Tarr, "The Strategic Environment, U.S.

National Security, and the Nature of Low Intensity Conflict" in Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., Nonnuclear Conflicts in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 41. As another analyst points out however, the term "low intensity conflict" is indeed inaccurate because, "From the point of view of the average company commander in Vietnam, there was nothing low in intensity about the conflict, and the heavy casualty rates of the war's peak period compare with those of some World War II battles... The term 'low-intensity warfare' suggests conflicts which can be handled by a few thousand specialists: the reality is that such wars may require the services of tens or even hundreds of thousands of combat and support troops"; see Eliot A. Cohen, "Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars", International Security 9(Fall 1984): 153.

37. See Neil Macfarlane, "Intervention and Regional Security", Adelphi Papers No. 196 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1985), p. 2.
38. See Klaus Knorr, Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 3.
39. A classic analysis of national power according to the realist paradigm can be found in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Third Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), pp. 110-63. The relevant literature on the concept of national power is discussed in John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 54-64.
40. See, for example, Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 19-60.
41. See Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?", International Security 4(Spring 1980): 27.
42. See John R. Rickett, "Airlift and Military Intervention" in Stern, ed., op. cit., p. 137.
43. This point has been explicitly stated, for example, by US Air Force commanders; see US, Department of the Air Force, Air Force Report: Report to the 96th Congress, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 17.
44. Rickett in Stern, ed., op. cit., p. 143.
45. See Michael Vlahos, "Strategy and Status of Sealift", Journal of Defence and Diplomacy, March 1984, p. 18.

46. The loading/unloading of such heavy cargo at terminal areas lacking suitable port facilities has traditionally been the main difficulty of sealift. However, this obstacle may soon be a thing of the past thanks to the development of prefabricated floating facilities such as Flexiport. Flexiport "uses large floating barges to form almost any offshore loading and unloading system... The beauty of the Flexiport concept is that it can be tailored to meet just about any requirement... The barges can also carry workshops, communication centres, hospitals and even accommodation for personnel"; see Terry J. Gander, "Flexiport--the Military Port of the Future", Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 December 1985, p. 1414.
47. For a cogent discussion of some of the problems related to logistical support under intense combat conditions see Bloomer D. Sullivan, "Logistical Support for the Air Land Battle", Military Review LXIV(February 1984): 2-16.
48. See Jeffrey Record, The Rapid Deployment Force and US Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1983), pp. 47-9.
49. See World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1981 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1981), p. 71. However, the transfer of major weapons systems to Third World countries began to decline after 1980 mainly due to tightening budgets caused by world recession; see Thomas Ohlson and Michael Brzoska, "The Trade in Major Conventional Weapons" in World Armament and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, 1984 (London & Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis, 1984), pp. 175-76.
50. See Ruprecht Haasler and Hans Goebel, "Uneasiness About Technological Progress in the Armed Forces", Military Review LXII(October 1982): 66.
51. Such experiments have led, for example, in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) employing the UH60 Black Hawk helicopter as a main weapons and air mobility platform; in a recent successful exercise the 101st, essentially a light infantry force, engaged armoured forces in a desert environment; see James E. Thompson, "Heavy-Light Operations in the Desert", Military Review LXV(May 1985): 53-62; in a related context see also W. Bruce Moore and Glenn M. Harned, "Air Assault in the Desert: How To Fight", Military Review LXV(January 1985): 43-60.
52. See, for example, Frank Barnaby, "Microelectronics and War" in John Tirman, ed., The Militarization of

High Technology (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984), pp. 45-61.

53. The procurement of computers for military uses has been boosted tremendously in recent years by decreasing costs and manifold increases in computing power. In one illustrative case, the price of a new range of Ferranti military computers "has fallen by a factor of 1,000" while its "power-price ratio has increased by a factor of 100"; see "Military Computing Equipment", Defence Materiel 8(November/December 1983): 193.
54. See Davis B. Bobrow, "Communications, Command, and Control: The Nerves of Intervention" in Stern, ed., op. cit., p. 105.
55. See Bernard Blake, "EASAMS: Wide Involvement in the 3I Systems Field", Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 April 1986, p. 622.

CHAPTER IV

1. Troop contributions came from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Phillipines, Thailand, Turkey, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. In addition, Denmark, Italy, India, and Sweeden contributed field medical units.
2. Not to mention 300,000 South Korean and one-and-a half to two million Chinese and North Korean battle-related casualties--in addition to perhaps four million civilian casualties in both Koreas; see Harold Hakwon Sunoo, America's Dilemma in Asia: The Case of South Korea (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1979), p. 95; see also the tables of battle casualties in Appendix C in David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 460-61.
3. For a detailed treatment of how Korea came to be part of the Japanese empire see C.I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967) and, also, Han Woo-keun, The History of Korea, trans. Lee Kyung-shik, ed. Grafton K. Mintz (Seoul: The Eul-Yoo Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 361-492.
4. For background in regard to American policy towards Korea at the end of of the Second World War and prior to the North Korean invasion see Mark Paul "Diplomacy Delayed: The Atomic Bomb and the Division of Korea, 1945" and Stephen Pelz "U.S. Decisions on Korean

Policy, 1943-1950: Some Hypotheses" in Bruce Cumings, ed. Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), pp. 67-132.

5. The emergence of the two Korean regimes between 1945 and 1947 is exhaustively treated in Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); see especially pp. 179-213 and 382-427; see also William W. Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 22-8
6. Rees, op. cit. pp. 11-2.
7. Establishing exclusively southern national defense forces only three months after Japan's defeat was an "extraordinary and insubordinate act"; also, most of the south's policemen came from the Korean element of the Japanese national police, a fact which certainly added very little to the reputation of the new force let alone Rhee's own credibility; see Bruce Cumings "Introduction: The Course of Korean-American Relations, 1943-1953" in Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict, op. cit. p. 15.
8. Withdrawing the troops was a deft diplomatic maneuver on the part of the Russians. Their interests in Korea, given the dedication of the Kim regime, were, no doubt, in good hands. Confident that factionalism and corruption would soon do away with Rhee in the south, Moscow refused to involve itself with UN efforts to resolve the Korean crisis, and made clear that the UN Temporary Commission, charged with paving an avenue for an eventual north-south re-unification, could not "carry out its tasks above the thirty-eighth parallel"; see Stueck, op. cit., pp. 90-1.
9. Both the Joint Chiefs and General Douglas MacArthur, US Far East commander, "took the lead" in insisting that the troops withdraw at the earliest possible time because of the permanent fear of weakening America's commitment to Europe; see Stueck, op. cit. p. 154-55.
10. American military reaction to the North Korean invasion was limited due to the low state of readiness of the understrength US Army forces in Japan. By 30 June, the only unit available for immediate deployment to Korea was this small infantry task force of about 440 men under Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith; see US, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu

(June-November 1950) by Robert E. Appleman (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 61 (henceforth referred to as 'Appleman'). American unpreparedness was starkly illustrated not only by insufficient manpower levels, but also by the poor state of the equipment and weapons with which American soldiers were expected to carry on in combat; see J.C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: McGraw, 1983), p. 141.

11. The history of the fighting between July and mid-September 1950 is covered in detail in Appleman, op. cit., pp. 248-487; see also Edwin P. Hoyt, The Pusan Perimeter: Korea (Scarborough House, NY: Stein & Day, 1984).
12. An amphibious landing at Inchon was met with almost universal opposition in Washington. The daring nature of the operation, the physical obstacles present at the proposed location, and the conviction of the Joint Chiefs that the days of Normandy-type operations were over combined to block the Inchon landing. It was only MacArthur's singleminded support of the plan as the only way out from the impossible military situation that finally won the day; see the general's own account of the debate over CHROMITE in Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (London: Heinemann, 1964), pp. 346-51; according to the then Secretary of State Acheson, MacArthur himself assessed the odds of success at Inchon as "5,000-to-1"; see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p. 447; the detailed history of the operation is in Appleman, op. cit. pp. 488-514; see also Rees, op. cit. pp. 77-97.
13. In fact, missing a 200,000-man Chinese army amounted to a disastrous intelligence lapse. Predictably, there is some confusion as to how this could happen. The official historian lists various intelligence estimates by both field intelligence officers of X Corps and MacArthur's Headquarters predicting possible Chinese intervention -- which, however, grossly underestimate the size of the Chinese forces never placing it above 78,000 men; see Appleman, op. cit., pp. 760-65. MacArthur gives no answer to the question, although he blames Washington's refusal to allow bombing of the Yalu river bridges as the major contributing factor to the successful Chinese infiltration; see MacArthur, op. cit., p. 374. In any case, it is reasonable to attribute this grave lack of warning to at least three salient factors: (a) lack of air reconnaissance over Manchuria, the main staging area of the Chinese armies, (b) the remarkable camouflage control exercised by Chinese forces in North Korea, and the almost total absence

of daylight activities by Chinese troops, and (c) the inadequate training of American field intelligence personnel accentuated by the absence of World War II veteran intelligence officers.

14. See Rees, op. cit., pp. 155-77; and John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), pp. 114-34.
15. Although MacArthur's strong views about how to combat Communism in Asia were well known, it was generally believed that the commander-in-chief, Far East, complied with the Administration's views. The Wake Island conference between him and Truman, held in early October 1950 shortly before the Chinese intervention, seemed to confirm the "harmony" between Washington and its military commander directing the war in Korea. Truman himself reported in his memoirs that Wake had been "a most satisfactory conference"; see Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Upheaval, vol. 2 (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1956), p. 367. MacArthur, however, later wrote that Wake made him realize "that a curious, and sinister, change was taking place in Washington... there was a tendency towards temporizing rather than fighting it through. The original courageous decision of Harry Truman to boldly meet and defeat Communism in Asia was apparently chipped away by the constant pounding whispers of timidity and cynicism"; see MacArthur, op. cit. p. 363. On balance, the meeting at Wake, designed primarily as a political public relations act to boost Truman's fortunes in the elections campaign, left MacArthur "with a greater sense of freedom" -- something which the President almost certainly had no intention of doing; see Stueck, op. cit. p. 238; see also Spanier, op. cit., pp. 105-13; and "Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on 15 October 1950" in US, Department of State, Historical Office, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. VII, Korea (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 948-60 (henceforth referred to as FRUS followed by vol. number, part, and year of publication). It was MacArthur's letter to Joseph Martin, Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, written on 20 March 1951, and openly critical of the handling of the Korean War by the Truman Administration, which hastened the general's dismissal; MacArthur asserted that he "attached little importance to the exchange of letters" since they were only part of a "polite response" to Representative Martin; see MacArthur, op. cit. p. 386 where part of the crucial letter is also reproduced. But, as Spanier points out, the general was aware beyond question that his letter would receive maximum publicity by such a prominent member of Truman's opposition; see Spanier, op. cit.,

- p. 203. MacArthur's assertion that he was merely engaging in polite correspondence is further weakened by the fact that, on the same day he wrote to Martin, he was informed by the Joint Chiefs that the United Nations were about to begin discussions for a diplomatic settlement of the Korea issue; see "The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)" in FRUS, VII(1951) 1, 1983, p. 251. As Secretary Acheson summed it up, the general had demonstrated "willful insubordination and incredibly bad judgement"; see Acheson, op. cit., p. 526.
16. For Truman's account of how MacArthur's dismissal came about see Truman, op. cit., pp. 432-50.
 17. See statement by the State Department in Department of State Bulletin, 9 July 1951, p. 45.
 18. See Rees, op. cit., pp. 294-301.
 19. For an excellent analysis of the tortuous road to the 1953 armistice see Barton J. Bernstein "The Struggle over the Korean Armistice: Prisoners or Repatriation?" in Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict, op. cit. pp. 261-307; and also William H. Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjon: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations, reprint ed. (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1973).
 20. For the full text of the armistice see Rees, op. cit., Appendix D, pp. 462-92.
 21. Kennan's contribution to the birth of containment is discussed in detail in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 25-53.
 22. It is important, however, to note that containment was based on the assumption that, save some unexpected chain of events, the Soviet Union did not plan to initiate war with the United States; see Kennan's own analysis in "Resume of World Situation" in FRUS, I(1947), 1973, pp. 772-77.
 23. Ibid., pp. 738-50.
 24. Gaddis, op. cit., p. 44.
 25. Spanier, op. cit., p. 23.
 26. See Alexander L. George "American Policy-Making and the North Korean Aggression", World Politics 7(January 1955): 210.
 27. Spanier, op. cit., pp. 16-8.

28. See Pelz in Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict, op. cit., p. 111.
29. See Carl Berger, The Korea Knot: A Military-Political History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), p. 93.
30. Acheson, op. cit., p. 356.
31. Ibid., p. 357.
32. See "Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency" in FRUS, VII(1950), 1976, p. 111.
33. Acheson, op. cit., p. 405.
34. See Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 165.
35. See "Intelligence Estimate Prepared by the Estimates Group, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State" in FRUS, VII(1950), 1976, pp. 153-54.
36. Gaddis, op. cit., p. 90.
37. Ibid., p. 91.
38. Truman, op. cit., p. 332-33.
39. Sunoo, op. cit., p. 83.
40. See "Memorandum By Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State" in FRUS, VII(1950), 1976, p. 238.
41. See "Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff" in *ibid.*, p. 450.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 451.
44. Osgood, op. cit., pp. 169-70.
45. See "Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)" in FRUS, VII(1950), 1976 p. 346.
46. See, for example, "Extracts of Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, with General MacArthur in Tokyo on August 6 and 8, 1950" in *ibid.*, p. 543.
47. See "Report by the National Security Council to the President" in *ibid.*, p. 715.

48. Ibid., p. 716.
49. Acheson, op. cit., p. 453.
50. See "The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff" in FRUS, VII(1950), 1976, pp. 1237-38.
51. The theory that North Korea, along with Communist China, acted as mere Soviet proxies during the Korean war has been recently challenged, notably in Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean War (New York: Free Press, 1975).
52. See "The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)" in FRUS, VII(1951), Part 1, 1983, p. 395.
53. Ibid., pp. 395-96.
54. Acheson, op. cit., p. 529.
55. See Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1973), pp. 71, 72.
56. Ibid., pp. 74-5.
57. The use of atomic weapons was first discussed in some detail in NSC 147/April 1953; see "Note by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council" in FRUS, XV, (1952-1954) Part 1, 1984, pp. 854-48.
58. See Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), p. 240.
59. Osgood, op. cit., p. 187.
60. William W. Kaufmann, Policy Objectives and Military Action in the Korean War, P-886 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1956), p. 9.
61. Ibid., p. 14.

CHAPTER V

1. "National Security Action Memorandum No. 273 by McGeorge Bundy, November 26, 1963" in Gareth Porter, ed., Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Heyden, 1979), p. 221.
2. NSAM 273, an "interim don't rock the boat" document, failed to grasp the impact of Diem's elimination on South Vietnam's turbulent domestic situation and

simply stated already established American policy; see The Pentagon Papers. The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, the Senator Gravel Edition, vol. III (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 17 (hereafter referred to as Gravel followed by vol. numeral). Diem's association with the Americans dated back to the Eisenhower Administration when the ex-administrator in the French Colonial Service captured American attention with his staunch anti-communism. His "friendship" with Washington, however, did not prevent tacit American approval of the coup that overthrew and shot him dead; see George Herring, The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), pp. 104-06; see also Hedrick Smith "The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem: May-November 1963" in Neil Sheehan, et. al., The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp. 166-96 (hereafter referred to as the Pentagon Papers); and Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 18-28.

3. "Telegram from Rusk to Lodge, December 6, 1963" in Porter, op. cit., pp. 227-29.
4. "Memorandum for the President from McNamara, December 21, 1963" in *ibid.*, p. 232. McNamara also expressed concern about the performance of American advisors whom he saw as unable to provide the "leadership" and the "coordinated administration" for the efficient operation of the American aid programs in South Vietnam; see Gravel, op. cit., III, p. 31.
5. On 2 August 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked USS Maddox, an American destroyer, as she steamed parallel to the North Vietnamese coast on an electronic intelligence patrol codenamed DESOTO. Two days later, the attack was repeated against both Maddox and a sister ship, USS Turner Joy. There were no American casualties, but the United States reacted immediately with retaliatory air strikes and the passing of the Tonkin Gulf resolution; see Lewy, op. cit., pp. 32-6. Many critics later charged that the Tonkin Gulf incident was in effect a fabrication, "a trumped-up crisis designed... to provide a pretext for escalation"; see Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1979), pp. 103-04. This allegation remains unsupported by unequivocal evidence; rather, the haste with which Johnson sought extra powers should be seen as the outcome of "his political instincts at work in an election year"; see Robert Divine, Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), p. 148; see also

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power (New York: The New American Library, 1966), p. 533. For a discussion of the Tonkin Gulf incident in light of the "conspiracy theory" see Peter Dale Scott, The War Conspiracy: The Secret Road to the Second Indochina War (Indianapolis/New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), pp. 51-75.

6. SNIE 53-2-64 "The Situation in South Vietnam, October 1, 1964" in Porter, op. cit., pp. 322-26.
7. See "April '65, Order Increasing Ground Forces and Shifting Mission" in Pentagon Papers, op. cit., pp. 452-53. For a discussion of the deliberation that surrounded NSAM 328 see Gravel, op. cit., III, pp. 97-105. At this stage, the Administration was also becoming aware of the first anti-war rumblings. Thus, the closing paragraph of NSAM 328 stressed the need to carry out further troop deployments, and other military actions, without "premature publicity" and with the view of presenting shifts in the Administration's tactics "as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy"; see Pentagon Papers, op. cit., p. 453.
8. See McNamara's mid-1965 recommendations to the President in "Memorandum for the President by McNamara, July 20, 1965" in Porter, op. cit., pp. 385-91. Note that the Defense Secretary suggests, in para. 4a, that for the United States to withdraw "under the best conditions that can be arranged" could only be "damaging" and "humiliating".
9. See Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 239.
10. See "Summary of a Speech by Chairman of the Lao Dong Party Reunification Department, Gen. Nguyen Van Vinh at the COSV Congress, April 1966" in Porter, op. cit., p. 418.
11. Ibid.
12. Robert Shaplen, The Road From War: Vietnam 1965-1970 (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 166. Official optimism, however, had already begun to show the first, if only still slight, signs of fatigue. In February 1967, for example, General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was prepared to offer a less glowing report of the military situation in Vietnam: "What has all this effort, sacrifice, bravery, and dedication [of US troops in Viet Nam] achieved? Not a final victory, even on the battlefield, but a turnaround of pessimism, an end to

unimpeded invasion, and a long forward step" (emphasis mine); see, "The U.S. Achievements in Vietnam" in Department of State Bulletin, 6 February 1967, p. 190.

13. See "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCSM-286-67" in Porter, op. cit., pp. 463-64.
14. Johnson's position on the reserves call-up had not undergone any change since early in the "Americanization" of the war. His view on the matter had been stated clearly during a White House meeting in mid-1965 and still stood firm as the situation deteriorated: "Then, we could go to Congress and ask for great sums of money; we could call up the reserves and increase the draft; go on a war footing; declare a state of emergency... if we go into that kind of land war, then North Vietnam would go to its friends, China and Russia, and ask them to give help. They would be forced into increasing aid. For that reason I don't want to be overly dramatic and cause tensions. I think we can get our people to support us without having to be too provocative and warlike"; see Johnson, op. cit., p. 149.
15. Intelligence from the field added to the gloom. Despite the massive American effort, the CIA estimated, in November 1967, that Hanoi, although facing a "major" manpower problem, did have the resources and the will to sustain the guerrilla campaign, and infiltration from the North, for at least another year; see SNIE 14.3-67, "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam, November 13, 1967" in Porter, op. cit., pp. 481-82.
16. See Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War: Vietnam 1945-1975 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 205-06. President Johnson, in his first public statement following Tet, insisted that the United States knew "for several months... that the Communists planned a massive winter-spring offensive"; see "President Johnson's Conference of February 2" in Department of State Bulletin, 19 February 1968, p. 221.
17. See "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCSM-91-68, February 12, 1968" in Porter, op. cit., p. 497. The same report estimated that the Viet Cong had committed the "bulk" of their forces to the attack, and that their casualties, including captured guerrillas, were between thirty and forty thousand.
18. This figure is given in Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (Garden

City, NY: Doubleday, 1971), dedication page.

19. Shaplen, op. cit., p. 189. Communist terrorist killings, and especially the mass execution of local officials and other prominent citizens in Hue, seemed to galvanize a hitherto apathetic urban population against the guerrillas and "unite South Vietnam in solid opposition to the North"; see Dave R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: US-Vietnam in Perspective (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 208.
20. Even prominent American apologists of the communist side had to admit the destruction of the Viet Cong: "As the succeeding year was to show, the Tet offensive seriously depleted the NLF main force units and wiped out a sizeable proportion of its most experienced cadres, driving the southern movement for the first time into almost total dependency on the north"; see Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1972), p. 395.
21. Ha Van Lau quoted in Maclear, op. cit., p. 205.
22. For an exhaustive analysis of how the American media presented and interpreted the Tet events see Peter Braestrup, Big Story, abridged ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978).
23. The Clifford report recommended that an additional 22,000 American troops be deployed in South Vietnam, but left the reserve call-up issue open pending further analysis of American future policy; see "Memorandum for the President from the 'Clifford Group', TAB E, March 4, 1968" in Porter, op. cit., p. 505; see also Maclear, op. cit., pp. 216-17. The Clifford recommendations about troop deployments were a far cry from the Westmorland/Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation, expressed in Gen. Earl Wheeler's situation report issued shortly before the Clifford group convened, for an additional 206,756 troops bringing the total US strength in South Viet Nam to 731,756; see "Report of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Earl G. Wheeler, on the Situation in Vietnam, February 27, 1968, (Extracts)" in Porter, op. cit., p. 504.
24. See the President's own account of the events leading to his decision in Johnson, op. cit., pp. 425-37. For the complete text of Johnson's address to the Nation on 31 March see "A New Step Toward Peace" in Department of State Bulletin, 15 April 1968, pp. 481-86.
25. The total US air effort in Vietnam was impressive -- to say the least. At its peak the United States

- deployed more than 6,000 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft which eventually succeeded in dropping more ordnance on North and South than the amount expended by the US air forces during the Second World and Korean wars combined; see Timothy J. Lomperis, The War Everyone Lost-And Won (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), p. 69.
26. See Thomas C. Thayer, "The Impact of the Air Effort Probably Outweighed Many of Its Benefits" in W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., The Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 147.
 27. See "Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, JCSM-46-64, January 22, 1964" in Porter, op. cit., p. 237.
 28. See "Draft Memorandum for the President by Assistant Secretary of Defense William P. Bundy, March 1, 1964", in ibid., p. 244.
 29. See Robert L. Galluci, Neither Peace Nor Honor (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 35.
 30. See "Memorandum for the President by McNamara, March 16, 1964" in Porter, op. cit., p. 253. By October 1964, the belief that North Vietnam had to be eventually subjected to direct American military action had crystallized among Johnson's advisers; what remained to be worked out was an actual plan for action; see Gravel, op. cit., III, pp. 200-02.
 31. H. P. Willmott, "From Rolling Thunder to the Tet Offensive, 1968" in John Pimlott, ed., Vietnam: The History and the Tactics (London: Orbis, 1982), p. 42. It should be noted, however, that the decision to bomb was not taken in light heart but rather "against a background of anguished concern over the threat of imminent collapse of the Government of South Vietnam and its military effort against the Viet Cong"; see Gravel, op. cit., p. 269; for relevant background see also James Clay Thompson, Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policy and Program Failure (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 13-34.
 32. See Paul Burbage, et. al., "The Battle for the Skies Over North Vietnam" in Air War Vietnam (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1978), p. 227.
 33. Ibid., p. 215.
 34. So tight was the control exercised by the White House that :policy makers on the Potomac seemed to do everything but actually fly the aircraft"; see

- Palmer, op. cit., p. 77. In late 1965, one "concession" the White House made was to issue two-week target packages instead of the earlier ones released weekly; see U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 99. For details on ROLLING THUNDER targeting authorization procedures see W. Hays Parks, "Rolling Thunder and the Law of War" in Air University Review XXXIII(January-February 1982): 13-6.
35. See "McCone Memo to Top Officials on Effectiveness of Air War, 2 April 1965" in Pentagon Papers, op. cit., pp. 450-51. Earlier that year the McGeorge Bundy group had expressed similar doubts. Writing to the President, at the time of ROLLING THUNDER's opening phase, Bundy stressed the need for a "continuous operation" and warned that "episodic responses geared on a one-to-one basis to 'spectacular' outrages [perpetrated by the Viet Cong] would lack the persuasive force of sustained pressure"; see Gravel, op. cit., III, p. 313.
 36. See "SNIE 10-3/1-65, Communist Reactions to Possible US Courses of Action Against North Vietnam, February 10, 1965" in Porter, op. cit., pp. 360-61.
 37. See Herring, op. cit., p. 147. It is interesting to note that Secretary McNamara, by late summer 1966, had been transformed into the main Administration figure advocating reduction of ROLLING THUNDER. The major cause of this rather unexpected conversion of an earlier "hawk" was the apparent inability of ROLLING THUNDER to reduce significantly Communist infiltration from the North; see Thompson, op. cit., pp. 52-3.
 38. Sharp, op. cit., p. 85.
 39. Shaplen, op. cit., p. 193.
 40. Herring, op. cit., p. 151.
 41. See Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 63.
 42. See Thayer in Thompson and Frizzell, eds., op. cit., p. 149. In North Vietnam, the loss, for example, of a steel mill was a prestige rather than a strategic blow; replacing the mill was a secondary task in an environment of largely elementary economic functions.
 43. See M.J. Armitage and R.A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age 1945-1982 (London: MacMillan, 1983), p. 85.

44. Herring, op. cit., p. 148.
45. Maclear, op. cit., p. 242.
46. Lomperis, op. cit., p. 75.
47. See Peter Mersky and Norman Polmar, The Naval Air War in Vietnam (Annapolis, MD: The Nautical Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1981), pp. 27-8.
48. Lewy, op. cit., p. 24.
49. During this early period American servicemen were engaged in a "nine-to-five" war, as a veteran was to wryly observe later: "There was no war after four-thirty. On Saturdays, no war. On Sundays, no war. On holidays, no war. That's right, a nine-to-five war"; see Jan Barry in Al Santoli, Everything We Had (New York: Ballantine Books, 1981), p. 5.
50. The United States was also involved in a continuous effort to organize and provide population security in rural areas. Such, essentially police, programs operated throughout the war but always with modest results; see, for example, Lawrence E. Grinter, "Requirements of Strategy in Vietnam" in Richard A. Hunt and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds., Lessons From an Unconventional War: Reassessing US Strategies for Future Conflicts (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 130-35; see also the excellent analysis in Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 52-127 and 205-78.
51. See "Message From Westmorland to Sharp, June 7, 1965" in Porter, op. cit., p. 374.
52. Ibid.
53. Westmorland seemed concerned about the "abrasive effect" that US combat troops would have if brought near the civilian Vietnamese population; his concern was shared by the US ambassador in Saigon but not CINCPAC -- who expected fighting American units to be brought into densely populated areas in order to meet the guerrillas in their own milieu; see Gravel, op. cit. III, p. 480.
54. See "Message from Westmorland to Sharp, June 14, 1965" in Porter, op. cit., p. 379. As Westmorland elaborated later, search-and-destroy was based on the "time-honored military formula of reconnaissance in force: seek the enemy, find him, and then apply the necessary force to either destroy him or to drive him from the field"; see William Westmorland, "A Military War of Attrition" in Thompson and Frizzel, eds., op.

cit., p. 64. On the search-and-destroy strategy see also, US, Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Materiel Innovations by Lieutenant General John H. Hay, Jr. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 169-78.

55. This period of search-and-destroy followed the abandonment of the so-called "enclave" strategy which persisted through May 1965. The "enclave" strategy put a limitation on US deployments to five "secure" coastal areas leaving the conduct of the jungle war to the South Vietnamese. It was soon clear, however, that the ARVN was in no position to sustain alone the level of combat intensity required to counter the insurgency. Restricting American troops, on the other hand, to static defense was vigorously opposed by American commanders (including Westmorland) who insisted on more dynamic missions; see Lewy, op. cit., pp. 42-9.
56. The destruction of the South Vietnamese countryside, and the effects of American firepower on populated areas, led many South Vietnamese to conclude "that neither Saigon and its U.S. ally nor Hanoi cared sufficiently about their welfare"; see Grinter in Hunt and Shultz, eds., op. cit., p. 135.
57. See Westmorland in Thompson and Frizell, eds., op. cit., p. 64.
58. Herring, op. cit., p. 154.
59. Lewy, op. cit., p. 60.
60. On RANCH HAND see, US, United States Air Force, Office of Air Force History, Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia 1961-1971 by William A. Buckingham, Jr. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Ecological Consequences of the Second Indochina War (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976), pp. 24-45; and William A. Buckingham, Jr., "Operation Ranch Hand: Herbicides in Southeast Asia" in Air University Review XXXIV(July-August 1983): 42-53.
61. See Gelb and Betts, op. cit., p. 355. As Johnson phrased it himself in 1965, the policy of the United States was to control "Communist aggression and terrorism" through military action "at the lowest possible cost in human life, to our allies, our own men, and to our adversaries too" (emphasis mine); see "President Reiterates U.S. Policy on Viet-Nam" in Department of State Bulletin, 12 April 1965, p. 528.
62. Johnson, op. cit., p. 323.

63. See "Pattern of Peace in Southeast Asia" in Department of State Bulletin, 26 April 1965, p. 607. The "commitment" theme was regularly present in Johnson's public statements; see, for example, "We will Stand in Viet-Nam" in *ibid.*, 16 August 1965, p. 263, and "The State of the Union" in *ibid.*, 31 January 1966, p. 151.
64. See Harry G. Summers, Jr., "Defense Without Purpose" in Transaction/Social Science and Modern Society 21(November-December 1983): 5.
65. *Ibid.*
66. See Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1984), p. 124.
67. See Thomas J. Bellows, "Lessons Yet to Be Learned" in Transaction/Social Science and Modern Society 21(November-December 1983): 23.
68. The diplomatic maneuvers in the Washington-Moscow-Peking triangle have been analyzed in a number of works; see especially Daniel S. Papp, Vietnam: The View from Moscow, Peking, Washington (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1981), pp. 49-122; and the excellent analysis in Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict 1964-1968 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1980) particularly pp. 76-212.
69. See Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, Second ed. (New York, Washington: Praeger, 1974), pp. 702-3.

CHAPTER VI

1. Gairy had become Chief Minister in the British colonial Administration in 1961. Although he was soon accused of misusing public funds, he capitalized on his personal popularity among the Grenadian peasantry to win the general election of 1967. Gairy was an eccentric man interested in the mystical sciences and devoted much of his time in studying unidentified flying objects and other strange phenomena; see Courtney Glass, "The Setting" in Peter M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson, eds., American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation "Urgent Fury" (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 3.
2. See Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton, and Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 14.

3. Glass in Dunn and Watson, eds., op. cit., p. 4.
4. Bishop's decision to stage a coup was prompted by the conviction that Gairy had given orders for the "massacre" of all NJM leaders. However, no evidence to corroborate this allegation was ever produced; see Hugh O' Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion, and Aftermath (London: Sphere Books, 1984), pp. 77-8.
5. Payne et. al, op. cit., p. 18.
6. See Jiri Valenta and Virginia Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada" in Jiri Valenta and Herbert J. Ellison, Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Internal Crisis and U.S./OECS Intervention (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 7.
7. See Caribbean Insight, 5(11), November 1982, p. 3. For a detailed discussion of the NJM economic and social policies see Fitzroy Ambursley, "Grenada: The New Jewel Revolution" in Fitzroy Ambursley and Robin Cohen, eds., Crisis in the Caribbean (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 206-14.
8. Glass in Dunn and Watson, eds., op. cit., p. 9.
9. International Herald Tribune, 17 October 1983.
10. Ibid., 21 October 1983.
11. See Howard J. Wiarda, "Changing Realities and U.S. Policy in the Caribbean Basin: An Overview" in Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin: Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Caribbean Basin, James R. Greene and Brent Scowcroft, Cochairmen (Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hein, 1984), pp.55-6.
12. Another Bay of the Pigs must have been a constant worry for the leaders of the NJM. There were frequent rumours about Gairy hiring thugs in the United States for such an operation although no such attack ever took place. For example, one Canadian TV report in 1980, typical of those that alarmed the PRG, alleged that Gairy had been in contact with Cuban anti-Castro exiles in Miami in an attempt to organize his return to power; see Caribbean Insight, 3(3), March 1980, p. 3.
13. Ambassador Ortiz was quoted by Bishop himself during a radio broadcast after the American official's visit; see "In Nobody's Backyard: National Broadcast on RFG, 13 April 1979" in Chris Searle, ed., In Nobody's Backyard: Maurice Bishop's Speeches, 1979-1983: A Memorial Volume (London: Zed Books, 1984), p. 10 (emphasis added). As it should have been

expected, the Grenadians were not pleased; Bishop responded accordingly: "Grenada is a sovereign and independent country... and we expect all countries to strictly respect our independence... No country has the right to tell us what to do or how to run our country, or who to be friendly with... We are not in anybody's backyard, and we are definitely not for sale"; see *ibid.*, pp. 13-4.

14. See Dorothea Cypher, "Grenada: Indications, Warning, and the U.S. Response" in Dunn and Watson, eds., op. cit., p. 47.
15. See Mark Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada: Notes Toward an Inner History", in Valenta and Ellison, eds., op. cit., p. 68.
16. See Caribbean Insight, 3(3), March 1980, p. 4.
17. See "Secret Protocol of the Military Collaboration Between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada" (undated, probably late 1979), Appendix A, Document 14, in Valenta and Ellison, eds., op. cit., pp. 385-391.
18. The NJM was also potentially interested in developing relations with Arab radical states like Iraq, Algeria, Syria, and Libya although such relations never took concrete form. The first "successful bilateral discussions" with these countries were carried out during the 1979 Non-Aligned Movement Conference held in Havana where Grenada acted as one of the conference vice presidents; see speech by Maurice Bishop "Beat Back Destabilisers: National Broadcast on RFG [Radio Free Grenada], 18 September 1979" in Searle, ed., op. cit., p. 9. As of February 1980, the PRG had established diplomatic relations with only "progressive" states, i.e. Algeria, Cuba, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Kampuchea, Suriname, Soviet Union, Vietnam, South Yemen, Zambia, and Czechoslovakia; see Caribbean Insight, 3(2), February 1980, p. 4.
19. In Moscow, Coard met and had discussions with Boris Ponomarev, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and A.S. Chernyayev, Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's International Department. See Caribbean Insight, 3(6), June 1980, p. 3.
20. See George C. Abbot, "Grenada: Maverick or Pace-maker in the West Indies?" The World Today 36(April 1980): 160.
21. "Grenada Has Chosen Its Road", Interview with Maurice Bishop, World Marxist Review 25(April 1982): 84.

22. See statement of Anthony P. Maingot, in US, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean. Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 98th Congress, 1st Session, November 2, 3, and 16 1983, pp. 154-57 (hereafter referred to as US Military Actions).
23. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Impact of the Grenada Events on the Soviet Alliance System" in Valenta and Ellison, eds., op. cit., p. 44.
24. See report by W. Richard Jacobs to the PRG, "Year of Political and Academic Education", Appendix A, Document 5 (undated but probably late 1981) in *ibid.*, p. 301.
25. Howard J. Wiarda, "The Impact of Grenada in Central America" in *ibid.*, p. 109.
26. According to Bishop, the Americans refused to accept Williams "on the grounds that she was too young"; see Caribbean Insight, 3(11), November 1980, p. 4.
27. Payne et. al., op. cit., pp. 54-55.
28. Caribbean Insight, 4(6), June 1981, p. 4.
29. This US "heavyhanded approach" caused protest even among those Caribbean regimes "unsympathetic" to the PRG; see Robert Pastor, "U.S. Policy Toward the Caribbean: Continuity and Change" in Dunn and Watson, eds., op. cit., p. 25.
30. The Times, 14 March 1981.
31. See Maurice Bishop, "Forward to 1982 -- the Year of Economic Construction! New Year's Address to the Nation, Made on Radio Free Grenada and Television Free Grenada, 1 January 1982" in Searle, ed., op. cit., pp. 105-06. Bishop's persistent allegations of an American "conspiracy" to deprive Grenada of development funds were naturally denied by American officials and have been labelled "a myth"; see, for example, "Prepared Statement of Hon. Sally A. Shelton, Former U.S. Ambassador to Eastern Caribbean" in US Military Actions, p. 64.
32. Quoted by Stephen W. Bosworth, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in US, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Policy Toward Grenada. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 15 June 1982, pp. 29-30

(hereafter referred to as US Grenada Policy).

33. Grenadian fears were reinforced by comments made by Admiral McKenzie, commander of the Caribbean contingency task force, describing Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada as "practically one country" and as "political-military problem"; see Caribbean Insight, 4(10), October 1981, p. 1. Determined to demonstrate his government's vigilance, Bishop, shortly after the completion of the US exercises, declared that Grenada's own military exercises were under way throughout the island with the participation of all able-bodied Grenadians; see The Times, 2 September 1981.
34. See Cypher in Dunn and Watson, eds., op. cit., p. 48.
35. Caribbean Insight, 6(5), May 1983, p. 1.
36. See Bishop's radio address, "Every Grain of Sand Is Ours! Radio/TV Address to the Nation, 23 March 1983, St. George's, Grenada" in Searle, ed., op. cit., p. 220; see also Caribbean Insight, 6(4), April 1983, p. 3.
37. Los Angeles Times, 22 November 1983.
38. Lack of diplomatic contacts prompted the US State Department to admit, at the time of the crisis, that assessing the situation in Grenada was almost impossible and had to rely on sources of dubious validity; see The Times, 22 October 1983.
39. The Times, 28 October 1983; also, Caribbean Insight, 6(11), November 1983, p. 1.
40. Washington Post, 22 October 1983.
41. The members of the OECS are Dominica, St. Lucia, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Grenada. It is not clear whether the OECS decision (which was not officially communicated to the US government until 22 October) was reached in direct consultation with the United States or not. The timing of the announcement raised justified doubts as to the spontaneity of the OECS members' action. At least one press report alleged that the OECS request was actually drafted by American officials and delivered "ready made" to the OECS heads of state; see New York Times, 30 October 1983. It should be stressed, however, that Bishop's murder aroused great revulsion and outrage among all Caribbean nations. Meeting in Barbados after Bishop's execution, without a Grenadian representative, the OECS leaders roundly condemned the new NJM junta and the massacre of the

NJM "moderates" as an act of barbarity, irreconcilable with the Commonwealth Caribbean tradition of politics, and demanded the punishment of those responsible. It is interesting to note that this sense of outrage was equally shared, albeit for different reasons, by Fidel Castro who called for the "exemplary punishment" of those responsible for Bishop's "cold blood" execution; see Castro's statement in the Boston Globe, 20 November 1983.

42. Stephen J. Andriole, "A Decision Theoretic Analysis of the Reagan Administration's Decision to Invade Grenada" in Dunn and Watson, eds., op. cit., p. 75.
43. See interview with Admiral McDonald, Baltimore Sun, 27 November 1983.
44. Estimates of Cuban strength and capabilities varied widely. It seems, however, that the consensus among military planners was that the Cubans were mainly workers with only rudimentary military training who were not going to resist. As it turned out, the 700 Cuban "workers", organized into two battalions, put up a much stiffer fight than expected complete with anti-aircraft fire and "fortified machine-gun emplacements"; see, for example, The Wall Street Journal, 27 October 1983.
45. New York Times, 17 November 1983.
46. See news conference with Secretary Shultz, *ibid.*, 26 October 1983.
47. The Sunday Times, 30 October 1983.
48. Washington Post, 26 October 1983.
49. With the exception of Britain, whose government refused to condemn the American action although Grenada remained technically a member of the Commonwealth, the invasion caused waves of "shock, regret, and condemnation" in Western Europe with France being the most "blunt" in its comments; see International Herald Tribune, 27 October 1983.
50. See, for example, Washington Post, 9 November 1983.
51. The Reagan policy towards Grenada was repeatedly challenged by members of the Congressional Black Caucus whose "fact-finding" travels to Grenada had produced considerable rapport between them and Bishop; see, for example, statement by Ronald V. Dellums in US Grenada Policy, pp. 15-21.
52. See, for example, New York Post, 27 October 1983 and International Herald Tribune, 22-23 October 1983.

53. The President's announcement of the invasion clearly conveyed this impression; see New York Times, 26 October 1983.
54. The Wall Street Journal, 14 November 1983. It was correctly suggested, for example, that if indeed the Grenadians wanted to take American hostages, they could have done so quite easily even after the invasion troops had landed; see statement by Robert A. Pastor in US Military Actions, op. cit., p. 82. Four US diplomats, who were able to visit Grenada only two days before the invasion in order to speak with American residents, found that no immediate risk for US citizens existed and made no recommendations for evacuation; see International Herald Tribune, 25 October 1983.
55. A public opinion poll conducted two weeks after the invasion showed that 71 percent of the American people approved the action taken by the President; see Washington Post, 10 November 1983.

CHAPTER VII

1. At the time of the Red Army's arrival the Hungarian Communist Party had perhaps no more than 3,000 active members; its membership was quickly increased, however, thanks to vigorous recruiting among the poor and ex-Nazi collaborators who saw the party card as the only means of survival in the "new" Hungary; see Ernst C. Helmreich, ed., Hungary (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 115.
2. Rakosi's "slicing-off" operations quickly destroyed the "right-wing" Smallholders, the Social Democrats, and the National Peasant Party; they were followed by a general assault on the Catholic Church as well as against all other religious denominations; see Paul Ignotus, "The First Two Communist Takeovers of Hungary: 1919 and 1948", in Thomas T. Hammond, ed., The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 395-97; see also George Mikes, The Hungarian Revolution (London: A. Deutsch, 1957), pp. 33-9.
3. For a review of the Hungarian economy under Rakosi see Helmreich, ed., op. cit. pp. 214-349.
4. See Bill Lomax, Hungary 1976 (London: Allen & Busby, 1976), p. 52.
5. See Miklos Molnar, Budapest 1956: A History of the Hungarian Revolution, trans. Jennetta Ford (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1971), p. 30.

6. See Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 165.
7. Lomax, op. cit., p. 22; also,, "Road to the Revolution" in Imre Kovacs, ed. Facts About Hungary (New York: Waldon Press Inc., 1966), p. 70.
8. Rakosi's hand was strengthened by the continuing struggle for power within the Kremlin which, in early 1955, took a turn in favour of the "hardliners" signalled by the fall of Georgy Malenkov; see Paul Ignotus, Hungary (London: Ernest Benn, 1972), p. 226. The new prime minister's credentials were limited to having been the private secretary of Rakosi's most trusted lieutenant, Erno Gero, and having "...no other talent than an unlimited penchant for opportunism"; see Tibor Meray, Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin, trans. Howard L. Katzander (London: Thames and Hudson, n.d., probably 1959), p. 32.
9. An indication of the public mood came with the honorary re-burial of ex-premier Laszlo Rajk attended by an estimated 200,000 of Budapest's citizens; see New York Times, 7 October 1956.
10. The Petofi circle attracted not only intellectuals and academics, but also young technocrats, militant party members with reformist tendencies, and other such "nonconformists"; it is significant to note that out of the twenty members of Petofi's directing committee seventeen were active Communist party members; see Meray, op. cit. p. 51.
11. On the day Gero left for Belgrade (14 October), Nagy was reinstated as a member of the Communist Party; still, however, his "mistakes" were not fully erased from the record and his re-admission to the ranks remained "conditional"; see Zinner, op. cit. p. 228.
12. The student demonstrations were spearheaded by the students of the Budapest Technical College who submitted their "Freedom Demands" to the government; see New York Times, 22 October 1956. The student demands were immediately followed by those of the Petofi circle; in a ten-point declaration, the Petofi insisted, among other things, on Nagy receiving "a worthy place in the direction of the Party and the Government", on the dismissal of Rakosi from all party and government posts, and on consolidating "Hungarian-Soviet friendship... on the basis of the Leninist principle of complete equality"; see "Petofi Circle's Ten Demands" as reported by the Hungarian News Agency in Melvin J. Lasky, ed., A White Book: The Hungarian Revolution (London: Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd, 1957), p. 47 (henceforth referred to as

'White Book').

13. According to Gyorgy Kalmar of Radio Kossuth (the Hungarian state radio), the people who gathered in front of the radio building at the beginning were "disciplined, orderly demonstrators"; however, they were soon infiltrated "by irresponsible hooligans" whose numbers increased with the arrival of others armed with weapons stolen from nearby barracks. Kalmar makes a conscious effort to separate the "hooligans" from the "students and young workers" who, according to him, refused to join in the attack against the building and "left the scene in groups"; see "The Battle for the Radio Building" in White Book, p. 53. It was obvious from the outset of the disturbances that the only armed force the government could rely on was the security police; army troops brought in to help repel the radio station demonstrators immediately fraternized with the crowd; see Molnar, op. cit., pp. 120-21. As the revolution progressed in the following days, soldiers joined the rebels in the thousands; see New York Times, 26, 27 October 1956.
14. On the morning of 25 October, thousands gathered in Parliament Square expecting to hear Nagy speak. Soviet tanks, standing by to discourage a riot, suddenly came under fire from surrounding rooftops and, after initially returning fire in the direction of the buildings, began mowing down those gathered around them in the square. Although the rooftop snipers were not identified, it is reasonable to assume that they were members of the AVH; see US, Department of Defense, National Defense University, Crisis Decision Setting and Response: The Hungarian Revolution by Ernest A. Nagy, National Security Affairs Monograph 78-1 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 6 (henceforth referred to as 'Nagy'; the author is not related to Imre Nagy). See also reports by Endre Marton of the Associated Press in "The Shooting in Parliament Square" in White Book, p. 71; and by John MacCormac of the New York Times, and B. Konieczny of Rude Pravo (Prague), in "The Workers Are Being Murdered" in ibid., pp. 71-2.
15. The Nagy appeal reached the UN Headquarters in New York via teletype at 1227 hours on 1 November; for the complete text see Kovacs, ed., op. cit., p. 122. Meantime, reports of new Soviet military moves poured in putting Soviet strength already in Hungary at eight divisions, mostly armored ones; see "New Soviet Troops on the Move" in White Book, pp. 201-02.
16. The complete text of the speech, as it was released in English translation by the US State Department, can be found in Thomas P. Whitney, ed., Khrushchev

Speaks: Selected Speeches, Articles, and Press Conferences, 1949-1961 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1963), pp. 207-65. The impact of the speech was indeed unprecedented; as one analyst put it, "...the terms of Khrushchev's secret speech legitimized a form of systemic criticism. The Party leader made clear that the attack on Stalin was more than a call for reevaluating Soviet History; it had vast implications for the present"; see George Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 59; see also the discussion of the 20th CPSU congress in Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.: The Struggle for Stalin's Succession 1945-1960 (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 263-91.

17. Zinner, op. cit., pp. 160-61.
18. See Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 40.
19. See Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 82-3.
20. Ibid.
21. In fact, the New Course speech was "the first de-Stalinising speech" which instantly became "a surprisingly sincere and outspoken statement condemning not single mistakes and occasional errors but the overall political strategy of an entire period", and indicating "a receptiveness towards 'national communism'"; see Ferenc Feher and Agness Heller, Hungary 1956 Revisited: The Message of Revolution (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 26-7 (emphasis in the original).
22. Mikes, op. cit., p. 61.
23. Gero's party background confirmed the worse fears of those Hungarians who expected genuine democratic reform. Gero was a typical Stalinist "executioner" whose most prominent accomplishment was to preside over the purge of Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War. After the defeat of the Republicans, Gero escaped to the USSR where he became a Soviet citizen; see Noel Barber, Seven Days of Freedom (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 36.
24. Vali, op. cit., p. 249.
25. Lomax, op. cit., p. 67. In the end, it was the obstinacy of the Rakosi clique which pushed Nagy onto

a path which, given a different situation, he would have most likely avoided; see Molnar, op. cit., pp. 47-8. For a detailed discussion of Nagy's personal attitudes and political beliefs see Ferenc and Heller, op. cit., pp. 119-36; also, Zinner, op. cit., pp. 219-21. Nagy's reluctance to identify fully with the burgeoning popular feeling against the ruling Communist party, and Soviet interference in Hungarian affairs, was revealed in his first radio message to the Hungarian people after he had been again elevated to the premiership on 25 October. Charging "counter-revolutionaries and provocateurs, small in number" with the fighting in the streets of Budapest, Nagy called upon those who were trying to overthrow "our people's democratic regime" to surrender their arms and expect to be treated with "magnanimity in the spirit of understanding and reconciliation"; it was "in the interest of workers who love peace and order" to "apply the rigour of the law against those who continue armed action, incitement, and plunder"; see "Broadcast by Nagy" in White Book, pp. 74-5. Although one might argue persuasively that the wording of this message did not reflect Nagy's true feelings, and was rather designed to show to the Russians that Nagy was prepared to support "law and order" and reduce the need for further "fraternal" help from Soviet troops, it is also easy to see the reaction it elicited from the freedom fighters of Budapest.

26. See Janos Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. 7.
27. Nagy, op. cit., p. 4. It was soon obvious, however, that Nagy had nothing to do with the "invitation" of the Soviet troops. Kept under the "protective" guard of an armed detachment of AVH policemen, he remained, at least during the opening days of his short-lived regime, a virtual prisoner of Gero and his diehards unable to exercise his duties according to his own free will; see Meray, op. cit. pp. 96-9. See also the account of Zoltan Zelk, member of the Hungarian Writers' Association, "Nagy as 'Prisoner'" in White Book, p. 55.
28. Molnar, op. cit., pp. 123-25.
29. Ignotus, Hungary, op. cit., p. 243.
30. See Bela K. Kiraly, "Reconquest of Hungary" in Kovacs, ed., op. cit., pp. 183-84.
31. New York Times, 29 October 1956. Publicly, however, the Russians maintained the hard line against the "counter-revolutionaries" and "criminals" who had carried out the fighting in Hungary with "outside

help" -- although recognizing, at the same time, that "there are circles [in Hungary] who wish to improve the work of the state administration and also the welfare of the people"; see statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov and Pravda analysis in "Moscow Views: Shepilov, Zhukov, 'Pravda'" in White Book, pp. 132-34.

32. Vali, op. cit., p. 278. There were, for example, reports of Soviet soldiers defecting to the Hungarian freedom fighters, and of others refusing to fire on crowds even when pelted with stones; see "The Soviet Troops" in White Book, pp. 102-03.
33. Ibid., p. 279. According to a German military analyst writing in the Journal of Military Affairs (Munich) the first Russian intervention fell to only two Soviet army divisions stationed then in Hungary. While the one was committed in Budapest, the other remained in reserve positioned in such a way as to control rail and road communication between Vienna and Budapest. Soviet commanders apparently wanted to provide for defense against any attempt by Western powers to offer military assistance to the citizens of Budapest; see "A German Military Analysis" in White Book, p. 284-85.
34. For the complete text of the Soviet declaration see "Declaration by the Government of the U.S.S.R. on 'The Basis for the Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States', October 30, 1956" in US, Department of States, Historical Office, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1956 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1959) reprint ed. (New York: Arno Press, 1971), pp. 463-66.
35. Zinner, op. cit., p. 322; see also the rather conciliatory Soviet statement published in Pravda on 31 October in "Soviet Declaration on Satellites" in White Book, p. 146.
36. Nagy, op. cit., p. 11. For Andropov's role in Hungary see Zhores Medvedev, Andropov: His Life and Death (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 32-40.
37. According to the same German military analyst (see note 33), the Russians finally committed thirty five divisions in Hungary which was "one fifth of the entire active strength of the Soviet Army".
38. See Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (London: Book Club Association, 1971), p. 417.

39. Ibid., p. 418-19. As Isaac Deutscher observed, this was a defeat for the Presidium "liberals" whose hope was to allow Nagy to build a Communist government which, like Gomulka's in Poland, would retain Hungary in Soviet orbit; when, however, Nagy denounced the Warsaw Pact "this hope was dashed", and "the die-hards of Stalinism" along with the military imposed their plan for a massive invasion -- although the final decision should have been unanimous because even the "liberals" recognized the incalculable risks for international Communism involved in allowing the Hungarian people to destroy the Hungarian Workers' Party; see the report by Isaac Deutscher in "'Harsh News' and the 'Crisis in Moscow'" in White Book, p. 185.
40. Vali, op. cit., p. 352.
41. See Marshal Tito's article published in Borba (Belgrade) on 16 November 1956 in "Tito, the Soviets, and Hungary" in White Book, pp. 36-7.
42. Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 418.
43. Ibid.
44. See Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev (London: St. Jane's, 1966), pp. 241-42.
45. See Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev; The Years in Power, trans. Andrea R. Durkin (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 72.
46. Nagy, op. cit., p. 24.

CHAPTER VIII

1. Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 40-1. Slovak demands for greater autonomy had often evoked charges of "bourgeois nationalism" from Novotny and they remained a particularly nagging point of contention within the CPCS; see H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 49-56.
2. For a first-hand "progressive" analysis of Novotny's fall see Vojtech Mencl and Frantisek Ourednik, "What Happened in January" in Robin Alison Remington, ed., Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 18-39. See also Skilling, op. cit., pp. 183-95.

3. Ernest Mandel, Why They Invaded Czechoslovakia, Spokesman Pamphlet No. 40 (Nottingham: The Bertrand Russel Foundation, n.d.), p. 10.
4. As Dubcek himself put it shortly after he took over as CPCS First Secretary: "...we hope to develop a resolute approach to overcoming everything outdated without resorting to the distortions and deformations which hampered our progress forward in the political, economic, and ideological spheres. This criticism of everything outdated and ossified will direct us toward the near future..."; see "Dubcek Speech at Agricultural Congress, February 1, 1968" in Remington, ed., Winter, p. 41.
5. The Times, 12 March 1968.
6. Ibid., 23 March 1968.
7. Ibid., 18 March 1968.
8. New York Times, 29 March 1968.
9. Soon after Novotny's resignation from the presidency four of his "closest associates", Chudik, Simunek, Hendrych, and Lastovicka were dropped from the Presidium and two others, Pastyrik and Sabolcik, lost their candidate membership. Also forced into retirement was Dolansky, prominent member of the old guard and comrade of both Gottwald, father of Czechoslovakia's Communism, and Novotny; see Skilling, op. cit., p. 215.
10. The Times, 2 April 1968.
11. Skilling, op. cit., p. 217.
12. The Times, New York Times, 10 April 1968. For the complete text of the Action Program see "The Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia" in Remington, ed., Winter, pp. 88-137.
13. Skilling, op. cit., p. 222.
14. After meeting the Czechoslovak delegation, the Soviet leaders had separate talks with the leaders of East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria in Moscow apparently to discuss Dubcek's uncooperative attitude; see Galia Golan, Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek era 1968-1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 224.
15. See Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968: Reform, Repression and Resistance (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969), p. 39; also New York Times, 25 May 1968.

16. Ibid., pp. 46-7. Emphasis mine.
17. The Times, 1 June 1968.
18. Ibid., 28 June 1968.
19. See full text in Ludvik Vaculik, "2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, Artists, and Everyone" in Remington, ed., Winter, pp. 196-202.
20. Golan, op. cit., p. 127.
21. Skilling, op. cit., p. 276.
22. Windsor and Roberts, op. cit., p. 50.
23. The Times, 10 July 1968.
24. Pravda, Izvestia, 18 July 1968 in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 7 August 1968, pp. 4, 5 (hereafter referred to as CDSP).
25. See "Czechoslovak Reply to the Warsaw Letter, July 18, 1968" in Remington, ed., Winter..., p. 243.
26. The initial Russian invitation was for a meeting to be held in either Moscow or the Ukrainian cities of Kiev or Lvov, the Soviet news agency Tass complaining that the Czechoslovaks had "indefinitely postponed" past invitations to parley; see New York Times, 20 July 1968.
27. Skilling, op. cit., p. 309.
28. For full texts of the Cierna and Bratislava communiques see Pravda, 2 August 1968 and Pravda 4 August 1968 in CDSP, 21 August 1968, pp. 3, 4-5.
29. Pravda, 18 August 1968 in CDSP, 4 September 1968, pp. 10-1.
30. Golan, op. cit., p. 17.
31. Harry Schwartz, Prague's 200 Days: The Struggle for Democracy in Czechoslovakia (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 90.
32. The Economist, 2 March 1968.
33. Vera Pirozhkova, "The Recent Events in Czechoslovakia and the Fundamentals of Soviet Foreign Policy", Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR 10(15) 1968: 7.
34. Roger Kanet, "The Implications of the Occupation of Czechoslovakia for Soviet Foreign Policy",

International Spectator 23(1969): 1733. See also Russian reporting on "West German revanchism" in Izvestia, 26, 27 July 1968 and Pravda, 28 July 1968 in CDSP, 14 August 1968, pp. 9, 10.

35. Golan, op. cit., p. 223.
36. Remington, Winter..., op. cit., p. 134.
37. Golan, op. cit., p. 224.
38. Valenta, op. cit., pp. 25-6.
39. Richard Lowenthal, "The Sparrow in the Cage", Problems of Communism XVII(November-December 1969): 14.
40. On Events in Czechoslovakia, Issue One (Moscow: Press Group of Soviet Journalists, 1968): 23.
41. Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 14.
42. Even at this final moment, however, the Czechoslovak government avoided inflammatory language. Col. Gen. Martin Dzur, Minister of National Defence, praised the joint exercises as demonstrations of "the noble idea of indivisible friendship and alliance" with the USSR and his laudatory comments were duly carried by the Soviet press; see Izvestia, 22 June 1968 in CDSP, 10 July 1968, p. 15.
43. Pravda, 26 September 1968 in CDSP, 16 October 1968, pp. 10-2.
44. Mandel, op. cit., p. 17.
45. David W. Paul, "Soviet Foreign Policy and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia: A Theory and a Case Study", International Studies Quarterly 15(1971): 196.

CHAPTER IX

1. Supplementary Memorandum by Professor J. Erickson, "Afghanistan: A View of Current Developments (118/79-80/FM)" in UK, Parliament, Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and Its Consequences for British Policy, Fifth Report (With Appendices), Series 1979/80, No. 745 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1980), p. 249 (henceforth referred to as Commons Report).
2. Anthony Hyman, Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964-83 (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 159.

3. Nancy Peapody Newell and Richard S. Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 35.
4. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, August 6-12, 1973, p. 26033(henceforth referred to as Keesing's); the Parcham was seen as "collaborationist" and was often "laughingly referred to as 'The Royal Communist Party'"; see Ralph H. Magnus, "Tribal Marxism: The Soviet Encounter with Afghanistan", Conflict 4(2/3/4) 1983: 349.
5. Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1983), pp. 57-8; and Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 37-8.
6. Hyman, op. cit., p. 70. The PDPA had been originally formed in 1965 by Taraki only to split into several quarreling factions two years later.
7. It is unclear whether the Qadir council ever existed and the PDPA official history is deliberately obscure on this point; by 30 April, the soldiers, for all their role in the coup, had been effectively "shouldered aside" by the PDPA conspirators; see Bradsher, op. cit., p. 79.
8. Keesing's, June 23, 1978, p. 29037.
9. Magnus, op. cit., p. 83.
10. See Bradsher, op. cit., p. 83.
11. Magnus, op. cit., p. 361; Bradsher, op. cit., p. 69; Hammond, op. cit., p. 49.
12. Anthony Arnold, "The Stony Path to Afghan Socialism: Problems of Sovietization in an Alpine Muslim Society", Orbis 2pring 1985): 43.
13. Pravda, Izvestia, 6 December 1978 in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 3 January 1979, p. 10 (henceforth referred to as CDSP).
14. Ibid., p. 11.
15. Newell and Newell, op. cit., p. 85.
16. Hyman, op. cit., pp. 92-3.
17. Newell and Newell, op. cit., p. 73.
18. The other prominent Parchamist leader, Noor Ahmed Noor, Minister of the Interior, was dispatched to the post of ambassador in Washington; see Keesing's,

September 15, 1978, p. 29198.

19. Ibid.
20. Hyman, op. cit., pp. 84-5.
21. Keesing's, June 1, 1979, p. 29641.
22. David Rees, Afghanistan's Role in Soviet Strategy, Conflict Studies No. 118 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1980), p. 2.
23. Hammond, op. cit., pp. 84-5.
24. Ibid., pp. 9-18.
25. Bradsher, op. cit., p. 169.
26. Erickson testimony, Commons Report, op. cit., p. 38.
27. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Afghanistan: Embraced by the Bear", Orbis 26(Spring 1982): 139.
28. Ibid.
29. Erickson testimony in Commons Report, op. cit., p. 38.
30. Rees, op. cit., p. 2.
31. Erickson Supplementary Memorandum in Commons Report, op. cit., p. 249.
32. Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Difficulty of Knowing Where To Stop", Orbis 24(Summer 1980): 210.
33. Bradsher, op. cit., p. 165.
34. The "opportunistic" interpretation of the Soviet invasion blames American inactivity in the face of communist gains of previous years as a major cause of the Soviet decision to dispatch the troops. Henry Kissinger and other conservative scholars criticized the Carter Administration for not making specifically clear to the Soviets from the outset that the replacement of Daoud with Taraki "was incompatible with the rules of coexistence"; see US, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, An Assessment of the Afghanistan Sanctions: Implications for Trade and Diplomacy in the 1980's, Report by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 13.
35. Richard S. Newell, "Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan", The World Today 36(July 1980): 252-53.

36. Erickson testimony, Commons Report, op. cit., p. 41; Hammond, op. cit., p. 142; and US, Department of Defense, National Defense University, Soviet Intentions and American Options in the Middle East, by Benson Lee Grayson, National Security Affairs Monograph Series 82-3 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), p. 14.
37. See US, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Soviet Policy and United States Response in the Third World, Report Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 87 (Henceforth referred to as US House Report).
38. Ibid.
39. Pravda, 22 January 1980 in CDSP, 20 February 1980, p. 4.
40. Mikhail Koloskov, Fighters for the Faith? No, Hired Killers! (Moscow: Novosti, 1986), p. 7.
41. US House Report, op. cit., p. 88.
42. Bradsher, op. cit., p. 154.
43. Strategic Review 1980-81 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 64.
44. Francis Fukuyama, The Future of the Soviet Role in Afghanistan: A Trip Report, N-1579-RC (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1980), p. 4; for a further discussion of the early Soviet strategy see Zilmay Khalizad, "Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan", Problems of Communism XXIX(November-December 1980): 23-40 but particularly pp. 26-35.
45. Erickson Supplementary Memorandum in Commons Report, op. cit., p. 251. Soviet mountain warfare doctrine and tactics are examined in C.N. Donnelly, "Soviet Mountain Warfare Operations", International Defense Review 13(6) 1980: 823-34.
46. Keith D. Dickson, "The Basmachi and the Mujahidin: Soviet Responses to Insurgency Movements", Military Review LVX(February 1985): 40.
47. The Mujahidin are loosely organized into dozens of regional groupings under the direction of seven separate Afghan parties based in Peshawar, Pakistan; see Anthony Hyman, "The Struggle for Afghanistan", The World Today 40(July 1984): 282.
48. Alex R. Alexiev, "Soviet Strategy and the Mujahidin",

Orbis 29(Spring 1985): 32.

49. See statement of Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick before the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan in US, United States Information Service, "Kirkpatrick Urges Negotiated Settlement in Afghanistan", Official Text, US Embassy, London, 12 March 1985, p. 2.
50. Hyman, "The Struggle for Afghanistan", op. cit., pp. 281-2.
51. Alexiev, op. cit., p. 36.
52. Strategic Survey 1983-84 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), pp. 83-4.
53. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 2; The Independent, 15 October 1986.
54. Joseph J. Collins, "The Soviet-Afghan War: The First Four Years", Parameters XIX(Summer 1984): 52.
55. Strategic Survey 1984-85 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), p. 72.
56. Pravda, 5 May 1986 in CDSP, 4 June 1986, p. 22.
57. See the analysis by Michael Fathers in The Independent, 22 November 1986.
58. Pravda, 15 May 1986 in CDSP, 18 June 1986, p. 24.
59. Izvestia, 28 August 1985 in CDSP, 25 September 1985, p. 10.
60. Konstantin Likutov, Soviet Foreign Policy: Questions and Answers (Moscow: Novosti, 1985), p. 64.
61. Amin Saikal, "The Afghanistan Crisis: A Negotiated Settlement?", The World Today 40(November 1984): 487.
62. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 6.
63. Izvestia, 18 August 1985 in CDSP, 11 September 1985, p. 13.
64. The Independent, 1 December 1986.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

An Explanatory Note

The nature of the topic, and the enormity of the literature, dictated the necessity to "cast the net wide" in an effort to strike a reasonable balance between theoretical and historical sources.^(*) This bibliography contains, therefore:

--all the materials which have been specifically cited in the Notes;

--and in addition, all those which were consulted during the course of my writing, in an effort to better clarify theoretical questions or establish background details of historical events.

In the opening phases of the research, certain choices had to be made as to the kind of materials to be examined and, eventually, selected for the final bibliography. In broad terms, at least four areas of potential interest were identified: First, international relations with particular emphasis on conflict/war studies; second, superpower foreign policy and relations; third, military and strategic affairs; and, fourth, historical accounts pertaining to the case studies. A

(*) Since the author has no affiliation, contact, or official connection with government agencies here or abroad, this study has been entirely based on unclassified material available in the public domain.

fifth area, that of systems theory and analysis, emerged as soon as it was decided that "systems thinking" should become the guide to the research.

The scope of one's bibliographical search is generally determined and more narrowly formed by the emphasis one chooses to give to certain aspects of a given topic. In this present case, a number of initial rough "sketches" of the study were considered, in conjunction with the working bibliography, to determine the further direction of the work. It was clear, for example, that the availability of sources, dealing exclusively with the finer points of the development of military concepts and the technicalities of military operations in general, was astonishingly small outside specialized libraries reserved for the exclusive use of military and government personnel. As I discovered, the access of civilian researchers to these establishments is severely rationed and requires complicated arrangements not routinely made. These practical considerations thus severely constrained the option of concentrating on the purely military aspects of intervention policies. By contrast, the publicly available body of literature which focuses on superpower foreign relations, the development of their policies towards specific regions over time, and their military developments is practically endless allowing the researcher a considerable degree of flexibility--not to mention what I thought was the luxury of actually discarding material without any pronounced feeling of guilt.

Having said this, it was also apparent from the outset that military intervention (as opposed to intervention in general), despite its pervasive impact upon international relations, attracts limited interest from those specialists concentrating on pure theory. Whether this is a major drawback or a relatively benign shortcoming is a matter for debate--although I am inclined to believe that operational issues, as opposed to abstract theories of military intervention, are much more relevant here. The use of military force is often compared with the wielding of a scalpel, an act which, taken in itself, requires precise, and constantly updated, techniques much more so than discussions of the ethics of surgical practice. An effort was thus made to approach the choice of bibliographical material with the operational aspects of foreign policy in mind.

The relative paucity of theoretical material on military intervention comes in sharp contrast to the large (and constantly expanding) historical literature dealing with specific cases of military intervention. This is another indication of the growing demand for "how to" works which analyze in depth the "lessons" of a particular action. The recent growth, especially in the United States, of policy studies and, more specifically, of comparative defence policy studies, seems bound to further stimulate the proliferation of "after action" monographs and reports. As a result, the researcher is confronted with a lopsided situation, to say the least. In the absence of a better solution, I have attempted to rectify

this problem--partially at least-- by searching for theoretical statements which elaborate on the relationship between the use of force with the broader international system; and on the way military intervention may, or may not, affect existing power balances or the longevity of international actors.

One point which also deserves attention is the manner in which one gains insights into Soviet decisionmaking processes and views on important issues. The problems associated with analyzing Soviet political and military strategy are well known; the language barrier is the most serious one followed by the relative inability of all but the most seasoned researchers to determine whether a particular Soviet source is authoritative or mere propaganda. Thus, in the absence of long experience and linguistic fluency, one has to compensate by relying on translated material and the work of Western Soviet experts of established reputation.

Accordingly, this work benefited from the Soviet Military Thought series and other similar translations, an extensive number of articles written by Soviet experts and published in English, and books, papers, and reports produced by prominent Western Soviet analysts whose research is almost exclusively based on primary Soviet sources. Furthermore, my "Soviet education" was crucially affected by two additional, and indeed vital, factors: the guidance offered by Professor Erickson through the extensive (and constantly growing) collection of Soviet materials held by Defence Studies; and the informal

discussions and constant interaction with the senior Research Fellows appointed annually to the Department.

Finally, it should also be noted that the chronological cut-off line for material cited is roughly late 1985. In the case of Afghanistan, this rule was obviously broken and material as of late 1986 was also included.

* * *

For convenience and clarity, the bibliography has been broken down in a "user-oriented" manner into two parts.

Part I contains Western sources and has been further broken down into the following sections:

- (1) Official Documents and Publications
- (2) Systems Methodology (books and articles)
- (3) International Relations and Global Security (books and articles)
- (4) Superpower Military Intervention (books and articles)
- (5) Case Studies (books and articles)
- (6) Papers and Reports
- (7) Newspapers and Newsletters
- (8) Annual Publications

Part II contains Soviet sources published in Russian or English and has also been broken down into sections as follows:

- (1) US Government Translations
- (2) Books (in English and Russian)

(3) Articles (in English and in translation from Russian).

(4) Booklets and Pamphlets.

(5) Newspapers

PART I

(1) Official Documents and Publications

This section contains:

--Congressional hearings on US foreign and defence policy
The official record of each annual hearing amounts thousands of pages of both the testimony by various US Government officials, as well as, documents deposited with Congressional Committees for inclusion "in the record".
An indispensable tool here is the annual official Congressional Directory which describes in some detail the different committees' investigative assignments and serves as a compass, so to speak, for one's initial searches. Of particular value to those researchers interested in US national security policy are the annual hearings (held before Senate as well as House committees) on the defence budget and appropriations for the different US armed services.

--Monographs published by the National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC on a wide range of both specific and broad foreign and military policy issues. The volume on The Future of Conflict, for example, is a typical sample of NDU edited collections of essays written by a variety of both military and civilian academic specialists participating in its programs. NDU publications are

especially useful for expanding one's background on policy "trends" and equally for use in obtaining authoritative insights into American interpretations of crucial events-- as in Nagy's Crisis Decision Setting and Response: The Hungarian Revolution (the author is not related to Imre Nagy).

--Annual reports to Congress from the Secretary of Defense as well as publications of the US Department of the Army, including Field Manual 100-20 on Low Intensity Conflict. The Defense Department reports offer concise statements of US national security policy, describe in some detail ongoing procurement programs for both strategic and general purpose forces, and serve as the official indicator of current US perceptions of the Soviet "threat" and proposed responses to it. They should be read, however, in conjunction with testimony before the Congressional Committees by the Secretary himself and the different military chiefs, who all go to much greater length in explaining current force structure, doctrine, and missions.

--Published US State Department documents that include telegrams, reports, national security estimates, and briefings on important policy meetings of US administration officials and military chiefs.

--Speeches and various statements made by US presidents and other US administration officials released for public distribution through the US International Communication Agency and the US Information Service (US Embassy, London).

(2) Systems Methodology

This section covers only a small sample of the extensive literature relating to systems analysis, design, and modeling. Strictly speaking, this is uncharted territory for the historian or political scientist without a strong background in mathematics, computers, and statistical techniques. In recent years, however, there has been a noted upsurge in interest for "soft" systems modeling which largely depends on non-quantitative techniques like scenario-building and case studies "focused comparison". Peter Checkland's Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, and Brian Wilson's Systems: Concepts, Methodologies, and Applications, albeit conceived as studies of systems methodology in business and industrial environments, deserve special mention as extremely useful guides in conceptualizing and working with any "soft" human activity system. User Centered System Design, edited by Norman and Draper, is an extremely useful volume dealing with man-machine interfacing and computer system design which should be made part of any effort to build computer-assisted modeling projects of "soft" problems. Also, it would be an omission to overlook Robert Krone's Systems Analysis and Policy Science which indeed succeeds in putting an extremely dry and arcane subject into plain English.

(3) International Relations and Global Security

The material in this section contains both general theoretical works and publications on specific topics of

international relations and global security. It refers essentially to Chapters I and III. The selection here is so large that inevitably no "selected" bibliography can possibly fit all the criteria of completeness. It would be impractical to attempt extensive annotation of sources in this brief note, but nevertheless I thought a number of entries deserve special mention. The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, edited by Murray and Viotti, offers a surprising degree of comprehensiveness in a single volume. Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society and Aron's classic Peace and War were always indispensable in my struggles with international relations theory. McKinlay and Little presented an intriguing and lucid analysis of global problems in Global Problems and World Order. The Global Possible, edited by Robert Repetto, left little doubt in my mind that we often dangerously overlook the problems of global resource distribution. The Future of Conflict in the 1980s, edited by Taylor and Maaranen, presented a range of informative essays on the risk potential and management of future crises. The late Bernard Brodie's Strategy and National Interests: Reflections for the Future gave an illuminating interpretation of the concept of national interest, and its relation to national security, by one of America's most prominent civilian strategic thinkers. Soviet Military Thinking, edited by Derek Leebaert, and Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security, edited by Valenta and Potter, offered invaluable insights into Soviet foreign policy and national security decisionmaking.

(4) Superpower Military Intervention

This portion of the bibliography basically--but not exclusively--supports Chapter II. Professor Osgood's Limited War and Limited War Revisited were crucial in understanding postwar US attitudes towards "small" wars and the role of the United States in them. Herbert Tillema's Appeal to Force, although dated, proved an excellent "broad review" work. Gregory Foster in his "On Selective Intervention" expressed the current attitudes towards a strategy of military intervention shared by members of the conservative community in the United States. Fabyanic's "Conceptual Planning and the Rapid Deployment Force" was a particularly interesting analysis of the problems encountered when attempting to plan for the rapid deployment mission. The Third World in Soviet Military Thought, by Mark Katz, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts, by Hosmer and Wolfe, and The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures, by Robert Donaldson, served as systematic guides of the evolution of Soviet military and political thought towards the Third World. Last but not least, Kaplan's Diplomacy of Power, and Force Without War, by Blechman and Kaplan, analyzed the postwar nonviolent uses of military power by the USSR and the United States respectively.

(5) Case Studies

The case studies chosen have generated an extensive historical literature. It is often said, for example, that the Vietnam war is perhaps the most documented war in

the history of the United States and this is hardly an overstatement. Material for the other five case studies, although not as overabundant, was relatively easy to locate. Certain works emerged as the principal sources of information in each case study. Korea benefited from David Rees's Korea: The Limited War; Vietnam from George Herring's The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, Colonel Summers's On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, and from The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, by Gelb and Betts; Grenada from American Intervention in Grenada, edited by Dunn and Watson, and Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy, edited by Valenta and Ellison, which included a very useful appendix of captured Grenadian government documents; Hungary from Vali's Rift and Revolt in Hungary; Czechoslovakia from the most comprehensive Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution, by H. Gordon Skilling, and Golan's Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia; and, finally, Afghanistan from Thomas Hammond's chronicle Red Flag Over Afghanistan.

(6) Papers, Reports, and Pamphlets

This section lists four categories of sources:

- First, papers and reports published by the RAND Corporation covering mainly issues of US national security, US-Soviet relations, and Soviet power projection;
- second, papers published by Defence Studies, University of Edinburgh on Soviet views of deterrence, global strategy, and ideology; and,

-- third, research papers and reports on international security and foreign affairs by various authors.

(7) The final two sections include the titles of newspapers and newsletters cited throughout the study, as well as those of annual publications.

PART II

(1) US Government Translations

This section contains translations into English of Soviet military works published by the US Air Force. USAF translations of important Russian publications on military thought, science, and strategy are perhaps best known to students who do not read Russian through the Soviet Military Thought series which has been widely distributed since the late 1970s when its first volume was published. The USAF also issues a monthly selection of translations from Soviet military service journals, but this collection is not normally available to the public and the materials therein remain protected by the original copyright. All these publications provide valuable insight into Soviet defence decisionmaking, military strategy, and tactics.

(2) Books

This section includes works in both English and Russian dealing mainly with international relations and the foreign policy of the USSR. It should be noted here that the established Soviet discipline of globalistika has caused a steady stream of works that receive only limited distribution in the West and are, therefore, relatively

unknown to the Western academic community. The Department of Defence Studies holds a significant number of such original monographs in Russian; a small number of relevant ones have been included in this section.

(3) Articles

The material in this section is essentially drawn from Social Sciences and International Affairs, Moscow, and covers a wide time span from the 1960s to the present. There are also articles appearing in the Joint Publications Research Service, an extremely useful compilation of Soviet materials in English translation which is available only through the British Library Lending Division, a fact which restricts its use rather severely.

(4) Booklets and Pamphlets

This section covers mainly pamphlets published in English by the Novosti Press Agency, Moscow and made available to the public through its London office.

(5) Newspapers

The section cites the titles of Soviet newspapers consulted and cited from translations in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press.

PART I

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